When words, timing, and conditions decide a marriage

הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה אָבִי״:

If a man tells a woman, “You are hereby consecrated to me on condition that my father agrees”:

The kiddushin depend upon the father actively expressing his approval.

רָצָה הָאָב — מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת;

if the father agrees, she is consecrated.

Once the father expresses his consent, the condition has been fulfilled and the kiddushin take effect.

לֹא רָצָה, אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁתַק, אוֹ שֶׁמֵּת קֹדֶם שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע הַדָּבָר — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

If he refuses, remains silent, or dies before hearing about the kiddushin, she is not consecrated.

In this wording, silence is not enough. The father must positively agree. If he never does so, the condition is not fulfilled.

״עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא יְמַחֶה אָבִי״:

If the man instead says, “on condition that my father does not object”:

This is a different condition. The kiddushin do not require the father’s active approval; they require only that he not protest.

שָׁמַע וּמִחָה — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת;

if the father hears about the kiddushin and objects, she is not consecrated.

His objection prevents the condition from being fulfilled.

לֹא מִחָה, אוֹ שֶׁמֵּת — הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

If he does not object, or if he dies without objecting, she is consecrated.

Here, silence is sufficient. As long as the father does not protest, the condition remains fulfilled.

מֵת הַבֵּן וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁמַע הָאָב —

If the son dies and the father only hears about the kiddushin afterward,

If the kiddushin take effect, the woman may become obligated to marry the deceased man’s brother through yibbum, or to receive chalitzah from him.

מְלַמְּדִין אֶת הָאָב שֶׁיֹּאמַר ״אֵינִי רוֹצֶה״,

we instruct the father to say, “I do not agree,”

By objecting, the father causes the condition to fail, preventing the kiddushin from taking effect.

כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא שָׁם קִדּוּשִׁין, וְלֹא תִפֹּל לִפְנֵי יָבָם.

so that the kiddushin will not take effect and the woman will not become subject to yibbum.

Since the son was never halachically married to her, she has no marital bond connecting her to his brother.

הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּזֶה עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״, אוֹ ״בֵּית כּוֹר עָפָר״:

If a man tells a woman, “You are hereby consecrated to me with this item on condition that I own two hundred zuz,” or “on condition that I own a beis kor of land”:

He is making the validity of the kiddushin depend upon whether he owns the amount of money or land that he claims to own.

אִם יֵשׁ שָׁם עֵדִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ — הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת;

if witnesses confirm that he owns it, she is definitely consecrated.

Their testimony establishes that his condition was fulfilled.

וְאִם אֵין לוֹ — הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת סָּפֵק,

If it appears that he does not own it, the status of the kiddushin remains uncertain.

We cannot confidently declare that the kiddushin failed merely because no known property can be found.

שֶׁמָּא יֵשׁ לוֹ, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר אֵין לוֹ כְּדֵי לְקַלְקְלָהּ.

Perhaps he really does own it but claims that he does not in order to place her in a difficult position.

He may be concealing his property so that she will believe that the kiddushin failed and marry someone else. He could then reveal that he did own the property, raising serious questions about the second marriage.

״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּזֶה עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״, אוֹ ״בֵּית כּוֹר עָפָר בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״:

If he tells her, “You are hereby consecrated to me with this item on condition that I own two hundred zuz,” or “a beis kor of land in a particular place”:

By naming a specific location, he makes ownership in that particular place part of the condition. Owning equivalent property somewhere else would not fulfill it.

אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ בְּאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם — מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת;

if he owns it in that place, she is consecrated.

The condition has been fulfilled exactly as stated.

וְאִם אֵין לוֹ בְּאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר — הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת מִסָּפֵק,

If no such property is known to belong to him in the place he named, the kiddushin remain doubtful.

The absence of publicly known ownership does not conclusively prove that he owns nothing there.

שֶׁמָּא יֵשׁ לוֹ שָׁם, וְהוּא מִתְכַּוֵּן לְקַלְקְלָהּ.

Perhaps he does own property there and is hiding that fact in order to place her in a difficult position.

He might later produce proof of ownership after she has acted as though she were unmarried.

״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּזֶה עַל מְנָת שֶׁאַרְאֵךְ מָאתַיִם זוּז״, אוֹ ״בֵּית כּוֹר עָפָר״ —

If a man tells a woman, “You are hereby consecrated to me with this item on condition that I show you two hundred zuz,” or “a beis kor of land”:

In context, he is not merely promising to point out that amount of money or land. He is promising to show her assets of that amount that belong to him.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת, וְיַרְאֶנָּה.

she becomes consecrated when he shows it to her.

Showing her his own money or land fulfills the condition.

הֶרְאָהּ הַזּוּזִים בְּיַד אֲחֵרִים, אוֹ שֶׁהֶרְאָהּ בֵּית כּוֹר עָפָר בִּשְׂדֵה אֲחֵרִים —

If he shows her money belonging to someone else, or a beis kor within someone else’s field,

Although he has technically shown her the stated amount, he has not fulfilled what his words naturally implied.

אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת, עַד שֶׁיַּרְאֶנָּה מִשֶּׁלּוֹ.

she is not consecrated unless he shows her property that belongs to him.

Her acceptance of the kiddushin was based upon his demonstrating that he personally possesses those assets.

