This chapter explains the marriage restrictions of a and a , including when several prohibitions apply together. It also distinguishes earlier from later marriage, and legally significant reports from suspicion. These laws are presented for study, not for deciding an individual’s personal status.
פרק יז21 halachosThursday, November 5, 2026כ״ה במרחשון תשפ״ז◷ Estimated study time: 55–70 min
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and are precise categories, not general descriptions of a woman’s character. The defines in Chapter 18 and in Chapter 19. These are -level marriage restrictions.
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For a , four categories are forbidden—
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these three, and a widow.
This applies equally to a anointed with the anointing oil
,
or invested through the additional garments,
When the anointing oil was available, it was used to install the . After the oil was hidden away in the First Temple period, he assumed the office by wearing its eight garments. Either form of installation carries the marriage restrictions stated here.
and equally to the currently serving in that office
,
or a who was appointed and subsequently ceased to serve,
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and also to the anointed for war—
The anointed for war addresses the people before battle, as described in 7:1. He is not the for the Temple service, but his anointing brings him within the marriage laws stated here.
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all are commanded to marry a virgin
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and are forbidden to marry a widow.
These are two distinct obligations: a positive commandment concerning marriage to a virgin, and a prohibition against marrying a widow. Leaving active service does not remove these restrictions.
Synopsis
Every is subject to the restrictions concerning a divorced woman, a , and a . The specified higher priestly offices also carry the commandment to marry a virgin and the prohibition against a widow.
When the Three Priesthood Prohibitions Carry Lashes
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Any who married a woman from these three categories,
,
whether a or an ordinary ,
-.
and had relations with her receives lashes.
For this ruling, together with relations is sufficient; completion of the later stage of marriage, , is not required. The ’s wording “married” must not be read as limiting liability to a fully completed marriage.
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If he had relations with her outside marriage,
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he does not receive lashes under the prohibitions of a , a divorced woman, or a ,
״״(,)-
for it says, “They shall not take” (Leviticus 21:7)—
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until he takes her in marriage and has relations.
According to the , these particular priestly prohibitions require both and relations for the stated lashes. This is not permission for relations outside marriage: he assigns lashes under a separate prohibition in 1:4. The disputes the requirement of for the priestly prohibition; his position must not be confused with the ’s ruling here.
Synopsis
According to the , lashes for these three priestly marriage prohibitions require both and relations. The absence of that liability does not make relations outside marriage permitted.
🔎Dig DeeperWhen the Three Priesthood Prohibitions Carry Lashes
When the Three Priesthood Prohibitions Carry Lashes
Does the additional prohibition require ?
The Ra’avad challenges the ’s distinction between a with a divorced woman and a with a widow. He points to the derivation linking the ordinary to the concerning disqualification of offspring, and argues that their prohibitions should not be separated in the way the Rambam separates them.
He also reads the Talmud’s discussion of the ’s two liabilities differently: the example does not, in his view, establish that only the can be liable for relations without . This is a substantive disagreement about the basis of liability, not merely a different translation of “take.” The main presentation above follows the Rambam.
he receives one set of lashes, even without having her,
״״(,)-
because of “He shall not profane” (Leviticus 21:15)—
,.
once he has relations with her, he profanes her and disqualifies her for the priesthood.
The widow was previously eligible to marry an ordinary . The ’s relations with her give her the disqualification of a , so that she may no longer marry any . This change occurs even without . The prohibition against causing that disqualification therefore supplies an independent basis for lashes.
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A , a , and a divorced woman, however,
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already stand disqualified before he has relations with them.
All three were already forbidden to . The contrast here concerns their prior eligibility for priestly marriage; it does not mean that all three categories were already technically called .
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Therefore, a receives lashes for relations with a widow,
;
even when there were no ,
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because he has profaned her,
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and he is forbidden to profane those of valid status—
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neither a woman nor his offspring.
Although the verse speaks explicitly of his offspring, its prohibition is understood to include the woman’s disqualification as well. That is why the widow’s case differs from the three categories already forbidden to every .
Synopsis
A ’s relations with a widow create a new priestly disqualification. He therefore receives lashes for that act even without , unlike the liability described for the three already-disqualified categories.
one for “A widow…he shall not take” (Leviticus 21:14),
״״(,).
and one for “He shall not profane” (Leviticus 21:15).
