The legal status and consequences of divorce

These expressions describe the strongest level of invalidity used by the Rambam. The get has not effected a divorce under Torah law.

Her original marriage remains completely intact. This is not merely a Rabbinic defect in an otherwise effective divorce; on the Torah level, she is still married to her husband.

Since the first marriage was never terminated under Torah law, she was still an eishes ish when she entered the second relationship.

Ordinarily, an ineffective get does not give her the status of a gerushah with regard to the prohibition against a Kohen marrying a divorced woman. Since no divorce took effect, she does not become forbidden to her Kohen husband on that account.

The attempted divorce does not take effect because it does not fully release her from the marriage: he seeks to separate her from himself while still preventing her from marrying anyone else.

Although the attempted divorce is ineffective, it has enough resemblance to a divorce for the Sages to treat it as rei'ach ha-get for this limited purpose. She therefore becomes Rabbinically forbidden to the kehunah even though she has not actually become divorced.

This is fundamentally different from a get that is batel. A get described as pasul is effective under Torah law; the defect in it is Rabbinic. That distinction explains all the consequences that follow.

Since the divorce is effective on the Torah level, she has the Torah status of a divorced woman and is therefore forbidden to a Kohen.

Because the problem with the get is Rabbinic rather than a failure of the Torah divorce, she may not rely on it to remarry initially. If she already remarried, however, that marriage is not dissolved, and a child born from it is legitimate.

The Rabbinic defect should be corrected by obtaining a fully valid get from her first husband. She does not need to leave her present husband while this is being done.

The children are halachically legitimate. Nevertheless, if their father were to divorce their mother specifically because a defect was discovered in her original get, people might mistakenly question the children's legitimacy. He should therefore not create such a damaging rumor about them.

This is the third category. A batel get definitely did not effect a Torah divorce. A pasul get did effect a Torah divorce but has a Rabbinic defect. Here, by contrast, we genuinely do not know whether the divorce took effect.

If the original divorce took effect, she was free to marry the second man. If it did not, she remained an eishes ish. Since her marital status is unresolved, the child's status is likewise doubtful.

According to the Rambam’s wording, he does not need to renew the nisu'in, recite Sheva Berachos, or write a new kesubah unless she underwent a complete divorce. The Maggid Mishneh and Kessef Mishneh nevertheless understand that renewed kiddushin are still required.

As established in Halachah 1, a get batel did not effect a divorce under Torah law. She therefore remained married to her first husband when she entered the second marriage.

Her second marriage did not create a valid Torah marriage while she was still an eishes ish. Nevertheless, because she publicly entered nisu'in with the second man and lived as his wife, the Sages required her to receive a get from him. Otherwise, people might see her leave what appeared to be a marriage without a get and mistakenly conclude that a married woman can do so.

The two gittin serve different purposes. The first husband's get is necessary to end the Torah marriage that never actually terminated. The second husband's get is required by Rabbinic decree because of the appearance created by her second marriage.

Her mistake was unintentional: she believed that her original divorce was valid and that she was free to remarry. Nevertheless, the Rambam rules that she may remain with neither man.

Regarding her return to the first husband, the Rambam gives a specific concern: people might mistakenly understand the sequence as a valid divorce, followed by a valid marriage to another man, followed by the first husband taking back his divorcee after that second marriage.

The prohibition against remaining with either man continues even after the fact. If either one takes her back, he must separate from her.

This parallels the previous halachah. There, she entered a second marriage because she believed that a get had ended her first marriage. Here, she did so because witnesses testified that her husband had died. When he returns, it becomes clear that her first marriage had never ended.

A cheresh in this context has limited halachic capacity, so his kiddushin are not complete kiddushin. Nevertheless, the Rambam applies this ruling whether the first husband or the second husband has that status. Cheresh here refers to the specific classical halachic category discussed by Chazal; it should not automatically be applied to every deaf person today.

The law is therefore not limited to a case in which both marriages have the ordinary full legal status.

