This chapter develops in three stages. 1–21 explain delayed and conditional divorces, including the wording that determines when a takes effect. 22–30 address time-based instructions and appointments made to groups. 31–40 define the authority of delivery agents and the details they must preserve.
פרק ט40 halachosWednesday, September 30, 2026י״ט בתשרי תשפ״ז◷ Estimated study time: 180–230 min
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If a man divorces his wife with the divorce to take effect after a fixed period of time, she becomes divorced when the time he specified arrives.
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This resembles a conditional divorce, yet it is not actually a conditional divorce.
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It resembles a condition because she becomes divorced only when the time he specified arrives.
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But it is not a condition, because one who divorces subject to a condition has already effected the act of divorce, whereas in this case no divorce has yet taken place until that time arrives.
With a true conditional , the is given as an act of divorce immediately, although the divorce is not completed until the condition is fulfilled. Here, however, the husband has postponed the divorce itself. Until the designated time arrives, no divorce has yet taken place.
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Therefore, one who divorces subject to a condition must state his condition in both forms, whereas this man does not need to repeat his statement in both forms,
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nor must he follow the other rules governing conditions that we have explained.
Those special requirements apply to a condition attached to an act that has already been performed. Here, the husband is instead specifying when the divorce itself will occur, so those requirements do not apply.
Synopsis
When a husband postpones the divorce itself until a specified time, no divorce takes place until that time arrives. Although this resembles a conditional , it is not governed by the special rules of conditions.
The Must Still Exist When the Divorce Takes Effect
?״,״-
How so? If a man says to his wife, “This is your , but you will not be divorced by it until after thirty days,”
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she does not become divorced by it until after thirty days.
During those thirty days, she is holding the , but the divorce itself has not yet taken effect.
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If the husband dies, or the is lost or burned, during those thirty days,
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she is not divorced.
If the husband dies before the thirty days have passed, the divorce can no longer take effect, because a cannot create a divorce after the husband's death. If the is lost or destroyed beforehand, the divorce likewise cannot take effect, because when the appointed time arrives, the through which the divorce was supposed to occur no longer exists.
Synopsis
Because the divorce does not take effect until the appointed time, the husband must still be alive and the must still exist when that time arrives. If the husband dies or the is lost or destroyed beforehand, she is not divorced.
If she went and placed the at the sides of the public domain,
The “sides of the public domain” were areas alongside the main public thoroughfare where people did not ordinarily walk. Although such an area was not her private property, it was not treated as the public domain itself for this purpose.
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and it was stolen or lost from there after the thirty days had passed, she is divorced,
The important point is that the was still there when the thirty days ended. The divorce therefore took effect at that time; its later loss does not undo a divorce that had already occurred.
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since the was still in existence on the day on which she became divorced through it,
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and she had designated for it a place that was not the public domain,
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because the sides of the public domain are not treated like the public domain itself.
Although the designated place does not belong to her, she chose it as the place where the would remain. When the divorce is due to take effect, that designated location is legally sufficient to preserve the connection to her original receipt of the . Had she instead placed it in the public domain itself, the original delivery would no longer be sufficient for the divorce to take effect there.
Synopsis
When the appointed time arrives, the must still exist in a place that preserves the legal effect of the husband's original delivery. A place she designated at the side of the public domain is sufficient, even though it does not actually belong to her.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
A husband gives his wife a and says that the divorce will take effect after thirty days. She places it in a designated spot alongside the public thoroughfare. When the thirty days end, the is still there, so the divorce takes effect. If the is stolen the following day, that later loss changes nothing.
🔎Dig DeeperA Designated Place for the
A Designated Place for the
The and note an apparent contrast between this ruling and the 's law concerning a sale that is meant to take effect after thirty days. In 2:9, a sale made in this manner requires the acquisition to be effective retroactively from the original act of acquisition.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the two mechanisms are different. A monetary transfer requires an act of acquisition, and that act occurred when the transaction was originally made, not thirty days later. With a , by contrast, the writing of the itself is fundamental to bringing about the divorce. This distinction allows the to effect the divorce at the later time when it still exists in the legally required manner.
Sources: Maggid Mishneh and Kessef Mishneh on 9:3; 2:9.
Similarly, if he makes the divorce dependent upon an act, its law is the same as a divorce set to take effect at a later time.
Here too, the divorce itself has not yet taken effect. The difference is simply what triggers it: instead of waiting for a specified time to arrive, the divorce waits for the designated act to occur.
?״,״-
How so? For example, he says to his wife, “This is your , but you will not be divorced by it until you give me two hundred .”
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She becomes divorced after she gives him the money.
The event upon which the divorce depends does not necessarily have to be an act performed by the wife. For example, the divorce could be set to take effect upon the occurrence of the first rainfall.
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He does not need to state the condition in both forms, nor must he follow the other rules governing conditions that we have explained.
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For he has not divorced her subject to a condition; rather, he has not yet divorced her at all.
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Instead, he made the divorce dependent upon the performance of a particular act, and only afterward will she become divorced.
The distinction is the same one established in Halachah 1. A true conditional is already functioning as an act of divorce whose completion depends upon fulfillment of the condition. Here, the divorce itself is being held back until the specified event occurs.
Synopsis
When the husband makes the divorce itself dependent upon a future act, no divorce has yet occurred. The divorce takes effect only after that act occurs, so this follows the laws of a delayed divorce rather than those of a conditional .
The Fundamental Difference Between a Condition and a Delayed Divorce
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What is the difference between one who divorces subject to a condition and one who sets a time for the divorce or makes it dependent upon an act?
This spells out the practical consequences of the distinction established above.
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With one who divorces subject to a condition, there is already an act of divorce in place, but it is not completed until the condition is fulfilled.
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Therefore, when the condition is fulfilled, she becomes divorced as long as the still exists, even though it is not in her possession.
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She does not need to take the again or have it in her possession after the condition is fulfilled,
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because it originally came into her hands as an act of divorce.
The original delivery was already legally a delivery for divorce. When the condition is later fulfilled, it completes the divorce that was initiated through that original delivery; a new act of receiving the is therefore unnecessary.
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And if she married another man before the condition was fulfilled, she does not have to leave him, as we have explained.
This follows the law previously established for a genuine conditional .
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By contrast, when the divorce is made dependent upon a time or an act, the did not originally come into her hands as an act of divorce,
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but rather as an entrusted object until the time he specified arrives or until the designated act is performed.
Until then, she is holding the document only as an entrusted object, not as a that has already begun to effect her divorce. The divorce itself will begin only when the designated time or event arrives.
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Therefore, when the appointed time arrives, the must be in her possession,
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or she must take possession of it again,
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or it must be in a place that she designated for it, even though that place does not belong to her, as we have explained,
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and only then does she become divorced through it.
This is the crucial difference from a true conditional . Here, the original delivery did not yet function as a delivery for divorce; until the appointed time or act, she held the merely as an entrusted object. Therefore, when the divorce is finally to take effect, the must then be situated in a way that allows the original delivery to become effective for divorce: it must be in her possession, she must take it again, or it must remain in a place she specifically designated for it, as described in Halachah 3.
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And if she married another man before the time he specified arrived, or before she performed the act upon which he made the divorce dependent,
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she must leave the second husband, and a child born from that union is a ,
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because at that point she is still fully a married woman, and no divorce has yet taken effect at all.
This sharply distinguishes the case from a true conditional . In the delayed divorce discussed here, nothing has yet changed her marital status: until the specified time arrives or the designated act occurs, she remains fully married to her first husband.
Synopsis
A true conditional is delivered as an act of divorce from the outset, so when its condition is fulfilled, no new possession of the is required. A divorce postponed until a future time or act is different: until then, the is merely held as an entrusted object and no divorce has yet occurred. When the appointed time or act arrives, the must therefore be in the legally required place for the divorce to take effect.
In short: with a conditional , the original delivery already counts as a delivery for divorce, and fulfillment of the condition completes or confirms its effect. With a delayed divorce, the original delivery is only for safekeeping; the divorce itself begins later, so the must then be situated where it can legally effect the divorce.
Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration
Two women each receive a .
tells his wife, “This is your on condition that you give me 200 .” tells his wife, “You will not be divorced with this until you give me 200 .”
The wording sounds similar, but the legal mechanism is different. gave a conditional : the document came into her hands as a for divorce. postponed the divorce itself: until she pays, she is holding the document like an entrusted object.
That difference determines where the must be when the 200 are eventually given.
A conditional is delivered for divorce now and awaits fulfillment; a delayed divorce begins only later, so the document is held merely for safekeeping until then. The parchment shown is illustrative, not an actual .
🔎Dig DeeperThe Fundamental Difference Between a Condition and a Delayed Divorce
The Fundamental Difference Between a Condition and a Delayed Divorce
The notes that other authorities understand the requirement differently from the . According to the Rambam, when a divorce was postponed until a future time or act, the must be in the woman's possession, be taken by her again, or remain in a place she designated when the divorce is to take effect. If it is not, the divorce does not take effect.
Other authorities maintain that in such a case the divorce should instead be treated as doubtful. The ( 146:3) records this disagreement. Thus, the dispute concerns the consequence when the future time or act arrives but the is no longer situated as the Rambam requires.
Sources: Maggid Mishneh on 9:5; Beit Shmuel, 146:3.
If a man places a in his wife's hand and says to her, “If you do not give me two hundred , this is not a ,”
״״-
or, “You are not divorced,”
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he has not divorced her at all.
Although his words imply that he may want the document to become a if she gives him the money, he never affirmatively gives it to her as a or declares her divorced. He states only the negative consequence if she fails to pay. An intention that can merely be inferred from his words is not enough to create the divorce.
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There is neither a conditional here nor a divorce made dependent upon an act.
This differs from the previous cases, where the husband first established the document as a — for example, by saying, “This is your ” — and then attached a condition or specified a future act. Here, the necessary affirmative declaration of divorce is missing.
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The same law applies to all similar cases.
Synopsis
Words that merely imply what would make a document effective are not enough to create a divorce. The husband must affirmatively give the document as a or declare the divorce; otherwise there is neither a conditional divorce nor one dependent upon a future act.