Both bases of liability are now present: followed by relations violates the marriage prohibition, and the relations themselves create her priestly disqualification.
Whether a or an ordinary
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married a woman from the four categories but did not have relations,
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he does not receive lashes.
This concluding rule concerns the restrictions applicable to each . A widow is forbidden to a , not to an ordinary . For a prohibited marriage covered here, marriage without relations does not carry these lashes; the absence of lashes is not permission to enter that prohibited marriage.
Synopsis
A who consecrates a widow and has relations with her incurs two sets of lashes. Without relations, the marriages discussed here do not carry the stated lashes.
wherever he does not receive lashes, she does not receive lashes.
The priestly relationship prohibitions bind the woman as well as the man. The distinctions just stated therefore determine her liability too.
This assumes that each participant independently meets the conditions for punishment. As 1:8–9 explains, inadvertent wrongdoing does not carry these lashes, and a woman who was coerced is exempt. His guilt does not make her guilty.
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For punishments do not distinguish between a woman and a man,
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except in the case of a alone, as we explained.
The exceptional case is the designated maidservant discussed in Chapter 3, Halachah 14. It has its own differing rules for the man and woman; it does not change the shared liability for the priestly prohibitions here.
Synopsis
For the priestly prohibitions discussed here, the woman’s liability for lashes follows the same distinctions as the man’s. The designated-maidservant case is a separately defined exception.
receives lashes for the prohibition concerning a .
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For cannot take effect with her,
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and he is forbidden to have relations with a ,
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whether she is Jewish or non-Jewish.
Halachah 2 requires marriage together with relations for the lashes described there. That condition concerns a woman with whom can take effect. A non-Jewish woman cannot become through , so the ’s liability here does not depend on marriage. is a defined category, discussed in Chapter 18, Halachah 1; its ordinary English associations are not its legal definition.
Synopsis
A who has relations with a non-Jewish woman incurs the stated lashes even without marriage, because cannot take effect with her.
and he is given disciplinary lashes under their law.
releases a childless widow from her bond to her deceased husband’s brother, just as a releases a married woman from marriage. This resemblance underlies the Rabbinic restriction. The disciplinary lashes here are not the lashes imposed for a definite prohibition.
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If a married a woman whose status as a is doubtful,
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they are not required to end their marriage,
;
and both she and her child remain of valid status,
because the decree did not extend to a doubtful ,
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but only to a definite .
For example, a ceremony took place, but it is uncertain whether the man was actually her deceased husband’s brother. Once they are married, this doubt about a Rabbinic restriction does not require divorce; she is not treated as a , nor is her child treated as a chalal or . This is not permission to enter such a marriage initially, and a definite must be divorced.
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If a woman is doubtfully divorced,
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or doubtfully a or a ,
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he is given disciplinary lashes,
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and must divorce her with a .
Here the uncertainty concerns a prohibition, so it is treated more strictly. For example, a woman received a of doubtful validity and her former husband subsequently died: she is no longer another man’s wife, but her status as a divorcee remains uncertain. The ’s can take effect even if the priestly marriage prohibition applies, so a is needed to end the marriage.
Synopsis
A definite is forbidden to a by Rabbinic law. A marriage already entered with a doubtful may remain intact, unlike a marriage involving doubt about the listed prohibitions.
Visual guide, Doubt, and Priestly Marriage
Which doubt is involved?
The distinction is the underlying prohibition, not simply whether someone is uncertain.
Status in this
Basis
Marriage already entered
Definite
BasisRabbinic restriction
Marriage already enteredMust end.
Doubtful
BasisDoubt about this Rabbinic restriction
Marriage already enteredNeed not end; no chalal status created.
Doubtful divorcee, , or
BasisDoubt about a restriction
Marriage already enteredMust end with a .
Permission to leave an existing marriage intact does not authorize entering it initially. These are the cases in Halachah 7.
one prohibition does not take effect over an existing prohibition,
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unless the two prohibitions take effect simultaneously,
or the other prohibition adds
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further restrictions beyond the existing prohibition,
or it encompasses other things
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together with this prohibited thing.