לָקַח הַמָּעוֹת בְּמִלְוָה אוֹ בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת,

If he obtained the money through a loan or a partnership,

Borrowed money does not demonstrate that he owns the promised wealth. Similarly, partnership funds are not entirely his own.

אוֹ שֶׁשָּׂכַר הַשָּׂדֶה, אוֹ לְקָחָהּ בַּאֲרִיסוּת וְהֶרְאָהּ —

or if he rented the field or took it under a sharecropping arrangement and then showed it to her,

The right to use or cultivate land is not the same as owning it.

אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת, עַד שֶׁיַּרְאֶנָּה מִשֶּׁלּוֹ;

she is not consecrated unless he shows her property that is truly his,

The condition concerns ownership, not merely access or temporary control.

שֶׁמַּשְׁמַע ״שֶׁאַרְאֵךְ״ — שֶׁאַרְאֵךְ מִשֶּׁל עַצְמִי דָּבָר זֶה שֶׁאָמַרְתִּי לָךְ.

because “I will show you” means, “I will show you the property I mentioned from among my own possessions.”

That is how the woman would reasonably understand his promise in this setting.

הָיָה לוֹ בֵּית כּוֹר עָפָר,

If he owns a beis kor of land,

The field appears to contain the required area, but some sections may not be suitable for planting.

וְהָיָה בּוֹ נְקָעִים עֲמוּקִים עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים אוֹ סְלָעִים גְּבוֹהִים עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים:

and it contains depressions ten tefachim deep or rocks ten tefachim high:

Areas separated from the rest of the field by such a significant difference in height may be treated as distinct sections rather than as ordinary parts of the field.

אִם הָיוּ הַנְּקָעִים מְלֵאִים מַיִם — הֲרֵי הֵן כִּסְלָעִים,

if the depressions are filled with water, they are treated like the rocks,

Both are unusable portions of the property that cannot be planted along with the rest of the field.

וְאֵין נִמְדָּדִין עִמּוֹ, מִפְּנֵי שְׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִין לִזְרִיעָה;

and they are not included when measuring the required area, because they are unsuitable for planting.

The condition referred to a beis kor of usable agricultural land. Ground that cannot be planted does not help fulfill that requirement.

וְאִם אֵינָן מְלֵאִים מַיִם — נִמְדָּדִין עִמּוֹ,

If the depressions are not filled with water, they are included in the measurement,

Their depth alone does not exclude them if they can still be used as part of the farmland.

מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן רְאוּיִין לִזְרִיעָה.

because they are suitable for planting.

The deciding factor is whether the land can serve the agricultural purpose implied by the condition.

הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּזֶה עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין עָלַיִךְ נְדָרִים״,

If a man tells a woman, “You are hereby consecrated to me with this item on condition that you are not bound by vows,”

Unless he specifies otherwise, this condition refers to vows significant enough to interfere with ordinary married life—not necessarily every vow she has ever made.

וְנִמְצְאוּ עָלֶיהָ אֶחָד מִשְּׁלוֹשָׁה נְדָרִים אֵלּוּ:

and she is found to be bound by one of the following three types of vows:

These vows are treated as substantial restrictions that a husband would ordinarily care about.

שֶׁלֹּא תֹאכַל בָּשָׂר, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִשְׁתֶּה יַיִן,

a vow not to eat meat, not to drink wine,

Such vows impose ongoing restrictions upon foods and drinks commonly associated with enjoyment and ordinary family life.

אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִתְקַשֵּׁט בְּמִינֵי צִבְעוֹנִין — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

or not to adorn herself with colorful clothing or ornaments—she is not consecrated.

Since she is bound by a vow of the kind excluded by his condition, the condition was not fulfilled and the kiddushin do not take effect.

נִמְצָא עָלֶיהָ נֶדֶר חוּץ מֵאֵלּוּ,

If she is bound by a different type of vow,

A vow outside these recognized categories does not ordinarily fall within the meaning of his general condition.

אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״מַקְפִּיד אֲנִי אַפִלּוּ עַל זֶה״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

she is consecrated, even if he later says, “This vow also bothers me.”

He cannot redefine his original words after discovering the vow. Since he did not say that he objected to every possible vow, his unexpressed personal preference does not become part of the condition.

וְאִם אָמַר לָהּ ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין עָלַיִךְ כָּל נֶדֶר״,

If, however, he tells her, “on condition that you are not bound by any vow whatsoever,”

The words “any vow whatsoever” broaden the condition. It now includes even vows that would usually be considered minor.

אַפִלּוּ נִמְצֵאת שֶׁנָּדְרָה שֶׁלֹּא תֹאכַל חַרּוּבִין — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

then even if she had merely vowed not to eat carobs, she is not consecrated.

Although this restriction would not ordinarily disturb married life, it violates the precise condition he stated.

הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּזֶה עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין בָּךְ מוּמִין״,

If a man tells a woman, “You are hereby consecrated to me with this item on condition that you have no physical blemishes,”

The term mumin has a defined halachic meaning. It does not automatically include every physical difference or medical condition.

וְנִמְצָא בָּהּ אֶחָד מִן הַמּוּמִין הַפּוֹסְלִין בַּנָּשִׁים — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

and she is found to have one of the conditions classified by halachah as a disqualifying blemish for a woman, she is not consecrated.

The condition was not fulfilled because the physical condition falls within the recognized meaning of the term he used.

