Mi'un, waiting periods, and protecting vulnerable children
This chapter develops in three stages. 1–17 explain when a minor may leave a Rabbinic marriage through mi'un and how mi'un differs from a . 18–24 establish the ninety-day waiting period between marriages. 25–28 protect the welfare of another man's unborn or nursing child.
פרק יא28 halachosFriday, October 2, 2026כ״א בתשרי תשפ״ז◷ Estimated study time: 175–225 min
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Although a father has the authority to arrange for his minor daughter, instructed that this should not ordinarily be done. Rather, she should be allowed to mature and express whom she wishes to marry.
,
If a man marries a minor girl who is an orphan,
established a form of marriage for a minor orphan so that she could have someone to care for and protect her. Since she has no father who can effect -level for her, this marriage has Rabbinic rather than full -level force.
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and she does not wish to remain with this husband—
,
she may perform mi'un and leave,
;
and she does not require a from him;
,
because the of a minor in this situation are not complete ,
.
as we have explained.
Mi'un is the minor girl's refusal to continue this Rabbinically established marriage. Because these do not have the full -level force of ordinary , gave her the ability to reject the marriage while she is still entitled to mi'un. She then leaves without requiring a .
Mi'un is therefore not a form of divorce through a . It is the mechanism established through which a minor can reject this particular type of Rabbinic marriage.
This right is temporary. Once she reaches adulthood, mi'un is no longer available. Whether the marriage has also become fully binding under law depends on what occurred after she reached maturity, as explained in 4–6.
Similarly, if a girl's father married her off while she was a minor,
In this case, the original marriage is fundamentally different. arranged by her father while he has authority over her are binding under law and cannot be ended through mi'un.
,
and she was then widowed or divorced,
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while she was still a minor—
;
she is considered like an orphan even though her father is still alive;
Although her father is alive, she is treated like an orphan for this law. Once the marriage arranged by her father has ended, his authority to arrange another -level for her does not return.
,
and if she marries again while she is still a minor,
.
she may end that marriage through mi'un.
Her original marriage arranged by her father could not have been ended through mi'un. But once that marriage has ended through widowhood or divorce, a later marriage entered while she remains a minor has the Rabbinic status that can be rejected through mi'un.
Synopsis
A minor orphan may end her Rabbinically established marriage through mi'un without receiving a . The same applies to a minor whose father originally married her off, if that -level marriage first ended through divorce or widowhood and she then entered another marriage while still a minor.
A in this context is a deaf-mute woman with the limited legal capacity associated with that status.
although her marriage is established by Rabbinic law,
-
like the marriage of a minor girl—
At first glance, we might expect her to have the same right of mi'un as the minor discussed in Halachah 1. In both cases, the marriage is a Rabbinic institution rather than an ordinary -level marriage.
,
the Sages did not establish the right of mi'un for her,
.
so that men would not refrain from marrying her.
A minor's right to mi'un has a built-in endpoint: when she reaches adulthood, her status changes and the special right ends. A 's status does not automatically change with age in the same way, so such a right would have no comparable built-in endpoint.
If she could end her marriage through mi'un indefinitely, men might be reluctant to marry her in the first place. therefore did not establish mi'un for her, even though her marriage, like the minor's, is Rabbinic.
Synopsis
Although the marriage of a is Rabbinic like the marriage of a minor, did not give her the right of mi'un. A minor's right ends when she matures; for a , such a right would have no comparable built-in endpoint and could discourage men from marrying her.
The now defines how broadly this right operates while she remains a minor.
,
whether she is only in the stage of ,
,
or she has already entered nisu'in,
Mi'un is not limited to the period before the couple begins married life. As long as she still qualifies for this right, she may exercise it even after nisu'in.
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whether in her husband's presence,
.
or when he is not present.
Her husband's presence or consent is not what gives mi'un its effect.
,
Just as she may perform mi'un with regard to her husband,
.
so too she may perform mi'un with regard to a .
If her husband dies childless and she becomes bound to a , mi'un can terminate that bond as well. She does not have to proceed with .
,
She may perform mi'un with one husband,
,
then marry another man,
,
and perform mi'un with the second husband,
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and likewise with a third—
.
even any number of times.
There is no rule that exercising mi'un once exhausts the right. As long as she remains a minor and enters marriages to which mi'un applies, she may exercise the right repeatedly.
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As long as she remains a minor, she has the right to perform mi'un.
This is the basic time limit on the special right. The following will define more precisely when she is no longer treated as a minor for this purpose.
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If a minor girl did not formally perform mi'un,
,
even though she is married,
,
and she went and accepted from another man,
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while she was still a minor—
.
those very are themselves her mi'un.
Ordinarily, a married woman cannot accept from another man. Here, however, her first marriage is the special Rabbinic marriage of a minor that she still has the power to reject through mi'un.
By knowingly accepting from another man while she still possesses that right, she unmistakably rejects her first marriage. Those new themselves are therefore treated as her act of mi'un: קידושיה הן הן מיאוניה — her are themselves her mi'un.
Synopsis
A minor who has the right of mi'un may exercise it after or nisu'in, in or outside her husband's presence, and even toward a . She may exercise mi'un repeatedly while she remains a minor. If she instead accepts from another man while still entitled to mi'un, those new themselves constitute her rejection of the first Rabbinic marriage.
🔎Dig DeeperHow Broadly a Minor Can Exercise Mi'un
How Broadly a Minor Can Exercise Mi'un
The notes that although a minor technically may marry and exercise mi'un repeatedly, the Sages did not view a cycle of repeated marriages and mi'un favorably. A should therefore arrange such a minor's marriage only when there is reason to expect that she will remain in it.
Until when may a girl exercise her right of mi'un?
The previous established that mi'un is available only while she remains a minor. The now defines when that period ends.
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As long as she remains a minor,
,
until she becomes a na'arah,
A na'arah is a girl who has reached the next stage of maturity. Once she reaches that stage, the special right of mi'un ends.
.
or until it becomes known that she is an .
An is a woman whose development establishes that she does not follow the ordinary pattern of female physical maturity and is regarded as incapable of bearing children. Once she is established as an , she likewise no longer exercises mi'un as a minor.
?
When does this apply?
The now qualifies the ruling. Once she reaches the age when signs of maturity are expected, whether marital relations took place afterward becomes crucial.
When her husband did not have relations with her
.
after she became twelve years and one day old.
After she reaches twelve years and one day, we ordinarily presume that she has developed the physical signs of maturity. If she has not had marital relations after reaching that age, however, it can still be relevant to determine through examination whether she actually developed those signs.
,
But if she reached this age
-
and then had marital relations,
since relations effect under law,
,
as we have explained,
.
she can no longer exercise mi'un.
Once she reaches twelve years and one day, we ordinarily presume that she has developed the signs of maturity. If her husband then has marital relations with her, those relations establish the marriage on the level. Mi'un, which applies to the special Rabbinic marriage of a minor, can therefore no longer terminate the relationship.
,
And she does not require an examination for purposes of mi'un,
.
because we presume that she has developed the signs of physical maturity.
This — legal presumption is the starting point once she reaches twelve years and one day: unless established otherwise, we assume that she has matured.
If she has not had marital relations after reaching twelve and wants to establish that she still qualifies for mi'un, an examination showing that she has not developed signs of maturity can establish that she remains a minor for this purpose.
The next addresses the more complicated situation in which such an examination finds no signs, but marital relations had already taken place after she reached the age when those signs could have appeared.
Synopsis
A girl may exercise mi'un only while she retains the status of a minor. Once she becomes a na'arah or is established as an , that right ends. After twelve years and one day, she is ordinarily presumed to have developed signs of maturity; if marital relations then take place, those relations establish -level and mi'un can no longer end the marriage.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
was married as a minor under the Rabbinic marriage described in this chapter. She is now twelve years and one day old. If her husband has relations with her after this point, we presume that she has developed the signs of maturity, and the marriage can now have -level force. She can therefore no longer simply end the marriage through mi'un as she could while she was a minor.
At first glance, the examination seems to establish that she is still a minor. But here there is an additional fact: marital relations had already taken place after she reached the age when signs of maturity could have appeared.
since she had marital relations
,
after reaching the age at which signs of maturity could be expected,
we are concerned
,
that perhaps she developed the signs and they later fell away,
The examination establishes only that the signs are not present now. It does not prove that they were never present.
Perhaps she had already developed signs of maturity before the marital relations and those signs later disappeared. If so, she was already mature when those relations took place, and the relations established -level.