The question is whether a second prohibition creates an additional liability, not whether the first prohibition disappears. There are three exceptions: both begin together; the new prohibition adds a restriction to what was already forbidden; or it covers other things as well as the thing already forbidden. The next two apply the second exception to priestly marriage. An example of the third is a animal: the prohibition on its entire body can include its already-forbidden sciatic nerve as well.
Synopsis
A second prohibition generally does not take effect over an existing one. It can do so when both begin together, when the new prohibition adds restrictions, or when it encompasses other things as well.
he receives four sets of lashes for one act of relations.
The order matters. She was widowed, a later husband divorced her, she then acquired status through prohibited relations with a , and afterward acquired status through relations that confer that status. Each new stage adds a prohibition in the manner explained below; these are legal categories, not interchangeable descriptions.
The four-count case still assumes followed by relations, as required by 17:2 for the divorcee, , and prohibitions. This passage counts the prohibitions that can coexist; it does not cancel their earlier conditions.
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For a widow is forbidden to a ,
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but permitted to an ordinary .
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When she subsequently becomes divorced, a prohibition is added:
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she becomes forbidden to an ordinary .
Therefore, another prohibition takes effect for her
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in addition to the prohibition concerning a widow,
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while she is still permitted to eat .
Divorce expands the restriction from the to ordinary too. That added scope allows the divorce prohibition to take effect for the as well. Permission to eat here presumes an independent basis for that permission; widowhood or divorce alone does not grant it.
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When she becomes a , a prohibition is added,
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because she becomes forbidden to eat ,
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while she is still permitted to an Israelite.
status adds a restriction on , allowing this further prohibition to take effect. The permission to an Israelite means that status by itself does not prohibit marriage to a non-.
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When she becomes a , since there is a form of illicit relations
that forbids a woman to an Israelite,
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when his wife willingly commits adultery,
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another prohibition takes effect for her.
The points to adultery, which can forbid a woman even to her Israelite husband. He does not say that every woman with status is forbidden to every Israelite. The added liability rests on the particular extension described here, not on replacing all these categories with one general marriage ban.
Synopsis
When widowhood, divorce, status, and status arise in this order, the added scope at each stage permits four liabilities to apply to one act by a .
Visual guideFour Prohibitions in a Particular Order
What each new status adds
This is the specific order described in Halachah 9, not every possible sequence.
Stage
Added restriction described here
Widow
Added restriction described hereForbidden to a ; still permitted to an ordinary .
Then divorced
Added restriction described herePriestly marriage restriction now includes ordinary .
Then
Added restriction described here consumption becomes forbidden.
Then
Added restriction described hereThe invokes illicit relations that can forbid even an Israelite’s wife to him.
permission requires its own basis. status does not make every woman forbidden to every Israelite. Halachah 10 explains why changing the order requires separate analysis.
he receives three sets of lashes for one act of relations.
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But if this order is changed,
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he receives only one set of lashes.
The Maggid Mishneh explains the final clause as the case in which status came first, leaving no further added scope for the other prohibitions. It does not mean that every possible change of order always produces only one liability. Where another prohibition preceded status, the applicable additional liability must still be considered.
These three liabilities likewise presume followed by relations, as required in 17:2.
Synopsis
An ordinary incurs three liabilities when divorce is followed by status and then status. If status came first, the later categories do not add the same liabilities.
🔎Dig DeeperThe Corresponding Rule for an Ordinary
The Corresponding Rule for an Ordinary
A changed order can still leave two liabilities
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the final phrase “only one” describes status arising first. It is not a blanket rule for every rearrangement of the stages. If status arises in the middle of the ordinary ’s sequence, there can still be two liabilities.
For the , he similarly distinguishes a second-position status from a third-position one: the count can be two or three, with widowhood first in the sequence he specifies. The order must therefore be examined stage by stage. Simply noticing that it differs from the four-stage example does not establish the final count.
Repeated Widowhood or Divorce Does Not Multiply the Ban
If a woman has been widowed from several husbands
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or divorced from several husbands,
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the lashes incurred for relations with her
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are only one set for each act of relations.
Repeated occurrences of the same status do not create new categories of prohibition. This differs from the distinct prohibitions discussed above: several widowhoods remain one widowhood prohibition for the , and several divorces remain one divorce prohibition for a .