If a man wishes to divorce his wife conditionally, with the substance of his condition being that she not become divorced until a particular time,
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he should express this arrangement in the language of a condition,
Rather than postponing the divorce itself until a future time, as in the earlier , he wants to give the within the framework of divorce now and make its ultimate effectiveness depend upon a future event. He must therefore formulate the matter as a genuine condition.
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and make the condition depend upon his coming or going within a fixed period of time.
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How so? For example, he says to her, “If I do not return between now and thirty days from now, this is a ;
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and if I return within thirty days, it will not be a ,”
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and he places the in her hand.
Here he explicitly states both sides of the condition and gives her the document as a . Whether the divorce ultimately takes effect depends upon whether the condition is fulfilled.
״,״
Alternatively, he may say to her, “This is your from now, if I do not return between now and thirty days from now,”
The words מֵעַכְשָׁו — “from now” make the divorce relate back to the present when the condition is ultimately fulfilled. The is therefore being given now within the framework of divorce, rather than merely being held as an entrusted object until a future divorce occurs.
״,״.
Or he may say, “This is your , on condition that I do not return to this region within thirty days.”
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The same law applies to all similar formulations.
Such a conditional had an important practical use when a husband was leaving on a dangerous journey. It could protect his wife from being left unable to remarry if he failed to return, while still allowing the divorce to depend upon whether he returned within the period he specified.
Synopsis
To make a future event operate as a genuine condition rather than merely postponing the divorce, the husband must formulate the as a conditional divorce. The is given within the framework of divorce now, while its ultimate effectiveness depends upon fulfillment of the stated condition.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
A man is leaving on a long journey. Rather than saying, “You will be divorced thirty days from now,” he gives his wife a and says, “This is your from now if I do not return within thirty days.” If he does not return, fulfillment of the condition causes the divorce to take effect according to the conditional arrangement established when he gave her the .
✦Live ItWhat You Say Matters
What You Say Matters
A tiny change in wording can completely change what a person means.
Throughout these , phrases that sound almost identical can produce very different results. “You will be divorced after thirty days” is not the same as “This is your from now, if I do not return within thirty days.” One postpones the divorce itself; the other creates a divorce now whose completion depends upon a condition.
Try today
We often assume that other people know what we mean. But good intentions are not always enough. When something matters — an apology, a commitment, an expectation, or a promise — say clearly what you actually mean. Clear words prevent confusion later.
When Circumstances Beyond His Control Prevent His Return
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If he stipulated that the would take effect if he did not return to this region within thirty days,
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and he was on his way back within the thirty days,
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but he became ill, or a river prevented him from proceeding, and he did not arrive until after the thirty days,
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the is effective.
The condition concerned whether he would actually return within the specified period. His sincere attempt to return does not itself fulfill that condition.
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This is so even if he stands and cries out, “I am being prevented by circumstances beyond my control,”
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because a claim of unavoidable circumstances is not accepted with regard to .
Ordinarily, being prevented from fulfilling a condition by circumstances genuinely beyond one's control can affect the legal result. The Sages established an exception for . With circumstances such as illness or flooding, the husband's inability to return does not prevent the condition from being fulfilled.
One reason for this rule is that otherwise a woman might fear that her absent husband had been prevented from returning through circumstances beyond his control and therefore refrain from remarrying even after the period specified in the had passed.
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This is true even though he has made it clear that he does not want the divorce to take effect.
Even his clear demonstration that he does not want the divorce to occur does not change the result. The depends upon the condition he actually stated, and that condition has been fulfilled.
Synopsis
When a conditional depends upon the husband's failure to return within a specified time, circumstances beyond his control do not ordinarily prevent fulfillment of the condition. If he does not actually return within the required period, the takes effect even though he tried to return and clearly did not want the divorce to occur.
Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration
gives his wife a and says, “If I don't return within thirty days, this is your .”
On day 30, is almost home — but a flooded river blocks the road. He is standing on the other side and wants to return. Everyone knows that the delay is beyond his control.
But the condition was not “if I don't try to return.” It was “if I don't return.” Since he did not actually arrive within the thirty days, the condition is fulfilled and the takes effect.
The husband tried to return, but the condition depended on whether he actually arrived before the deadline—not on why he was delayed.
🔎Dig DeeperWhen Circumstances Beyond His Control Prevent His Return
When Circumstances Beyond His Control Prevent His Return
The describes a man whose return was blocked by a river. Although he stood at the riverbank and called out that he had come as far as circumstances allowed, that did not constitute the return required by his condition.
The cites and other authorities who qualify the principle of אֵין אֹנֶס בַּגִּטִּין. They understand it to apply to unavoidable events that could conceivably have been anticipated, such as illness or flooding, but not necessarily to extraordinarily unlikely events. The Maggid Mishneh points to the 's rulings in as indicating that the Rambam also accepts this distinction.
The husband desperately tries to return before the deadline. He is already on his way home, but illness or a flooded river prevents him from arriving. He may even cry out that the delay is beyond his control — yet the condition he established depends upon whether he actually arrives.
There is a broader lesson here, without equating ordinary life with the ruling: effort and outcome are two different questions.
Sometimes what matters is that we genuinely tried. Other times, another person is depending upon an actual result. “I meant to call,” “I was planning to do it,” or “I almost made it” may be completely sincere — but the thing still did not happen.
Try today
When someone is depending on you, ask yourself: Am I measuring this by what I intended to do, or by what actually needs to get done? If the result matters, build in enough time and margin to make sure it happens.
If he stipulated that she would become divorced when he had been away from her presence for thirty days,
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and he repeatedly came and went but did not enter into seclusion with her,
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when he eventually leaves and remains away for thirty days, she becomes divorced.
The condition requires an eventual period of thirty days during which he remains away from her. His earlier coming and going does not invalidate the ; once he subsequently remains away for a full thirty days, the stated condition has occurred. His visits do, however, create a separate concern: perhaps during one of them he appeased her and she agreed to waive the condition.
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Although he had repeatedly come and gone during the thirty-day period,
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since he did not enter into seclusion with her, the is valid.
Entering into seclusion would create a separate concern regarding the continued validity of the . Merely visiting her, however, does not itself prevent the condition from later being fulfilled.
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When does this apply? When he stipulated, “I accept her as trustworthy to say that I did not appease her.”
By accepting her word in advance, the husband allows her to establish that during his visits he did not persuade her to waive the condition.
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But if he did not accept her as trustworthy, we are concerned that perhaps he appeased her while he was coming and going,
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and she waived the condition for him, in which case the was nullified when he appeased her.
This condition was established for her benefit. Because it is a condition that she has the ability to waive, if he actually appeased her and she agreed to relinquish it, the was nullified.
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Because of this concern, the is disqualified even after the thirty days have passed.
There are two distinct levels here. If he actually appeased her and she waived the condition, the was nullified. Even when we do not know that this happened, the opportunity for such an appeasement creates a Rabbinic concern, and the Sages therefore disqualify the despite the apparent fulfillment of the condition. On the level, without evidence that they changed their arrangement, fulfillment of the condition would make the effective.
״״,
Similarly, if a man says to his wife, “This is your after twelve months,”
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and he remained with her in the same region, we are concerned that perhaps he appeased her,
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unless he says, “I accept her as trustworthy to say that I did not appease her.”
Although this is a divorce postponed until twelve months have passed rather than the earlier thirty-day conditional formulation, his continued presence in the same region creates the same concern that he may have reconciled with her before the divorce took effect.
Synopsis
When the husband has an opportunity to appease his wife regarding a condition she can waive, we are concerned that she may have waived it and the may have been nullified. This concern is avoided if he expressly accepts her word that he did not appease her.
🔎Dig DeeperThe Concern That He Appeased His Wife
The Concern That He Appeased His Wife
The explains why appeasement can matter here even though a given “on condition that” cannot ordinarily be revoked after it has been delivered. This condition was established for the wife's benefit. Because she has the ability to waive it, if the husband persuades her to relinquish the condition, the can be nullified.
There is therefore an important difference between knowing that appeasement actually occurred and merely suspecting that it may have occurred. Actual appeasement and waiver nullify the ; when there is only a possibility that this happened, the Sages nevertheless disqualify the because of that concern.
The same applies to all conditions that depend upon her will,
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where, if she chooses to waive them, the is nullified:
This extends the previous ruling to any condition whose continuation depends upon the wife's will — one that she has the ability to waive. If the husband has an opportunity to appease her, we must consider the possibility that she agreed to give up the condition.
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we are concerned that perhaps he appeased her,
״״.
unless he says, “I accept her as trustworthy [to say that I did not appease her].”
The abbreviated wording refers back to the declaration described in the previous . By accepting her word, he allows her statement that no appeasement occurred to resolve this concern.
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When does this apply? When she is being divorced after nisu'in, because he is familiar and at ease with her.
The expression לִבּוֹ גַּס בָּהּ describes the familiarity that developed through their married life. Here, פִּיֵּס — “appeased her” does not mean merely that he spoke kindly to her. It means that he may have reconciled with her and persuaded her to relinquish a condition that depended upon her will. Because of their established relationship, that is a realistic concern when he has contact with her.
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But when she is being divorced after , before nisu'in,
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we are not concerned that perhaps he appeased her.
When the divorce occurs during , we do not presume the same degree of familiarity and influence between them. The specific concern that he may have appeased her is therefore not raised.
Synopsis
The concern that the husband may have appeased his wife applies to conditions that depend upon her will and that she can waive. It applies after nisu'in, when their established familiarity makes such appeasement a realistic concern, but not when the divorce occurs during .
If a man says to his wife, “This is your from now, if I do not return between now and twelve months from now,”
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we are not concerned that perhaps he returned secretly,
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because people do not ordinarily return in secrecy.
Once the twelve months have passed without any known return, we do not create an uncertainty merely because it is theoretically possible that he slipped into the region unnoticed. The normal way people return is openly enough for their arrival to become known.
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If the period he specified ends and he did not return, she is divorced.
The condition was that he fail to return within twelve months. Once that period ends without his return, the condition has been fulfilled, and we do not undermine the divorce based only upon the possibility that he may have returned secretly.
