Children, marriage, and mutual responsibility

The obligation of onah requires a husband to maintain marital intimacy with his wife at the intervals applicable to him. Since this is her right, she may voluntarily waive it. Her permission, however, does not remove an independent obligation that rests upon him.

Here, “children” means children through whom he has fulfilled the commandment’s requirements. Halachos 4–5 define those requirements.

His wife can waive what he owes her, but she cannot release him from his obligation to fulfill the commandment of periyah veriviyah—being fruitful and multiplying. Until he fulfills that commandment, her waiver does not permit him to discontinue the required marital relations.

This distinction concerns who bears the commandment, not whether a woman’s participation has religious value. Rabbenu Nissim explains that she shares in the reward because she actively participates in its fulfillment.

Seventeen completed years marks the beginning of his eighteenth year. This explains how the main reading here corresponds to the teaching in Avot associating marriage with eighteen. The Hebrew also preserves a parenthetical alternative reading; the English translation follows the main text.

The age of twenty is not when the obligation first begins. It marks the point at which continued delay, without the justification described below, constitutes neglect of the commandment.

The permission addresses someone already absorbed in Torah study who is concerned that the responsibility of supporting a household will prevent him from continuing. It is permission to delay marriage under these circumstances. The exceptional case of remaining unmarried throughout life is addressed separately in the next halachah.

This principle explains the permission in the particular circumstances just described. The next halachah adds a necessary qualification: delaying marriage is not permitted when a person’s sexual inclination overcomes him.

Ben Azzai represents an exceptional degree of lifelong devotion to Torah. This ruling goes beyond the temporary postponement permitted in the preceding halachah. Nevertheless, the Turei Zahav (Even HaEzer 1:6) explains that the words “bears no sin” do not present remaining unmarried as the preferred course to choose at the outset.

This qualification also limits the permission to delay marriage in Halachah 2. Devotion to Torah does not justify remaining unmarried when doing so exposes the person to the concern described next.

The obligation here is not dependent on whether he still needs to fulfill the commandment to have children. Marriage is required because of the danger posed by his inclination, even when he has already fulfilled that commandment.

Having only sons or only daughters does not fulfill the requirement, regardless of their number. The commandment requires both a male and a female child.

The significance here is that the commandment requires more than having a male and a female child: the children described must themselves be capable of continuing the family line.

The death of his children does not necessarily undo his fulfillment of the commandment. Their descendants can take their place, provided the family includes the combination described below.

Two requirements must be met: the grandchildren must include a grandson and a granddaughter, and they must represent both branches of the family—one through his son and the other through his daughter.

The grandchild does not have to be the same sex as the child whose place that grandchild takes. A daughter’s son and a son’s daughter satisfy both requirements: there is a male and a female grandchild, and both the son’s and the daughter’s family lines continue.

The surviving grandson and granddaughter both descend from the same child—either his son or his daughter. They therefore continue only one family branch. Their being male and female does not allow them to take the place of both a son and a daughter.

Although the children were born before his conversion, they can count toward his fulfillment of the commandment afterward. The ruling here requires both the father and his children to convert, and the children must satisfy the requirements established in the preceding halachos.

Tosafot maintains that the father fulfills the commandment even if his children do not convert. The Beit Shmuel (1:12) discusses this difference of opinion.

Here, eved refers to a slave in the halachic category commonly called an eved Kena’ani, rather than a Jewish servant. The distinction concerns legal parentage: children fathered during this status are not attributed to him through a legally recognized paternal line. Their later emancipation does not establish that connection retroactively.

For this commandment, the children he fathered before conversion can count toward its fulfillment when both he and they convert. By contrast, children fathered while he was a slave do not count toward his fulfillment after emancipation, because the paternal lineage required for this ruling is not legally established during slavery.

This passage states the requirements of the Torah commandment. Even after fulfilling it, a man remains subject to the additional Rabbinic obligation to continue having children, as explained in Halachah 16. The Dig Deeper below addresses how that obligation qualifies the permission stated here.

The common factor is that the proposed marriage does not presently provide a means of fulfilling his outstanding obligation to have children. The reference to another wife reflects the legal framework discussed by the Rambam. It must be read together with the established Ashkenazic restriction against having more than one wife.

A ketubah establishes financial obligations owed to the wife, including payment upon divorce. Ending the marriage under this ruling does not, by itself, deprive her of that payment. The next halachah addresses circumstances that affect her entitlement.

The Rivash, cited by the Rema (Even HaEzer 154:10), explains that a couple who had a child together are not compelled to divorce merely because another ten years pass without additional children. Thus, the ten-year rule here should not be read as applying automatically to every ten-year gap between births.

This enforcement concerns a man who does not pursue either course stated above: divorcing her or marrying another woman capable of bearing children.

This describes enforcement by the court within the legal framework of the ruling, not action by private individuals. The Rema (Even HaEzer 1:3) records that in his time it was no longer customary to compel a husband to divorce on this ground.