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A widow, whether widowed after
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or after full marriage, is forbidden.
The widowhood prohibition for a does not depend on whether the first marriage reached . alone creates the marital bond whose end through death gives her this status.
Synopsis
Repeated widowhood or divorce does not multiply the liability for that status. A ’s widowhood prohibition applies even when the earlier husband died after alone.
For a widow who remains a virgin, 6:10 explains that the positive of could override the negative prohibition for the first act. Nevertheless, the Sages forbade proceeding lest it lead to a second act of relations, when the initial of would no longer apply.
This assumes that his paternal brother died without descendants and left a widow subject to , as described in 1:1. Not every brother’s widow requires .
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If a woman became bound to him for while he was an ordinary ,
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and he was then appointed ,
even if he had performed with her
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while he was an ordinary ,
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he does not perform after his appointment.
is the Rabbinic preliminary act of consecration for a . It is not merely a promise to marry, but it also does not establish the full marriage created by . An earlier therefore does not remove the obstacle created by his appointment.
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But if he a widow
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and was then appointed ,
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he may complete the marriage after his appointment.
Ordinary , unlike with a , already made her his wife before the appointment. The later completion of that marriage is therefore permitted.
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If her were of doubtful validity
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and the man who her died,
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she is doubtfully a widow.
Because she may have been his wife, the uncertainty about creates uncertainty about widowhood. She is therefore forbidden to a because of that doubt.
Synopsis
A performs rather than , even after an earlier . Ordinary with a widow before his appointment does permit completing that marriage; doubtful can create doubtful widowhood.
Visual guide and a Marriage Begun Before Appointment
What happened before the appointment?
Both acts preceded appointment as , but they do not create the same bond.
Earlier act
Later appointment
Result stated here
Ordinary with a widow
Later appointmentHe becomes
Result stated hereHe may complete that marriage.
with his
Later appointmentHe becomes
Result stated hereHe may not perform .
is a Rabbinic preliminary act, not ordinary or completed . A doubtful remains a separate doubtful-status case.
for it says, “He shall take a woman in her virginity” (Leviticus 21:13):
״״,;
“a woman,” not a minor;
״״,.
“in her virginity,” not a .
?,
How is this fulfilled? She has left the status of a minor
-.
but has not entered the status of a : this is a .
and are precise stages, not merely everyday descriptions of youth and adulthood. 2:1–2 defines by the required physical signs after age twelve; follows six months after begins. The marriage requirement here is specifically the intervening stage. Halachah 17 addresses a woman who reaches between and .
Becoming a does not require a wife to leave an already completed marriage. The restriction here concerns entering marriage; 17:15 separately explains when a prohibited marriage, once entered, may remain intact.
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He may never be married to two women at once,
״״(,)-
for it says, “He shall take a woman” (Leviticus 21:14):
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one, not two.
The applies this restriction throughout the year, not only when the performs the Yom Kippur service. It limits simultaneous marriages, not remarriage after an earlier marriage has ended.
Synopsis
The is commanded to marry a virgin in the stage of , and the prohibits his having two wives at the same time.
🔎Dig DeeperA Virgin and One Wife
A Virgin and One Wife
Is the one-wife restriction limited to Yom Kippur?
The states a year-round rule: a may not have two wives simultaneously. The Raavad questions whether the discussion in Yoma proves so broad a restriction. The 's reference to the ’s ‘house’ is understood there as one household, not two; the Raavad suggests that the restriction might apply particularly to Yom Kippur, when concern about ritual impurity is especially immediate.
The Raavad also acknowledges the practical logic of a broader rule, so that the would not need to divorce a wife before Yom Kippur. Nevertheless, he raises a difficulty from II Chronicles 24:3, which he reads as saying that Yehoyada married two women. This is his objection to the Rambam’s rule, not a change in the Rambam’s stated ruling.
describes the loss of the physical signs of virginity through an injury rather than intercourse. The absence of previous relations does not by itself satisfy the requirement.
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If she has had anal intercourse,
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she is treated as one who has had vaginal intercourse.
For this marriage restriction, prior anal intercourse with a man disqualifies her even if the physical signs of virginity remain.
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If she has had intercourse with an animal, she is permitted.
