רRambam, Clearly
Aa
Hilchos Gerushin · Perek 2Gerushin · Ch. 2
20 left0% read20 halachos left

·

Writing, delivery, and consent in divorce

Authorizing a , determining the scope of an agent’s instructions, and the capacity and consent required for divorce.

פרק ב20 halachosWednesday, September 23, 2026י״ב בתשרי תשפ״ז◷ Estimated study time: 70–95 min

אTap any Hebrew word to see its meaning and how it works in the phrase.

Chapter progress 0 of 20 completed🔎 0 learned in depth
Halachah 10% through
הלכה א

Authorizing Another Person to Write or Deliver a

-

The ’s statement, “He shall write her a document of severance and place it in her hand” ( 24:1),

A is the written document through which a Jewish divorce takes effect. This explains whether the verse requires the husband to write and deliver it personally.

applies equally whether he writes it himself or instructs someone else to write it for her,

and whether he gives it to her himself or instructs someone else to give it to her.

The husband may authorize another person to perform these acts on his behalf. Writing and delivery are separate tasks: permission to write the document does not by itself authorize its delivery, as the chapter later explains.

“He shall write” teaches that divorce can take effect only through a written document;

“He shall place” teaches that she may not take it on her own.

The verse requires both a written document and an act of giving. The woman’s simply taking the document does not fulfill the requirement that it be given to her by her husband or someone acting on his behalf.

Synopsis

A husband may authorize others to write and deliver his . The divorce nevertheless requires a written document that is given to the wife; she cannot bring about the divorce by taking it herself.

הלכה ב

Assigning the Writing, Signing, and Delivery

-

If he tells two people, “Write a , sign it, and give it to my wife,”

they may write it, sign it, and give it to her.

Those same people serve as both his agents and his .

Acting as the husband’s agents does not give them a personal stake in the divorce, so they may also serve as .

Having only these two people carry out the instructions means that the person who writes the document also signs as one of its . explains in the that, even according to the , this arrangement should ordinarily be avoided and should be used only when no alternative is available.

-

Similarly, if he tells a scribe, “Write me a for my wife,” and instructs the to sign,

they write it, sign it, and give it to him.

He may then use it to divorce her whenever he wishes.

Here, the instructions authorize preparation of the document, while the husband retains control over its delivery. Writing and signing alone do not dissolve the marriage.

“Whenever he wishes” assumes that nothing has happened to disqualify the document before delivery. If the husband enters seclusion with his wife after it is written but before it is delivered, the resulting presumption of marital relations disqualifies that previously written . The marriage has not yet ended, since the document has not yet been delivered.

Synopsis

People appointed to prepare and deliver a may also serve as its . Alternatively, the husband may have the document prepared and returned to him, leaving its delivery in his own hands.

🔎Dig DeeperAssigning the Writing, Signing, and Delivery

Assigning the Writing, Signing, and Delivery

A bears the date on which it is prepared, while the divorce itself takes effect only upon delivery. This creates a practical question when the husband keeps the document and delivers it on a later day.

The ’s wording here permits the husband to retain the and deliver it on a later day, provided nothing else has disqualified it. The ( 127:5), however, rules that a delivered after its date of writing is acceptable only when delivered through an agent. The disagreement therefore concerns delayed delivery by the husband himself, not whether writing alone ends the marriage.

Sources: , 127:5; 127:7.

הלכה ג

Establishing Identity and Preventing Substitution

-

A may be written for a man even when his wife is not with him,

provided that the and the scribe who wrote and signed it recognize and know that he is the man in question and that his wife is the woman in question.

Her absence does not prevent preparation of the document, but the couple’s identities must be established. Even if a woman accompanies him and he identifies her as his wife, that statement alone does not satisfy the requirement.

The clarifies that this requirement applies to the signing . A scribe who does not also sign as a witness need not personally know the couple’s identities.

The identifying information also includes the names of the husband’s and wife’s fathers. Established identity does not require lifelong acquaintance: a name consistently used in a town for thirty days can suffice. A person’s own statement can establish his or her father’s name.

-

If two men in the same locality have identical names, and their wives also have identical names,

neither may divorce his wife unless the other man is present,

lest he have a written and bring it to the other man’s wife, passing it off as a divorce from her husband.

Matching names create an opportunity for substitution: a document prepared for one couple could appear to belong to the other. Requiring the other husband’s presence guards against that deception. It does not mean that one man actually has authority to divorce another man’s wife.

Synopsis

A may be prepared without the wife’s presence, but the couple’s identities must be established. When two couples have matching names, an additional safeguard prevents one couple’s document from being passed off as the other’s.