נִמְצָא בָּהּ מוּם אַחֵר חוּץ מֵאוֹתָן הַמּוּמִין,

If she has a different physical condition that is not included among those blemishes,

That condition does not violate his general stipulation, even if he personally considers it significant.

אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמַר ״מַקְפִּיד אֲנִי אַפִלּוּ עַל זֶה״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

she is consecrated, even if he later says, “This also bothers me.”

The kiddushin are judged according to the accepted meaning of his words when he made the condition—not according to an objection that he expresses afterward.

וּמַה הֵן הַמּוּמִין הַפּוֹסְלִין בַּנָּשִׁים?

Which conditions are classified as disqualifying blemishes for a woman?

The Rambam now defines the meaning of the condition so that it is not left to each person’s subjective interpretation.

כָּל הַמּוּמִין הַפּוֹסְלִין בַּכּוֹהֲנִים — פּוֹסְלִין בַּנָּשִׁים.

Every physical blemish that disqualifies a kohen from serving in the Beis HaMikdash is also included among the blemishes relevant to this condition.

The laws governing a kohen’s eligibility for the Temple service provide the initial halachic list used here.

וּבְהִלְכוֹת בִּיאַת הַמִּקְדָּשׁ יִתְבָּאֲרוּ כָּל מוּמֵי הַכּוֹהֲנִים.

All the blemishes that disqualify a kohen are explained in Hilchos Bi’as HaMikdash.

Rather than repeat the entire list here, the Rambam directs the reader to the section where those laws are discussed fully.

וְיוֹתֵר עֲלֵיהֶן בַּנָּשִׁים:

For women, the following additional conditions are also included:

These conditions are added specifically because the general stipulation was made in the context of marriage.

רֵיחַ הָרָע, וְזֵיעָה, וְרֵיחַ הַפֶּה, וְקוֹל עָבֶה,

an unpleasant body odor, excessive perspiration, unpleasant breath, or an unusually deep voice;

These are conditions that, according to the social realities addressed by the Rambam, were understood to affect the closeness and ordinary companionship of marriage.

וְדַדִּין גַּסִּין מֵחַבְרוֹתֶיהָ טֶפַח, וְטֶפַח בֵּין דַּד לְדַד,

breasts that are a tefach larger than those of other women, or a space of a tefach between them;

The Rambam provides objective measurements rather than leaving these cases to an undefined personal reaction.

וּנְשִׁיכַת כֶּלֶב וְנַעֲשָׂה הַמָּקוֹם צַלֶּקֶת,

a scar left by a dog bite,

The relevant condition is the lasting scar, not merely the fact that a bite once occurred.

וְשׁוּמָא שֶׁעַל הַפַּדַּחַת.

or a noticeable mark on her forehead.

The Rambam next defines the particular mark that is included in this additional category.

אַפִלּוּ הָיְתָה קְטַנָּה בְּיוֹתֵר, וְאַפִלּוּ קְרוֹבָה מִשְּׁעַר רֹאשָׁהּ,

This applies even if the mark is very small or located close to her hairline,

Its position on the forehead places it within this category even if it is not large or especially prominent.

וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שֵׂעָר,

and even if no hair grows from it.

For this forehead mark, hair growth is not required for it to be included.

וְזוֹ הִיא הַשׁוּמָא שֶׁיְּתֵרָה בָּאִשָּׁה עַל הַכּוֹהֲנִים.

This is the type of mark that is included for a woman beyond those that disqualify a kohen.

A small, hairless forehead mark is relevant to the marital condition discussed here, although it would not disqualify a kohen from Temple service.

אֲבָל אִם הָיְתָה שׁוּמָא שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ שֵׂעָר בִּשְׁאָר הַפָּנִים,

But if a mark elsewhere on the face has hair growing from it,

Hair growth makes the mark significant even when it is not on the forehead.

אוֹ שׁוּמָא גְּדוֹלָה כָּאִיסָר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ שֵׂעָר —

or if the mark is as large as an isar, even without hair,

Its size alone places it within the recognized category of a blemish.

הֲרֵי זֶה מוּם, בֵּין בַּכּוֹהֲנִים בֵּין בַּנָּשִׁים.

it is considered a blemish both for kohanim and for women.

Unlike the small forehead mark mentioned above, these larger or hair-bearing facial marks are already included in the general laws of blemishes that apply to kohanim.

הַמְּקַדֵּשׁ אִשָּׁה סְתָם,

If a man consecrates a woman without making any specific condition,

He did not explicitly say that the kiddushin depended upon her being free of vows or physical blemishes.

וְנִמְצָא בָּהּ אֶחָד מִן הַמּוּמִין הַפּוֹסְלִין בַּנָּשִׁים,

and she is later found to have one of the physical conditions classified as a disqualifying blemish for a woman,

Because he never stated a condition, the discovery does not automatically invalidate the kiddushin. Nevertheless, it raises the possibility that he entered the marriage under a mistaken assumption.

אוֹ נִמְצָא עָלֶיהָ אֶחָד מִשְּׁלוֹשָׁה נְדָרִים —

or she is found to be bound by one of the three significant types of vows mentioned above,

These vows may affect married life strongly enough that a person could claim he would never have agreed to the kiddushin had he known about them.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת מִסָּפֵק.

the status of the kiddushin is uncertain.

The doubt is whether the undisclosed condition is serious enough to mean that his original consent was based upon a fundamental misunderstanding.