The explains this permission as referring to anal intercourse, where her physical virginity remains; under this interpretation, intercourse that removed her physical virginity would disqualify her. The statement concerns eligibility to marry the , not permission for the act itself.
Synopsis
Physical virginity and the nature of prior intercourse are distinct considerations. The ’s first explanation limits the animal-case permission to preserved physical virginity; he also records a different interpretation.
🔎Dig DeeperPhysical Virginity and Prior Relations
Physical Virginity and Prior Relations
Why the animal case is read in two ways
The explains the animal case as anal intercourse. On his explanation, vaginal intercourse that removed physical virginity would still disqualify her from marrying a : even though it does not have the same legal status as intercourse with a man, it would be no better than the injury classified as .
He also records another interpretation allowing the animal case even after vaginal intercourse. That view treats the restriction as a Rabbinic safeguard against marriage to a woman who had relations, and distinguishes a common injury from the unusual animal case. The Meiri presents these as different explanations; they should not be merged into one undisputed rule.
If a married a woman who had previously had relations,
,.
he does not receive lashes, but must divorce her with a .
This violates the positive commandment to marry a virgin, and that transgression does not carry lashes. The absence of lashes does not permit the marriage to continue. Since the took effect, a is needed to end it.
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If he married a or a ,
.
he may remain married to her.
These marriages should not have been entered initially, as stated above, but once entered they need not be dissolved. This differs from marriage to a woman who had previously had relations.
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If he a woman who had previously had relations and was then appointed ,
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he may complete the marriage after his appointment.
As with the widow in Halachah 12, the ordinary established their marriage before his appointment. This permission does not authorize beginning the after he becomes .
Synopsis
A who marries a woman who previously had relations must divorce her, although he does not receive lashes for that positive-commandment violation. A marriage already entered with a or may continue, and qualifying before his appointment may be completed afterward.
even if he raped or seduced her while an ordinary ,
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and was appointed before marrying her—
;,.
he must not marry her; if he did marry her, he must divorce her.
His own involvement does not remove the requirement to marry a virgin. Unlike the previously woman discussed in Halachah 15, this woman had not first been to him. The restriction therefore remains even though he himself caused the loss of virginity. Because she is not a virgin when he takes her in marriage, continuing relations remain prohibited; the requirement to divorce does not disappear after the wedding.
Synopsis
A may not marry a woman whom he raped or seduced before consecration, even if the act occurred before his appointment. If he married her, he must divorce her.
If he a minor girl and she reached full maturity while to him, before marriage—
,;
he must not marry her, because her body has changed;
,.
but if he married her, he need not divorce her.
The must marry a rather than a , as explained in Halachah 13. Earlier consecration does not permit him to proceed after this physical change. Nevertheless, the after-the-fact rule for marrying a remains the one stated in Halachah 15: the marriage need not be ended.
Synopsis
A girl’s reaching full maturity after consecration prevents the from proceeding to marriage, but does not require divorce if the marriage already took place.
is the refusal that ends a qualifying minor girl’s Rabbinically established marriage. It is not a divorce. In the stated sequence, her later removes the significance of the earlier for this marriage restriction, as detailed in 11:16.
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Whenever a woman is not eligible for —
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if was performed with her, she is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.
Merely performing the outward act does not create the status of a when this woman was not subject to that rite. The rule concerns eligibility for , not permission to disregard a valid .
Synopsis
Divorce after either consecration or marriage bars marriage to a . The specified sequence and performed with an ineligible woman do not create that disqualification.
while she continues living with him as his wife and attending to him—
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she is not required to leave her husband.
A cannot remarry his own divorcee, so the rumor would matter if established. Here, however, a rumor arising after the marriage does not itself require the couple to divorce.
Writing a does not itself divorce a woman: 1:1 requires its delivery to her. This concerns the legal weight of a report, not proof that a divorce actually occurred.
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But if she married another ,
.
she must leave the second husband.
This refers to her marrying the second after the first husband’s death. The rumor now precedes the second marriage; it is not being used to unsettle a marriage that existed before the rumor. The legally significant rumor must be distinguished from ordinary unsubstantiated gossip.
