An is a woman who exhibits the signs of being incapable of bearing children.
-
and he has no children, and no other wife with whom he can fulfill the of having children—
The problem is not that marriage to an is inherently forbidden. Rather, if this marriage leaves him without a practical means of fulfilling his obligation to have children, he cannot remain in that situation.
,,.
although we compel him to divorce her, she is nevertheless treated like other wives, and she is entitled to her , together with the other provisions of the .
Because her status was known when he married her, the marriage was entered into knowingly. The fact that he must later divorce her in order to fulfill his obligation to have children does not deprive her of the ordinary financial rights of marriage.
.
Similarly, the husband acquires the same marital property rights that a husband acquires with other wives.
The marriage therefore carries the usual financial rights and obligations on both sides, even though this particular husband cannot remain married to her indefinitely under the circumstances described.
Synopsis
When a man knowingly marries an , she retains the ordinary rights of a wife and he retains the ordinary marital property rights. If he has no children and no other wife through whom he can fulfill the of having children, he is nevertheless compelled to divorce her.
Financial Rights in Certain Forbidden or Mistaken Marriages
,,
But if a man married a woman without being aware of her status, and she was discovered to be an , or a woman forbidden to him by a negative commandment,
here are forbidden relationships in which nevertheless take effect. Their prohibition is a negative commandment, rather than one of the forbidden relationships carrying , the penalty of spiritual excision.
,
and similarly, if he married a ,
A is a woman whom the Sages prohibited him from marrying because of a rabbinic extension of the ’s forbidden relationships.
-
whether he knew of her status or did not know of it—
The distinction between knowledge and lack of knowledge applies differently to these categories. For an or a woman prohibited by a negative commandment, this is discussing a case in which he did not know her status. A , however, receives the following ruling whether or not he knew of the rabbinic prohibition.
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she is not entitled to the basic amount, nor to any of the standard provisions of the ,
These are the obligations that ordinarily attached to marriage. In these cases, the Sages did not grant those protections in the usual way.
.
but she is entitled to the additional amount that the husband voluntarily added to the .
This extra amount is treated differently from the basic because it was a personal obligation the husband accepted upon himself rather than a standard rabbinic enactment. Halachah 3 explains this distinction.
,.
She is not entitled to support, even after his death.
During his lifetime, the lack of support is taken for granted because the relationship is one the court wants brought to an end. Even after his death, she does not receive the support normally provided under the obligations.
,
And when the court compels them to separate,
The uses the language of separating the couple rather than explicitly saying here that the husband must give a . The examines this wording. For marriages prohibited by a negative commandment, he concludes that the take effect and a is required. His discussion of an unrecognized is separate, as explained in Dig Deeper.
.
we do not require the husband to return the produce he already consumed from her property.
Even though some of the ordinary reciprocal marital obligations do not apply, the produce he already used is not recovered from him.
Synopsis
If a man unknowingly married an or a woman prohibited by a negative commandment, or if he married a whether knowingly or unknowingly, she does not receive the basic or its standard provisions, but she does receive the voluntary addition. The husband also keeps the produce he already consumed from her property.
🔎Dig DeeperFinancial Rights in Certain Forbidden or Mistaken Marriages
Financial Rights in Certain Forbidden or Mistaken Marriages
The examines the ’s use of “separate them” here, rather than “compel him to divorce.” He initially considers whether a marriage to a woman prohibited by a negative commandment, when the husband did not know of the prohibition, might be invalid because it was entered into by mistake.
He rejects that conclusion for these prohibited marriages: the take effect and a is required. His discussion treats an unrecognized separately; the same conclusion should not simply be extended to that case.
The , 116:1, also addresses the husband’s right to retain produce he already consumed. Even though he does not bear the usual reciprocal obligation to redeem her from captivity, the produce is not taken back from him; this operates as part of the penalty structure applied in these cases.
Sources: Noda B’Yhudah, second edition, 80; , 116:1.