קִדְּשָׁהּ עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים,

If he consecrated her on condition that she was not bound by vows,

Here the issue was stated explicitly: the kiddushin depend upon her having no relevant vows.

וְהָיוּ עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים, וְהָלְכָה אֵצֶל חָכָם וְהִתִּיר לָהּ —

and she did have such vows, but she went to a Torah sage who annulled them,

A sage’s annulment does more than permit her to disregard the vow from now on. Halachically, it uproots the vow from its beginning.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

she is consecrated.

Because the vow is retroactively removed, the condition that she not be bound by vows is regarded as having been fulfilled at the time of the kiddushin.

קִדְּשָׁהּ עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ מוּמִין,

If a man consecrates a woman on condition that she has no physical blemishes,

The condition describes her physical state at the time of the kiddushin.

וְהָיוּ בָּהּ מוּמִין, וְהָלְכָה אֵצֶל רוֹפֵא וְרִפָּא אוֹתָהּ — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

and she did have blemishes but later went to a physician who healed them, she is not consecrated.

Medical treatment changes her condition from the time of healing onward. It does not change the fact that the blemishes existed when the kiddushin were given, so the original condition was not fulfilled.

אֲבָל אִם הִתְנָה הָאִישׁ שֶׁאֵין עָלָיו נְדָרִים, וּשֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מוּמִין,

If, however, the man made the kiddushin conditional upon his having no vows and no physical blemishes,

In this case, the woman agreed to marry him based upon his description of his own condition.

וְהָיוּ עָלָיו נְדָרִים, וְהָיוּ בּוֹ מוּמִין,

and he was in fact bound by vows and had physical blemishes,

At the time of the kiddushin, the facts did not match the condition he had stated.

וְהָלַךְ אֵצֶל חָכָם וְהִתִּירוֹ, אֵצֶל רוֹפֵא וְרִפְּאוֹ — הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת;

but he went to a Torah sage who annulled his vows and to a physician who healed his blemishes, she is consecrated.

The vows are regarded as never having existed, while the healed blemishes no longer present the ongoing issue that the woman would ordinarily have had in mind.

שֶׁאֵין לָאִישׁ גְּנַאי בְּמוּמִין שֶׁכְּבָר נִרְפְּאוּ,

because a man is not considered diminished by physical blemishes that have already been healed,

According to the marital expectations assumed by this halachah, a woman generally does not continue to object to a man’s former condition once it has been corrected.

וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה מַקְפֶּדֶת עַל זֹאת.

and a woman is ordinarily not particular about that.

Her condition is therefore understood as seeking a husband who will not continue to have these blemishes—not necessarily one who never had them.

הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּזֶה עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֶתֵּן לָךְ מָאתַיִם זוּז מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁלוֹשִׁים יוֹם״:

If a man tells a woman, “You are hereby consecrated to me with this item on condition that I give you two hundred zuz within thirty days”:

The kiddushin are being established now, but their final validity depends upon his paying the promised amount before the deadline.

אִם נָתַן לָהּ בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלוֹשִׁים יוֹם — מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת;

if he gives her the money within thirty days, she is consecrated.

By paying within the stated period, he fulfills the condition attached to the original kiddushin.

וְאִם עָבְרוּ הַשְּׁלוֹשִׁים וְלֹא נָתַן — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

If the thirty days pass and he has not paid her, she is not consecrated.

Once the deadline passes, the condition can no longer be fulfilled. A later payment cannot activate these kiddushin.

״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּזוּזִים אֵלּוּ לְאַחַר שְׁלוֹשִׁים יוֹם״,

If he tells her, “You are hereby consecrated to me with these zuz after thirty days,”

This is not a condition requiring a future payment. He gives her the kiddushin money now but schedules the kiddushin themselves to take effect thirty days later.

אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְאַכְּלוּ הַמָּעוֹת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלוֹשִׁים יוֹם —

even if the money has already been spent or used up during those thirty days,

The woman received the money from him when the kiddushin were arranged. It does not need to remain physically present until the date on which the kiddushin take effect.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לְאַחַר הַשְּׁלוֹשִׁים.

she becomes consecrated once the thirty days have passed.

The original transfer remains capable of effecting kiddushin at the designated time even though the actual coins are no longer present.

וְאִם חָזַר בּוֹ בְּתוֹךְ הַשְּׁלוֹשִׁים, אוֹ חָזְרָה הִיא — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

But if either he or she withdraws consent during the thirty days, she is not consecrated.

Because the kiddushin have not yet taken effect, either party may still cancel the arrangement before the thirty-day period ends.

בָּא שֵׁנִי וְקִדְּשָׁהּ בְּתוֹךְ הַשְּׁלוֹשִׁים יוֹם,

If a second man comes and consecrates her during the thirty-day waiting period,

The first man said that his kiddushin would take effect only after thirty days. Until then, no marriage has yet begun, and the woman remains free to receive kiddushin from someone else.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי לְעוֹלָם —

she becomes permanently consecrated to the second man.

The second man’s kiddushin take effect immediately. They are not merely temporary and do not expire when the original thirty days end.

לְפִי שֶׁבְּשָׁעָה שֶׁקִּדְּשָׁהּ הַשֵּׁנִי לֹא הָיְתָה מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת,

This is because when the second man consecrated her, she was not yet consecrated,

Although she had accepted money from the first man, his kiddushin had been delayed. At the moment the second man acted, there was no existing marriage preventing his kiddushin from taking effect.