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If he dies during the twelve months,
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although it is now impossible for him to return, and she is divorced,
His death makes it impossible for him to return, so the eventual outcome of the condition is now certain and the describes her as divorced. Nevertheless, where a is involved, she may not rely on that certainty to marry immediately.
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if there is a , she may not marry until after the twelve months have passed, when the condition is fulfilled.
Although his death has made his return impossible, the condition he actually stated was defined by the full twelve-month period. Therefore, when his death would otherwise leave her subject to , she must wait until that period has actually ended before relying upon the to marry without . If she wishes to marry during the twelve months, she must first undergo .
Synopsis
When a depends upon the husband's failure to return within twelve months, we do not suspect that he secretly returned. If he dies during that period, his return becomes impossible and the divorce is assured; nevertheless, where a is involved, she may not marry without until the full twelve months have passed.
🔎Dig DeeperWe Do Not Suspect a Secret Return
We Do Not Suspect a Secret Return
The rules that we do not suspect that the husband secretly returned during the specified period. The Ra'avad understands the underlying Talmudic passage more stringently and requires the husband to have expressly accepted his wife's word regarding whether he returned; otherwise, the possibility of a secret return remains a concern.
The ( 144:7) follows the Rambam's basic ruling that we do not suspect a secret return. Nevertheless, it records the practice of initially including the additional stipulation that addresses the concern raised by the Ra'avad.
If a healthy man stipulated that this would be a if he died,
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or a sick man stipulated that this would be a if he died from this illness,
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his statement has no effect.
The problem is not that a can never depend upon the husband's death. Rather, a divorce must take effect while the husband is still alive. Once he has died, there is no longer a marriage that a can terminate.
״״-,.
For the expression “if I die” can imply after death, and it can also imply from now.
The phrase “if I die” is inherently ambiguous. It can mean that the should take effect only after his death, or that it should take effect from now if he eventually dies.
,״״,:-
Therefore, if he says, “If I die,” it is treated as though he said, “After my death,”
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and there can be no after death.
Since his words do not clearly establish that the divorce begins during his lifetime, the statement is treated as though he said that the should take effect after his death. That formulation cannot create a divorce, because a cannot take effect once the husband has died.
Synopsis
The words “if I die” are ambiguous: they can refer either to a divorce beginning after death or to one that relates back to the present. Because they do not clearly establish a divorce during the husband's lifetime, they are treated as “after my death,” and the does not take effect.
Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration
Three seriously ill husbands each hand their wives a .
says: “This is your if I die.” The wording can mean that the divorce should begin only after his death, so the does not take effect.
says: “This is your from now if I die.” Now the divorce is anchored to a time while he is alive. If he dies, the condition is fulfilled and the takes effect from the earlier time.
says: “This is your from now … after my death.” His words point in opposite directions. Did he retain the “from now” timing, or did he change his mind and mean only after death? The result is a doubtful divorce.
Three very similar statements — three different results.
Nearly identical wording can place the divorce after death, anchor it from now, or create a doubtful result. The parchment shown is illustrative, not an actual .
🔎Dig Deeper“If I Die” — When the Cannot Take Effect
“If I Die” — When the Cannot Take Effect
The Ra'avad disagrees with the . He maintains that the date written in the itself indicates that the husband intends the divorce to relate back to the time of the rather than to begin only after his death.
The ( 145:1) records the Rambam's ruling while also mentioning the minority opinion that takes the Ra'avad's position into consideration.
If he says to her, “This is your from now, if I die,”
״״״-
or, “from today, if I die,”
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this is a valid ,
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and when he dies, she is divorced.
The addition of מֵעַכְשָׁו — “from now” or מֵהַיּוֹם — “from today” resolves the ambiguity of the previous . He has now expressly connected the divorce to a point during his lifetime.
His death fulfills the condition upon which the depends; it does not cause a new divorce to begin after his death. When he eventually dies, the condition is fulfilled and the takes effect from the earlier point designated by his words — “from now” or “from today.” It is therefore not a divorce taking place after death.
Synopsis
When the husband says that the is effective “from now” or “from today” if he dies, the is valid. His death fulfills the condition, while the divorce takes effect from the earlier time designated during his lifetime.
🔎Dig DeeperMaking the Effective From Now
Making the Effective From Now
The cites as preferring the expression מֵעַכְשָׁו — “from now” over מֵהַיּוֹם — “from today.” The concern with “from today” is that the husband might die before the end of that day, creating uncertainty about precisely when during the day the divorce was intended to take effect.
The ( 145:2) records the preference for saying “from now.”
Sources: Hagahos Maimoniyos on 9:13; Rabbenu Tam; , 145:2.
If he says to her, “This is your from now” — or “from today” — “after my death,”
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and he dies, her status is that of a woman whose divorce is in doubt.
His words point in opposite directions. “From now” or “from today” places the divorce during his lifetime, while “after my death” points toward a divorce that would begin only after death.
״״,
For perhaps, after saying “from now,” he changed his mind,
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and ultimately intended the divorce to take effect only after his death,
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when a can no longer take effect.
Perhaps his initial words, “from now” or “from today,” were intended to make the effective during his lifetime. But by then adding “after my death,” he may have retracted that timing and intended the divorce to begin only after his death. Since we cannot determine whether he retained the earlier timing or replaced it with the later one, her status is one of — doubtful divorce.
If he dies childless and leaves a , this doubt prevents both ordinary remarriage and . She requires before marrying someone else, and she may not perform , because perhaps the did take effect.
Synopsis
If the husband combines language making the effective from the present with language placing the divorce after his death, the divorce is doubtful. Perhaps he retained the valid present-tense formulation, or perhaps he retracted it and intended an ineffective divorce after death.
The Rebbe ExplainsWhen is a legal act truly complete?
When is a legal act truly complete?
The Rebbe explains that the disagreement between Rabbi and the Sages reflects two ways of determining when a legal act is complete. Rabbi looks at the act as it exists now, in its plain and concrete form. The husband has already placed the into his wife’s possession, so the act of giving was completed immediately, even though its ultimate effect is connected to something that will happen later.
The Sages, however, look at the legal content and intended result of the act. If the husband’s words make the divorce dependent on a later time or event, the legal act is not necessarily complete merely because the parchment has already been handed over. The consistently follows the Sages’ approach in the related cases where this dispute appears.
This explains the ’s ruling here. The words ‘from now’ indicate that the present delivery should have legal effect. But the words ‘after my death’ may mean that the husband withdrew the phrase ‘from now’ and intended the divorce to begin only after his death. That cannot work, because a cannot take effect after the husband has died. Since it is uncertain which part of his statement governs, the woman is considered doubtfully divorced. A legal act is therefore defined not only by what physically happened, but also by the meaning and legal effect created by the person’s words.
If a man says to his wife, “This is your when the sun emerges,”
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and he dies during the night, it is not a valid .
By saying that the will take effect when the sun emerges, he postpones the divorce itself until that future event. If he dies during the night, the time for the divorce has not yet arrived. When the sun rises the next morning, it is already too late for the to take effect, because a divorce cannot begin after the husband's death.
״״,
But if he says, “On condition that the sun rises,”
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and he dies during the night, she is divorced,
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and when the sun rises, the condition is fulfilled.
Here, עַל מְנָת — “on condition that” creates a true conditional . When the sun later rises, the condition is fulfilled, and the takes effect retroactively from the time it was originally given. His death during the night therefore does not prevent the divorce.
The two formulations sound similar, but their legal mechanisms are very different. לִכְשֶׁתֵּצֵא חַמָּה — “when the sun emerges” postpones the divorce itself until morning. עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּזְרַח חַמָּה — “on condition that the sun rises” gives the as a conditional divorce whose effect relates back to the earlier delivery once the condition is fulfilled.
״״,
If he stipulated with her, “If the sun rises, it will be a , and if the sun does not rise, it will not be a ,”
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and he dies during the night, it is not a valid ,
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because the condition was not fulfilled before he died,
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and a cannot take effect after death.
Unlike the preceding case of עַל מְנָת, this formulation does not make the effective retroactively from the time it was given. The therefore remains ineffective until the condition itself is fulfilled. Since sunrise occurs only after the husband's death, the divorce cannot then take effect.
Synopsis
The husband's precise wording determines when the divorce takes effect. “When the sun emerges” postpones the divorce until sunrise; “on condition that the sun rises” makes the effective retroactively once sunrise fulfills the condition. A simple “if the sun rises” formulation remains ineffective until the condition occurs, so it cannot take effect if the husband dies first.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
It is 10:00 PM. Three husbands each give their wives a . All three husbands die before sunrise.
said: “This is your when the sun rises.” No divorce — the divorce itself was waiting for sunrise, and by then he had died.
said: “This is your on condition that the sun rises.” When morning comes, the condition is fulfilled and the takes effect retroactively from when it was given.
said: “If the sun rises, this will be a .” No divorce — the does not become effective until the condition occurs, and sunrise came only after his death.
Same . Same sunrise. Same night. The wording changes everything.
If a man who is dangerously ill had a written for his wife and divorced her,
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and he then recovered, he cannot retract the divorce,
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because his is not governed by the same law as his gift.
A shechiv mera — a person who is dangerously ill — is governed by a special rule concerning a deathbed gift of all his property: if he recovers, that gift is retracted. A is different. Once he has actually divorced his wife, his later recovery does not undo the divorce.
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For if you were to say that he may retract it,
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people would say, “His divorces after his death,”
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just as his gift does not acquire until after his death.
A deathbed gift of this kind acquires only after the giver's death. If we allowed his to be retracted upon recovery in the same way, people might mistakenly conclude that his also operates like his gift — taking effect only after death. But that cannot be the mechanism of a , because there is no divorce after death.
The fact that he recovered therefore does not reveal that his divorce was merely provisional. The and the deathbed gift operate through fundamentally different legal mechanisms.
Synopsis
A dangerously ill man's is not treated like his deathbed gift. His gift acquires only after death and can therefore fall away if he recovers; a cannot operate after death, so an actual divorce that he already effected is not undone by his recovery.
If a man says to his wife, “This is your from today if I die from this illness,”
and a building collapses upon him,
or a snake bites him,
or a lion mauls him,
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or he dies from another similar cause,
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the is not effective.