.
Therefore, she requires a because of the doubt.
There are two possibilities.
If she never developed signs of maturity, she remained a minor and her marriage retained the Rabbinic status that could be ended through mi'un.
If she had already developed the signs before the marital relations and they subsequently disappeared, those relations established -level, which mi'un cannot terminate.
Because we cannot determine whether she had already matured when those relations occurred, she requires a because of the possibility that -level took effect.
,
If she performed mi'un after being examined,
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and then became to another man—
She performed mi'un after an examination showed no present signs of maturity. But the earlier uncertainty remains: perhaps she had previously matured, had relations with her first husband, and only afterward lost those signs.
;
she requires a from the second man because of the doubt;
Here the two possibilities lead to opposite results.
If she was still a minor, her mi'un ended the first Rabbinic marriage and the second man's took effect.
If she had already matured before the earlier marital relations, those relations established -level with the first husband. Her later mi'un could not end that marriage, and the second man's could not take effect.
We cannot determine which situation actually occurred, so the second relationship must also be treated as doubtful.
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And if she entered nisu'in with the second man—
,
she must leave both men,
.
and a child from either man has the status of a safek — a doubtful .
This consequence concerns children fathered after the second .
If the first marriage became binding under law, a child subsequently fathered by the second man may have been conceived while she was still married to the first.
But if she truly remained a minor, her mi'un was valid and the second man's took effect. A child subsequently fathered by the first man may then have been conceived while she was bound to the second.
Because we cannot determine which marriage was binding, a child subsequently fathered by either man after the second has the status of a safek .
Synopsis
If a girl had marital relations after reaching the age when signs of maturity could appear, a later examination finding no signs does not prove that she was still a minor—the signs may have appeared and then fallen away. She therefore requires a because -level may have taken effect. If she then performs mi'un and becomes to another man, it is uncertain which relationship is binding; if she proceeds to nisu'in, she must leave both men, and a child subsequently fathered by either man has the status of a safek .
Picture the CaseA concrete example
After turning twelve, had relations with her husband. Later, she was examined and no signs of maturity were found. That does not settle the question: perhaps the signs had already appeared before the relations and later fell away. If so, those relations established -level. Because we cannot know which possibility occurred, cannot rely on mi'un alone and requires a because of the doubt.
If a minor girl did not perform mi'un and then reached adulthood,
even though her husband did not have relations with her
-
from the time she became twelve years and one day old—
This case differs from the previous two . Here, no later marital relations occurred that could establish a -level basis for the marriage.
,
she can no longer exercise mi'un,
.
because she has reached adulthood.
Mi'un is a special right that exists only while she remains a minor. Once she has grown up, that right ends even though her husband did not have relations with her after she reached the relevant age.
.
And she requires a by Rabbinic law.
She still requires a , but not because later relations established -level. Her need for a comes from the Rabbinic marriage she entered while she was still a minor.
The now carefully rules out the two ways in which later relations could have given the marriage a stronger status.
For her husband did not have relations with her
,
after she reached the age of na'arut,
which would have required us to be concerned
that perhaps she had developed signs of maturity
,
and was therefore doubtfully ,
This rules out the uncertainty discussed in Halachah 5. There were no relations during the period in which we might wonder whether she had already developed the physical signs of maturity and thereby acquired a -level marital status.
nor did he have relations with her after she had definitely reached adulthood
,
which would have made her a fully married woman,
This also rules out definite -level through later relations.
There were therefore neither relations creating a doubt about nor relations after definite adulthood that would make the marriage fully binding under law.
It follows that she requires a
,
only because of the marriage she entered while she was a minor,
.
which is a Rabbinic institution.
Nothing occurred after her childhood marriage to establish -level. Her bond to the first husband therefore remains Rabbinic, and that Rabbinic bond is the sole reason she requires a .
,
Therefore, if after reaching adulthood she went and became to another man,
.
the second man's take effect.
Because her bond to the first husband remains only Rabbinic, it does not prevent another man's -level from taking effect after she reaches adulthood.
There are now two different levels of relationship at the same time:
The first husband's bond remains Rabbinic.
The second man's have -level force.
Keeping that distinction in mind explains the rulings that follow.
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If the first husband divorces her,
.
the second man may proceed to nisu'in with her.
The second man's have already taken effect, but she may not proceed to nisu'in with him while the Rabbinic bond to the first husband remains. Once the first husband gives her the required , that remaining bond is removed and the second man may proceed to nisu'in.
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But if the second man divorces her,
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the first husband may not continue his marriage with her—
:
lest people say,
“He took back his divorcee
.
after she had become to another man.”
Once the second man's have taken effect and he later divorces her, do not allow her to remain with the first man. Otherwise, it could appear that the first husband took back his divorcee after she had become to someone else.
If the second man had relations with her
-
before the first husband divorced her—
,
she must leave both men,
because her situation resembles that of a woman
who heard that her husband had died,
married another man,
.
and afterward her first husband returned.
The resemblance is that she entered into a second marriage before her bond to the first husband had been formally severed. Because of that similarity, require her to leave both men.
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A child from the second man, however, is not a .
The resemblance to the earlier case does not extend to the child's status.
The first husband's bond is only Rabbinic, while the second man's have -level force. A child from the second man is therefore not a .
But if the first husband had relations with her
,
before the second man divorced her,
.
the child is a .
Here the -level relationship is with the second man. Once his have taken effect, a child subsequently fathered by the first husband while that second marriage remains in force is a .
The difference between the two children therefore follows directly from which relationship has force: the first husband's bond is only Rabbinic; the second man's are binding under law.
Synopsis
If a minor's Rabbinic marriage continues until she reaches adulthood without later relations with her first husband, she loses the right of mi'un but requires a only by Rabbinic law. Because the first bond remains Rabbinic, -level from a second man can take effect. The later rulings—including the different status of children from the two men—follow from the distinction between the first husband's Rabbinic bond and the second man's -level.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
married as a minor and later grew up, but her first husband never had relations with her after she reached the relevant age. Her bond to him therefore remains Rabbinic. If now accepts from a second man, those -level can take effect even though she still needs a Rabbinic from her first husband. That difference—first bond Rabbinic, second -level—explains the unusual rulings that follow.
Which minor girl requires mi'un to end her marriage?
Not every marriage involving a minor has enough Rabbinic standing to require mi'un. The now defines when a minor's understanding is sufficient for her marriage to require this formal rejection.
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From age six through age ten,
we examine her
:
according to the level of her understanding:
Between ages six and ten, the ruling depends upon her individual level of understanding.
If she knows how to safeguard what she received for her
,
and understands that it was given to her as ,
The question is not merely whether she can physically keep an object safe. She must appreciate the special significance of what she received and understand that it was given to her for the purpose of .
rather than merely guarding it
the way she would guard a nut or a date
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or something similar—
A young child may understand that an object has value and should not be lost. That alone is not the level of understanding described here. She must recognize the special significance of the object as .
;
then she requires mi'un;
Her understanding is sufficient for the marriage to have the Rabbinic standing that requires mi'un in order for her to leave it.
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But if she does not understand how to safeguard her —
,
she does not require mi'un,
rather, she simply returns to her mother's home
.
as though she had never been at all.
If she lacks the required understanding of the , she does not need a formal act of mi'un to leave. She simply returns to her mother's home as though no had taken place.
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If she is younger than six—
,
even if she knows how to safeguard what she receives,
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she does not require mi'un.
Below age six, the rules that mi'un is unnecessary even if she knows how to safeguard what she receives.
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If she is older than ten—
,
even if she has very little understanding,
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she requires mi'un.
Above age ten, while she remains a minor, the individual assessment of understanding no longer changes this ruling: she requires mi'un.
Whenever her brothers arranged her marriage,
or her relatives,
,
or her mother,
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without her knowledge—
.
she does not require mi'un.
This refers to a case in which her family arranged the marriage without informing her of the identity of the man she was being married to. Because she did not knowingly participate in accepting this marriage, she does not require mi'un to leave it.
Synopsis
Between ages six and ten, whether a minor requires mi'un depends upon whether she understands the special significance of the she receives. Below six, mi'un is unnecessary; above ten, while she remains a minor, mi'un is required even if her understanding is very weak. If her family arranged the marriage without her knowledge, she does not require mi'un.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
An eight-year-old girl is given an item for . The question is not simply whether she knows that the item is valuable and should not be lost. Does she understand that she received it specifically as and recognize what that means? Between ages six and ten, that level of understanding determines whether her Rabbinic marriage has enough standing that she will need mi'un to leave it.