הלכה ד

An Emergency Exception and the Scribe’s Fee

-

In a time of danger— the may be written and delivered, even though the people involved are not personally recognized.

This refers to a husband whose life is in danger and who requests a divorce so that his wife will not become subject to or if he dies. These are the marriage or release procedures that may be required between the widow of a man who died without surviving descendants and his surviving brother.

In this emergency, the ordinary requirement of personal recognition is relaxed so that the opportunity to arrange the divorce is not lost. The husband’s authorization is still required.

This exception concerns personal recognition; it does not dispense with identifying the husband and wife. In the emergency case discussed later in this chapter, the ( 141:19) explains that the man states his name, his wife’s name, and their respective towns.

In all cases, the woman pays the scribe’s fee.

This payment rule applies generally, not only in an emergency. Although arranging the written divorce is the husband’s responsibility, the Sages assigned the scribe’s fee to the wife so that his lack of funds would not delay her receipt of the .

Synopsis

Danger to the husband’s life permits writing and delivering a without the ordinary personal-recognition requirement, though the parties must still be identified. As a general rule, the wife pays the scribe’s fee so lack of funds will not delay the divorce.

הלכה ה

The Husband Must Personally Authorize the Writer and Signers

The husband must himself tell the scribe, “Write,” and the , “Sign.”

The authorization must come from the husband to the people performing these tasks. This does not mean that he must raise the subject without being asked; the next case expressly allows others to ask him first.

-

If a court or two people ask him, “Shall we write a for your wife?” and he answers, “Write it,”

the is valid if they themselves write and sign it.

The explains that the case includes authorization to sign as well as to write. The decisive point is that the people whom the husband authorized carry out the work themselves.

But if they instruct a scribe to write it and to sign it, and those people do so,

-

even if they then give it to the husband and he gives this to his wife in the presence of ,

the is void, because it was written by someone whom the husband did not instruct to write it.

Here, the husband instructed these people to perform the work themselves; he did not authorize them to pass the instructions to others. The verbal assignment they received cannot simply be transferred to a substitute. Even a court has no greater authority in this case.

Halachah 6 separately addresses a husband who expressly instructs intermediaries to tell others to write or sign.

The defect arose when the document was written without the required authorization. The husband’s later acceptance and personal delivery do not repair it. “Void” means that the document does not effect a divorce under law, as halachah 7 will explain.

Synopsis

The husband must personally authorize those who write and sign his . If the people he authorizes instead delegate the work to others without being authorized to do so, the resulting document is void, even if he later delivers it himself.

הלכה ו

Telling Intermediaries to Appoint the Scribe and

If the husband said to two or three people, “Tell the scribe to write a for my wife, and tell the to sign it,”

and they told the scribe, and he wrote it, and they told the , and they signed it,

-

or if he said to two people, “Tell the scribe to write a for my wife, and you yourselves sign it”—

the is disqualified.

This differs from the previous . There, the husband authorized specific people to perform the writing and signing themselves, and they improperly transferred that task to others. Here, he expressly tells them to relay his instructions to the scribe or .

Because the intermediaries are carrying out exactly what he told them to do, the defect is less severe than in Halachah 5. Nevertheless, the rules that the is still Rabbinically disqualified.

This matter requires very careful consideration, because the is close to being considered void.

Although the formally classifies it as , he warns that its defect approaches the more serious category of a -level invalid .

Synopsis

If the husband expressly tells intermediaries to instruct a scribe or on his behalf, the resulting is Rabbinically disqualified. Because the defect is close to a -level invalidity, the case must be treated with particular caution.

🔎Dig DeeperTelling Intermediaries to Appoint the Scribe and

Telling Intermediaries to Appoint the Scribe and

understands the ’s warning—“it is close to being a void ”—to mean that this case is more severe than an ordinary and that the woman’s divorce should be treated as doubtful. The follows this approach.

, however, understands the Rambam literally: despite the warning, the remains in the ordinary category of a Rabbinically disqualified and does not acquire a special doubtful status.

Sources: on 2:6 (Rav David HaCohen and Rav Moshe Alshacar); Rama, 120:4.

הלכה ז

The Difference Between and

What is the difference between a that is called “disqualified” and one that is called “void”?

Whenever this work states that a is “void,” it is void by law;

A does not effect the divorce on the level.

and whenever it states that a is “disqualified,” it is disqualified by Rabbinic law.

An ordinary classified as effects a divorce under law, but the Sages prohibit relying on it to remarry. This differs from a , which does not dissolve the marriage at all.