Why are these women not entitled to the basic amount, while they are entitled to the additional amount?
The two parts of the have different legal foundations, so they can receive different treatment.
,,
The basic is an enactment of the Sages, instituted so that divorcing his wife should not be an easy matter in his eyes.
The basic creates a financial consequence for divorce and therefore helps stabilize an ordinary marriage.
,.
Since he was unaware of her status, she is not entitled to the basic amount.
In this type of relationship, the Sages did not apply an enactment whose purpose is to discourage divorce, because the relationship itself is one that should end.
The additional amount, however, is an obligation that he voluntarily accepted upon himself.
Unlike the basic , this addition does not arise automatically from the rabbinic institution. The husband chose to undertake it.
,,,-
He accepted that obligation on the understanding that she would be willing to remain with him, and she fulfilled her side of that understanding. She provided the marital relationship and benefit in consideration of which he voluntarily undertook that additional obligation, and she remains willing to continue the marriage—
She did not fail to provide what that additional obligation contemplated.
,?
but the forbade her to him. What can she do about that?
Whether because of a preexisting prohibition or because the marriage cannot continue under the applicable law, the reason for separation was already inherent in her status; it was not created by misconduct on her part after marriage.
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Therefore, she is entitled to the additional amount, because it was not her actions that caused her to become forbidden after the marriage, rather, the impediment already existed beforehand.
This is the crucial distinction: she did not create the problem through misconduct during the marriage. The cause was already present, so she retains the voluntary addition the husband undertook.
Synopsis
The basic is withheld because it is a rabbinic protection intended for a marriage the Sages seek to preserve. The husband’s voluntary addition remains payable because the woman fulfilled her side of the relationship and did not create the impediment that requires separation.
🔎Dig DeeperWhy She Receives the Addition but Not the Basic
Why She Receives the Addition but Not the Basic
, commenting on 101a, explains that the additional amount is a voluntary obligation undertaken by the husband in consideration of the marital benefit and intimacy he receives. It is therefore fundamentally different from the basic , which instituted as a standard protection for marriage.
That distinction explains why a woman can lose the basic in these circumstances while retaining the husband’s voluntary addition.
Why did the Sages not distinguish regarding a between a case where the husband knew of her status and one where he did not, but instead ruled that in every case she does not receive the basic ? Because her prohibition is rabbinic, the Sages reinforced their prohibition.
Precisely because the prohibition is rabbinic, the Sages imposed a stronger financial consequence so that it would not be treated lightly. Thus even a husband who knowingly entered such a marriage does not create the ordinary basic entitlement.
,
But if he married a woman prohibited to him by a negative commandment and he knew of the prohibition, or he married a woman prohibited through a positive commandment,
are marriages prohibited because a positive command defines whom a person may marry, rather than through an explicit negative commandment.
-;
whether he knew of that prohibition or did not know— she is entitled to a .
These situations differ from the cases in Halachah 2. A woman prohibited by a negative commandment receives a when the husband knowingly entered the prohibited marriage; a woman prohibited through a positive commandment receives one whether he knew or not.
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For when he knowingly married a woman prohibited by a negative commandment, he knowingly accepted the financial loss to his own property,
He entered the relationship aware of the prohibition and of the financial consequences attached to the marriage.
-.
and regarding those prohibited through a positive commandment, their prohibition is less severe.
For that reason, the Sages did not impose the same financial penalty.
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Both categories are entitled to support from his estate after his death.
During his lifetime, however, they are not entitled to ongoing support while the prohibited marriage continues, because the court wants the relationship brought to an end. After his death, that concern no longer applies, so the ordinary -based support obligation remains.
,.
Similarly, if she borrowed money for her support and used it for her needs, he is obligated to repay it.
This concerns support she borrowed while her husband was absent and now seeks to recover when they separate. It does not permit them to maintain the prohibited marriage by arranging future support through loans.
,.