🔎Dig DeeperWhich Minor Requires Mi'un?
Which Minor Requires Mi'un?
The cites an opinion that these rules apply only when the girl's mother or brother arranged the marriage; if the girl arranged the marriage herself, it does not have Rabbinic force.
The Ra'avad gives a different qualification. Between ages six and ten, he maintains that family involvement is necessary for the marriage to have Rabbinic force. After age ten, however, the marriage can take effect Rabbinically even if the girl arranged it herself.
The now moves from defining who is eligible for mi'un to the actual procedure. Mi'un does not require a from the husband; it is accomplished through the girl's own declaration rejecting the marriage.
She says in the presence of two people,
The declaration of mi'un must be made before two people.
״״
“I do not want so-and-so, my husband,”
״
or, “I do not want the
״
through which my mother had me ,”
״״,
or “my brother,”
.
or another statement with a similar meaning.
No single formula is required. What matters is that she clearly expresses that she does not want the husband or the through which she was married to him.
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Even if the two people were guests seated in her husband's home,
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and she was standing there serving them drinks,
The two people do not have to be assembled for a formal proceeding. They may simply be present when she makes her declaration.
״״-
and she said, “I do not want so-and-so, my husband”—
.
this constitutes mi'un.
The example emphasizes how straightforward the essential act is. Even while carrying on an ordinary task in her husband's home, a clear declaration before two people that she does not want him is sufficient to constitute mi'un.
Synopsis
Mi'un is accomplished when the minor clearly declares before two people that she does not want her husband or the through which she was married to him. No special formula or formal setting is required; a clear statement expressing her rejection of the marriage is sufficient.
Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration
Two guests are sitting in a girl's husband's home while she serves drinks. Without any formal ceremony, she says clearly in front of them, “I don't want him as my husband.” That is enough to constitute mi'un. She does not need a courtroom setting or a special formula; what matters is that she clearly rejects the marriage in the presence of two people.
Mi'un does not require a formal courtroom. A clear declaration before two people can end this Rabbinically established marriage.
🔎Dig DeeperHow Mi'un Is Performed
How Mi'un Is Performed
and other authorities maintain that, ideally, mi'un should be performed before three people. The records this view alongside the 's requirement of two, while giving greater weight to the Rambam's position.
The two people before whom the minor performs mi'un
write for her:
The mi'un itself has already occurred through her declaration. The now describes the written record documenting what happened.
״
“On such-and-such a day,
so-and-so, daughter of so-and-so, performed mi'un in our presence
,
with regard to so-and-so, her husband,”
and they sign it
״;
and give it to her;
.
and this is the essential text of a document of mi'un.
Although this document is called a mi'un, it does not function like an ordinary . The girl's spoken mi'un is what ends the Rabbinic marriage; the document records that the mi'un already occurred.
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A document of mi'un—
is not like a of divorce,
,
whose delivery effects the divorce,
This is the fundamental distinction between the two documents.
With an ordinary , giving the document to the wife is itself what effects the divorce.
With mi'un, the girl's declaration has already ended the Rabbinic marriage. The written document merely records what occurred.
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and it does not need to be written specifically for her sake,
An ordinary has special requirements concerning the intention with which it is written. Since the mi'un document does not itself cause the separation, those requirements do not apply here.
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nor does it require formal delivery,
.
nor does it require any of the other laws governing a of divorce.
The name mi'un should therefore not be misunderstood. It is not another type of divorce document governed by the laws of .
,
And we do not write it using the standard forms and wording of a ,
,
lest it appear to be a of divorce,
The wording is deliberately kept distinct. If a document of mi'un looked like an ordinary , people could mistakenly conclude that the girl had actually been divorced through a .
That misunderstanding could lead to incorrect consequences, such as treating the former husband as forbidden to marry her close relatives.
.
because it is merely like a record.
Its function is evidentiary: it records the mi'un that already occurred rather than producing the legal change itself.
Synopsis
The two people who witness the girl's mi'un write and sign a document recording what occurred. Unlike an ordinary , this document does not cause the separation; the girl's declaration of mi'un already did that. It therefore does not require the special writing, delivery, or wording of a and serves as a legal record of the mi'un.
Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration
After declares mi'un before two people, they write down what happened and give her the signed document. The marriage did not end when received that paper—it had already ended through her declaration of mi'un. The document is the record proving what happened. That is why a mi'un does not need all the special requirements of an ordinary divorce .
The girl's declaration of mi'un ends the marriage. The document written afterward records what already occurred; it does not cause the separation.
🔎Dig DeeperThe Written Record of Mi'un
The Written Record of Mi'un
The in relates that the Sages originally used wording for the mi'un record that somewhat resembled a . They later changed the wording because this created the mistaken impression that mi'un carried the same consequences as divorce—including the assumption that the former husband could no longer marry the girl's close relatives.
Keeping the wording distinct therefore preserves the fundamental difference between mi'un and an actual divorce through a .
and the identity of the husband whom she rejected.
The two people before whom the declaration is made must know who the girl is and which husband she is rejecting. This ensures that the mi'un can be reliably connected to the correct marriage.
,
Therefore, anyone who saw her perform mi'un
,
and heard her declaration of mi'un,
,
may write a document of mi'un for her,
.
even though they themselves do not know the identities involved.
The two people before whom the mi'un is actually performed must know the girl and her husband. But someone who saw and heard that valid mi'un may write its record even without personally having that prior identification.
We rely on the fact that the two people before whom the mi'un occurred knew her and her husband as required.
,
The Jewish people have already adopted the custom of writing a document of mi'un
:
using the following text:
The now introduces the customary full wording of the mi'un document. The actual formula follows in the next .
Synopsis
The two people before whom mi'un is performed must know the identities of the girl and the husband she is rejecting. Someone who saw and heard that valid mi'un may write its record even without personally having that prior identification. The then introduces the customary wording of the document, which follows in the next .
🔎Dig DeeperWho Must Know the Girl and Her Husband?
Who Must Know the Girl and Her Husband?
The ruling of the supports relying on the identification made by the people before whom the mi'un occurred. They are presumed to know the law and would not have allowed the declaration to proceed without knowing the identities involved.
The previous introduced the customary wording used to record a mi'un. The now gives that formula.
Unlike an ordinary , this document does not itself end the marriage. The girl's declaration has already accomplished the mi'un; this document provides a lasting legal record of what occurred.
On such-and-such a day of the week,
on such-and-such a day of such-and-such a month,
,
in such-and-such a year according to the specified reckoning,
The document begins by recording when the mi'un occurred.
so-and-so, daughter of so-and-so, performed mi'un in our presence
:
and said:
The record now preserves the girl's declaration.
“My mother or my brother misled me into this marriage
and married me off or had me
while I was a minor
.
to so-and-so, son of so-and-so.
The formula now switches into Aramaic:
And now I have revealed my intention before you
that I do not desire him
.
and I will not remain with him.”
This is the substance of her mi'un: she clearly states that she does not want this husband and will not continue living with him.
And we examined this woman, so-and-so,
and it became established to us
,
that she is still a minor,
The record confirms that she still had the status of a minor when she performed mi'un, since the right of mi'un exists only while she retains that status.
The examination was performed by women whom the could rely upon to determine whether she had developed signs of physical maturity.
and we have written and signed this document
and given it to her
for her benefit
.
and as clear evidence.
The document gives her a lasting record that can serve as evidence that the mi'un took place. Its delivery does not itself terminate the marriage as the delivery of an ordinary would.
,
So-and-so, son of so-and-so, witness;
.
so-and-so, son of so-and-so, witness.
The formula concludes with the signatures of the two .
Synopsis
The customary document of mi'un records when and before whom the girl rejected the marriage, her declaration that she does not want the husband, confirmation that she is still a minor, and the ' signatures. It serves as lasting evidence of a mi'un that has already occurred; the document itself does not end the marriage.
When Intervening Forbid Her Return to Her First Husband
If a man divorces his wife
-
and she subsequently becomes to another man—
The now begins a new subject: when a divorced woman becomes forbidden to return to her first husband.
,
even though the second man has not had marital relations with her,
.
she becomes forbidden to her first husband.
The second relationship does not need to progress to nisu'in or marital relations. Once valid with another man take effect after her divorce, she becomes forbidden to return to her first husband.
,
If the first husband took her back,
The case is that her relationship with the second man has already ended—for example, through divorce—and the first husband then takes her back.