Synopsis
A rumor of divorce does not dissolve the existing marriage it follows. If she later marries another , after the first husband’s death, the prior rumor requires her to leave the second marriage.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
The same report, a later marriage
A rumor of a arises while a and his wife are already living together. That rumor does not require their marriage to end. After he dies, she marries a different . Now the same qualifying rumor preceded this second marriage, so the second marriage must end. The first husband’s death, not a confirmed divorce, is what allowed her to remarry at all.
If a report spread in the city that she was and then divorced from that consecration—
,.
her status must be treated with concern, as we explained in Hilchos Gerushin.
The report here is a rumor substantiated by a court under the relevant rules, not ordinary hearsay. It is still not conclusive testimony that the event occurred. The rules for recognizing such a rumor appear in 9:22; the divorce rule is in 10:20. Because divorce would prohibit marriage to a by law, this qualified report cannot simply be ignored.
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But if a rumor spread that she is a ,
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her status is not treated as suspect.
The distinguishes this Rabbinic restriction from the prohibition of marrying a divorcee. As in Halachah 7, uncertain status does not have the same consequence as uncertain divorcee status.
The cases should not be equated: Halachah 7 discusses a marriage already entered with a doubtful . Here the allows the rumor of to be disregarded even before marriage, as 6:12 explains.
Synopsis
A legally significant rumor of consecration followed by divorce affects eligibility to marry a . The does not impose the same restriction because of a rumor of .
🔎Dig DeeperA Rumor of Divorce Is Not a Rumor of
A Rumor of Divorce Is Not a Rumor of
Does a substantial rumor of count?
The Ra’avad disagrees with treating a rumor of differently from a rumor of divorce. His concern is not ordinary gossip: he describes a report examined in court, with its chain of information traced toward clear facts. In his view, such a report can matter even for , provided it did not arise only after the woman’s existing .
He nevertheless makes an exception for a reputation of illicit relations. People may have seen improper behavior and called it illicit relations without knowing that the act occurred. That specific uncertainty about what the label means is different from the report of discussed here.
Sources: Hasagot HaRaavad on , Forbidden Intercourse 17:20
Suspicion Alone Does Not Establish Disqualification
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If a rumor spread that a virgin had previously had relations—
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her status is not treated as suspect, and she may marry a .
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If a rumor spread that she is a maidservant—
,.
her status is not treated as suspect, and she may marry even a .
Unproven reports do not themselves establish these disqualifying personal statuses. The law requires evidence of the kind specified below.
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If she acquired a reputation in the city for illicit relations,
.
her status is not treated as suspect.
Here, even a rumor substantiated in court does not establish disqualifying relations. This differs from the qualifying divorce rumor in Halachah 20; a reputation for illicit relations is not itself clear testimony of the act.
Even if her husband sent her away
because she violated the law of and Jewish standards of conduct
,
or because testified to unseemly conduct,
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and he died before giving her a —
;
she is permitted to a .
For a woman in these cases is not prohibited
,.
unless there is clear testimony or her own admission.
Testimony to suspicious conduct is not the same as clear testimony establishing relations that disqualify her from the priesthood. Nor did the husband’s separation itself make her a divorcee: he died before giving a . By her own admission she accepts this prohibition upon herself, as explained in Chapter 18, Halachah 9. These rules distinguish evidence of disqualification from conduct that raises suspicion; they do not approve the conduct.
Synopsis
Rumor or suspicious conduct alone does not establish the stated priestly marriage disqualifications. Clear testimony or the woman’s own admission is required; separation without a does not make her a divorcee.
🔎Dig DeeperSuspicion Alone Does Not Establish Disqualification
Suspicion Alone Does Not Establish Disqualification
An established rumor can still describe the wrong thing
The Beit Shmuel explains that this ruling includes even a rumor established in court. The difficulty is what people actually observed: they may have seen improper conduct and described it as illicit relations. Establishing that the report genuinely circulated does not establish that disqualifying relations occurred.
He notes that the Ra’avad agrees in this particular case, despite taking a stricter position about a substantial rumor of . Here there is a specific alternative explanation for the reputation. The point is about this kind of report, not a general rule that evidence of misconduct can always be dismissed.
✦Live ItSeparate what happened from what you assumed
Separate what happened from what you assumed
The distinguishes a reputation or suspicious conduct from evidence establishing the disqualification discussed here. A story can circulate widely without proving what people assume it means.