And when he is compelled to divorce her, we recover from the husband all the produce he consumed from all of her property.
According to the , when the court compels him to divorce, he must reimburse her for all the produce he consumed from her property.
Synopsis
A loses the basic whether or not the husband knew of the prohibition, as a reinforcement of the rabbinic restriction. By contrast, a knowingly married woman prohibited by a negative commandment, and a woman prohibited through a positive commandment whether known or not, retain rights and related financial protections.
🔎Dig DeeperWhen Forbidden Marriages Still Carry Rights
When Forbidden Marriages Still Carry Rights
The explains that during the husband’s lifetime these women do not receive ordinary support because the court does not want to strengthen a prohibited relationship that should end. After his death, however, that concern disappears, and the -based support obligation can apply.
The also requires the husband, when compelled to divorce, to reimburse the produce he consumed from her property. The follows authorities who disagree with the Rambam on this point and do not require repayment of that produce.
The Financial Rights of a Woman Who Ends a Rabbinic Marriage Through
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A woman who ends her marriage through
is the procedure by which certain minor girls whose marriages were created rabbinically may reject the marriage while still minors.
,
is not entitled to the basic amount,
The Sages instituted this type of minor’s marriage for her benefit while also giving her the ability to end it through . If she chooses to terminate the marriage, she bears the financial consequence of losing the basic .
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but she is entitled to the additional amount.
The husband knew from the outset that this rabbinic marriage could be ended through . The additional amount was his voluntary undertaking in consideration of the marital relationship from which he benefited, so that obligation remains.
.
We do not require the husband to return the produce he consumed from her property.
At the time he used the property, he was entitled to do so under the rules governing this marriage. Her later exercise of does not retroactively make his use unauthorized.
,,-.
And if, while she was married to him, she borrowed money and used it for her support, and afterwards exercised , we do not require the husband to reimburse that support.
Because she ultimately chose to dissolve the rabbinic marriage through , the financial consequences attached to that institution include the loss of this claim as well.
Synopsis
A woman who ends a rabbinic marriage through loses the basic and cannot recover support she borrowed or produce the husband already consumed, but she retains the voluntary additional amount.
A woman who committed adultery while married is not entitled to a , neither the basic amount nor the additional amount, nor to any of the standard provisions of the ; because her own actions caused her to become forbidden to her husband.
This is the contrast to the cases discussed earlier in the chapter. There, the marriage had to end because of a preexisting status or prohibition that was not created by the woman’s conduct during the marriage. Here, her own act creates the prohibition that prevents the marriage from continuing, so she loses both the basic and the husband’s voluntary addition.
Synopsis
A woman who willingly commits adultery during the marriage loses both the basic and additional amounts, as well as the other provisions, because her own conduct caused her to become forbidden to her husband.
What is the law concerning the dowries of the women discussed above?
The loss of a does not necessarily mean that a woman loses property that is actually hers. The now turns from rights to the separate question of the she brought into the marriage.
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Whenever a woman’s property remains intact, even if she committed adultery, she takes what belongs to her and leaves.
Even where she has forfeited her , whatever remains of her own property belongs to her, including surviving items that have become worn. The question of reimbursement concerns property that has been lost or used up, and any loss in value for which the husband would otherwise be responsible.
,
And if she was a or a woman prohibited through a positive commandment,
,
whether the husband knew of her status or did not know,
,
or she was an or a woman prohibited by a negative commandment,
-
and he knew of her status,
.
the ordinary rules governing a wife’s apply to her.
Except for a , the women listed here retain ordinary rights in these circumstances, so their dowries are governed by the ordinary rules as well. A is treated the same way regarding her even though she lacks the basic , because the Sages imposed financial consequences on both parties to the prohibited marriage.
,;
With regard to , the husband bears responsibility for them;
are assets whose value is assessed when they enter the marriage and for whose agreed value the husband assumes financial responsibility.