His condition was not simply that he die. He specifically made the dependent upon his dying from this illness. If an independent cause kills him instead — such as a collapsing building, a snakebite, or a lion attack — the event he specified never occurred. The therefore does not take effect.
The words מֵחֹלִי זֶה — “from this illness” are decisive. Although his death occurs, death alone is not enough; the depends upon the particular cause of death that he stated.
Synopsis
When a is conditioned specifically upon the husband's dying from his present illness, death from an unrelated external cause does not fulfill the condition. The therefore does not take effect.
“If I Do Not Recover” and Determining the Cause of Death
״״,
If he says to her, “If I do not recover from this illness,”
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and a building collapses upon him, a snake bites him, or a lion mauls him,
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her status is that of a woman whose divorce is in doubt.
This differs from the previous . There he said, “If I die from this illness,” making the cause of death part of the condition. Death from an unrelated external cause therefore clearly failed to fulfill it.
Here, however, he says, “If I do not recover from this illness.” If an external cause kills him while he is still ill, two considerations point in opposite directions: he never recovered from the illness, but the illness itself did not cause his death. We therefore cannot determine with certainty whether the condition was fulfilled.
״״,
If he says to her, “This is your from now if I die from this illness,”
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and he recovered enough to up and walk in the marketplace,
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and afterward became ill and died,
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we assess his condition:
Getting up and walking in the marketplace does not necessarily establish that he fully recovered from the original illness. It is therefore necessary to determine whether his eventual death resulted from that first illness. This assessment is required even if he was able to walk through the marketplace without assistance.
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if he died as a result of the original illness, the is effective;
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but if he did not, the is not effective.
The controlling question is the cause of death. His condition specifically required that he die from the original illness. His temporary improvement does not by itself determine the outcome; the assessment establishes whether that illness ultimately caused his death.
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If, however, he passed directly from one illness into another,
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and did not up and walk in the marketplace,
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the is effective,
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and no assessment is necessary.
Because he never reached the degree of recovery represented by getting up and walking in the marketplace, the does not require an assessment of whether his death resulted from the first illness. In this case, the is effective without an omed — assessment.
Synopsis
The husband's wording and the course of his illness determine the result. If he says, “If I do not recover from this illness,” but dies from an external cause while still ill, the divorce is doubtful. If the depends upon his dying from the original illness and he later gets up and walks in the marketplace before becoming ill again and dying, the cause of death must be assessed. If he passes directly from one illness into another without getting up and walking in the marketplace, no assessment is required.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
is seriously ill and tells his wife, “This is your from now if I die from this illness.”
A week later, he feels much better. He gets dressed, leaves the house, and walks around the marketplace normally. A few days later, he becomes sick again and dies.
We cannot decide the merely by saying, “He got better” or “He eventually died.” We need to determine what actually caused his death. If the original illness ultimately caused it, the takes effect. If he died from something unrelated, it does not.
🔎Dig Deeper“If I Do Not Recover” and Determining the Cause of Death
“If I Do Not Recover” and Determining the Cause of Death
The ( 145:14) understands that even in the final case, where the husband passes directly from one illness to another and no assessment is required, the 's ruling still assumes that the original illness remains present when he dies. Thus, the absence of an assessment does not necessarily mean that every later illness is automatically treated as a continuation of the first.
throughout the period from the giving of the until he dies and the condition is fulfilled,
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she is regarded as divorced in every respect,
These were given in a form that makes the divorce relate back to the time the was delivered once the condition is ultimately fulfilled. Because of that legal status, during the intervening period she is treated as divorced with regard to the husband's marital rights, even though the condition has not yet reached its final fulfillment. This does not mean that she may marry another man while the condition is still pending. If the stipulated event ultimately does not occur, the condition will not be fulfilled and the will not take effect. The is describing her legal status during the intervening period, not granting permission for immediate remarriage.
For example, he is no longer entitled to her earnings and cannot annul her vows. If he is a , he may not become tamei for her if she dies. Regarding his obligation to provide for her support during this period, the does not give an explicit ruling; most other authorities maintain that he remains obligated.
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provided that he does not enter into seclusion with her, as we have explained.
If they enter into seclusion, we are concerned that they may have had marital relations and that the husband may have nullified the beforehand. The status described here therefore depends upon their not entering into together.
Synopsis
With these conditional , the divorce relates back to the earlier delivery once the condition is fulfilled. During the intervening period, the woman is therefore treated as divorced with regard to the marital relationship, provided that the couple does not enter into seclusion together.
If a sick man wishes to divorce his wife conditionally when he dies,
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so that she will not become subject to a ,
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while if he recovers, she will not be divorced,
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and he does not wish to divorce her from now, so that his mind will not become distressed,
He wants the divorce to protect his wife from becoming subject to if he dies, while allowing their marriage to continue if he recovers. At the same time, he does not want the divorce to take effect from now, because knowing that he is already divorced while lying seriously ill may distress him.
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this is what he writes in the after writing its essential text,
or what he says to her when he gives her the :
״,
“If I do not die, it will not be a ;
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if I die, it will be a ;
״.
and if I do not die, it will not be a .”
The repetition is deliberate. He is formulating the arrangement as a properly structured condition rather than merely directing that a divorce begin after his death.
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so that the condition will be stated in both forms,
He states both outcomes — whether he dies or survives — thereby creating the required doubled condition.
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and so that the affirmative precedes the negative,
Although his complete statement begins with “If I do not die, it will not be a ,” that opening is not counted as the beginning of the doubled condition. The operative affirmative side — “if I die, it will be a ” — precedes the concluding negative side — “if I do not die, it will not be a .” This fulfills the requirement that the affirmative precede the negative.
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and so that he does not begin his words by speaking of misfortune.
The preliminary statement “If I do not die” allows him to avoid opening directly with the words “If I die,” while the subsequent repetition still gives the legal condition its required structure.
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If he dies, she becomes divorced when he dies,
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provided that the reaches her hand before his death.
This procedure works only if the reaches the wife's hand while the husband is still alive. Delivery after his death cannot create a divorce. Accordingly, the words “when he dies” cannot mean that a new divorce begins after death. The understands this carefully structured, doubled condition as allowing the delivered during his lifetime to become effective through his death. As discussed below, other authorities require the husband to add “from now” so that the divorce is unmistakably rooted in his lifetime.
Synopsis
A sick husband who wants his wife to be divorced if he dies, but to remain married if he recovers, can formulate the as a doubled condition. Its wording places the affirmative before the concluding negative without forcing him to begin by speaking of his own death, and the must reach his wife's hand while he is still alive.
🔎Dig DeeperA Conditional for a Sick Husband
A Conditional for a Sick Husband
The raises a difficulty with the 's ruling. Earlier indicate that when a divorce depends upon the husband's death, language such as מֵעַכְשָׁו — “from now” is needed to prevent the divorce from beginning only after death. Yet here the Rambam validates a formulation that does not explicitly include “from now.”
The Rambam's ruling appears to treat the properly doubled condition as sufficient to avoid that problem even without an explicit מֵעַכְשָׁו. The Maggid Mishneh notes the difficulty, and many other authorities do not accept the ruling in that form. Accordingly, when the ( 145:5) records this procedure, it adds מֵעַכְשָׁו — “from now” to the formulation.
If a husband gives a to another person and says to him, “Acquire this for my wife so that she will not become subject to a ,”
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and the husband dies before the reaches her hand,
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her status is that of a woman whose divorce is in doubt.
The wife did not appoint this person as her agent to receive the . Instead, the husband instructed him to acquire it for her because avoiding may be considered a benefit to her.
The legal principle involved is זכין לאדם שלא בפניו: when something is considered a benefit for a person, another person can sometimes acquire it on that person's behalf even without prior authorization. The question here is whether avoiding can be treated as such a benefit for the wife.
״
For most women, it is considered a benefit not to become subject to a ,
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and therefore her divorce is doubtful,
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even though the never reached her hand,
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since another person acquired it on her behalf.
Ordinarily, a person can acquire something for another without that person's knowledge only when the acquisition is considered a benefit. Avoiding is a benefit for most women, but it is not necessarily an unquestionable benefit in every case. Therefore, the other person's acquisition of the on her behalf is sufficient to create a doubt whether the divorce took effect, but not sufficient to establish a definite divorce.
Synopsis
If a husband has another person acquire a for his wife so that she will avoid , and he dies before the reaches her, the divorce is doubtful. Avoiding is considered a benefit for most women, allowing the other person's acquisition to create a possibility that the took effect even without her appointment.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
is critically ill and has no children. He gives a to and says, “Acquire this for my wife so that she won't fall to .”
Before can bring the to her, dies.
Normally you might think: “She never received the , so nothing happened.” But was told to acquire it for her. Since avoiding is considered a benefit for most women, perhaps he acquired the on her behalf the moment he received it.
Because that benefit is not certain in every case, her status is one of doubtful divorce.
Writing and Delivering a Only After the Appointed Time
״״
If a husband says to , “After twelve months, write a and give it to my wife,”
״״-
or he says to them, “Write and give a to my wife after twelve months,”
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they must write the after the period he specified and then give it to her.
In either formulation, the specified time governs the writing itself, not merely the delivery. The agents therefore may not prepare the earlier and simply hold it until the twelve months have passed.
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If they wrote it during the specified period,
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even if they gave it to her only after the time he specified,
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it is not a valid .
By writing it too early, they failed to follow the husband's instructions. His authorization was to write the only after the appointed period, so an earlier writing falls outside the agency he gave them. Delaying the delivery until the correct time cannot repair a that was written without the required authorization.
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If they wrote it after the appointed time, as he instructed,
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but he died before it was given to her,
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it is not a valid .
Although the writing was performed correctly, the divorce was not completed before the husband's death. The still had to be delivered to his wife while he was alive.
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If it is not known whether his death occurred before the was given,
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or whether the was given before his death,
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her status is that of a woman whose divorce is in doubt.
If delivery occurred first, the divorce could have taken effect while the husband was alive. If death occurred first, no divorce could take effect afterward. Since the order of events is unknown, her divorce is doubtful.
Synopsis
When the husband instructs that a be written and delivered only after a specified time, the writing itself must wait until that time. Writing it too early invalidates the , and even a properly written cannot effect a divorce if the husband dies before it is delivered.