וְתָפְסוּ בָּהּ קִדּוּשֵׁי שֵׁנִי, וְנַעֲשָׂת אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ;

so the second man’s kiddushin take effect and she becomes a married woman.

Once his kiddushin take effect, she becomes forbidden to every other man, including the first.

וּלְאַחַר הַשְּׁלוֹשִׁים יוֹם, כְּשֶׁיָּבוֹאוּ קִדּוּשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹן,

When the thirty days pass and the first man’s kiddushin reach the time when they were supposed to take effect,

The first arrangement now attempts to create a marriage, but the woman’s halachic status has changed in the meantime.

יִמְצְאוּ אוֹתָהּ אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ,

they find that she is already married,

The second man’s completed kiddushin now prevent any new kiddushin from taking effect.

וְנִמְצָא הָרִאשׁוֹן כְּמִי שֶׁקִדֵּשׁ אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, שֶׁאֵין הַקִּדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בָּהּ.

so the first man is treated like someone who attempted to consecrate a married woman, in whom kiddushin cannot take effect.

A delayed act is judged according to the situation at the time it is meant to become effective. Since she is then married to the second man, the first kiddushin fail.

הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי מֵעַכְשָׁו לְאַחַר שְׁלוֹשִׁים יוֹם בְּדִינָר זֶה״,

If a man tells a woman, “You are hereby consecrated to me with this dinar from now and after thirty days,”

His wording points in two different directions. “From now” suggests that the kiddushin begin immediately, while “after thirty days” suggests that they begin only later.

וּבָא אַחֵר וְקִדְּשָׁהּ בְּתוֹךְ הַשְּׁלוֹשִׁים —

and another man consecrates her during those thirty days,

The second kiddushin force us to determine whether the woman was already fully married to the first man.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת מִסָּפֵק לִשְׁנֵיהֶם.

her status is uncertain, and she is treated as possibly consecrated to both men.

Perhaps the first man intended his kiddushin to begin immediately, in which case the second kiddushin could not take effect. Alternatively, perhaps the first man postponed his kiddushin until the end of the thirty days, allowing the second man’s kiddushin to take effect first.

לְפִיכָךְ שְׁנֵיהֶם נוֹתְנִין גֵּט,

Therefore, both men must give her a get,

A get from only one would leave open the possibility that she is still married to the other.

בֵּין בְּתוֹךְ הַשְּׁלוֹשִׁים יוֹם, בֵּין לְאַחַר הַשְּׁלוֹשִׁים יוֹם.

whether the divorces are given during the thirty days or afterward.

Even the first man can give a get during the waiting period. If his kiddushin ultimately take effect retroactively from the original moment, the get can release the bond created from that moment.

״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי מֵעַכְשָׁו לְאַחַר שְׁלוֹשִׁים יוֹם״,

If one man tells her, “You are hereby consecrated to me from now and after thirty days,”

His ambiguous statement creates the first possible claim of kiddushin.

וּבָא אַחֵר וְאָמַר לָהּ ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי מֵעַכְשָׁו לְאַחַר עֶשְׂרִים יוֹם״,

and another man then says, “You are hereby consecrated to me from now and after twenty days,”

The second man also uses wording that may begin something now while postponing its completion.

וּבָא אַחֵר וְאָמַר לָהּ ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי מֵעַכְשָׁו לְאַחַר עֲשָׂרָה יָמִים״,

and a third man says, “You are hereby consecrated to me from now and after ten days,”

Each man’s wording leaves room for the possibility that some aspect of his kiddushin began immediately.

אַפִלּוּ הֵן מֵאָה עַל הַסֵּדֶר הַזֶּה — קִדּוּשֵׁי כֻּלָּן תּוֹפְסִין בָּהּ;

even if one hundred men proceed in this pattern, the kiddushin of each one may have taken effect.

The uncertainty created by each earlier statement leaves enough unresolved space for the next kiddushin to become a possibility as well.

וּצְרִיכָה גֵּט מִכָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד,

and she requires a get from every one of them,

No single possibility may be ignored, because we cannot identify which kiddushin created the binding marriage.

מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לְכֻלָּן בְּסָפֵק.

because she is possibly consecrated to each of them.

Each man has created a separate halachic doubt that must be resolved before she may marry someone else.

הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי חוּץ מִפְּלוֹנִי״,

If a man tells a woman, “You are hereby consecrated to me except with regard to a particular man,”

He is attempting to create a marriage that applies against everyone except one named individual.

כְּלוֹמַר שֶׁלֹּא תֵאָסֵר עָלָיו,

meaning that she should not become forbidden to that man,

Ordinary kiddushin make a woman forbidden to every other man. Here, the man is trying to leave one exception within the marriage itself.

אֶלָא תִּהְיֶה אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ עַל כָּל הָעוֹלָם, וְלִפְלוֹנִי כִּפְנוּיָה —

so that she will be considered married with regard to everyone else but single with regard to him,

The proposed kiddushin would therefore create only a partial marital restriction.

הֲרֵי זוֹ סָפֵק מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

the status of the kiddushin is uncertain.

The unresolved question is whether kiddushin can create an incomplete marriage—one that excludes a single person from its normal effect.

אֲבָל אִם אָמַר לָהּ ״הֲרֵי אָתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּהְיִי מֻתֶּרֶת לִפְלוֹנִי״ —

But if he tells her, “You are hereby consecrated to me on condition that you remain permitted to a particular man,”

Unlike the first case, he is not trying to limit the kiddushin themselves. He is attempting to attach an external condition to otherwise complete kiddushin.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת;

she is consecrated,

The kiddushin take effect normally, while the impossible condition is disregarded.