As the later chapters explain, this distinction also affects the ruling if the woman has already remarried. Halachah 6 presents a special concern because the describes that as close to being void.

Synopsis

Throughout the ’s laws of divorce, “” means the is void by law, while “” means it is disqualified by Rabbinic law.

הלכה ח

Rewriting an Invalid Until a Valid One Reaches Her

-

If the husband brings a signed in his hand, and says, “Give this to my wife”—

they may give it to her.

Since the husband himself presents the completed and instructs them to deliver that specific document, they may rely on his direction and give it to her.

If he told other people to write a and sign it and give it to his wife,

-

and they wrote it, signed it, and gave it to her, but the was then found to be void or disqualified—

they may write another one, and even a hundred others, until a valid reaches her hand.

His instruction was not merely to prepare one particular piece of paper; he appointed them to bring about the divorce. If the they produced proves void or disqualified, their mission has not yet been completed, and they may continue until a valid is successfully delivered.

Synopsis

When the husband appoints people to write, sign, and deliver the , their mission is to accomplish the divorce. If the they produce is invalid, they may prepare another—and continue doing so until a valid reaches her.

🔎Dig DeeperRewriting an Invalid Until a Valid One Reaches Her

Rewriting an Invalid Until a Valid One Reaches Her

The explains that when the husband personally hands over a completed signed and tells the agents to deliver it, we do not suspect that he intentionally prepared a defective document merely to create problems for his wife.

The adds an important practical limitation to the second ruling. If the first is technically valid but fails to meet a local rabbi’s preferred standard, the scribe may not automatically write another one, because the original agency may already have been completed. For this reason, later practice developed the custom that the husband explicitly authorizes the writing of as many as necessary until one is accepted by the rabbi supervising the divorce.

Sources: Kessef Mishneh on 2:8; , 122:1.

Live ItFollow through on what you offered

Follow through on what you offered

When the husband authorizes people to write, sign, and deliver a , their task continues if the document proves invalid. They may prepare another until a valid reaches his wife. Their assignment is to accomplish the authorized result.

That distinction can help us think about everyday commitments. If we offered to arrange a ride for someone and the driver cancels, passing along the cancellation may leave the person stranded. We can check whether another arrangement is needed and what we can realistically do. Remembering the purpose of our offer helps us notice what still needs attention.

Try today

Revisit one offer of help and check whether the need has actually been met.

Suggested reflection on 2:8.

הלכה ט

When the Writers’ Agency May Already Be Finished

If the husband said to them, “Write and sign and give it to the agent to bring to her,”

-

and they wrote and signed it and gave it to the agent, but the was found to be void—

they may not write another until they consult the husband again;

The difference from Halachah 8 is the scope of their assignment. Here, the husband did not tell them to carry out the divorce itself; he told them to prepare a and hand it to a separate delivery agent.

because he did not appoint them as agents to effect the divorce,

and perhaps he intended only that they write the and give it to the agent, with no further task remaining for them afterward,

and they have already written it and given it over, therefore, they may not write another one.

Their specific assignment may have ended when they handed the document to the delivery agent, even though the document ultimately proved unusable.

-

If they nevertheless wrote another valid , gave it to the agent, and the agent gave it to her—

she is doubtfully divorced.

The doubt is whether the husband’s original authorization had already ended or whether his true intention was that they continue until the divorce was successfully completed.

“Doubtfully divorced” means that it is uncertain whether the marriage has ended. She cannot rely on this as establishing that she is free to marry someone else.

Synopsis

When the writers were appointed only to prepare the and hand it to a separate delivery agent, their mission may end with that handoff. If the first proves void, they need renewed authorization before writing another; otherwise a later divorce is only doubtful.

🔎Dig DeeperWhen the Writers’ Agency May Already Be Finished

When the Writers’ Agency May Already Be Finished

disagrees with the and argues that the agency cannot be considered complete if the writers produced an invalid . In his view, the husband clearly intended them to prepare an actual , not a worthless document.

The narrows the Rambam’s ruling further. He understands the case as one in which the disqualification arose only after the had already been given to the delivery agent. If it was already defective when handed to the agent, he maintains that even the Rambam would permit the writers to prepare another.

The records the Rambam’s ruling, while the follows Rav Moshe HaCohen’s more lenient position.

Sources: on 2:9 (Rav Moshe HaCohen); and Rama, 122:2; Beit Shmuel 122:7.

Live ItCheck before taking the next step

Check before taking the next step

When the writers are instructed to prepare a and hand it to a separate delivery agent, their authorization may end at that handoff. If the document proves invalid, they must consult the husband before preparing another.