If she were still married to the second man, relations with the first husband would instead constitute adultery.
-
and had marital relations with her—
,
he receives lashes,
The lashes follow his having relations with her in violation of the prohibition; the does not say here that the mere act of taking her back through itself incurs lashes.
,
and he is compelled to divorce her,
Their renewed marriage may not continue.
as it is stated,
״״(,).
“Her first husband who sent her away may not return to take her...” ( 24:4).
The prohibits the first husband from taking her back after she has become to another man following their divorce.
This prohibition is counted among the 's negative commandments.
Synopsis
Once a divorced woman becomes to another man, she is forbidden to return to her first husband even if the second relationship never progressed to marital relations. If that second relationship later ends and the first husband nevertheless takes her back and has relations with her, he violates a prohibition, receives lashes, and is compelled to divorce her.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
divorces . Later, accepts from , but she and never proceed to nisu'in or have marital relations. Eventually that second relationship ends. still may not return to . The crucial event was the second themselves; the prohibition does not depend on the second marriage progressing any further.
What Kind of Second Relationship Creates the Prohibition?
,
If she had non-marital relations with another man
-
while she was divorced—
This case sharply contrasts with the previous .
In Halachah 12, with another man made her forbidden to return to her first husband. Here, she had relations with another man while divorced but did not become to him.
,
she is permitted to return to her first husband,
The prohibition discussed in Halachah 12 is not triggered merely because she had relations with someone else while she was divorced.
as it is stated,
״
“And she leaves his house
and goes
״(,)-
and becomes another man's wife” ( 24:2)—
The focuses on the 's word וְהָיְתָה — “and she becomes.”
It is her becoming bound to another man
,
meaning through ,
that makes her forbidden
.
to return to her first husband.
The decisive factor for this prohibition is , not simply relations with another man.
That explains the contrast:
Divorce → to another man → she may no longer return to the first husband.
Divorce → non-marital relations with another man, without → this particular prohibition against returning to the first husband does not arise.
This ruling concerns specifically the prohibition against a divorced woman returning to her first husband after becoming to another man. It should not be confused with the separate laws governing a woman who has relations with another man while she is still married. The next addresses that different situation.
Synopsis
Non-marital relations with another man while a woman is divorced do not by themselves create the prohibition against returning to her first husband. That prohibition is triggered by intervening . This is distinct from the laws governing relations with another man while a woman is still married.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
divorces . While divorced, has non-marital relations with another man but never enters with him. Those relations alone do not create the prohibition discussed here against returning to . Compare this with Halachah 12: if she had accepted from the other man, she would be forbidden to return to her first husband.
There, she had relations with another man while she was divorced, so those relations alone did not create the prohibition against returning to her former husband.
Here, the relations occurred while she was still married. She therefore becomes forbidden to continue with her husband.
,
and if her husband has relations with her, he receives lashes,
Once she has become forbidden to him in this manner, the states that the husband receives lashes if he subsequently has relations with her.
as it is stated,
״״(,)-
“After she has become defiled” ( 24:4)—
.
for she has indeed become defiled.
The understands the 's phrase אַחֲרֵי אֲשֶׁר הֻטַּמָּאָה as also encompassing a married woman who becomes forbidden to her husband through adultery.
The exception is when she is the wife of an Israelite
.
who was raped.
If a married woman was forced into the relations, she does not thereby become forbidden to her Israelite husband.
The qualification אֵשֶׁת יִשְׂרָאֵל — wife of an Israelite is significant. This exception does not apply in the same way to the wife of a . The same allowance applies when the wife of an Israelite engaged in the relations unknowingly rather than intentionally.
Therefore, whenever a woman becomes forbidden to her husband
-
through and stirah—
is a husband's formal warning to his wife concerning a particular man. Stirah is her subsequent seclusion with that man in circumstances that create the status of a .
At that point she becomes forbidden to her husband unless and until her status can be resolved through the applicable process.
,
if her husband has relations with her,
;
he is given — lashes for rebellious conduct;
is a Rabbinic punishment imposed for violation of a Rabbinic prohibition. It is distinct from the -prescribed lashes mentioned earlier in the .
and if he transgressed and took her back
,
after divorcing her,
.
he must divorce her with a .
Once she has become forbidden to him through and stirah, divorcing her does not allow them to remarry. If he nevertheless takes her back afterward, he must end that renewed marriage with a .
Synopsis
A woman who commits adultery while married becomes forbidden to her husband, unlike a divorced woman who merely has non-marital relations with another man. A wife of an Israelite who was forced into the relations does not become forbidden to him. A woman who becomes forbidden through and stirah likewise may not continue with her husband; if he divorces and later takes her back, he must divorce her again.
🔎Dig DeeperWhen Relations During Marriage Forbid Her to Her Husband
When Relations During Marriage Forbid Her to Her Husband
The points out an apparent difficulty within the . Here, the Rambam states that the husband receives lashes for having relations with his wife after adultery has forbidden her to him. Other passages in Issurei Bi'ah and appear to indicate that lashes are not imposed in this situation.
The Kessef Mishneh therefore raises the question of how the Rambam's ruling here should be reconciled with those other passages.
When an Intervening Rabbinic Marriage Does—and Does Not—Prevent Her Return
If a divorced his wife through gestures,
,
as we have explained,
A in this context is a deaf-mute with limited legal capacity. His marriage and divorce operate within the Rabbinic framework established for his status, including the use of gestures.
,
and the woman then went and became to another ,
-
and needless to say, if she became to a legally competent man—
.
she is forbidden to return to her first husband, the .
Even when the second are to another and therefore likewise have only Rabbinic force, they are sufficient to prohibit her from returning to her first husband.
Certainly, if she became to a pike'ach — a legally competent man, whose can have -level force, she may not return to her first husband.
The now reverses the situation.
,
But if the wife of a legally competent man was divorced,
,
and she then married a ,
-
and was divorced from him—
.
she is permitted to return to her first husband, who is legally competent.
The difference is the status of the first marriage and the intervening marriage.
In this second case, her original marriage to the pike'ach was binding under law, but her intervening marriage to the had only Rabbinic force.
Since the second marriage was not binding under law, it does not create the prohibition that ordinarily prevents a divorced woman from returning to her first husband. For this purpose, it is as though she had not entered the type of intervening marriage described in Halachah 12.
This creates an important contrast:
First husband = → second husband = or pike'ach → she may not return to the first.
First husband = pike'ach → second husband = → she may return to the first after the second marriage ends.
Synopsis
If a divorces his wife and she subsequently becomes to another man—even another —she may not return to her first husband. But if her first husband was legally competent and her intervening marriage was only to a , that Rabbinic second marriage does not create the prohibition against returning to the first husband after it ends.
🔎Dig DeeperWhen an Intervening Rabbinic Marriage Does—and Does Not—Prevent Her Return
When an Intervening Rabbinic Marriage Does—and Does Not—Prevent Her Return
The Ra'avad disagrees with the 's ruling in the second case. His position is based on a different textual version of the , according to which the intervening marriage to the also prevents the woman from returning to her first husband.
This is one of the central distinctions of this chapter.
A ends a marriage from that point forward. Mi'un, by contrast, causes the Rabbinic marriage to be treated as though it had not existed.
,
Her status in relation to the husband whom she rejected
;
is the same as her status with a man who had never her at all;
Because mi'un does not leave behind the status of an ordinary divorce, the usual consequences of having once been married to this man do not remain.
,
she is permitted to marry his relatives,
,
and he is permitted to marry her relatives,
An actual marriage followed by divorce creates continuing prohibitions involving certain relatives. Mi'un does not create those restrictions.
.
and he has not disqualified her from marrying into the .
A woman who was divorced with a may not marry a . A girl who leaves through mi'un does not acquire the status of a divorcee and therefore is not disqualified from the because of this relationship.
,
If she then marries another man,
,
and the other man divorces her,
,
or he dies,
-
or she performs mi'un with him—
.
she is permitted to return to the first man.
Even if the intervening marriage ends through an actual or through the second husband's death, she may return to the first man.
What matters is how she originally left the first man: she left him through mi'un rather than through divorce. Therefore, she does not have the status of his divorcee for the prohibition against returning after an intervening marriage.
,
And not only that,
even if the first husband originally divorced her with a
,
and then took her back,
,
and she subsequently performed mi'un with him,
and then married another man
,
after performing mi'un with the first,
-
and the other man divorced her—
;
she is permitted to return to the first husband;
This is a more surprising case because the first husband had, at an earlier point, actually divorced her with a .