וְתִהְיֶה אֲסוּרָה עַל אוֹתוֹ פְּלוֹנִי כִּשְׁאָר הָעָם,

and she is forbidden to that particular man just as she is forbidden to everyone else,

Once the kiddushin take effect, their normal consequence applies universally. The named man receives no exception.

מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִתְנָה בְּדָבָר שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לְקַיְּמוֹ.

because he made a condition that cannot be fulfilled.

A woman cannot be fully consecrated to one man while simultaneously remaining permitted to another. Since the condition contradicts the nature of kiddushin, it cannot control the act.

הַנּוֹתֵן שְׁתֵּי פְּרוּטוֹת לְאִשָּׁה,

If a man gives a woman two p’rutot,

Each p’rutah is intended to create a separate kiddushin at a different point in time.

וְאָמַר לָהּ ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי הַיּוֹם בְּאַחַת, וּבְאַחַת לְאַחַר שֶׁאֲגָרְשֵׁךְ״ —

and tells her, “You are hereby consecrated to me today with one, and with the other after I divorce you,”

The first p’rutah creates the present kiddushin. Since he can consecrate her now, he can also direct the second p’rutah toward a future kiddushin that will follow the end of this same marriage.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת;

she is consecrated.

The first kiddushin take effect immediately.

וּכְשֶׁיְּגָרֵשׁ אוֹתָהּ תִּהְיֶה מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת —

and when he divorces her, she becomes consecrated to him again,

The second kiddushin take effect once the divorce removes the first marriage.

עַד שֶׁיְּגָרֵשׁ אוֹתָהּ פַּעַם שְׁנִיָּה, מִן קִדּוּשֵׁי פְּרוּטָה שְׁנִיָּה.

and she remains married to him until he divorces her a second time, because of the kiddushin created by the second p’rutah.

The first get ends only the first marriage. Once the second kiddushin take effect, a second get is required to end the new marriage.

אֲבָל הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּזֶה לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶתְגַּיֵּר״,

But if a man tells a woman, “You are hereby consecrated to me with this item after I convert,”

At present, he is not Jewish and cannot establish kiddushin with a Jewish woman.

״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּתְגַּיְּרִי״,

or “after you convert,”

At present, she is not Jewish and cannot enter Jewish kiddushin.

״לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶשְׁתַּחְרֵר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּשְׁתַּחְרְרִי״,

or “after I am freed from servitude,” or “after you are freed from servitude,”

A Canaanite servant cannot establish Jewish kiddushin while still in that status. The future freedom has not yet created the legal ability to marry.

״לְאַחַר שֶׁיָּמוּת בַּעְלָךְ״,

or “after your husband dies,”

A married woman cannot receive kiddushin from another man while her present marriage continues.

״לְאַחַר שֶׁתָּמוּת אֲחוֹתֵיךְ״ —

or “after your sister dies,”

This refers to a man who is presently married to her sister. As long as his wife is alive, the Torah forbids him from marrying her sister.

אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת, מִפְּנֵי שְׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל עַתָּה לְקַדְּשָׁהּ.

she is not consecrated, because he is presently unable to consecrate her.

A future change does not activate kiddushin attempted at a time when no valid marriage between them was legally possible.

הָאוֹמֵר לִיבָמָה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּזֶה לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחְלֹץ לָךְ יְבָמִיךְ״ —

If a man tells a yevamah, “You are hereby consecrated to me with this item after your brother-in-law performs chalitzah,”

The woman is presently bound to her deceased husband’s brother. The man giving the kiddushin wants them to take effect once chalitzah releases her from that bond.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת מִסָּפֵק,

she is doubtfully consecrated.

These kiddushin cannot be treated as certainly valid, but neither can they be dismissed entirely.

הוֹאִיל וְאִלּוּ קִדְּשָׁהּ עַתָּה,

because if he were to consecrate her now,

Unlike the cases in the previous halachah, kiddushin given to a yevamah before chalitzah are not completely meaningless.

הָיוּ קִדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בָּהּ מִסָּפֵק.

his kiddushin would already take hold to a doubtful extent.

Since present kiddushin could create at least a possible bond, the attempt to arrange kiddushin for after chalitzah also receives the status of doubtful kiddushin.

הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ ״אִם יָלְדָה אִשְׁתְּךָ נְקֵבָה, הֲרֵי הִיא מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּזֶה״ —

If a man tells another man, “If your wife gives birth to a girl, she is hereby consecrated to me with this item,”

He is attempting to arrange kiddushin with a future daughter through her father before she has been born.

לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.

his statement has no effect.

Since no particular child yet exists, there is presently no person to whom the kiddushin can attach. The possibility that a daughter may be born in the future is not enough.

וְאִם הָיְתָה אֵשֶׁת חֲבֵרוֹ מְעֻבֶּרֶת, וְהֻכַּר הָעֻבָּר —

But if the other man’s wife was already pregnant and the pregnancy was clearly recognizable,

The situation is no longer a vague possibility of a future child. A developing fetus is already present and its existence is apparent.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

the daughter is treated as consecrated.

If the child is born female, the existing pregnancy gives the original kiddushin enough significance to be taken seriously.