Good intentions can carry us beyond what someone actually asked us to do. A friend might ask us to find out about an available apartment. After speaking with the landlord, we may feel tempted to reserve it before someone else does. A quick check gives our friend room to decide. Helping includes respecting which decisions remain theirs, even when the next step seems obvious.

Try today

Before extending a task someone entrusted to you, confirm that they want you to take the next step.

Suggested reflection on 2:9.

הלכה י

Which Expressions Actually Authorize a Divorce

If a husband says to two or more people, “Write a and give it to my wife,”

“Divorce her,” “Send her away,” “Divorce her,” “Divorce her,”

-

or, “Write a document and give it to her”—

they should write a valid and give it to her.

These expressions communicate clearly enough that the husband wants them to bring about the divorce. and are Aramaic expressions whose meaning here is explicitly “divorce,” so they authorize the writing and delivery of a just as the corresponding Hebrew expressions do.

But if he said to them, “Dismiss her,” “Provide for her,”

-

“Do for her according to religious law,” “Do for her according to the customary law,” or, “Do for her what is proper”—

he has said nothing that authorizes a divorce.

These phrases are too broad or ambiguous to establish that he intended specifically to appoint them to write and deliver a .

If they nevertheless wrote a and gave it to her, the is void.

Since the husband never gave valid authorization to perform the divorce, the defect is -level rather than merely Rabbinic.

Synopsis

Words that clearly direct the agents to divorce the wife authorize them to write and deliver a . The other expressions listed here do not create that authority; a written and delivered on their basis is void.

הלכה יא

Ambiguous Expressions That May or May Not Mean Divorce

-

If the husband said to them, “Take her out,” “Leave her,” “Permit her,” “Let her be,” or, “Help her”—

there is a doubt whether these words mean that they should divorce her, or whether they mean something else.

The preceding lists expressions that the rules do not establish authorization to divorce. Here, he leaves unresolved whether these particular expressions do establish that authorization. Consequently, a prepared and delivered on their basis is doubtful rather than certainly void.

Therefore, they should not write a for her.

Because the husband’s words do not clearly authorize a divorce, the agents may not proceed on the basis of those words alone.

But if they nevertheless wrote a and gave it to her, she is doubtfully divorced.

The uncertainty in his language carries through to the status of the divorce itself: perhaps he intended to authorize a , and perhaps he did not.

Synopsis

When the husband uses language that could mean divorce but could also mean something else, the agents should not write a . If they do write and deliver one, the woman is only doubtfully divorced.

הלכה יב

When “Write a ” Does Not Include Permission to Deliver It

-

If a man says, “Write a for my wife”—

they should write it and sign it and place it into the husband’s hand,

but they may not give it to his wife unless he tells them to give it to her.

An instruction to write the ordinarily authorizes only the preparation of the document. It does not automatically appoint them to deliver it and complete the divorce.

If they nevertheless gave it to her, it is not a .

Because the husband never authorized delivery, the essential act that effects the divorce was carried out without his appointment.

When does this rule apply? When the husband is healthy.

In an ordinary situation, there is no reason to read more into his words than he actually said.

But if he is dangerously ill— meaning that illness suddenly overtook him and immediately became severe—

or if he is being led away in chains, even because of a financial matter,

or is departing on a sea voyage, or is leaving with a caravan,

-

and he says, “Write a for my wife”—

they should write it and sign it and give it to her,

because it is evident that he intended that they both write the and give it to her.

In these situations, the circumstances make his intention clear. He faces danger, possible death, or a journey from which his fate may become unknown, so his abbreviated instruction is understood as a request to complete the divorce, not merely prepare the document.

He may wish to prevent his wife from becoming subject to or if he dies, or from remaining unable to remarry if he disappears without reliable evidence of his death. Preparing the document without delivering it would not accomplish either purpose.

Synopsis

For a healthy man, “Write a ” authorizes writing but not delivery. When the husband faces serious danger or departure into a hazardous situation, the circumstances make it clear that he intends both writing and delivery.

הלכה יג

When Later Conduct Reveals What the Husband Meant

If a healthy man said, “Write a for my wife,” and they wrote it and gave it to her,

-

and he immediately caused his own death, for example, by throwing himself from a roof, or casting himself into the sea—

the is valid.

His immediate conduct reveals that he was already facing a crisis comparable to the dangerous situations of the previous . We therefore understand his earlier words as intending not merely that the be written, but that it be delivered as well.

-

But if he went up onto a roof and the wind pushed him off, and he died— it is not a .

An accidental death does not reveal that he had been contemplating death when he originally said only, “Write a .” His words therefore remain limited to writing and do not authorize delivery.