Even where the kiddushin of a cheresh are not complete, the Rambam applies the same consequences: she must separate from both men, receive a get from each, and may not return to either one.

She underwent kiddushin with the second man but did not proceed to nisu'in. This is the crucial difference between this case and the previous two halachos.

When it becomes clear that her first marriage never ended, it also becomes clear that the second kiddushin could not have taken effect.

Unlike the woman who actually entered nisu'in with a second man in Halachos 4–5, merely undergoing the second kiddushin does not make her permanently forbidden to her first husband.

Since her first marriage was still intact, she remained an eishes ish, and kiddushin with another man could not take effect. There is therefore no second Torah marriage that would require a get.

The remaining question is why the Sages do not nevertheless require a get from the second man for appearances, as they did in Halachah 4. After all, in both cases the second relationship could not create a valid Torah marriage.

Since she never proceeded from kiddushin to nisu'in with the second man, people can attribute the end of those kiddushin to an unfulfilled condition. There is therefore no strong appearance that a married woman simply left a marriage without receiving a get.

This explains the difference between Halachos 4 and 6: second nisu'in creates the appearance that requires a Rabbinic get; second kiddushin alone does not.

This continues the cases discussed above. The woman entered a second marriage believing that her first marriage had ended, but it later became clear that she had still been married to her first husband.

The Rambam now describes the financial and marital consequences of that mistaken second marriage.

These are rights that ordinarily accompany marriage. In this unusual situation, neither man receives these marital rights.

Here, פֵּרוֹת — produce refers to the benefits or income generated by property belonging to the woman.

Although neither man is now entitled to these marital benefits, whatever they already consumed is not recovered from them.

Just as neither man receives the ordinary marital rights listed above, she cannot demand from either man the ordinary financial rights of marriage.

Nichsei tzon barzel are assets whose value is assessed when they enter the marriage, with the husband ordinarily assuming responsibility for that assessed value. Even if such property was lost or wore out here, the Rambam rules that its value is not recovered from either man.

Since her first marriage had never actually ended, the Rambam rules that a child born from her relationship with the second man is a mamzer.

Although the first man remains her actual husband, Halachah 4 established that after she entered the second marriage she became forbidden to both men and requires a get from the second. Therefore, if the first husband resumes relations with her before that required get is given, the Rambam gives the resulting child the status of a mamzer by Rabbinic decree.

The difference is when the true situation became known. Once the mistake has been discovered, she cannot collect the marital payments described above and must return what she takes. But if the second husband had already divorced her and she had already received support or her kesubah before the first husband returned or the original get was discovered to be void, those payments are not recovered from her.

The Rambam specifically says that the first brother performed kiddushin with her. He does not say here that they had already entered nisu'in.

The second brother acted on the report that the first brother had died and performed what was understood to be yibbum.

It now becomes clear that the first brother had never died and that his original kiddushin were still in force when the second brother performed yibbum.

The Rambam applies the same framework established in the preceding halachos: she must separate from both men, requires a get from each, and the other consequences already described apply to her as well.

The first woman was his arusah: kiddushin had taken place, but they had not yet entered nisu'in. Believing her dead, he then married her sister.

At first glance, the requirement that the sister receive a get may seem surprising. The next halachah contrasts this case with one in which the first woman had already entered nisu'in, and Halachah 10 will explain why the Sages nevertheless required a get from the sister in this case.

While his wife was still alive, her sister was an ervah to him. Kiddushin with the sister therefore could not take effect. His attempted marriage to her created no marriage bond requiring a get, and his original wife remains permitted to him.

At first glance, this seems difficult to reconcile with the preceding halachah: there too, the first woman's sister would appear unable to become his wife, yet the Rambam required her to receive a get. Halachah 10 will explain why the Sages nevertheless required a get in that earlier case.