,,,.
but with regard to , whatever was stolen or lost is her loss, and he is not required to repay it.
remain the wife’s property, while the husband ordinarily has the right to their produce. Because he does not assume responsibility for the , an ordinary accidental loss is borne by her.
Synopsis
property that still exists remains the wife’s even if she has forfeited her . In cases where the ordinary rules apply, the husband is responsible for , while losses to are generally borne by the wife.
🔎Dig DeeperRecovering the When the Marriage Ends
Recovering the When the Marriage Ends
In his ,9:3, the explains why the ordinary rules of still apply to a . Since she receives no basic , one might have expected the husband also to lose his usual right to benefit from this property. As a penalty for the prohibited marriage, however, the Sages left these assets subject to the ordinary rules: he retains the right to use them and is not required to compensate her for their permitted use until they wear out.
Even when a woman loses her because of misconduct, the property that still belongs to her is returned. The financial consequence specified by the law does not erase her ownership of everything else.
When we feel wronged, it can become tempting to let the disagreement affect every interaction. If a friend has disappointed us, we might put off returning something we borrowed from them. This offers a point for reflection: we can address the hurt while still honoring what belongs to the other person. Keeping that distinction helps us respond fairly while working through the disagreement.
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Take care of one obligation you still owe someone with whom you are upset.
The Reversed Rules in an Unrecognized Prohibited Marriage
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If she was an or a woman prohibited by a negative commandment, and the husband was unaware of her status,
this case differs from the one in the previous , where he knowingly entered the marriage.
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whatever was lost, stolen, worn out, or deteriorated completely from the — the husband is not required to pay for it, because she gave him permission to hold and use those assets.
Although a husband normally assumes responsibility for , that acceptance was made here under mistaken premises. His assumption of liability therefore does not remain binding in the ordinary way. At the same time, his possession was authorized, because she willingly placed the assets with him.
,-;
But whatever was lost or stolen from the , he is required to repay, the reverse of the rule that applies to other wives;
Ordinarily, the wife bears accidental losses to because the husband has not assumed responsibility for their . His right to the produce is a separate marital benefit. In the mistaken marriage discussed here, he did not acquire the ordinary rights in these assets, so the usual allocation of losses changes.
,.
because the marriage does not have the full financial status of an ordinary marriage, he did not acquire rights in the .
The themselves are not being described here as nonexistent. Rather, because he entered the marriage unaware of the disqualifying status or prohibition, he did not acquire the normal marital right to benefit from her . Since he lacked that right, he is responsible for losses that occurred while those assets were in his possession.
The reversal is therefore precise: with , she entrusted the property to him, but his assumption of liability was based on mistaken premises; with , he never acquired the ordinary right to use the property, so he bears responsibility for its loss.
Synopsis
When the husband unknowingly married an or a woman prohibited by a negative commandment, the usual rules are reversed: he is not liable for lost , but he is liable for losses to because he did not acquire the ordinary marital rights in them.
A woman who ends her marriage through has no claim at all for property from her that has been lost or worn away.
Here the issue is reimbursement for assets that have been lost or worn away. Worn items that still remain are not forfeited; she takes whatever property of hers is still present, as the end of this states.
,,
For we do not recover anything from the husband for what was lost or stolen, whether from or from .
This differs from an ordinary marriage because the court itself established this rabbinic marriage together with its special financial rules. Under those rules, the husband had permission to use the property and is not required to reimburse these losses when the marriage ends through her .
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Rather, she takes whatever property of hers is still present and leaves.
The surviving property remains hers, but she has no claim for the part that no longer exists.
Synopsis
When a minor wife terminates a rabbinic marriage through , she takes whatever property still remains, but the husband does not reimburse her for losses to either or .
Financial Consequences for Adultery and Other Serious Misconduct
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A woman who committed adultery while married is not entitled to a , neither the basic amount nor the additional amount.
This repeats and develops the ruling of Halachah 6, now addressing not only the itself but also losses to her .