If he says to them, “Write and give it to her after the seven-year cycle,”
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they write it only during the year immediately following the end of that cycle.
The word שָׁבוּעַ here refers to the seven-year cycle. “After the cycle” means during the immediately following year; it does not mean that the agents should wait for that following year itself to pass.
,״״-
If he says to them, “After the year,”
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they write it during the first month of the following year.
״״-
If he says to them, “After the month,”
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they write it during the first week of the following month.
These rulings follow one pattern: “after” means acting within the immediately following unit of time. After a seven-year cycle, the window is the following year; after a year, the following month; after a month, the following week. The agents are not to wait until that next unit itself has passed.
״״-
If he says to them, “After ,”
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they may write it from after through the end of Tuesday.
For this instruction, “after ” includes Sunday through Tuesday.
״״-
If he says to them, “Write and give it to her before ,”
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they may write it from Wednesday through the end of Friday,
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and give it to her.
For this instruction, “before ” includes Wednesday through Friday.
The thus defines a specific window for each expression. The agents must act within the period immediately associated with the time the husband named, rather than treating words such as “after the year” or “after the month” as permission to act at any later date.
Synopsis
When a husband instructs his agents to write and give a “after” a particular period, they must act within the immediately following unit of time: the next year after a seven-year cycle, the next month after a year, or the next week after a month. “After ” means Sunday through Tuesday, while “before ” means Wednesday through Friday.
If the agents delayed beyond the time the husband specified,
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and only afterward wrote the and gave it to her,
״״,
for example, he told them, “After the month,”
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and they wrote it and gave it to her after two weeks of the following month had passed,
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the is — disqualified.
As explained in the previous , when the husband says “after the month,” the agents are to act during the first week of the following month. His words therefore do more than establish the earliest time at which they may act; they also indicate the period within which they are to carry out his instruction.
By waiting beyond that period, the agents fail to carry out his instruction at the proper time. The therefore rules that the resulting is — disqualified.
Synopsis
The time indicated by the husband's instructions has both a beginning and an end. If the agents wait beyond the permitted window before writing and delivering the , the rules that the is .
If the husband entered into seclusion with his wife after instructing them to write, sign, and give her a ,
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they should not write it.
The concern is that their may have led to marital relations. Because this occurred after the husband instructed the agents to prepare the but before they actually wrote it, they should no longer proceed with those instructions.
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This follows all the more so from the following reasoning:
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if even a that had already been placed in her hand becomes disqualified when he enters into seclusion with her,
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because we are concerned that perhaps he had marital relations with her,
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then certainly this applies to a that has not even been written yet.
The 's makes the concern clear. Even when the already exists and has been given to the wife, subsequent can disqualify it because perhaps they had marital relations. Certainly, then, the agents should not proceed with a that had not even been written before the .
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If they nevertheless wrote the and gave it to her after he had entered into seclusion with her, it is not a valid .
The rules more strongly than merely instructing the agents not to proceed. Even after the fact, if they wrote and delivered the following the , he rules אֵינוֹ גֵּט — it is not a .
Synopsis
If the husband enters into with his wife after instructing agents to write, sign, and deliver a , they should no longer write it because of the concern that the couple had marital relations. If the agents nevertheless write and deliver the afterward, the rules that it is not a valid .
🔎Dig Deeper After Ordering a
After Ordering a
The commentaries question why the rules so definitively that the is ineffective. The couple were still married when the occurred, since the had not yet been written or delivered; therefore, the concern is not that their relations created new . Rather, the may indicate reconciliation or that the husband no longer intended his earlier instruction to proceed. Since it is also possible that no relations or reconciliation occurred, the commentaries ask why the subsequently written is definitely ineffective rather than merely doubtful.
The suggests a distinction from an earlier ruling in which a husband himself gives his wife a after they had entered into . In that case, his later personal delivery of the is stronger evidence that he did not intend the intervening to prevent the divorce. Here, by contrast, the had not yet been written when the occurred. The Maggid Mishneh offers this distinction, although he acknowledges that the Rambam's ruling here still raises difficulty.
The ( 149:7) accepts that initially the agents should not write such a . If they nevertheless write and give it to her, however, it follows the and and treats the divorce as doubtful rather than definitely ineffective.
Sources: Maggid Mishneh on 9:25; Ramban and Rashba on ; , 149:7.
If a man says to ten people, “Write a for my wife,”
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one of them may write it on behalf of all of them.
Thus, saying “Write a ” to ten people does not mean that all ten must somehow take part in physically writing the document. One of them may fulfill the instruction for the group.
״״-
But if he says, “All of you, write it,”
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one of them writes it in the presence of all of them.
The word כֻּלְּכֶם — “all of you” changes the requirement. Although only one person actually writes the , he must do so while all ten are present.
״״-
If he says, “Bring this to my wife,”
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one of them may bring it on behalf of all of them.
As with writing, when he addresses the group without saying כֻּלְּכֶם, one member can carry out the instruction for the group.
״״-
But if he says, “All of you, bring this to my wife,”
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one of them brings it in the presence of all of them.
One person may physically deliver the , but when the husband said כֻּלְּכֶם, the delivery must take place in the presence of the entire group.
The distinction throughout the is therefore concrete: without כֻּלְּכֶם, one member of the group may carry out the instruction on behalf of everyone; with כֻּלְּכֶם, one person still performs the actual writing or delivery, but all members of the group must be present.
These are the rules that apply on the -law level. The Sages instituted additional safeguards when a husband gives such instructions to a group, as the explains in Halachah 28.
Synopsis
When a husband tells a group to write or deliver a without saying “all of you,” one member may carry out the instruction for the group. If he explicitly says “all of you,” one person still performs the actual writing or delivery, but the entire group must be present.
When a Group Is Told to Write, Sign, and Deliver the
״״-
If a man says to ten people, “Write a , sign it, and give it to my wife,”
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one of them writes it,
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two of them sign it,
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and one of them gives it to her.
Because the husband did not say כֻּלְּכֶם — “all of you,” he does not require every member of the group to perform each task. One person can write the , two provide the required witness signatures, and one can deliver it.
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Even if the person who wrote the was also one of the two who signed it,
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and he was also the agent who gave it to her,
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the is valid.
Thus, after the fact, the is valid even if the same person wrote it, served as one of its two signing , and acted as the agent who delivered it.
״״-
If he says to them, “All of you, sign it,”
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all of them must sign it.
Here, every signature becomes necessary because the husband explicitly required the entire group to sign.
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If he counted them,
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whether he counted all of them or counted only some of them,
״״-
and then told them, “Sign,”
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it is regarded as though he had said, “All of you, sign.”
Counting the people before instructing them to sign indicates that he is particular about the group's participation. The therefore treats the instruction as “All of you, sign” even if he counted only part of the group rather than every individual. One example of such counting would be addressing them as “one, two, three, four...” before instructing them to sign.
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The first two who sign do so as ,
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while the remaining signers sign in fulfillment of the husband's stipulation.
There are therefore two legally different kinds of signatures on this . The first two are the actual witness signatures. The remaining signatures are necessary because the husband required everyone to sign, but they are added to fulfill his stipulation rather than to supply the 's essential two signing .
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Therefore, if the remaining signers were disqualified as ,
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or one signed today and another on the following day,
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even if the additional signatures were added over the course of many days,
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the is valid.
Because these later signatures fulfill the husband's stipulation rather than serve as the two essential witness signatures, the does not apply all the ordinary requirements of signing to them. The two essential , by contrast, must sign on the day the is written.
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If one of them dies before signing,
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the is void.
Although the additional signatures are not needed as testimony, they are still required to fulfill the husband's explicit instruction that everyone sign. If one of the required signers dies before signing, that stipulation can no longer be fulfilled, so the is void.
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If one of the first two signers was disqualified as a witness,
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the is — disqualified,
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lest people say that a disqualified witness is acceptable for the testimony of other legal documents
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when many have signed them.
The first two signatures are the actual witness signatures. If one of those two were allowed to be invalid simply because many additional people signed, observers might wrongly conclude that an invalid witness may likewise be included among the actual on other legal documents whenever many people sign.
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The only reason a with many signers is accepted in this manner is that the who observe its delivery are the primary .
With other legal documents, the signing have primary importance. With a , however, the who observe its delivery are primary. This distinction allows greater flexibility regarding the additional signatures that were added only to fulfill the husband's stipulation, while the first two actual witness signatures must still be valid.
Synopsis
When a group is told simply to write, sign, and deliver a , one may write, two may sign, and one may deliver it. If the husband requires everyone to sign, the first two signatures serve as the actual witness signatures while the rest fulfill his stipulation. Every required signer must eventually sign, but the treats the additional signatures differently from the two essential .
🔎Dig DeeperWhen a Group Is Told to Write, Sign, and Deliver the
When a Group Is Told to Write, Sign, and Deliver the
Many authorities disagree with allowing the scribe to serve as one of the two signing . The explains that even according to the , this arrangement should not be used initially; the Rambam means only that the remains valid after the fact. The ( 130:18) therefore cautions against having the scribe sign as a witness.
There is also a question about what it means for the first two signatures to be the actual witness signatures. The Rambam appears to require those two valid not only to sign before the others chronologically, but also for their signatures to appear first on the . Other authorities understand that it is sufficient for them simply to sign first in time.
Finally, the Rambam permits the additional signers to include people who are disqualified as , since those later signatures fulfill the husband's stipulation rather than provide the essential testimony. and later authorities disagree and require all of the signers to be valid . The ( 120:10) records both views and appears to favor the Rambam, while the follows the stricter position.
Sources: Kessef Mishneh on 9:27; Tosafos on ; , 120:10 and 130:18; Rama.
How the Sages Required Group Appointments to Be Formulated
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The Sages established a procedure for a man who instructs a group to write, sign, or bring a to his wife:
The Sages instituted this wording to prevent a group appointment from accidentally making the depend upon the participation of every person present. If the husband's words required all of them to take part and even one failed to do so, his instruction would not be fulfilled. They therefore required him to make clear who may carry out each task.
-״״,
For writing, he should say to them, “Any one of you may write a for my wife.”