The Rambam now states the general principle behind the ruling. When a woman is an ervah with whom kiddushin cannot take effect, mistakenly going through a marriage with her does not create a marriage bond that must later be dissolved with a get.

This answers the question raised by the previous two halachos. In Halachah 8, a man performed kiddushin with a woman, mistakenly heard that she had died, and then married her sister. The Rambam ruled that the sister requires a get.

Yet Halachah 9 established that kiddushin do not take effect with an ervah. Why, then, is a get required here?

People might misunderstand the sequence. Instead of realizing that the original kiddushin remained in force, they might assume that those kiddushin had been conditional and that the condition was not fulfilled.

According to that mistaken understanding, the first woman was never actually his arusah, so there would have been nothing wrong with his subsequently marrying her sister.

To prevent people from treating the marriage to the sister as unquestionably valid on the assumption that the original kiddushin had failed, the Sages required the sister to receive a get.

The first safeguard now creates a second concern. Since the other sister has received a get from him, she has the appearance of being his divorcee.

If he were now allowed to remain with his original arusah, people could see that her sister had received a get from him and mistakenly conclude that he married the sister of a woman he had divorced.

The Sages therefore forbid the original arusah to him as well.

A shovar is a receipt acknowledging payment of an obligation. Here, it is the receipt connected with payment of the woman's kesubah. Instead of the woman receiving the get and the husband receiving the receipt, the documents were accidentally reversed.

Both parties believed that the divorce had been properly completed, although the get itself had actually remained with the husband.

The Rambam now distinguishes between a case in which she has not yet remarried and one in which she already has.

Since the get remained with the husband rather than being given to her, the required delivery had never taken place.

The original mistaken exchange did not effect a divorce. The husband can now properly give her the same get in an observed delivery, and the divorce takes effect from this new giving—not retroactively from the earlier mistake.

Once she has remarried, she has an established status as a divorced woman. The first husband's later possession of the document is not accepted as sufficient proof to overturn that status and prohibit her to her present husband.

This chazakah — established status becomes the starting point for how the situation is evaluated.

Rather than accept the first husband's later claim that she never received the get, we maintain her established status and presume that the get had reached her, was later lost from her possession, and was then found by him.

His present possession of the get is therefore not accepted as proof that the original divorce never occurred, since accepting that claim would now prohibit her to the second husband whom she married on the basis of her established status as divorced.

The Rambam discusses a husband whose decision to divorce is specifically based upon conduct that he considers serious enough to end the marriage.

He is instructed to tell her explicitly why he is divorcing her, impressing upon her the seriousness of the conduct that brought about the divorce.

Before giving the get, the husband must understand that if he divorces her for this stated reason, he may never later take her back.

The concern is that after marrying someone else, her conduct may change for the better.

His later statement could suggest that his original decision to divorce had depended upon the problem continuing.

The husband did not literally give the get with an explicit halachic condition. Rather, his later statement could make the original divorce appear dependent upon the reason for which he gave it—as though he had intended the divorce to stand only if that problem continued.

If such a claim were entertained after she had already married another man, it could cast doubt upon the original divorce and therefore upon the legitimacy of her subsequent marriage.

The Sages prevented that concern from arising by requiring the husband, at the time of divorce, to understand that his decision is final regardless of what she later does.

He must give the get with a firm and unconditional resolve to end the marriage, knowing that even if the conduct that prompted the divorce later changes, he will not be permitted to take her back.

If he violated this prohibition and took her back before she had become consecrated to another man, he is not required to divorce her again.

An aylonit is a woman regarded as incapable of bearing children.

This halachah continues the principle of Halachah 12. There, the concern was that a husband might later claim that he would never have divorced his wife had he known that the conduct prompting the divorce would change. Here, the same concern arises when the divorce was prompted by a physical condition that might later prove different from what he believed.

The second case involves a woman who repeatedly experiences bleeding whenever marital relations take place.

As in the previous halachah, once he divorces her specifically because of this condition, the Sages prohibit him from later taking her back.