The husband may wish to avoid paying the ketubah immediately, or the wife may wish to retain his financial support. But an arrangement that merely prevents them from being alone together does not address his unfulfilled obligation to have children. Their agreement therefore does not remove the requirement stated here.

The expression describes forceful ejaculation, which the Talmudic discussion cited here treats as relevant to the ability to father children. The ruling uses this characteristic to determine the legal presumption governing ketubah payment.

This is a legal presumption rather than a statement that the cause has been established with certainty. Under the Rambam’s ruling, this presumption applies unless she definitely asserts that he does not ejaculate in the manner described. Halachah 9 explains why her definite claim is accepted and why an uncertain statement does not have the same effect.

The comparison establishes the distinction between the two payments. Even an aylonit whose condition was unknown to her husband retains the additional amount, as discussed in Chapter 23, Halachos 2–3. The woman here is therefore not deprived of that amount merely because the cause of childlessness is presumed to lie with her.

Here, the presumption provides no basis for withholding her basic payment. She therefore receives both components.

Her definite claim changes the financial outcome described in the preceding halachah. The reason her account is accepted appears at the end of this halachah: she can perceive the relevant characteristic, whereas he cannot.

The ban, called a cherem, is directed conditionally against someone making an assertion without certain knowledge. It does not mean that the court has found her dishonest, and it is not an oath that the Rambam requires her to take here. After this measure, her definite claim remains the basis for payment.

Her uncertainty does not remove her entitlement to the additional sum established in Halachah 8. It prevents her from collecting the basic amount on the strength of a definite claim against her husband.

The husband presently possesses the money. Since the right to collect the basic payment is disputed, her uncertainty is insufficient to require him to surrender it. The special acceptance of her account applies when she makes a definite claim.

The ruling rests on the difference in their ability to know the relevant fact. Her definite account concerns something she can perceive directly; his contrary assertion does not rest on the same kind of knowledge.

Here, the wife initiates the demand to end the marriage so that she can have children. This differs from a dispute about her payment when the marriage is being ended under the preceding rulings.

Her claim is based on her own need for children, rather than an obligation to fulfill periyah veriviyah. The Talmud describes this need in terms of support during old age and care for her burial.

In this case, she seeks the divorce so that she can have children through another marriage. She receives the basic ketubah, but the husband’s additional undertaking is not treated as having been made on condition that she could require this divorce and collect that additional amount. Thus, her entitlement differs from Halachah 8, where the husband divorces her under the ruling described there.

The count is the ten-year period discussed above, after which a childless marriage requires further action. Time excluded under this ruling does not use up part of those ten years. Once the interruption ends, the count resumes; it does not begin again from zero.

Rabbenu Asher understands the exclusion to apply even when illness or imprisonment did not prevent marital relations, and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 154:11) follows his interpretation. This broader application should not automatically be attributed to the Rambam, whose Commentary to the Mishnah appears to understand the exclusion differently.

A miscarriage begins a new ten-year period. Unlike the interruptions in the preceding halachah, it does not merely pause the existing count. The time before the miscarriage is not carried forward into the new period.

Once this pattern is established, another miscarriage does not simply grant the couple another ten years. Rabbenu Asher explains that the ruling applies even when the three miscarriages occur within a shorter period.

The wording concerns the prospect of this couple having children together. She is permitted to marry another man, as recorded in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 154:12).

His claim would restart the ten-year count from the alleged miscarriage, allowing the marriage to continue. Her denial means that no such event interrupted the original count.

By denying the miscarriage, she accepts the unfavorable impression created by ten years without a birth. The ruling treats her willingness to make that admission as a reason to believe her, since she would not ordinarily portray herself as infertile falsely.

The Beit Shmuel (Even HaEzer 154:29) limits this ruling to a case in which there is no suspicion that she wants to marry another man. The setting is one in which the court is already addressing the childless marriage and she responds to her husband’s claim; she is not using this allegation to initiate a demand for divorce.

The difference between two miscarriages and three changes the ruling. Two do not establish the pattern described in Halachah 12; three do. His account would therefore allow the marriage to continue, while hers requires it to end.

Here too, her statement gives her an unfavorable reputation concerning future childbearing. That supports accepting her account, subject to the same qualification that the court does not suspect another motive. In both disputes, the accepted account leads to divorce with ketubah payment.

Accepting her account does not remove its financial consequence for him. Since he disputes the fact upon which the present payment depends, the Rambam allows him to require this oath.

One childless marriage does not establish that she cannot have children with someone else. The Talmud allows for the possibility that the first husband did not merit to have children through her, rather than treating the outcome of that marriage as conclusive about every future marriage.

For this ruling, two marriages that each lasted ten years without a birth establish the relevant presumption. This differs from the three miscarriages required in Halachah 12. The number of occurrences needed to establish a chazakah depends on the particular ruling; it is not invariably three.

The restriction concerns a prospective husband who still needs to fulfill the commandment through this marriage. The exceptions at the end of the halachah define its limits.

The loss of payment applies when the third husband married her without knowing her established history. If he knew of it when he married her, the same forfeiture does not follow. The distinction is addressed further in Chapter 24, Halachos 1–2.