-

If there is doubt whether he threw himself down or whether the wind pushed him—

the is valid, unless it becomes known with certainty that the wind pushed him.

The rules that in a case of uncertainty the remains valid unless it becomes certain that the wind caused his fall. Later authorities question why the unresolved doubt does not itself make the divorce doubtful.

-

Similarly, if a man was cast into a pit and said, “Whoever hears my voice should write a for my wife”—

those who hear him should write it and give it to her.

His dangerous situation makes clear that his intention is to complete the divorce even though he mentioned only writing.

This applies provided that they know who he is.

They must initially have sufficient identifying information to know whose is being requested.

-

Even if afterward they brought him up from the pit and could no longer recognize him— the remains valid;

because this is considered a time of danger, when a may be written and delivered even without ordinary personal recognition.

As explained earlier, the emergency exception relaxes the requirement of personal recognition, not the need to identify whose divorce is being arranged. The ( 141:19) states that the husband should identify himself, his wife, and their respective towns.

Similarly, if a person suffered severe injuries from which he cannot survive,

even if most of both his windpipe and gullet have been severed,

-

and he indicated his wishes and said, “Write a for my wife”— they should write it and give it to her;

His indication can include responding through head movements to show that he wants the divorce arranged.

because at this moment he is still alive, even though he will ultimately die.

The certainty that death will soon follow does not make him legally dead beforehand. As long as he is alive and capable of expressing the required instruction, the can be written and delivered while he still has the legal capacity to divorce.

Synopsis

Later circumstances can reveal that a healthy man who said only “Write a ” actually intended it to be delivered. A person in immediate mortal danger may likewise authorize a divorce while still alive, and emergency conditions relax ordinary recognition requirements.

🔎Dig DeeperWhen Later Conduct Reveals What the Husband Meant

When Later Conduct Reveals What the Husband Meant

The ( 141:18) distinguishes according to when the fall occurred. If the husband fell immediately after giving his instruction, the is acceptable even when it is uncertain whether he jumped or the wind pushed him. If the fall was not immediate and its cause remains uncertain, the divorce is treated as doubtful.

Sources: , 141:18.

הלכה יד

Divorce Instructions Given Without Settled Mental Capacity

If a person was being overwhelmed by a disturbing mental condition,

-

and, as the condition began to overtake him, he said, “Write a for my wife”—

his statement has no legal effect, because his mind is not sound and settled.

For a divorce instruction to have force, the husband must possess sufficient mental capacity when he gives it. Here, the condition has already impaired that capacity.

The same applies to a drunk person who has reached the level of ’s intoxication;

’s intoxication means a state in which the person is unaware of what he is doing. At that level, his instruction cannot authorize a divorce.

But if he has not reached that level, the status is doubtful.

The treats divorce instructions given by someone who is definitely intoxicated but has not reached total unawareness more cautiously than he treats performed by an intoxicated person.

Synopsis

A husband must have a sound and settled mind when authorizing a divorce. An instruction given during a disturbing mental condition or -level intoxication has no effect; lesser intoxication creates a doubt.

🔎Dig DeeperDivorce Instructions Given Without Settled Mental Capacity

Divorce Instructions Given Without Settled Mental Capacity

The commentators question why the treats lesser intoxication as doubtful here. In 4:18, he rules that a drunk man’s are valid unless he reaches ’s level of intoxication, and elsewhere an intoxicated person generally remains responsible for his conduct.

Nevertheless, the quotes the Rambam’s ruling here. On this basis, the advises that neither husband nor wife drink alcoholic beverages on the day of a divorce.

Sources: 4:18; , 121:1; Beit Shmuel 121:2.

הלכה טו

When the Husband Becomes Mentally Incapacitated After Giving Instructions

-

If a man said while he was mentally sound, “Write a and give it to my wife,” and afterward became mentally disturbed—

they wait for him until he recovers, and then write the and give it to her,

and they do not need to consult him again after he recovers;

His original authorization remains valid because it was given while he was competent. His temporary incapacity prevents the agents from acting during that period, but it does not erase the appointment. Once he recovers, they may rely on the original instructions.

But if they wrote the and gave it before he recovered, the is disqualified.

According to the ’s terminology, the has a Rabbinic defect rather than being automatically void on the level. The underlying problem is that the husband was incapacitated while his agents were acting on his behalf.

Synopsis

If the husband validly appointed agents and then became mentally incapacitated, they must wait until he recovers before acting. Once he recovers, the original appointment remains valid and need not be renewed.