Her later childbirth would show that the condition upon which the first husband based his decision to divorce was not as he had believed.

In the second case, the condition that prompted the divorce may later disappear.

As in Halachah 12, he did not literally give the get with an explicit condition. The concern is that his later statement could make the original divorce appear to have depended upon the condition continuing.

His later claim could cast retroactive doubt upon the divorce. If she had meanwhile married another man and had children, that could in turn cast doubt upon their status.

The Sages therefore prevent the first husband from taking her back, removing the basis for him to claim that he never would have divorced her had he known how events would unfold.

If he violated this prohibition and took her back before she had become consecrated to another man, he is not required to divorce her again.

An agent bringing a get from outside Eretz Yisrael may be required to make this declaration in order to establish the get's validity.

Because his own statement helped establish the get that made her available for marriage, he may not afterward marry her himself. Doing so could create suspicion that his testimony had been motivated by his desire for her.

This does not mean that his testimony is invalidated. Rather, the Sages prohibit the later marriage so that his personal benefit will not cast suspicion upon the testimony he gave.

Here too, his own testimony is what permitted her to marry. He may therefore not afterward marry her himself, lest that create suspicion about why he testified.

Because his ruling established that the vow prohibited her to her husband, he may not afterward marry her himself. Otherwise, his later marriage to her could create suspicion that personal interest influenced his ruling.

The Rambam now turns to a second type of concern. In the following cases, the man did not give testimony or issue a ruling that made the woman available. Rather, there had already been suspicion or actuality of a prohibited relationship between them, and their later marriage could reinforce that concern.

Although her later change in status now makes marriage possible, he should not marry her. Their marriage could reinforce the earlier suspicion that they had already been involved when marriage between them was not permitted.

Even after conversion or emancipation makes marriage possible, they should not marry. Their known prior relationship creates the same concern about formalizing a relationship that began when marriage between them was not permitted.

These restrictions apply to entering the marriage initially. If the marriage nevertheless took place, the Rambam does not require the couple to divorce.

This refers back to the men discussed in the previous halachah.

The significant point is that the man did not end his existing marriage in order to make himself available to marry the woman discussed in the previous halachah. Either his wife died, or the divorce came about through his wife's initiative rather than through his own efforts to free himself for this other woman.

These intervening circumstances remove the basis for the concern that prohibited the later marriage initially.

Under these circumstances, their marriage no longer creates the same suspicion, and it is permitted from the outset.

Here too, the intervening marriage changes how the earlier events are viewed. Since the woman actually married someone else before eventually becoming available again, her later marriage to the man discussed in Halachah 14 no longer creates the same suspicion that the earlier testimony, ruling, or events were arranged so that these two could marry one another.

The previous halachos prohibited certain men from marrying these women because the marriage could create suspicion about the man's earlier testimony, ruling, or involvement.

That concern does not extend to his son.

The suspicion of personal interest applies when the man himself stands to benefit. We do not suspect that he testified falsely, issued an improper ruling, or otherwise acted wrongly merely so that his son or another relative could eventually marry the woman.

A mi'un is a procedure through which, in the circumstances where halachah permits it, a minor girl rejects a Rabbinically established marriage.

Chalitzah is the procedure that releases a woman from the bond of yibbum.

In these cases, the woman's status did not depend upon the word of one man acting alone. There were multiple witnesses or judges involved.

This is the distinction from Halachah 14. When one man's testimony alone is what permits the woman, his later marriage to her can raise suspicion about why he testified. When her status was established through multiple witnesses or judges, we do not raise that same concern merely because one of them later marries her.

The Rambam concludes with this practical guidance: one should distance himself from testimony concerning mi'un, while making himself available when his participation is needed for chalitzah.

This means that the relations occur in circumstances established by witnesses. As the next halachah explains, kiddushin through relations does not require the witnesses to observe the intimate act itself.

The Rambam is discussing a divorced couple who resume relations before the woman has married anyone else.