וְיֵרָאֶה לִי,

Nevertheless, it appears to me,

The Rambam now adds his own conclusion about how the couple should proceed in practice.

שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לַחֲזֹר וּלְקַדֵּשׁ אוֹתָהּ מֵאָבִיהָ אַחַר שֶׁתִּוָּלֵד,

that after she is born, he should perform kiddushin with her again through her father,

The new kiddushin should be performed when she unquestionably exists as a person capable of receiving kiddushin through her father.

כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּכְנִיס אוֹתָהּ בְּקִדּוּשִׁין שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן דֹּפִי.

so that their kiddushin will be completely unquestionable.

Even though the original kiddushin must be treated seriously, the second kiddushin remove any uncertainty surrounding the marriage.

הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּמֵאָה דִינָר״,

If a man tells a woman, “You are hereby consecrated to me with one hundred dinarim,”

He promises her a total amount without identifying a particular set of one hundred coins.

וְנָתַן לָהּ אַפִלּוּ דִינָר אֶחָד —

and gives her even one dinar,

The first coin begins the transaction because it is part of the amount he promised.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת מִשֶּׁלָּקְחָה הַדִּינָר,

she is consecrated from the moment she accepts that dinar,

The kiddushin do not wait until she receives all one hundred coins. They begin with the first dinar, subject to his obligation to complete the payment.

וְהוּא יַשְׁלִים לָהּ אֶת הַשְּׁאָר.

and he must give her the remainder.

The unpaid balance is still owed to her and must be provided as promised.

שֶׁזֶּה כְּמִי שֶׁאָמַר לָהּ ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּדִינָר זֶה עַל מְנָת שֶׁאַשְׁלִים לָךְ מֵאָה דִינָר״ —

This is understood as though he had said, “You are hereby consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that I complete the full payment of one hundred dinarim,”

His wording implies that the first dinar effects the kiddushin now, while the remaining amount is an obligation that he must fulfill.

שֶׁהִיא מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לוֹ מֵעַכְשָׁו.

so she is consecrated to him immediately.

Because the promise is treated as a condition attached to the first dinar, the marriage begins when she receives that dinar.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים?

When does this rule apply?

The Rambam now limits it to a case in which the man promised an amount without pointing to specific coins.

בְּשֶׁאָמַר לָהּ ״בְּמֵאָה דִינָר״ סְתָם.

When he simply said, “with one hundred dinarim,” without specifying particular coins.

Since no particular group of coins was designated, the woman may understand the first coin as creating kiddushin together with a commitment to provide the rest.

אֲבָל אִם פֵּרַשׁ וְאָמַר לָהּ ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּמֵאָה דִינָר אֵלּוּ״,

But if he specifically tells her, “You are hereby consecrated to me with these one hundred dinarim,”

The word “these” identifies the complete group of coins as the consideration for the kiddushin. She is agreeing to receive this entire set—not merely one coin and a promise for the rest.

וְהִתְחִיל לִמְנוֹת לְתוֹךְ יָדָהּ —

and begins counting the coins into her hand,

The payment is now being delivered as one defined unit, even though the coins are handed over individually.

אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת עַד שֶׁיַּשְׁלִים.

she is not consecrated until he gives her the full amount.

Until all one hundred specified coins are delivered, the act she agreed to has not been completed.

וְאַפִלּוּ בְּדִינָר הָאַחֲרוֹן, שְׁנֵיהֶם יְכוֹלִים לַחֲזֹר זֶה בְּזֶה.

Until the final dinar is given, either of them may still withdraw.

Even if ninety-nine coins have already been transferred, the kiddushin have not yet taken effect. Either party can therefore cancel the arrangement before the last coin is delivered.

וְכֵן אִם נִמְצָא מָנֶה חָסֵר דִינָר,

Similarly, if the amount is found to be one dinar short,

Since he specified “these one hundred dinarim,” delivering only ninety-nine does not complete the agreed transaction.

אוֹ נִמְצָא מֵהֶן דִינָר נְחֹשֶׁת — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

or one of the coins turns out to be made of copper, she is not consecrated.

A copper coin cannot count as one of the promised dinarim. The specific set he offered therefore lacks the full amount to which she agreed.

נִמְצָא בָּהֶם דִינָר רָע:

If one of the coins is of inferior quality:

The coin is genuine, but its poor condition may make it difficult or impossible to use.

אִם יְכוֹלָה לְהוֹצִיאוֹ עַל יְדֵי הַדֹּחַק — יַחְלִיפֶנּוּ;

if she can spend it with some difficulty, he must exchange it for a proper coin.

Because the coin still has some usable monetary value, the defect can be corrected by replacing it.

וְאִם לָאו — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

But if the coin cannot be used at all, she is not consecrated.

An unusable coin leaves the specified payment incomplete, just as though one coin were missing.

אָמַר לָהּ ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בִּבְגָדִים אֵלּוּ שֶׁהֵן שָׁוִין חֲמִשִּׁים דִינָר״,

If a man tells a woman, “You are hereby consecrated to me with these clothes, which are worth fifty dinarim,”

The stated value is part of the proposal. She accepts the clothing based upon his claim that it is worth fifty dinarim.

וְהָיוּ שֶׁל מֶשִׁי וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה מִתְאַוָּה לָהֶן:

and the clothes are made of silk or another desirable material that a woman would ordinarily want:

Because the clothing is attractive and familiar enough to be valued approximately, she can confidently accept it without waiting for a formal appraisal.