The sequence is:
First husband → → he takes her back → she performs mi'un → another husband → .
Nevertheless, she may return to the first husband.
,
because whenever a girl leaves a marriage through mi'un,
-
even if a preceded that mi'un—
,
she is treated as though she had never been divorced from him with a ,
.
and she is permitted to return to him.
The later mi'un shows that the renewed marriage to the first husband remained the type of Rabbinic minor marriage that could be undone through mi'un. For this law, the earlier therefore does not leave behind the usual status of divorce that would prevent her later return.
The now presents the reverse case.
,
But if a man divorces a minor girl with a ,
,
and she marries another man,
-
and then performs mi'un with the other man—
,
she is forbidden to return to the first husband,
,
because she left the first husband through a ,
.
even though she left the latter husband through mi'un.
Here, the sequence is:
First husband → → another husband → mi'un.
The later mi'un from the second husband does not erase the fact that she left the first husband through an actual .
That is the crucial distinction: what matters is how she left the first husband before entering the intervening marriage.
,
Needless to say, this applies
,
if the latter husband divorced her,
.
or died.
Certainly, if the intervening marriage ended through an actual or through the second husband's death, she may not return to the first husband whom she had originally left through a .
,
Similarly, she is forbidden to the first husband's father,
,
his son,
,
and his brother,
-
like other divorced women—
.
even though she left the latter husband through mi'un.
The original from the first husband created the ordinary continuing restrictions of divorce between her and his close relatives. Her later mi'un from another husband does not remove those restrictions.
Synopsis
Mi'un does not have the status of divorce. If a girl leaves the first man through mi'un, she may return to him even after an intervening marriage ends. But if she left the first husband through an actual , a later mi'un from another husband does not erase the consequences of that original divorce. The key is how she left the first husband before the intervening marriage.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
Chana leaves her first husband through mi'un and later marries another man. Even if that second husband eventually divorces her with a , Chana may still return to the first man. Why? She was never considered the first man's divorcee; she left him through mi'un. If she had originally left the first husband through a , the result after an intervening marriage would be different.
🔎Dig DeeperMi'un Is Not Divorce
Mi'un Is Not Divorce
The explains an additional concern behind the case in which the first husband divorced her with a and she later left the second husband through mi'un.
Since the first husband divorced her, rather than she rejecting him, there may still be an attachment between them. were concerned that he might persuade her to perform mi'un from the second husband so that she could return to him.
When she originally left the first husband through mi'un, this concern is not present in the same way, because she herself had rejected him.
The now discusses a minor whose husband died childless and who became connected to one of his brothers through the bond of .
As established earlier in the chapter, she can use mi'un in relation to the .
,
is forbidden to the 's father,
because she appeared to be his daughter-in-law
;
at the time his son died;
The 's father is also the father of her deceased husband. At the moment his son died, she had the appearance of being this man's daughter-in-law.
Her later mi'un with the surviving brother does not remove that appearance retroactively. She therefore remains forbidden to the father.
,
But with regard to the 's other relatives,
.
she is permitted.
The special restriction is limited to the father. Mi'un does not create the ordinary family restrictions that would result from an actual marriage followed by divorce.
,
Therefore, if she performed mi'un with one of the ,
.
she is permitted to his brothers.
If the deceased husband had several brothers, those brothers are also potential . Rejecting one brother through mi'un does not make her forbidden to the others.
Synopsis
If a minor performs mi'un with a , she remains forbidden to his father, who is also the father of her deceased husband, because she had appeared to be his daughter-in-law when his son died. She remains permitted to the other brothers, so mi'un with one potential does not prohibit her from the others.
🔎Dig DeeperMi'un From a
Mi'un From a
The and disagree with the and maintain that she is forbidden to the deceased husband's other relatives as well, with the exception of his brothers.
The records both positions but gives greater weight to the Rambam's ruling.
The now begins a new group of laws. Before a divorced or widowed woman enters another marriage, she must wait a specified period.
she may not marry
and may not enter
,
until she waits ninety days,
Here, means actual , not merely an informal engagement or agreement to marry.
The restriction therefore applies both to and to nisu'in.
not counting the day on which she was divorced
,
or the day on which her husband died,
,
and not counting the day on which she enters new ,
Neither endpoint day is counted as one of the ninety days. There must be ninety full intervening days between the end of the previous marriage and the new .
so that it can become known
whether she is pregnant
,
or is not pregnant,
The waiting period allows enough time to determine whether a pregnancy began during the previous marriage.
so as to distinguish between the offspring of the first husband
.
and the offspring of the later husband.
The purpose is to establish clearly which husband fathered the child.
Knowing paternal identity is important throughout , including for determining prohibited family relationships and the laws of .
◇BackgroundWhy Ninety Days?
Imagine that a woman remarried immediately after a divorce and then discovered several weeks later that she was pregnant.
Without a waiting period, it could be impossible to determine whether the child was conceived during the first marriage or the second.
The ninety-day separation creates a clear boundary between the two relationships so that the child's paternal identity can be established.
Synopsis
A divorced or widowed woman must wait ninety full intervening days before entering new or nisu'in. Neither the day the previous marriage ended nor the day of the new counts toward the ninety days. The waiting period allows any pregnancy from the previous marriage to become identifiable, preventing uncertainty about which husband fathered the child.
Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration
Suppose divorces and immediately marries . Six weeks later, she discovers that she is pregnant. Was the child conceived near the end of her marriage to or at the beginning of her marriage to ? The ninety-day waiting period creates a clear separation between the two marriages so that this uncertainty over the child's father does not arise.
Ninety intervening days create a clear boundary between the previous marriage and the next, preventing uncertainty about when conception occurred.
🔎Dig DeeperThe 90-Day Waiting Period
The 90-Day Waiting Period
The notes that although she may not enter during these ninety days, an ordinary agreement or engagement to marry later is permitted, provided that she does not enter into private seclusion with her future husband during the waiting period.
The requires ninety days between one marriage and the next so there will be a clear boundary between them. Before beginning something new, the previous chapter needs enough space that the two do not become confused.
That can be useful beyond this specific . We sometimes rush from one responsibility, experience, or stage straight into the next without giving ourselves time to understand what we are carrying forward. Even a small pause after finishing something—a project, a difficult conversation, or a busy day—can help us enter what comes next with greater clarity.
Try today
Before moving into your next major task, take one quiet minute to close out what came before.
For a divorced woman, the count begins from the day the is written.
The previous established the requirement to wait ninety days. The now defines when those ninety days begin in the case of divorce.
.
The ninety days are counted for the divorced woman from that point.
The count does not necessarily begin when the actually reaches her. It begins from the day it is written.
,
This applies even if the was conditional,
A conditional takes effect only in accordance with the condition attached to it. Nevertheless, for purposes of calculating the ninety-day waiting period, the count begins from the writing of the .
This rule concerns when the waiting-period count begins, not when the divorce itself takes effect. Counting from the writing of the does not permit her to remarry before the is delivered and the divorce takes effect. It means only that, once the divorce takes effect, the required ninety-day interval may already have elapsed.
or if it did not reach her hand
-
until several years later—
Even a long delay between the writing and delivery of the does not change the starting point for this count.
,
the count begins from the day it was written,
because her husband no longer enters into private seclusion with her
.
from the time he has written the for her.
Since they no longer enter — private seclusion from the time the is written, that date provides the point from which the separation needed for the ninety-day calculation can begin.
The purpose remains the one established in Halachah 18: to create a clear enough separation to determine the paternity of a later child.
Synopsis
For a divorced woman, the counts the ninety-day waiting period from the date the was written, even if the was conditional or did not reach her until much later. This does not permit her to remarry before the is delivered and the divorce takes effect. It means only that, once the divorce takes effect, the required ninety-day interval may already have elapsed.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
A is written for Rivka today, but for some reason it does not reach her until much later. According to the , the ninety-day count is measured from when the was written, not from when Rivka eventually receives it. The divorce itself may depend on the 's delivery or conditions, but the waiting-period calculation begins from its writing.
🔎Dig DeeperWhen the Ninety Days Begin
When the Ninety Days Begin
The , citing , differs from the and maintains that the ninety-day count should begin from the day the actually reaches the woman rather than from the date on which it was written.