🔎Dig DeeperWhen the Husband Becomes Mentally Incapacitated After Giving Instructions

When the Husband Becomes Mentally Incapacitated After Giving Instructions

The questions why the calls this merely . He understands the ’s ruling as applying when a means of healing the husband is available; otherwise, the should be entirely void.

The ( 121:2) rules according to this distinction. The , however, defends the Rambam’s formulation.

The examines three ways to understand agency: the agent stands in the ’s place; the agent’s action is attributed to the ; or the agent acts independently, but the makes that action effective for the .

Sources: 70b; Kessef Mishneh on 2:15; , 121:2; Beit Shmuel 121:3; , section 1, opening.

הלכה טז

Giving Divorce Instructions Without Speech

If a person loses his ability to speak but his mind remains sound,

-

and they ask him, “Shall we write a for your wife?” and he nods his head in agreement—

A person who cannot speak may still authorize a divorce if it is clear that he understands what is happening and can communicate his wishes reliably.

they test him three times with varied questions;

The purpose of the test is to make sure that his head movements genuinely reflect understanding rather than automatic or confused responses.

-

if he responds “no” to questions whose answer is no and “yes” to questions whose answer is yes—

they may write the and give it to her.

The questions should be structured so that the expected answers are not all the same. This tests whether he is actually distinguishing among the questions.

They must examine him very carefully, lest his mental state have become impaired.

The central issue is not his inability to speak, but whether he retains the mental capacity needed to authorize the divorce.

-

Similarly, if he writes in his own hand, “Write and give a to my wife”—

they may write it and give it to her, provided that his mind is settled and sound;

because the law of someone who merely lost the ability to speak is not the same as that of a .

Here, refers to the classical category of a person who neither hears nor speaks. It is distinct from someone who cannot speak but can hear.

Synopsis

A man who cannot speak may still authorize a through reliable gestures or writing if his mental capacity is clearly intact. His understanding must be tested carefully before the divorce is carried out.

🔎Dig DeeperGiving Divorce Instructions Without Speech

Giving Divorce Instructions Without Speech

The explains that the three questions should include differing expected answers, so that his responses demonstrate actual understanding rather than a repeated reflex. Other authorities require two sets of three questions.

The recommends using questions with obviously different answers—for example, asking about seasonal fruit—to test whether the person is thinking coherently.

Sources: Kessef Mishneh on 2:16; Rama, 121:5.

Live ItGive someone time to answer

Give someone time to answer

A man who has lost the ability to speak may still communicate his wishes through reliable gestures or writing. Before acting on his instructions, those arranging the must establish that he understands and that his responses express what he intends.

This invites patience when someone needs more time or a different way to communicate. During a visit, a relative who struggles to speak may be able to answer if we pause and let them write. Filling the silence ourselves can unintentionally crowd out their voice. We can ask what helps and give them room to respond before deciding that we already know.

Try today

In one conversation today, leave enough time for the other person to finish expressing what they mean.

Suggested reflection on 2:16.

הלכה יז

How the Husband’s Status at Marriage Affects His Ability to Divorce

-

If a man married a woman while he had full capacity, and afterward became a , and certainly if he later became mentally incompetent—

he cannot divorce her until he recovers.

Because the marriage was created while he possessed full -level legal capacity, ending it requires a divorce with the corresponding level of valid authorization. While he lacks that capacity, he cannot initiate such a divorce.

We do not rely on the gestures of a or on his writing, even though his mind is sound and settled.

This differs from Halachah 16. A person who merely lost speech can still communicate valid instructions if his mind is intact. The classical status of carries a separate limitation on legal capacity.

-

But if he married while already a , he may divorce through gestures—

because his are not -level , as explained earlier,

and just as he enters that marriage through gestures, so too he may end it through gestures.

The Sages created this Rabbinic marriage through the communication methods available to him. They therefore allowed the same kind of communication to end it.

The gestures communicate his authorization for the divorce. A must still be written and delivered; the gestures themselves do not dissolve the marriage.

Synopsis

If a man entered a -level marriage while fully competent and later became a or mentally incompetent, he cannot divorce until he recovers. If he married while already a , the Rabbinic marriage can also be ended through gestures.

הלכה יח

Who Receives the for a Minor or

-

If a man a minor girl through her father, and divorces her while she is still a minor—

her father receives her , and once the reaches her father’s hand, she is divorced.

is the first stage of marriage, establishing a binding marital bond. is the second stage, which completes the marriage.

The father’s receiving authority described here applies before . Once she enters , he can no longer receive her on the strength of that paternal authority, even if she remains a minor.