“Another wife” here means a wife through whom he can fulfill the commandment, as explained in Halachah 7. These exceptions remove the obstacle arising from his outstanding Torah obligation. They must still be read together with the continuing Rabbinic obligation discussed in Halachah 16 and the restriction on multiple wives noted above.

This case concerns a claim brought before the ten-year period has elapsed. She maintains that continuing the marriage will not enable her to have children. The court does not immediately grant a compelled divorce on that assertion, but it also does not simply dismiss her concern.

A pesharah is a negotiated settlement. Here, the judges try to bring the spouses to an agreement through persuasion and concessions, rather than immediately resolving the matter by compelling one side to accept the other’s position.

The court initially encourages her to allow the period established for a childless marriage to run its course. If ten years pass without a birth, she can bring the demand discussed in Halachah 10, subject to its conditions.

The judges remain engaged in trying to resolve the dispute. Their advice to wait is part of that effort; it is not a command that she must remain regardless of her claim.

A moredet is a wife subject to the laws concerning refusal of marital relations, discussed in Chapter 14. Here, the court does not impose that status and its associated consequences merely because she refuses to continue living with him while raising this claim.

This does not itself end the marriage or permit her to remarry. A get is still required. The ruling concerns how the court treats her refusal to remain with him while it works toward a settlement.

The court therefore takes neither immediate step: it does not compel a divorce solely on this claim, and it does not compel her to remain or penalize her as a moredet. It continues working toward an agreed resolution.

Fulfilling the Torah’s requirement does not end every obligation concerning children. The continuing obligation stated here is Rabbinic, and it applies according to his physical capacity.

The Chidah explains that this obligation does not demand the same persistence as the unfulfilled Torah commandment. Continuing to endeavor to have children from time to time can satisfy this additional requirement. This distinction also explains the permission discussed in Halachah 1.

The value of bringing another child into the world remains even after the minimum number required by the Torah has been reached. The continuing obligation reflects that value.

This requirement has a purpose distinct from having children. Even when the obligation to continue having children does not determine whom he can marry, married life provides protection against improper sexual thoughts. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 1:8) addresses this distinction when a man cannot support a marriage that would further enlarge his family.

This guidance addresses avoiding suspicion of improper conduct. In Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 21:26, the Rambam expressly permits a woman to remain unmarried. Accordingly, the statement here should not be read as an absolute obligation for every woman to marry, nor does it impose upon her the commandment of periyah veriviyah.

The warning described here is directed toward preserving the purity of the marriage. The Talmud records a dispute concerning this statement, and the Rambam follows Rabbi Akiva’s position.

The obligation to protect the marriage does not justify unrestrained suspicion or repeated accusations. The warning must remain measured and directed toward preventing improper conduct.

Her agreement is necessary. The additional requirement of conversation and happiness describes the atmosphere in which intimacy should take place: mutual willingness and affectionate communication, rather than coercion or conflict.

The wording cautions against excess and a loss of restraint. It should be read together with the preceding halachah’s requirement that marital intimacy take place with conversation and happiness.

The distinction concerns how desire is expressed. The Talmud describes a woman conveying her desire through her manner rather than making an explicit verbal demand. The passage does not require an absence of desire or affection.

The conduct specifically rejected here is withholding otherwise permitted intimacy to cause distress and obtain greater affection. “Whenever he desires” operates within the laws governing marital relations; it does not override their prohibitions. It must also be read together with Halachah 17: relations require her consent, and her husband may not compel her.

The concern is familiarity that could provoke suspicion about marital faithfulness. Appropriate boundaries are needed even with people who regularly belong to the family’s immediate surroundings.

The expression includes compromising circumstances that suggest wrongdoing even when there is no clear evidence of adultery. Chapter 24 discusses such circumstances in greater detail. The instruction here is to avoid both wrongdoing and situations that reasonably appear improper.

Honor is expressed through the dignity and consideration he shows her. Clothing and adornments are examples of the material provision through which he gives her greater honor than himself. Loving her as himself means making her welfare a personal concern.

The standard rises with his resources. When he can afford more, his provision for her should reflect that ability.

The respect expected within marriage does not justify intimidation. The instruction that follows identifies the manner in which he should address her.

These instructions describe the manner of his dealings with her: gentle speech and a calm, welcoming attitude, rather than anger or gloom.

Here, “very great honor” expresses the degree of respect expected of her. The accompanying awe must be read together with the preceding halachah’s prohibition against a husband imposing excessive fear and its requirement that he speak gently.

The comparison describes the deference she should show him within the marriage. It appears alongside the obligations already placed upon him to honor her, care for her welfare, and refrain from intimidation.

The instruction calls for attentiveness to his preferences in their shared life: taking seriously what pleases him and avoiding conduct that he finds objectionable.

The conclusion names both women and men. It gathers together the conduct required of each spouse throughout these closing halachos, including faithfulness, modesty, consent, honor, love, and gentle speech.