,.
Nor do we recover anything from the husband for what was lost or stolen from her , and certainly not for losses to her .
This is especially stringent: even though the husband ordinarily bears responsibility for , she cannot demand reimbursement for those losses here. The additional case of negligent loss is discussed below.
,
And this rule does not apply only to a woman who committed adultery, but also to a woman who violates ,
refers to conduct that violates or obligations in the marriage, as defined in the next .
,
or ,
refers to accepted standards of Jewish modesty and marital conduct, as defined in Halachah 12.
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or a woman who is divorced because of conduct creating a serious suspicion of adultery—
This is not based on mere gossip. As Halachah 15 explains, must have observed particularly compromising conduct that strongly indicates wrongdoing even though they did not witness adultery itself.
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she is not entitled to a , neither the basic amount nor the addition, nor to any of the standard provisions of the .
These financial consequences do not follow merely from an accusation. For and ,Halachah 14 requires prior warning and the necessary proof, or her admission. The separately defined case of witnessed, highly compromising conduct is addressed in Halachah 15.
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Each of these women takes whatever remains from her and leaves, while the husband is not required to pay anything for what decreased in value or for what was lost.
What remains of her own property is returned to her, but she cannot demand compensation for deterioration or loss.
Synopsis
When the required conditions are established, adultery, violations of or , and witnessed highly compromising conduct can cause the loss of both amounts and the other provisions. The warning and proof requirements differ, as 14–15 explain. Whatever remains of her own is returned, but she cannot recover the losses described here.
🔎Dig DeeperFinancial Consequences for Adultery and Other Serious Misconduct
Financial Consequences for Adultery and Other Serious Misconduct
The ,115:20, explains that the exemption from repaying lost property can apply even when the husband was negligent. He invokes the rule of : negligence in a custodial arrangement in which the owner was also serving the custodian. He treats this legal exemption separately from a case in which the husband sold her and consumed the proceeds, which he describes as wrongful appropriation of her .
These are the acts through which a woman is considered to have violated :
here refers to violations of or obligations that directly affect the marriage, especially where the husband is caused to transgress or is misled about matters of .
;
she goes out to the marketplace with her hair uncovered;
The Sages derive from the ’s description of the procedure that a married Jewish woman’s hair is ordinarily to be covered in public.
;
or she makes vows or oaths and does not fulfill them;
;
or she engages in marital relations while she is a ;
;
or she does not separate from her dough;
,
or she feeds her husband forbidden food,
,
and needless to say, this includes crawling creatures or meat from animals that were not properly slaughtered,
and even produce from which the required tithes were not separated.
This category includes misleading the husband into transgressing rabbinic prohibitions as well as prohibitions. The warning and proof requirements for forfeiting the are explained in Halachah 14.
?״״,
How can such misconduct be established? For example, she told him, “So-and-so the rendered these fruits permissible for me,”
This means that the required tithes or other separations were performed so that the produce could be eaten.
״,
or, “So-and-so separated from this dough for me,”
״-
or, “So-and-so the Sage ruled that this stain does not render me a ”—
,
and after he ate the food,
,
or after he had marital relations with her,
he asked the person she had named,
״״.
and that person said, “This never happened.”
The issue here is not merely that she made a mistake. Her husband relied on a specific factual claim she made about the permissibility of the food or her status, and that claim was later shown to be false.
,״״,.
Similarly, if it had become established among her neighbors that she was a , and she told her husband, “I am ritually pure,” and he then had marital relations with her.
This refers to circumstances in which her public conduct created a recognized presumption that she was in the state, yet she privately told her husband the opposite.
Synopsis
A woman violates when she engages in the - or -related conduct listed here, particularly where she causes her husband to transgress or misleads him about matters such as prohibited food, , tithes, or status.
🔎Dig DeeperConduct That Violates
Conduct That Violates
72a derives the obligation of a married woman to cover her hair in public from the ’s description of the procedure. The , 21:2, accordingly rules that a married woman may not go in the public domain with her hair uncovered.