This makes clear that the writing does not depend upon every member of the group. Any one of them can fulfill the husband's instruction.
״״;
Similarly, for bringing the , he should say, “Any one of you may bring it.”
Again, one member of the group can carry out the delivery; the participation of every person is not required.
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And if the instruction concerns signing,
״״.
he should say to them, “Any two of you may sign this and give it to my wife.”
Since two signatures are required, the husband specifies that any two members of the group may sign. The wording prevents the from unintentionally becoming dependent upon every member of the group signing.
Synopsis
The Sages prescribed explicit wording when a husband appoints a group so that the will not unintentionally depend upon every person's participation. He should state that any one may write or bring the , and any two may sign it.
Why did the Sages say that the to a may sign only in one another's presence?
,״״.
It is a safeguard lest a husband say to a group, “All of you, sign.”
The requirement protects against the situation discussed in Halachah 27, where the husband makes every member of a group responsible for signing the .
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For if were permitted to sign outside one another's presence,
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perhaps two of them would sign,
,
and the woman would take the into her hand,
,
thinking that all the required signatures had already been completed,
.
when in fact the husband's stipulation had not yet been fulfilled.
If the husband said כֻּלְּכֶם חֲתֹמוּ, the first two signatures can provide the essential witness testimony, but they do not by themselves fulfill his instruction. Every member of the designated group still has to sign.
If the could sign separately, the wife might receive the after seeing two valid signatures and assume that it was complete, even though the additional signatures required by the husband had not yet been added. Requiring the to sign in one another's presence helps prevent an incomplete from being mistaken for one that is ready for use.
The ( 130:13) rules that if the do not sign in one another's presence, the is .
Synopsis
The Sages required to sign in one another's presence to protect against a case in which the husband required an entire group to sign. Otherwise, the wife might see two valid witness signatures and mistakenly believe the was complete even though the additional signatures required by the husband's stipulation were still missing.
If a man says to three people, “Two of you should write a for my wife, sign it, and give it to her,”
,
and the group included a father and his son,
,
whether the father signs together with the third person,
-
or the son signs together with the third person,
,
the is valid,
The father and son cannot serve together as the two signing , because who are related to one another are disqualified from testifying together. Either one, however, may sign together with the unrelated third person.
.
because a person may appoint the son as an agent in place of the father.
As in the preceding , one person performs the writing, two qualified members sign as , and one of them may deliver the . The father and son cannot serve together as the two signing because they are related. Either one, however, may act together with the unrelated third person, since their relationship does not prevent the son from functioning as an agent in place of his father.
Synopsis
When a father and son are among three people appointed to prepare and deliver a , they cannot serve together as the two . Either one, however, may act together with the unrelated third person, because the son may serve as an agent in place of his father.
When the Husband Designates a Different Agent to Deliver the
״״
If a husband says to two people, “Write and sign a , and give it to so-and-so, who will bring it to my wife,”
״״-
or, “Give it to the agent who will bring it to her,”
,
one of them writes it,
both of them sign it,
.
and they give it to the agent.
The husband assigned the two men a specific role: they are to prepare and sign the and then transfer it to the person he designated to deliver it. They themselves were not appointed to perform the divorce by delivering the to his wife.
-
If they themselves bring it and give it to her,
,
it is not a valid ,
.
because he did not appoint them as agents to effect the divorce.
Their authority to write and sign the does not automatically give them authority to deliver it. The husband specifically assigned the act that effects the divorce to another agent. Their direct delivery to the wife therefore does not fulfill his appointment.
?
What should they do?
,
They should take the back from her,
,
give it to the designated agent,
.
and he then gives it to her again in their presence or in the presence of other .
Their first delivery did not effect the divorce because they lacked authority to deliver the . That failed delivery did not invalidate the document itself; it simply did not accomplish a divorce. The therefore does not need to be rewritten. They take it back, give that same to the husband’s designated agent, and he delivers it to the wife before . The husband's original instructions are then carried out properly.
,
My teachers issued a ruling concerning this that does not appear correct to me,
.
because of an error that existed in the versions of the they possessed.
The states that his teachers ruled differently because of the version of the relevant Talmudic passage that they possessed.
Synopsis
When the husband appoints two people to write and sign a and directs them to give it to a particular delivery agent, they cannot substitute themselves for that agent. If they mistakenly give the directly to the wife, they can correct the error by taking back the same , transferring it to the designated agent, and having him deliver it to her before .
🔎Dig DeeperWhen the Husband Designates a Different Agent to Deliver the
When the Husband Designates a Different Agent to Deliver the
The states that his teachers ruled differently because of the version of the they possessed. The discussion centers on the text and interpretation of 63b. Significantly, the standard printed versions of the available today follow the version associated with .
The ( 141:36) follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's approach and rules that the status of the divorce in this situation is doubtful. The discusses how the Rambam understood the passage differently.
If a husband says to a scribe, “Write a for my wife,”
,
and the scribe writes it and gives it to the husband without ,
The in this case has not been signed by .
and the husband takes it and gives it to an agent,
״״,
and says to him, “Give this to my wife in the presence of ,”
-
and the agent goes and gives it to her in the presence of ,
.
her status is that of a woman whose divorce is in doubt.
The difficulty is not that the husband's appointment of the agent required . According to the , this type of agency can be validly established even without . The problem is proving afterward that this particular unsigned document is the that the husband gave the agent for the purpose of divorcing his wife.
The who watch the agent give the document to the wife can testify to that delivery. But they did not witness the husband give this to the agent for divorce. Without signatures on the or to that earlier transfer, the agent himself is the only person connecting this document to the husband's instruction.
,
For the agent is not believed on his own to remove the woman's prohibited marital status,
-
even though he is a single witness,
A married woman has an established status as an eishes and is forbidden to other men. The testimony of this one agent alone is not sufficient to establish the facts necessary to remove that status and permit her to remarry.
,
except when his statement is supported by the written testimony of the who signed the ,
,
whose testimony is regarded as though it had already been examined,
,.
unless someone challenges it, as we have explained.
Ordinarily, the signatures of on a provide independent evidence supporting the agent's statement. Those signatures are treated as established testimony unless someone challenges them. Here, however, the is unsigned. The only person connecting this document to the husband's instruction is the agent himself, and one witness is not sufficient to remove the woman's established status as an eishes . The result is therefore a doubtful divorce.
But if two were present
-
who can testify that the husband gave this to the agent in order to divorce his wife with it,
.
she is divorced.
Two now establish that the husband gave this particular to the agent for the purpose of divorce, while also observe its delivery to the wife. The necessary proof is therefore complete, and the divorce is effective even though the itself bears no witness signatures.
This reflects the 's principle that who observe the delivery of a can establish the divorce even when the document is unsigned. Once the agent's authority to deliver this particular is established by , his delivery is treated like the husband's own delivery for this purpose.
Synopsis
An agent can be validly appointed without , but an unsigned creates a separate problem of proof: the agent alone cannot establish that this particular document was entrusted to him by the husband for divorce. If two saw the husband give this to the agent for that purpose, and observe its delivery to the wife, the divorce is effective even though the itself is unsigned.
When the Husband Specifies Where the Must Be Given
״״,
If a husband says to an agent, “Give this to my wife in such-and-such a place,”
-
and the agent gives it to her in another place,
.
it is not a valid .
By telling the agent to give the in a particular place, the husband makes that location part of the instructions governing the agency. If the agent delivers it somewhere else, he has not carried out the agency as the husband defined it.
״״,
But if the husband says, “She is in such-and-such a place,”
-
and the agent gives it to her in another place,
,
the is valid,
.
because the husband was merely indicating where she could be found.
Here, the husband is not restricting the agent's authority to a particular location. He is simply telling him where he expects his wife to be. If the agent finds her somewhere else and gives her the there, he has still fulfilled his mission.
The distinction therefore depends upon the husband's wording: “Give it to her in this place” makes the location part of the agency, while “she is in this place” merely provides information about where she may be found.
״״,
If he says to the agent, “Do not give it to her anywhere except in the house,”
,
and he gives it to her in the upper story,
״״,
or he says, “Do not give it to her except with your right hand,”
,
and he gives it to her with his left hand,
״״,
or he says, “Give it to her on such-and-such a day,”
-
and he gives it to her before that day arrives,
.
it is not a valid .
In each case, the husband has made a particular detail part of the agent's instructions. Giving the in the wrong part of the house, with the wrong hand, or before the appointed day does not fulfill the agency as he defined it.
When he says merely, “Give it to her on such-and-such a day,” the explicitly rules that giving it before that day is ineffective.
״״,
If he says, “Do not give it to her except on such-and-such a day,”
-
and the agent gives it to her either before or after that day,
,
it is not a valid ,
.
because he was particular about that specific day itself.
The phrase “do not give it to her except on that day” makes the exact day exclusive. Delivery either before or after it therefore violates the husband's explicit instruction.
.
The same law applies to all similar cases.
Synopsis
An agent must follow details that the husband makes part of his authority. “Give the in this place” makes the location essential, while “she is in this place” merely tells the agent where to find her. Likewise, explicit restrictions concerning the place, manner, or exact day of delivery must be followed.
Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration
tells his agent, “My wife is at her parents' house.” The agent arrives, but she has already left. He finds her at the grocery store and gives her the there. The is valid — was simply telling him where he expected her to be.
But suppose had said, “Give her the at her parents' house.” Now the location is part of the instruction. Giving it to her at the grocery store does not fulfill the agency.
The difference is simple: “She's there” tells you where to look. “Give it there” tells you where you must act.
Naming where the wife can be found provides information; directing that the be given in a particular place makes the location part of the mission. The parchment shown is illustrative, not an actual .
🔎Dig DeeperWhen the Husband Specifies Where the Must Be Given
When the Husband Specifies Where the Must Be Given
The distinguishes between saying “Give it to her on such-and-such a day” and saying “Do not give it to her except on such-and-such a day.” In the second case, he explicitly rules that delivery either before or after that exact day is ineffective. In the first case, he explicitly mentions only delivery before the appointed day.
From this contrast, the and other authorities infer that in the first case, if the agent gives the after the specified day, the divorce is effective. The disagrees and maintains that the Sages disqualify the divorce even then.