-

If he divorces her when she is a , if the reaches her own hand or her father’s hand— she is divorced.

is the six-month stage beginning when a girl has reached twelve and manifested the required signs of physical maturity. At this stage, both she and her father can receive the .

A betrothed may not appoint an agent to receive her from her husband during her father’s lifetime;

Although she can receive the personally, she cannot transfer that receiving authority to an agent while her father is alive.

Her father, however, may appoint an agent to receive the for his betrothed daughter, whether she is a minor or a .

The father’s own authority includes the ability to appoint someone else to receive the on her behalf.

Synopsis

Before , a father can receive a for the daughter whose were established through him. A may also receive her own , but while her father is alive she cannot appoint her own receiving agent; her father can.

🔎Dig DeeperWho Receives the for a Minor or

Who Receives the for a Minor or

The follows the ’s view that a minor girl does not independently receive her own while her father’s authority remains, while also recording ’s differing opinion.

Sources: , 141:4 (including the opinion of Tosafot).

הלכה יט

A Minor Girl After Her Father’s Death

If her father her while she was a minor, and he then died:

Her marriage remains a -level marriage because her father had validly established the while he was alive.

if she can distinguish between her and another object, she is divorced once the reaches her hand.

Since her father is no longer alive to receive it for her, her own capacity to receive the depends on whether she has enough understanding to recognize what she is receiving.

But if she cannot make that distinction, she cannot be divorced until she develops that understanding.

If he nevertheless attempted to divorce her, she is not divorced.

Her inability to understand the significance of receiving the prevents the delivery from effecting the divorce.

Synopsis

After the father who established a minor girl’s -level dies, she can receive her own only if she can distinguish it from an ordinary object. Until she has that level of understanding, delivery to her does not effect a divorce.

🔎Dig DeeperA Minor Girl After Her Father’s Death

A Minor Girl After Her Father’s Death

The explains that this level of discernment is generally associated with a child around six or seven years old, depending on her individual understanding.

The records a dispute regarding a younger child whose father is still alive. The allows the father to receive the regardless of the girl’s own understanding, while maintains that a girl who cannot distinguish the cannot be divorced even through her father. The appears to favor the Rambam’s view.

Sources: and Rama, 141:6 (including the opinion of Rashi).

הלכה כ

Why a Properly Compelled Divorce Is Considered Voluntary

-

If the law requires that a man be compelled to divorce his wife and he refuses to divorce her—

a Jewish court in every place and at every time beats him until he says, “I consent,”

and the is written, and it is a valid .

This applies only when itself authorizes coercion in that particular case. The is not granting a general power to force a husband to divorce; he is explaining the status of coercion where has already determined that the law requires it.

Similarly, if non-Jews beat him and tell him, “Do what the Jews are telling you to do,”

-

and Jews apply pressure to him through the non-Jews until he divorces her— the divorce is valid.

Here the coercion is being directed by Jewish authority in a case where Jewish law requires the divorce. The non-Jews are merely the means through which the pressure is applied.

-

But if the non-Jews compel him on their own initiative until he writes the —

since the law does require him to write it, the is disqualified.

Because the divorce was required, the is not void on the level. But because the coercion was not properly carried out under Jewish authority, the classifies it as Rabbinically disqualified.

Why is this not void?

After all, he was compelled, whether by non-Jews or by Jews.

The requires a to be given willingly. The therefore explains why legally justified coercion can still result in a voluntary divorce.

We call a person “compelled against his will” only when he is pressured and forced to do something that the does not obligate him to do,

such as someone who was beaten until he sold something or gave it away;

But when a person’s evil inclination overpowers him to neglect a or commit a transgression,

and he is beaten until he does what he is obligated to do

-

or withdraws from something he is forbidden to do—

this is not considered coercion against his true will; rather, he had been forcing himself through his wrongful state of mind.

The distinguishes between forcing someone to do something he has no obligation to do and compelling him to carry out an obligation that he himself is resisting.

-

Therefore, regarding a man who says that he does not want to divorce— since he wants to remain part of the Jewish people,

he wants to fulfill all the and distance himself from transgressions, and it is his evil inclination that has overpowered him.

-

Once he has been beaten until the force of that inclination has weakened and he says, “I consent”—

he has divorced of his own will.

The ’s point is not that verbal resistance never matters. Rather, in a case where law itself requires the divorce, his refusal is viewed as resistance to an obligation he fundamentally accepts as a member of the Jewish people. Once that resistance is overcome and he says “I consent,” the divorce is legally considered voluntary.

If the law did not require that he be compelled to divorce,

-

and a Jewish court mistakenly compelled him, or ordinary people compelled him, until he divorced—

the is disqualified.