The Waiting Period Applies Even When Pregnancy Is Not a Concern
It is an enactment of the Sages
,
that even a woman who is incapable of bearing children,
The ninety-day waiting period was established to distinguish the paternity of a possible child. We might therefore expect it to apply only when pregnancy is possible.
did not make that distinction.
and even if she was divorced
-
or widowed while still only in —
.
she must wait ninety days.
Even if the previous relationship had reached only — , rather than nisu'in, the waiting period still applies.
The now gives a series of cases showing how broadly this enactment applies.
,
Even a minor girl,
,
or an elderly woman,
,
or a barren woman,
,
or an ,
An is a woman whose physical development establishes that she is regarded as incapable of bearing children.
These examples show that the enactment applies even where the ordinary concern about pregnancy does not apply to the individual case.
,
and even if her husband was overseas,
,
or ill,
,
or imprisoned,
These examples approach the issue from another direction. The woman herself may be capable of becoming pregnant, but the circumstances indicate that she and her husband were apart or otherwise unable to live together normally.
Nevertheless, the same ninety-day requirement applies.
-
even a virgin who was only in —
.
all of these women must wait ninety days.
Even when it is known that the woman remained a virgin during , did not create an exception.
The enactment was applied uniformly rather than determining separately in each case whether the concern that originally motivated the waiting period was present.
Synopsis
applied the ninety-day waiting period uniformly, even where pregnancy is not a concern in the individual case or the circumstances strongly indicate that the couple had not been living together. A minor, elderly woman, barren woman, , woman whose husband was absent or unable to be with her, and even a virgin leaving must all wait ninety days.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
An elderly widow clearly cannot be pregnant, while another woman was only in and remained a virgin. It might seem that neither needs a ninety-day waiting period. Nevertheless, both wait. established the rule broadly rather than requiring a new investigation into the likelihood of pregnancy every time a marriage ends.
🔎Dig DeeperThe Waiting Period Applies Even When Pregnancy Is Not a Concern
The Waiting Period Applies Even When Pregnancy Is Not a Concern
The in explains that applied this enactment universally so that people would not begin searching for loopholes and exceptions that could undermine the rule.
applied the ninety-day rule even in cases where its usual concern seems absent. Rather than creating endless individual exceptions, they established a consistent boundary that would not be weakened by people searching for loopholes.
Personal commitments often work the same way. If every tired morning becomes a reason to reconsider when you learn, daven, exercise, or put away your phone, the decision has to be made again every day. A clear rule can remove that negotiation. Not every circumstance needs a new decision; sometimes consistency itself protects what matters.
Try today
Choose one worthwhile commitment you tend to renegotiate and decide on one simple boundary you will stop reopening.
The ninety-day waiting period applies when a woman enters a new status through emancipation or conversion as well.
Here too, the waiting period creates a clear boundary between a possible conception before the change in status and one afterward.
,
Even if a man and his wife convert together,
At first glance, there seems to be no uncertainty about who the father is: the same man was her husband before conversion and remains with her afterward.
Nevertheless:
,
they are separated from one another for ninety days,
in order to distinguish
,
between offspring conceived in holiness
.
and offspring not conceived in holiness.
Here, the concern is not uncertainty over which man fathered the child. The father is known.
The distinction is when conception occurred.
Zera shenizra bikedushah — offspring conceived in holiness means a child conceived after the parents' conversion. Zera shelo nizra bikedushah refers to a child conceived before their conversion.
The ninety-day separation makes it possible to distinguish between those two possibilities.
-
Similarly, with regard to a yefas to'ar—
A yefas to'ar is the non-Jewish female captive described by the whom a Jewish soldier wishes to marry under the special procedure set out in 21.
although the gave her
,
thirty days for her own preparation,
The establishes an initial thirty-day period as part of the procedure governing the yefas to'ar.
she must wait ninety days
.
for the sake of establishing the child's status.
The ninety days are needed because she may have conceived during the soldier's initial relations with her. The waiting period makes it possible to distinguish such a child from one conceived later, after the process permitting their marriage has been completed.
Thus, the two periods serve different purposes:
The gives thirty days לְתַקָּנַת עַצְמָהּ — for her own preparation.
The full ninety days are לְתַקָּנַת הַוְלָד — for establishing the child's status.
And the thirty days
.
are included within the ninety.
The periods are not added together to make 120 days. The 's thirty-day period counts as part of the total ninety-day waiting period.
◇BackgroundSame Father, Different Status
The case of a husband and wife who convert together shows that the ninety-day rule is not concerned only with identifying who the father is.
Here, the father is known.
What must be clarified is whether the child was conceived before conversion or after conversion, because those two possibilities give the child different circumstances.
The ninety-day separation creates a clear boundary between them.
Synopsis
A freed maidservant and a woman who converts are subject to a ninety-day waiting period. Even a husband and wife who convert together must separate for ninety days so that conception before conversion can be distinguished from conception afterward. A yefas to'ar likewise waits a total of ninety days so that a possible conception from the soldier's initial relations can be distinguished from a later conception; the 's thirty-day period is included within those ninety days.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
A non-Jewish husband and wife convert together and want to continue their life together. There is no question who would be the father of a child—it is the same man either way. They nevertheless separate for ninety days so that if she becomes pregnant, it can be determined whether conception occurred before conversion or after conversion.
🔎Dig DeeperWaiting After Conversion or Emancipation
Waiting After Conversion or Emancipation
The and understand the 's ruling about a giyores — female convert as referring to a woman who had been married before converting. According to this understanding, an unmarried non-Jewish woman who converts is not included in this particular requirement.
The disagrees and maintains that the ninety-day waiting period applies even if she was unmarried before conversion.
Sources: Maggid Mishneh on 11:21; , 13:5; Radbaz on 11:21.
Halachah 20 showed how broadly applied the ninety-day waiting period. Here, however, the identifies situations that were not included in that enactment.
A girl who leaves through mi'un is the first such case.
for the Sages did not enact the decree
.
except with regard to a divorced woman.
Mi'un is not divorce. As explained earlier in the chapter, a girl who leaves through mi'un does not acquire the ordinary status of a divorcee. The specific ninety-day decree imposed upon a divorced woman was therefore not applied to her.
,
Similarly, a woman who voluntarily engages in non-marital relations
,
does not need to wait ninety days,
because she takes precautions
.
so that she will not become pregnant.
The ninety-day waiting period protects against uncertainty over the paternity of a possible child. Here, the states that a woman voluntarily engaging in non-marital relations takes precautions against becoming pregnant, so did not require her to wait.
Similarly, a woman who was raped
,
or a woman who was enticed or seduced into such relations,
.
do not need to wait ninety days.
Here, mezanah states the general rule for voluntary non-marital relations. The then adds two classic legal categories: anusah, a woman who was forced, and mefutah, a woman who was enticed or seduced. Although a mefutah's relations were also consensual, she is identified as a distinct category.
The ruling here concerns specifically the waiting period before a later marriage. It does not mean that these different situations have the same status in other areas of .
Synopsis
A girl who leaves through mi'un does not wait ninety days, because imposed this decree upon a divorcee and mi'un is not divorce. A woman who voluntarily had non-marital relations likewise does not wait, since the states that she takes precautions against pregnancy. The also names the distinct categories of anusah, a woman who was forced, and mefutah, a woman who was enticed or seduced; neither requires the ninety-day waiting period.
The marriage was entered with the mistaken understanding that it was permitted.
,
and it became known that she was forbidden to her husband,
It was subsequently discovered that the couple were prohibited from remaining married.
-
and removed her from him—
therefore required the relationship to end once the prohibition became known.
if she was a minor girl
,
who was too young to bear a child,
This qualification is essential. The ruling applies specifically to a minor who is not capable of becoming pregnant.
If she were old enough to conceive while in this prohibited relationship, she would need to wait so that it could be determined whether a child had been conceived during that relationship.
;
she does not need to wait ninety days;
Although Halachah 20 ordinarily requires even a minor to wait, this particular situation is treated differently.
,
because this is an uncommon situation,
and regarding a situation that does not commonly occur,
.
the Sages did not impose their decree.
Halachah 20 showed that ordinarily did not create individual exceptions to the ninety-day rule. Here, however, the entire situation is identified as uncommon: a minor too young to conceive entered a prohibited marriage under a mistaken assumption and then was removed from it by .
did not extend their general decree to such an unusual case.