אִם הָיוּ שָׁוִין חֲמִשִּׁים — הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת מִשְׁעַת לְקִיחָה,

if they are actually worth fifty dinarim, she is consecrated from the moment she accepts them.

Their true value fulfills his statement. The later discovery or confirmation of that value does not delay when the kiddushin began.

וְאֵינָן צְרִיכִין שׁוּמָא בַּשּׁוּק, וְאַחַר כָּךְ תִּהְיֶה מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת,

They do not first require a professional market appraisal before the kiddushin can take effect,

The appraisal would merely confirm an existing fact; it would not create the item’s value.

כְּדֵי שֶׁתִּסְמֹךְ דַּעְתָּהּ;

in order for her to feel confident about their value.

Since this type of clothing is desirable and its value can be reasonably estimated, she can make a settled decision to accept the kiddushin immediately.

אֶלָא הוֹאִיל וְהֵן שָׁוִין כְּשֶׁאָמַר לָהּ —

Rather, since the clothes are in fact worth the amount he stated,

The objective truth of his statement combines with her willingness to accept these desirable items.

הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת מִשָּׁעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה.

she is consecrated from the original moment when she received them.

A later appraisal may prove the value, but the kiddushin are considered to have taken effect at the time of the transfer.

וְאִם אֵינָן שָׁוִין — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

If the clothes are not worth fifty dinarim, she is not consecrated.

She accepted them based on a specific claim about their value. If that claim is false, the terms of her acceptance were not fulfilled.

אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָיוּ עֲסֻקִין בְּדִבְרֵי אֵרוּסִין,

If a man and woman were discussing the terms of their kiddushin,

They both wanted to marry but had not yet agreed upon the amount the man would give for the kiddushin.

הוּא אוֹמֵר ״בְּמֵאָה דִינָר אֲקַדֵּשׁ אוֹתָךְ״,

and he said, “I will consecrate you with one hundred dinarim,”

This was the amount he was willing to offer.

וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת ״אֵינִי מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת לְךָ אֶלָא בְּמָאתַיִם זוּז״,

while she said, “I will accept kiddushin from you only for two hundred zuz,”

She rejected his lower offer and stated the amount she required.

וְהָלַךְ זֶה לְבֵיתוֹ, וְהָלְכָה זוֹ לְבֵיתָהּ,

and they each returned home,

Their discussion ended without an agreement. Neither one had accepted the other’s terms.

וְאַחַר כָּךְ תָּבְעוּ זֶה אֶת זֶה, וְקִדְּשׁוּ סְתָם:

and afterward one of them approached the other to resume the match, and they performed kiddushin without restating an amount:

Since the final kiddushin did not specify which earlier proposal they were using, their conduct must reveal whose terms were accepted.

אִם הָאִישׁ תָּבַע אֶת הָאִשָּׁה — יֵעָשׂוּ דִּבְרֵי הָאִשָּׁה;

if the man approached the woman, her original terms are accepted.

By returning to her after she had rejected his offer, he indicates that he is now willing to proceed according to the amount she demanded.

וְאִם הָאִשָּׁה תָּבְעָה אֶת הָאִישׁ — יֵעָשׂוּ דִּבְרֵי הָאִישׁ.

If the woman approached the man, his original terms are accepted.

By returning to him after refusing his offer, she indicates that she is now prepared to accept the amount he proposed.

הָעוֹשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַדֵּשׁ לוֹ אִשָּׁה,

If a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman on his behalf,

The agent has authority to perform the kiddushin only within the instructions given by the man who appointed him.

וְהָלַךְ הַשָּׁלִיחַ וְקִדְּשָׁהּ עַל תְּנַאי —

and the agent goes and consecrates her subject to a condition,

The man instructed him to perform ordinary, unconditional kiddushin. By adding a condition, the agent creates a different arrangement from the one he was authorized to make.

אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

she is not consecrated.

The agent’s authority does not extend to the kiddushin he performed, so his act cannot bind the man who appointed him.

וְכֵן אִם אָמַר לוֹ לְקַדְּשָׁהּ עַל תְּנַאי,

Similarly, if the man instructed the agent to consecrate her subject to a particular condition,

The condition forms part of the agent’s assignment and must be stated as instructed.

וְהָלַךְ וְקִדְּשָׁהּ סְתָם,

but the agent consecrated her without any condition,

Unconditional kiddushin are more extensive than those the man authorized. The agent cannot remove the protection or limitation that the man placed upon the kiddushin.

אוֹ עַל תְּנַאי אַחֵר,

or the agent used a different condition,

Even if the new condition appears reasonable, it is not the arrangement the man authorized.

אוֹ שֶׁשִּׁנָּה אֶת הַתְּנַאי —

or he altered the original condition,

Changing its wording or requirements may change when—or whether—the kiddushin take effect.

אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

she is not consecrated.

In each case, the agent exceeded or departed from his authority. The resulting kiddushin therefore do not bind the man who sent him.

אָמַר לוֹ ״קַדְּשָׁהּ לִי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״,

If a man tells his agent, “Consecrate her for me in a particular place,”

The wording makes the location part of the agent’s instructions. His authority is limited to performing the kiddushin there.

וְהָלַךְ וְקִדְּשָׁהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר — אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת.

and the agent goes and consecrates her somewhere else, she is not consecrated.