Since Jews compelled him, he should complete the divorce properly.

The coercion was not legally justified, so the existing cannot be relied upon. Nevertheless, because Jews imposed the pressure, the does not classify the document as entirely void and directs that the divorce be completed properly.

But if non-Jews compelled him to divorce when the law did not require it, it is not a .

-

Even though he told the non-Jews, “I consent,” and told Jews, “Write and sign,”—

since the law did not obligate him to divorce and the non-Jews forced him, it is not a .

Here the coercion forces him to do something he was not obligated to do. His declaration of consent therefore does not transform the forced act into a valid voluntary divorce.

Synopsis

When requires a husband to divorce, properly imposed coercion can lead to a valid voluntary because the pressure overcomes his resistance to an obligation he fundamentally accepts. If coercion is imposed when no divorce is required, the result is defective or void depending on who imposed it and how.

🔎Dig DeeperWhy a Properly Compelled Divorce Is Considered Voluntary

Why a Properly Compelled Divorce Is Considered Voluntary

The discusses a compelled by non-Jews acting on their own initiative, even though the husband is legally obligated to divorce. The calls such a , while , , and treat it as entirely void. The likewise rules that such a should be regarded as void.

Sources: 88b; Kessef Mishneh on 2:20; Beit Shmuel 134:10.

Live ItRemember what you want beneath the reluctance

Remember what you want beneath the reluctance

In explaining a divorce that the court is legally authorized to compel, the distinguishes a person’s resistance from his deeper desire to fulfill the . The husband’s reluctance can obscure a commitment he still holds.

We may recognize a smaller version of that tension in ourselves. After speaking sharply to someone, we can sincerely want to make things right while dreading the apology. That reluctance need not define what we choose next. Remembering that we value the relationship can help us begin with one honest sentence, even before we feel comfortable. We can act on a commitment while still finding it difficult.

Try today

Take one small step toward something you know you want to put right.

Suggested reflection on 2:20.

Sources & editorial method

Hebrew text: Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Gerushin, Chapter 2. The Hebrew is preserved as the primary text and divided into short learning units.

Translation and elucidation: Independently prepared for Rambam, Clearly in contemporary English. Translation follows the Rambam’s words; elucidation supplies only the context needed to understand them.

Word cards and glossary: Hebrew word cards distinguish a word’s basic meaning from its meaning in the particular phrase. Shared glossary entries explain recurring terms; biography entries identify the cited authorities.

Explain and Background: Explain provides context needed for the ruling. Optional Background panels provide additional context that can be skipped without losing the essential explanation.

Synopsis: A short summary follows each halachah. It is a guide to the central ruling, not a replacement for the full text and its qualifications.

Dig Deeper: Based on the classic commentaries named inside each panel. Editorial explanations are not presented as quotations.

Live It: Where present, these panels connect a particular halachah to a suggested personal reflection and an action to try. Original applications are labeled as suggested reflections. They are distinct from the ruling and are not attributed to the Rebbe merely because his guidance supports seeking a practical lesson.

Measurements: Modern equivalents draw on Chabad.org’s measurement glossary and cited halachic calculations. They show a range when major accepted calculations differ. Monetary equivalents fluctuate with the price of silver.

The Rebbe’s teachings and guidance: Source links accompany the completion teachings and the guidance inside Dig Deeper and Live It. Quotations, translations, and adaptations are identified; the general guidance is separate from the sources for a panel’s particular discussion.

Editorial responsibility: Created and prepared for this project by Levi Gelb. Corrections and suggestions can be submitted below. This presentation supports learning; practical halachic questions should be brought to a qualified rav.

Chapter 2 at a glance

Chapter review

Review the chapter’s central rulings through these synopses.

  • A husband may authorize others to write and deliver his . The divorce nevertheless requires a written document that is given to the wife; she cannot bring about the divorce by taking it herself.
  • Throughout the ’s laws of divorce, “” means the is void by law, while “” means it is disqualified by Rabbinic law.
  • For a healthy man, “Write a ” authorizes writing but not delivery. When the husband faces serious danger or departure into a hazardous situation, the circumstances make it clear that he intends both writing and delivery.
  • Before , a father can receive a for the daughter whose were established through him. A may also receive her own , but while her father is alive she cannot appoint her own receiving agent; her father can.
  • When requires a husband to divorce, properly imposed coercion can lead to a valid voluntary because the pressure overcomes his resistance to an obligation he fundamentally accepts. If coercion is imposed when no divorce is required, the result is defective or void depending on who imposed it and how.
פרק ב

End of chapter.

You have reached the end of all twenty halachos.