Synopsis
If a minor girl who is too young to conceive entered a prohibited marriage under a mistaken assumption and required her to leave, she does not need to wait ninety days. did not extend their decree to this uncommon situation. If she were old enough to conceive, however, she would need to wait so that a possible conception from that relationship could be identified.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
An eight-year-old girl entered a marriage under the mistaken belief that it was permitted. later discovers that she is forbidden to this husband and requires them to separate. Because she is too young to become pregnant and the entire situation is highly unusual, she does not need the ninety-day wait. This differs from the ordinary cases in which applied the waiting period broadly.
If a man enters with her during the ninety-day waiting period,
Here, means actual , not merely an informal engagement.
The now addresses what happens when a man enters with a woman before her required waiting period has ended.
.
he is placed under nidui.
Nidui is a formal Rabbinic ban imposed here as a disciplinary measure for violating the enactment.
The does not say that the are void. Rather, the man is sanctioned for entering during the prohibited period.
,
If he entered with her and then fled,
.
he is not placed under nidui.
If he leaves after the , the rules that nidui is not imposed. The practical result is that the couple remain apart during the prohibited period.
,
If he entered nisu'in with her during the ninety-day period,
This case goes further than alone: the couple have already entered married life before the required waiting period has ended.
they are separated from one another
,
until after the required period has ended,
The marriage itself is not dissolved. Rather, the couple must remain apart for the remainder of the ninety-day waiting period.
.
and afterward he may live together with his wife.
Once the waiting period has ended, they may resume married life. They do not require new or nisu'in, because their existing marriage was never dissolved.
The three cases can therefore be distinguished clearly:
during the waiting period: he is placed under nidui.
followed by his departure: nidui is not imposed.
Nisu'in during the waiting period: the couple are temporarily separated until the period ends, after which they may resume married life.
Synopsis
If a man enters with a woman during her required ninety-day waiting period, he is placed under nidui. If he enters and then flees, nidui is not imposed. If they already entered nisu'in, their marriage is not dissolved; they are separated until the ninety days have ended and may then resume married life without new or nisu'in.
Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration
During 's required ninety-day waiting period, improperly enters with her. He is placed under nidui. If instead they went further and entered nisu'in, they would have to live apart until the ninety days ended. Their marriage would not be canceled; once the waiting period was complete, they could resume married life without performing new .
Improper brings nidui, while entering nisu'in during the waiting period requires the couple to live apart until the period ends.
🔎Dig DeeperViolating the Ninety-Day Waiting Period
Violating the Ninety-Day Waiting Period
The Ra'avad maintains that the nidui is intended to compel the man to divorce her. The records this opinion.
The Rama states that in this situation the man is advised to flee, thereby remaining apart from the woman during the waiting period.
The now introduces a different protective enactment.
The previous dealt with situations in which a waiting period was needed to clarify a child's paternity. Here, there is no uncertainty about the father. The concern is instead for the welfare of another man's fetus or nursing child.
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even though it is known whose offspring the child is.
This phrase makes the distinction explicit. The prohibition does not arise from uncertainty about who fathered the child.
Even when the father is definitely known, prohibited another man from marrying the pregnant or nursing mother because of the concerns that follow.
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With regard to a pregnant woman—
there is concern that the fetus might be harmed
,
during marital relations,
The presents this as the concern underlying 's decree concerning a woman who is pregnant with another man's child. This explains the rationale as formulated it; it is not intended as contemporary medical guidance.
because he will not be as concerned
;
for another man's child;
The explains the decree as a concern that the new husband, knowing that the fetus is another man's child, may not exercise the same degree of caution to avoid harming it.
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And with regard to a nursing woman—
,
there is concern that her milk might become impaired,
The gives a separate concern regarding a nursing mother.
and the new husband may not be sufficiently concerned
to restore the milk
through measures that help restore it
.
if it becomes impaired.
If her ability to nurse is affected, measures may be needed to restore her milk. were concerned that a new husband would not take sufficient responsibility for those needs because the nursing child is another man's child.
Thus, both parts of the decree protect a child whose biological father is not the woman's new husband.
Synopsis
prohibited a man from marrying a woman who is pregnant with or nursing another man's child, even when the child's father is definitely known. The explains that, during pregnancy, the concern is that the new husband may not exercise sufficient caution to avoid harming another man's fetus; during nursing, the concern is that he may not take sufficient measures to restore the mother's milk if it becomes impaired.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
is pregnant from her previous husband, and everyone knows exactly who the baby's father is. She still may not marry another man during the protected period. Unlike the ninety-day rule, the issue here is not identifying the father. 's concern is for the welfare of a fetus whose father is someone other than the new husband.
The Rebbe ExplainsWhen halachah calls for medical guidance
When halachah calls for medical guidance
The explains that prohibited marrying a woman who is pregnant with another man’s child partly because the new husband may not be sufficiently careful, and marital relations could harm the developing child.
The Rebbe refers to the ’s teaching that marital relations can have different effects during the various stages of pregnancy: during the first three months they may be difficult for both the mother and child; during the middle months, difficult for the mother but beneficial for the child; and during the final months, beneficial for both. At the same time, the Rebbe notes that in a number of medical matters it has been ruled that physical conditions have changed since the era of the .
The ’s ruling here nevertheless shows that the possibility of harm during pregnancy is recognized in practical and must be taken seriously. The Rebbe therefore concludes that the proper guidance for an individual situation must come from an expert physician. General statements found in sources should not be turned into personal medical instructions without evaluating the actual circumstances.
were concerned for the welfare of a fetus or nursing child whose father was someone else. The 's concern is precisely that a new husband might not exercise the same care for a child who is not his own.
It is easier to feel responsible for what carries our name—our project, our family, our problem. But life constantly places someone else's needs in front of us: fixing a coworker's mistake, protecting something we borrowed, or noticing a person who could easily be overlooked. Responsibility can mean caring properly even when we could say, “That's not mine.”
Try today
Notice one thing that is not technically your responsibility but that you can protect or care for properly anyway.
The previous prohibited marrying a woman who is nursing another man's child. The now defines how long that restriction lasts.
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Twenty-four months,
For purposes of this enactment, the nursing period extends for twenty-four months.
not including the day on which the child was born
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or the day on which the woman enters .
Here, means actual , not merely an informal engagement.
The child's birth date and the day of the new are not counted as part of the required twenty-four-month period.
Synopsis
The nursing period for this restriction lasts twenty-four months. Neither the day of the child's birth nor the day of the woman's new is counted as part of that period.
🔎Dig DeeperHow Long the Nursing Period Lasts
How Long the Nursing Period Lasts
The rules that if these twenty-four months span a Jewish leap year, the extra month is included as part of the twenty-four months.
The , however, rules that ideally an additional month should be added in such a case.
Weaning the Child Does Not Normally End the Restriction Early
,
Just as it is forbidden to marry her,
so too it is forbidden to enter with her
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until this period has ended.
The restriction applies not only to nisu'in but even to — during the twenty-four-month nursing period.
,
Even if she gave her child to a wet nurse,
or she weaned him
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during the twenty-four months—
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she may not marry.
At first glance, once another woman is nursing the child—or once the child has been weaned—the original concern about the mother's milk appears no longer to apply.
Nevertheless, these steps do not ordinarily shorten the twenty-four-month restriction.
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If her child dies—
,
she is permitted to marry,
Once the child has died, the concern that motivated the nursing restriction no longer exists.
and we are not concerned
.
that perhaps she will kill him.
Although remarriage becomes permitted if the child dies, did not extend the restriction out of fear that a mother might deliberately harm her child in order to marry sooner.
Synopsis
The restriction on marrying a nursing mother applies even to and normally continues for the full twenty-four months. Giving the child to a wet nurse or weaning him early does not ordinarily permit the mother to marry sooner. If the child dies, however, she may marry; did not prohibit this out of concern that a mother might harm her child in order to remarry.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
A widow has a six-month-old baby and wants to remarry. She arranges for another woman to nurse the baby instead. That does not ordinarily allow her to marry immediately; the twenty-four-month restriction remains. Simply changing who is nursing the child after the father's death does not normally shorten the period established to protect the child.
🔎Dig DeeperWeaning the Child Does Not Normally End the Restriction Early
Weaning the Child Does Not Normally End the Restriction Early
explains that if giving the child to a wet nurse or weaning the child were enough to permit remarriage, women might be encouraged to take one of those steps specifically in order to marry sooner.
There are circumstances, however, in which this concern does not apply. The rules that if the child had already been given to a wet nurse during the first husband's lifetime, or if the mother is physically incapable of nursing, she may remarry.
In those cases, the nursing arrangement was not changed after the fact simply to allow the mother to marry sooner.