Sources: Beit Shmuel and Mishneh LaMelech on 9:33.
✦Live ItFollow the Mission, Not Your Version of It
Follow the Mission, Not Your Version of It
Again and again in this chapter, an agent must pay careful attention to exactly what he was asked to do.
“Give her the in this place” is different from “She is in this place.” “Take the article and then give the ” is different from “Give the and take the article.” Sometimes the place, order, timing, or even the particular person is part of the mission itself.
The agent cannot simply decide, This way seems basically equivalent.
A useful question is: “Is this just their suggested method, or is this something they specifically need me to preserve?”
Try today
When someone entrusts you with something important, don't immediately substitute the way you would do it. First understand what they actually asked for. Sometimes the details are incidental — but sometimes the details are the assignment.
Similarly, if a woman says to her agent, “Receive my for me in such-and-such a place,”
-
and he receives it for her in another place,
.
it is not a valid .
A lekabbalah receives the on the woman's behalf. His receipt is legally considered her receipt, so once he validly receives the , the divorce takes effect even though the document has not physically reached her.
Here, however, she limited that authority to a particular place. If he receives the elsewhere, he has acted outside the agency she gave him, so his receipt does not effect the divorce.
״״,
But if she says to him, “Bring my to me at such-and-such a place,”
-
and he brings it to her in another place,
.
the is valid.
Here the agent is not effecting the divorce by receiving the on her behalf. His role is to bring the document to her, and she herself ultimately receives it.
By accepting the from him somewhere other than the place she originally named, she demonstrates that she was not particular about where she would receive it. The different location therefore does not invalidate the delivery.
The distinction is therefore between an agent who receives the for her, whose authorized receipt itself effects the divorce, and an agent who merely brings the to her, where she herself performs the final act of receiving it.
Synopsis
If a woman appoints an agent to receive her for her in a particular place, receiving it elsewhere does not effect the divorce. If she merely tells an agent to bring the to her at a particular place, she may accept it elsewhere, demonstrating that the original location was not essential to her.
If a husband says to his agent, “Bring this to my wife,”
״״,
whether he said simply, “Bring it,”
״״,
or he said, “You bring it,”
-
and the agent becomes ill or is prevented by circumstances beyond his control,
.
he may send it through another person.
Even the more personal wording אַתְּ הוֹלֵךְ — “you bring it” does not prevent the agent from appointing another agent if illness or another unavoidable circumstance prevents him from carrying out the mission himself.
This permission applies when the original agent is prevented from fulfilling his agency. If he is able to carry it out himself, he should not transfer the responsibility to someone else.
״,״-
But if the husband says to him, “Take such-and-such an article from her for me, and give her this ,”
;
he should not send the through another person.
Because the mission also involves taking possession of the husband's article, the agent should not delegate it. There is reason to assume that the husband was particular about entrusting that article to the person he himself appointed.
,
If he nevertheless sends the through another person,
and the woman goes out to meet the agent,
,
and first gives him the article,
-
and afterward he gives her the ,
.
she is divorced.
Although the first agent should not have delegated the mission, the second agent follows the husband's specified sequence exactly: he first receives the article and only afterward gives her the . According to the , that is sufficient after the fact for the divorce to take effect.
The order is essential here: article first, second. The next explains what happens when that sequence is reversed.
Synopsis
An agent who becomes unable to deliver a may ordinarily appoint another agent. If the husband also instructed him to retrieve a particular article, however, he should not delegate the mission. If he does so anyway, the rules that the divorce is effective when the second agent follows the husband's specified sequence by receiving the article first and giving the afterward.
Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration
gives his agent a and wants his ring back from his wife.
If he says, “Take my ring and give her the ,” the order matters: ring first, second. If the agent gives her the first, he has not followed 's instruction.
But if says, “Give her the and take my ring,” receiving the ring is not a prerequisite to the divorce. The can take effect even if the ring is handed over afterward.
Same . Same ring. The question is whether getting the ring first was part of the husband's instructions for effecting the divorce.
When the husband requires the article first, the agent must preserve that order. When he says to give the and take the article, receiving the article first is not a prerequisite. The parchment shown is illustrative, not an actual .
🔎Dig DeeperWhen a Delivery Agent May Appoint Another Agent
When a Delivery Agent May Appoint Another Agent
disagrees with the 's ruling in the final case. He maintains that even if the second agent first receives the husband's article and only afterward gives the woman the , the divorce does not take effect.
The ( 141:51) records Rabbenu Asher's position as well, but appears to follow the Rambam's ruling that the divorce is effective when the second agent carries out the husband's instructions in the required order.
If the agent gives her the and only afterward she gives him the article,
-
even if it was the original agent himself who gave her the ,
,
it is not a valid ,
The problem is not limited to the substitution of a second agent. Even the husband’s original agent cannot reverse the sequence that the husband required.
;
because he violated the husband's instructions regarding a matter about which people are ordinarily particular;
״״,
for the husband told him, “Take the article and give her the ,”
.
but he gave her the first and only afterward took the article.
The husband's wording indicates that he wants the article secured before the divorce is effected. Since people are ordinarily particular about such a matter, reversing that sequence is a meaningful deviation from his instructions, and the does not take effect.
Synopsis
When the husband instructs the agent to take an article and then give the , the order matters. Even the original agent cannot give the first and collect the article afterward, because that reverses an instruction concerning something people ordinarily care about.
🔎Dig DeeperWhen the Agent Reverses the Required Order
When the Agent Reverses the Required Order
The ( 141:66) cites opinions that qualify this ruling. According to them, the is ineffective only when the husband's wording indicates that he definitely insists upon obtaining the article before the is delivered. If his words do not demonstrate such insistence, reversing the order may not prevent the divorce from taking effect.
When the Husband Says “Give the and Take the Article”
״,״-
If the husband says to the agent, “Give her the , and take such-and-such an article from her,”
,
he should not send the through another person,
.
because the husband does not want his entrusted article to be in someone else's possession.
Here the states explicitly why the original agent should not delegate the mission. Since the husband also expects his article to be received, we assume that he entrusted that responsibility specifically to the person he appointed and does not want the article placed in someone else's hands.
-
If the agent nevertheless sends the through another person,
,
the is valid,
Although the original agent should not have delegated the mission, the rules that this improper delegation does not invalidate the divorce after the fact.
,
whether she gave the article first,
.
or she gave it only afterward.
This case differs sharply from Halachah 36. There, the husband said “Take the article and give her the ,” indicating that he wanted possession of the article secured before the divorce. Here he said “Give her the and take the article.” His words do not make receipt of the article a prerequisite to the divorce.
Therefore, according to the , the is valid whether the woman gives the article before receiving the or only afterward.
Synopsis
When the husband says, “Give her the and take the article,” the original agent should not delegate the mission because the husband does not want his article entrusted to someone else. If he delegates anyway, however, the rules that the is valid whether the article is received before or after the is delivered.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
A husband gives an agent a and says, “Give my wife the and take my ring from her.” The agent should carry out the mission himself. If he instead appoints another agent, and that second agent gives her the before receiving the ring, the divorce is nevertheless valid according to the . Unlike “Take the ring and give the ,” the husband's wording here did not make possession of the ring a prerequisite to the divorce.
🔎Dig DeeperWhen the Husband Says “Give the and Take the Article”
When the Husband Says “Give the and Take the Article”
The disagrees with the 's ruling. He maintains that even when the husband says, “Give her the and take the article,” the divorce is effective only if the woman gives the article before receiving the .
According to the Rambam, however, there is no clear reason to assume that the husband insists upon receiving the article before the divorce when he himself mentioned giving the first.
If a husband gives a to an agent and says to him, “No one but you may give it to her,”
,
and the agent gives it to another person,
-
who then gives it to the wife,
.
it is not a valid .
The husband expressly made this particular agent's personal delivery part of the agency. The agent therefore has no authority to substitute someone else. Even though the ultimately reaches the wife, it was not delivered by the person whom the husband authorized to effect the divorce.
״,
Similarly, if the husband says to him, “Do not give it to her yourself;
,
rather, give it to so-and-so, and he will give it to her,”
-
and the first agent himself gives it to her,
,
it is not a valid ,
.
because the husband did not appoint him as the agent to effect the divorce.
The two halves of the illustrate opposite restrictions.
In the first case, the husband says: only you may deliver it. The first agent therefore cannot delegate.
In the second case, the husband says: you must not deliver it; give it to this other person, who will deliver it. The first person is authorized only to transfer the to the designated delivery agent. He himself has no authority to effect the divorce.
The decisive question is therefore not simply who physically possesses the , but whom the husband authorized to perform the delivery that effects the divorce.
Synopsis
The husband's instructions determine who has authority to effect the divorce. If he says that only the first agent may deliver the , that agent cannot substitute another person. If he instead directs the first agent to give the to a particular second person who will deliver it, only that second person is the agent authorized to effect the divorce.
Picture the CaseA concrete example
hands a to . says, “I don't know your wife.” replies, “Give it to — he knows her.”
's job is now to the document to . is the one authorized to deliver it to 's wife.
So even if later happens to meet her himself, he cannot simply hand her the . Having the document in your hand is not the same as having authority to use it to effect the divorce.
An Agent Whose Role Is Only to Transfer the to the Delivery Agent
״״,
If a husband gives a man a and says to him, “Bring this to my wife,”
״״,
and the agent says to him, “I do not know who she is,”
״,״-
and the husband tells him, “Give it to so-and-so; he knows who she is,”
,
the first man is an agent who was not given authority to effect the divorce,
The husband's response clarifies that the first man's role is now only to transfer the to the designated person. That second person is the one authorized to effect the divorce.
,
and he may give the only to the person whom the husband designated,
The first agent therefore cannot deliver the directly to the wife. His authority extends only to handing it to the particular person named by the husband.
,
and that designated person is the agent authorized to effect the divorce,
This continues the principle of the previous : one person may be authorized merely to transfer the to another person, while only the second person is authorized to perform the delivery that actually effects the divorce.
,
and he is the one who brings it to her,
.
or, if he becomes ill or is prevented by circumstances beyond his control, he may send it through another agent.