That distinction can encourage care in everyday speech. A friend answers your message briefly, and “she sent a short reply” becomes “she is angry with me.” The first describes what happened; the second adds an interpretation. Before repeating that interpretation or reacting to it, leave room to ask what you do not know. This reflection is about ordinary misunderstandings, not dismissing a report of harm or deciding anyone’s status.
Try today
Notice one conclusion you have drawn about someone and separate the observed fact from your interpretation.
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Synopsis: A short summary follows each halachah. It is a guide to the central ruling, not a replacement for the full text and its qualifications.
Dig Deeper: Based on the classic commentaries named inside each panel. Editorial explanations are not presented as quotations.
Live It: Where present, these panels connect a particular halachah to a suggested personal reflection and an action to try. Original applications are labeled as suggested reflections. They are distinct from the ruling and are not attributed to the Rebbe merely because his guidance supports seeking a practical lesson.
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Chapter 17 at a glance
Chapter Synopsis
Priestly marriage restrictions depend on the woman’s precise legal status, the priest’s office, and when the relevant events occurred. The distinguishes prohibitions from Rabbinic restrictions, punishment from permission, and initial marriage from whether an existing marriage must end. The concluding rulings show that different kinds of reports and evidence do not carry identical legal consequences.
Every is subject to the restrictions concerning a divorced woman, a , and a . The specified higher priestly offices also carry the commandment to marry a virgin and the prohibition against a widow.
According to the , lashes for these three priestly marriage prohibitions require both and relations. The absence of that liability does not make relations outside marriage permitted.
A ’s relations with a widow create a new priestly disqualification. He therefore receives lashes for that act even without , unlike the liability described for the three already-disqualified categories.
A who consecrates a widow and has relations with her incurs two sets of lashes. Without relations, the marriages discussed here do not carry the stated lashes.
For the priestly prohibitions discussed here, the woman’s liability for lashes follows the same distinctions as the man’s. The designated-maidservant case is a separately defined exception.
A who has relations with a non-Jewish woman incurs the stated lashes even without marriage, because cannot take effect with her.
A definite is forbidden to a by Rabbinic law. A marriage already entered with a doubtful may remain intact, unlike a marriage involving doubt about the listed prohibitions.
A second prohibition generally does not take effect over an existing one. It can do so when both begin together, when the new prohibition adds restrictions, or when it encompasses other things as well.
When widowhood, divorce, status, and status arise in this order, the added scope at each stage permits four liabilities to apply to one act by a .
An ordinary incurs three liabilities when divorce is followed by status and then status. If status came first, the later categories do not add the same liabilities.
Repeated widowhood or divorce does not multiply the liability for that status. A ’s widowhood prohibition applies even when the earlier husband died after alone.
A performs rather than , even after an earlier . Ordinary with a widow before his appointment does permit completing that marriage; doubtful can create doubtful widowhood.
The is commanded to marry a virgin in the stage of , and the prohibits his having two wives at the same time.
Physical virginity and the nature of prior intercourse are distinct considerations. The ’s first explanation limits the animal-case permission to preserved physical virginity; he also records a different interpretation.
A who marries a woman who previously had relations must divorce her, although he does not receive lashes for that positive-commandment violation. A marriage already entered with a or may continue, and qualifying before his appointment may be completed afterward.
A may not marry a woman whom he raped or seduced before consecration, even if the act occurred before his appointment. If he married her, he must divorce her.
A girl’s reaching full maturity after consecration prevents the from proceeding to marriage, but does not require divorce if the marriage already took place.
Divorce after either consecration or marriage bars marriage to a . The specified sequence and performed with an ineligible woman do not create that disqualification.
A rumor of divorce does not dissolve the existing marriage it follows. If she later marries another , after the first husband’s death, the prior rumor requires her to leave the second marriage.
A legally significant rumor of consecration followed by divorce affects eligibility to marry a . The does not impose the same restriction because of a rumor of .
Rumor or suspicious conduct alone does not establish the stated priestly marriage disqualifications. Clear testimony or the woman’s own admission is required; separation without a does not make her a divorcee.
פרק יז
End of chapter.
You have reached the end of all twenty-one halachos.