✦Live ItHalachah 27: Don't solve a responsibility by moving it away
Halachah 27: Don't solve a responsibility by moving it away
The rules that the nursing-period restriction does not normally disappear simply because the child was given to a wet nurse or weaned early. Changing the immediate arrangement does not automatically remove the responsibility that the original safeguard was meant to protect.
Sometimes we do something similar: instead of dealing with a responsibility, we rearrange things until it no longer feels like ours. We mute the reminder, hand off the annoying part, or find a technical workaround. Before doing that, it can be worth asking whether the underlying responsibility has actually disappeared—or whether we have only moved it out of sight.
Try today
When you are tempted to work around an obligation, ask yourself: “Did the responsibility change, or did I only rearrange it?”
If a man transgressed and married a pregnant woman,
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or a nursing woman during this prohibited period—
The previous established that a man may not marry a woman who is pregnant with or nursing another man's child. The now addresses what happens if he violates that prohibition and actually enters nisu'in with her.
,
he must divorce her with a ,
This is more stringent than violating the ninety-day waiting period discussed in Halachah 24.
There, if the couple entered nisu'in during the ninety days, they were temporarily separated until the period ended, after which they could resume married life.
Here, temporary separation is not sufficient. The marriage must actually be ended with a .
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This applies even if he is a .
This makes the ruling especially significant.
A who divorces his wife cannot later remarry her. Nevertheless, even though giving this will permanently prevent the couple from reuniting, he must divorce her.
,
But if he was an Israelite,
he may take her back
.
after the twenty-four-month nursing period has ended.
Unlike a , an Israelite is not ordinarily prohibited from remarrying his divorcee.
Therefore, the separation need not be permanent. If she was pregnant when he married her, the restriction continues throughout the pregnancy and through the subsequent twenty-four-month nursing period. If she was already nursing, it continues until the remainder of that nursing period has ended. Once the applicable period ends, he may marry her again.
,
If he married her and then fled,
and after the required period
he returned
,
and lived together with his wife,
.
there is no problem with this.
If he married her and then fled, remaining away until the prohibited period had ended, the does not require a when he later returns. At that point, he may resume living with his wife.
In practice, his absence meant that they did not live together during the prohibited period.
If a man entered with a pregnant woman
,
or a nursing woman,
The now distinguishes — from actual nisu'in.
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we do not compel him to divorce her.
Although entering during this period was prohibited, the couple have not yet entered nisu'in.
The therefore remain in place. Unlike a man who actually entered nisu'in with her, he is not compelled to give her a .
But he may not enter nisu'in with her
,
until after the nursing period has ended,
Although the existing remain in place, the couple may not proceed to nisu'in while the restriction continues.
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or until the child dies.
If the child dies before the period ends, the restriction likewise ends, as established in the previous . The couple may then proceed to nisu'in.
Halachah 28 distinguishes between violating this restriction through and through nisu'in.
If they entered nisu'in, the requires an actual .
If they entered only , the remain in place, but they may not proceed to nisu'in until the restricted period ends or the child dies.
Thus, although entering during this period is prohibited, after the fact the treats it differently from an actual nisu'in.
Synopsis
If a man violates the prohibition and enters nisu'in with a woman who is pregnant with or nursing another man's child, he must divorce her—even if he is a . An Israelite may remarry her after the restricted period has ended. If he married her and then remained away until that period ended, he may return and live with her. If he entered only , the does not compel him to divorce her, but they may not proceed to nisu'in until the nursing period ends or the child dies.
Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration
improperly enters with a woman who is still within the protected nursing period. The does not require him to give her a , but they cannot proceed to nisu'in yet. If had already entered nisu'in with her, the ruling would be stricter: he would have to divorce her with a . Thus, the same prohibited period has different after-the-fact consequences depending on how far the marriage progressed.
During the protected nursing period, remains in place but cannot advance to nisu'in. If the couple already entered nisu'in, the requires a .
🔎Dig DeeperIf He Married a Pregnant or Nursing Woman
If He Married a Pregnant or Nursing Woman
The Ra'avad maintains that the man is placed under nidui until he divorces her. The records this ruling.
The is more stringent and treats like nisu'in in this respect, requiring the man to divorce her.
Translation and elucidation: Independently prepared for Rambam, Clearly in contemporary English. Translation follows the Rambam’s words; elucidation supplies only the context needed to understand them.
Word cards and glossary: Hebrew word cards distinguish a word’s basic meaning from its meaning in the particular phrase. Shared glossary entries explain recurring terms; biography entries identify the cited authorities.
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Synopsis: A short summary follows each halachah. It is a guide to the central ruling, not a replacement for the full text and its qualifications.
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Chapter 11 at a glance
From a minor's refusal to safeguards between marriages
The chapter defines the temporary right of mi'un and its consequences, then explains the waiting periods that preserve clear family status and protect an unborn or nursing child.
A minor orphan may end her Rabbinically established marriage through mi'un without receiving a . The same applies to a minor whose father originally married her off, if that -level marriage first ended through divorce or widowhood and she then entered another marriage while still a minor.
A girl may exercise mi'un only while she retains the status of a minor. Once she becomes a na'arah or is established as an , that right ends. After twelve years and one day, she is ordinarily presumed to have developed signs of maturity; if marital relations then take place, those relations establish -level and mi'un can no longer end the marriage.
If a minor's Rabbinic marriage continues until she reaches adulthood without later relations with her first husband, she loses the right of mi'un but requires a only by Rabbinic law. Because the first bond remains Rabbinic, -level from a second man can take effect. The later rulings—including the different status of children from the two men—follow from the distinction between the first husband's Rabbinic bond and the second man's -level.
Mi'un is accomplished when the minor clearly declares before two people that she does not want her husband or the through which she was married to him. No special formula or formal setting is required; a clear statement expressing her rejection of the marriage is sufficient.
The two people who witness the girl's mi'un write and sign a document recording what occurred. Unlike an ordinary , this document does not cause the separation; the girl's declaration of mi'un already did that. It therefore does not require the special writing, delivery, or wording of a and serves as a legal record of the mi'un.
Once a divorced woman becomes to another man, she is forbidden to return to her first husband even if the second relationship never progressed to marital relations. If that second relationship later ends and the first husband nevertheless takes her back and has relations with her, he violates a prohibition, receives lashes, and is compelled to divorce her.
Mi'un does not have the status of divorce. If a girl leaves the first man through mi'un, she may return to him even after an intervening marriage ends. But if she left the first husband through an actual , a later mi'un from another husband does not erase the consequences of that original divorce. The key is how she left the first husband before the intervening marriage.
A divorced or widowed woman must wait ninety full intervening days before entering new or nisu'in. Neither the day the previous marriage ended nor the day of the new counts toward the ninety days. The waiting period allows any pregnancy from the previous marriage to become identifiable, preventing uncertainty about which husband fathered the child.
applied the ninety-day waiting period uniformly, even where pregnancy is not a concern in the individual case or the circumstances strongly indicate that the couple had not been living together. A minor, elderly woman, barren woman, , woman whose husband was absent or unable to be with her, and even a virgin leaving must all wait ninety days.
A freed maidservant and a woman who converts are subject to a ninety-day waiting period. Even a husband and wife who convert together must separate for ninety days so that conception before conversion can be distinguished from conception afterward. A yefas to'ar likewise waits a total of ninety days so that a possible conception from the soldier's initial relations can be distinguished from a later conception; the 's thirty-day period is included within those ninety days.
If a man enters with a woman during her required ninety-day waiting period, he is placed under nidui. If he enters and then flees, nidui is not imposed. If they already entered nisu'in, their marriage is not dissolved; they are separated until the ninety days have ended and may then resume married life without new or nisu'in.
prohibited a man from marrying a woman who is pregnant with or nursing another man's child, even when the child's father is definitely known. The explains that, during pregnancy, the concern is that the new husband may not exercise sufficient caution to avoid harming another man's fetus; during nursing, the concern is that he may not take sufficient measures to restore the mother's milk if it becomes impaired.
If a man violates the prohibition and enters nisu'in with a woman who is pregnant with or nursing another man's child, he must divorce her—even if he is a . An Israelite may remarry her after the restricted period has ended. If he married her and then remained away until that period ended, he may return and live with her. If he entered only , the does not compel him to divorce her, but they may not proceed to nisu'in until the nursing period ends or the child dies.
פרק יא
End of chapter.
You have reached the end of all twenty-eight halachos.