Once the reaches the person whom the husband designated as the actual delivery agent, the ordinary rules governing a delivery agent apply. If illness or another unavoidable circumstance prevents him from carrying out the mission personally, he may appoint another agent to deliver the .
Synopsis
When the first agent says that he does not know the wife and the husband directs him to give the to a particular person who does know her, the first agent's authority is limited to transferring the to that person. The designated second person is the agent authorized to effect the divorce and may appoint another agent if unavoidable circumstances prevent him from delivering it personally.
🔎Dig DeeperAn Agent Whose Role Is Only to Transfer the to the Delivery Agent
An Agent Whose Role Is Only to Transfer the to the Delivery Agent
According to the , if the first agent nevertheless gives the directly to the wife, the divorce does not take effect, because he was not appointed as the agent authorized to effect the divorce.
Other authorities disagree with this definite ruling and maintain that if the first agent gives the directly to the woman, the status of the divorce is doubtful.
✦Live ItResponsibility Includes Knowing Your Limits
Responsibility Includes Knowing Your Limits
The first agent is told to bring the to the man's wife. He responds honestly: אֵינִי מַכִּירָהּ — “I don't know who she is.”
He doesn't guess. He doesn't pretend he can figure it out. He tells the husband what he cannot do, and the husband gives him a different role: bring the to someone who does know her.
That honesty allows the mission to continue correctly.
Knowing the limits of your role isn't avoiding responsibility. Sometimes it's exactly what allows you to fulfill your responsibility properly.
Try today
Being responsible doesn't mean pretending you can handle everything yourself. Sometimes the responsible response is: “I don't know,” “I can't do this part,” or “I need someone who knows this better than I do.”
Appointing a Second Agent Before the Time for Divorce Arrives
״״,
If a husband gives a to an agent and says to him, “Do not give it to her until thirty days have passed,”
-
and during those thirty days the agent becomes ill or is prevented by circumstances beyond his control,
;
he may send the through another agent;
The original agent is not yet authorized to effect the divorce during these thirty days. Nevertheless, because his appointment will give him that authority once the thirty days have passed, he may appoint a substitute even before that authority becomes operative.
,
for although he is not presently an agent authorized to effect the divorce,
,
since after thirty days he will become an agent authorized to effect the divorce,
.
he may appoint another agent during the thirty days.
An agent can therefore pass on an authority that he cannot yet exercise himself, because that authority is already contained within his appointment and will become operative when the specified time arrives.
The second agent may be appointed during the thirty days, but he may not give the to the wife until the original thirty-day period has actually ended. The appointment can occur early; the divorce cannot.
?
When does this apply?
,
When her husband was not with her in the same region,
.
or when she was being divorced during , before nisu'in.
If the husband is not in the same region, there is no opportunity for the appeasement at issue here. And when the divorce is taking place during , the has already ruled that we do not raise the concern of שֶׁמָּא פִּיֵּס — perhaps he appeased her, because the degree of familiarity associated with nisu'in is absent.
,
But if she is being divorced after nisu'in and her husband is with her in the same region,
,
we are concerned that perhaps he appeased her,
Because they had entered nisu'in and remain near one another during the waiting period, there is a concern that the husband may have appeased her in the manner discussed earlier, affecting the condition attached to the .
,
and the agent should not appoint another agent during the thirty days,
״״.
unless the husband said, “I accept her as trustworthy to say that I did not appease her.”
When the couple had entered nisu'in and the husband remains in the same region, the original agent may not appoint a substitute during the thirty-day period unless the husband has accepted his wife's word that no appeasement occurred.
-
The agent may, however, give her the after the thirty days have passed,
,
but the concern regarding the remains, as we have explained,
״״.
unless the husband said, “I accept her as trustworthy to say that I did not appease her.”
Once the thirty days have passed, the original agent may deliver the himself. Nevertheless, because the husband remained near his wife during the waiting period, there is still a concern that they reconciled or altered the arrangement before delivery. The describes this as the concern that he may have appeased her. That concern is removed if the husband had accepted her word that no appeasement occurred.
There are therefore two distinct issues. During the thirty days, the concern prevents the original agent from appointing a substitute in this situation unless the husband accepted his wife's word. After the thirty days, the original agent can deliver the , but the itself remains subject to the שֶׁמָּא פִּיֵּס concern unless that same safeguard was established.
Synopsis
An agent who will become authorized to deliver a after thirty days may, if illness or unavoidable circumstances intervene, appoint a second agent even before those thirty days have passed; the second agent must still wait until the appointed time before delivering it. If the couple had entered nisu'in and the husband remains in the same region, however, the possibility that he appeased his wife creates an additional concern unless he expressly accepted her word that no appeasement occurred.
🔎Dig DeeperAppointing a Second Agent Before the Time for Divorce Arrives
Appointing a Second Agent Before the Time for Divorce Arrives
is concerned that if the first agent appoints a second agent during the thirty days, he may fail to communicate the husband's timing restriction clearly. He therefore maintains that the first agent should instead entrust the to a , which can appoint the second agent after the thirty-day period has passed.
Although the ( 141:37) records Rav Meir HaLevi's position, its presentation appears to favor the 's ruling, which permits the first agent to appoint the substitute during the thirty days when necessary.
Translation and elucidation: Independently prepared for Rambam, Clearly in contemporary English. Translation follows the Rambam’s words; elucidation supplies only the context needed to understand them.
Word cards and glossary: Hebrew word cards distinguish a word’s basic meaning from its meaning in the particular phrase. Shared glossary entries explain recurring terms; biography entries identify the cited authorities.
Explain and Background: Explain provides context needed for the ruling. Optional Background panels provide additional context that can be skipped without losing the essential explanation.
Synopsis: A short summary follows each halachah. It is a guide to the central ruling, not a replacement for the full text and its qualifications.
Dig Deeper: Based on the classic commentaries named inside each panel. Editorial explanations are not presented as quotations.
Live It: Where present, these panels connect a particular halachah to a suggested personal reflection and an action to try. Original applications are labeled as suggested reflections. They are distinct from the ruling and are not attributed to the Rebbe merely because his guidance supports seeking a practical lesson.
Measurements: Modern equivalents draw on Chabad.org’s measurement glossary and cited halachic calculations. They show a range when major accepted calculations differ. Monetary equivalents fluctuate with the price of silver.
The Rebbe’s teachings and guidance: Source links accompany the completion teachings and the guidance inside Dig Deeper and Live It. Quotations, translations, and adaptations are identified; the general guidance is separate from the sources for a panel’s particular discussion.
Editorial responsibility: Created and prepared for this project by Levi Gelb. Corrections and suggestions can be submitted below. This presentation supports learning; practical halachic questions should be brought to a qualified rav.
Chapter 9 at a glance
From delayed effect to faithful agency
The chapter begins by separating a divorce that starts later from a whose effect depends on a condition. It then applies exact timing and wording to illness, death, and group appointments, before turning to the limits of an agent’s authority and the place, order, and person specified for delivery.
When a husband postpones the divorce itself until a specified time, no divorce takes place until that time arrives. Although this resembles a conditional , it is not governed by the special rules of conditions.
A true conditional is delivered as an act of divorce from the outset, so when its condition is fulfilled, no new possession of the is required. A divorce postponed until a future time or act is different: until then, the is merely held as an entrusted object and no divorce has yet occurred. When the appointed time or act arrives, the must therefore be in the legally required place for the divorce to take effect.
When a conditional depends upon the husband's failure to return within a specified time, circumstances beyond his control do not ordinarily prevent fulfillment of the condition. If he does not actually return within the required period, the takes effect even though he tried to return and clearly did not want the divorce to occur.
The words “if I die” are ambiguous: they can refer either to a divorce beginning after death or to one that relates back to the present. Because they do not clearly establish a divorce during the husband's lifetime, they are treated as “after my death,” and the does not take effect.
The husband's precise wording determines when the divorce takes effect. “When the sun emerges” postpones the divorce until sunrise; “on condition that the sun rises” makes the effective retroactively once sunrise fulfills the condition. A simple “if the sun rises” formulation remains ineffective until the condition occurs, so it cannot take effect if the husband dies first.
The husband's wording and the course of his illness determine the result. If he says, “If I do not recover from this illness,” but dies from an external cause while still ill, the divorce is doubtful. If the depends upon his dying from the original illness and he later gets up and walks in the marketplace before becoming ill again and dying, the cause of death must be assessed. If he passes directly from one illness into another without getting up and walking in the marketplace, no assessment is required.
If a husband has another person acquire a for his wife so that she will avoid , and he dies before the reaches her, the divorce is doubtful. Avoiding is considered a benefit for most women, allowing the other person's acquisition to create a possibility that the took effect even without her appointment.
If the husband enters into with his wife after instructing agents to write, sign, and deliver a , they should no longer write it because of the concern that the couple had marital relations. If the agents nevertheless write and deliver the afterward, the rules that it is not a valid .
When a group is told simply to write, sign, and deliver a , one may write, two may sign, and one may deliver it. If the husband requires everyone to sign, the first two signatures serve as the actual witness signatures while the rest fulfill his stipulation. Every required signer must eventually sign, but the treats the additional signatures differently from the two essential .
When the husband appoints two people to write and sign a and directs them to give it to a particular delivery agent, they cannot substitute themselves for that agent. If they mistakenly give the directly to the wife, they can correct the error by taking back the same , transferring it to the designated agent, and having him deliver it to her before .
An agent must follow details that the husband makes part of his authority. “Give the in this place” makes the location essential, while “she is in this place” merely tells the agent where to find her. Likewise, explicit restrictions concerning the place, manner, or exact day of delivery must be followed.
An agent who becomes unable to deliver a may ordinarily appoint another agent. If the husband also instructed him to retrieve a particular article, however, he should not delegate the mission. If he does so anyway, the rules that the divorce is effective when the second agent follows the husband's specified sequence by receiving the article first and giving the afterward.
An agent who will become authorized to deliver a after thirty days may, if illness or unavoidable circumstances intervene, appoint a second agent even before those thirty days have passed; the second agent must still wait until the appointed time before delivering it. If the couple had entered nisu'in and the husband remains in the same region, however, the possibility that he appeased his wife creates an additional concern unless he expressly accepted her word that no appeasement occurred.