A further qualification concerns a husband who knowingly married a woman whose established practice was not to cover her hair: he cannot later treat that known practice as grounds for withholding the marriage contract’s financial obligations. This financial qualification does not make going out with uncovered hair permissible.
What is meant by ? It is the accepted standard of modest conduct practiced by Jewish women.
Unlike , which concerns direct or prohibitions, concerns established Jewish standards of modesty and proper marital conduct.
,:
These are the acts through which she is considered to have violated :
she goes out to the marketplace or to a passageway open at both ends
with her head insufficiently covered,
,
without the outer covering ordinarily worn by other women,
;
even though her hair itself is covered by a headscarf;
This differs from the previous , which addressed going out with the hair actually uncovered. Here, the hair is covered, but not according to the accepted standard of modest dress in that setting.
,;
or she spins in the marketplace while wearing a rose or similar ornament prominently on her forehead or cheek, in the manner practiced by immodest non-Jewish women;
The point is not the object itself, but the manner of presentation associated with immodest conduct.
,;
or she spins in the marketplace while exposing her arms to other people;
The ’s qualification concerning habitual conduct is discussed below.
;
or she behaves frivolously with young men;
,
or she demands marital relations from her husband in a loud voice,
;
to the point that her neighbors hear her speaking about their intimate relations;
.
or she curses her husband’s father in her husband’s presence.
The further opinions recorded by the are discussed below. As Halachah 14 explains, forfeiture for requires the applicable warning and proof; it does not follow automatically from an allegation.
Synopsis
consists of established Jewish standards of modesty and proper marital conduct. Conduct that falls within these categories can place a woman in this status even when the act is not itself one of the direct violations described under .
🔎Dig DeeperConduct That Violates
Conduct That Violates
The ,115:4, qualifies the example of exposing her arms in public as habitual conduct rather than a single isolated occurrence. He also records opinions extending the cursing category to a woman who curses her father-in-law in his own presence, even without her husband present, or curses her husband to his face. These are additional views recorded by the Rama, beyond the ’s wording here.
instituted that a woman should regularly wear a within her home, as a measure of modesty.
The exact meaning of is disputed. The ’s understands it as a belt-like garment; other sources interpret it differently. The essential point here is that instituted an additional modesty practice within the home.
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But if she did not wear it, she is not considered to have violated , and she does not forfeit her .
Not every recommended or instituted modesty practice carries the financial consequences of violating or .
,-,.
Similarly, if she went out with her head not fully covered, from one courtyard to another within the passageway, as long as her hair itself was covered by a headscarf, she is not considered to have violated .
Here, “her head was not fully covered” does not mean that her hair itself was exposed. The immediately clarifies that her hair was covered with a ; what was absent was the fuller public covering discussed in the previous .
This also explains the difference in setting. The stricter standard in Halachah 12 applies to the marketplace or an open thoroughfare, while moving between courtyards within a passageway with the hair itself covered does not carry the same consequence.
Synopsis
Some modesty practices are important without being grounds for forfeiting the . Failing to observe ’s additional home practice, or moving between courtyards with the hair covered by a headscarf, does not by itself constitute a violation of .
A woman who violates requires a prior warning and , and only then does she forfeit her .
In the ordinary case of violating , the misconduct alone is not enough to make her forfeit the . She must first be warned and then violate the standard under circumstances established by .
,
If she transgressed privately between herself and her husband,
,
and he knew that she was violating ,
,
and he warned her without present,
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and she then transgressed again—
״״,
and he claims, “She transgressed after the warning,”
״״
while she says, “I did not transgress at all,”
״״-
or, “I was never warned”—
,
if he wishes to divorce her,
;
he must pay her , after she takes an oath that she did not transgress.
Because the warning was not witnessed, the husband cannot establish the facts necessary to make her forfeit the . She may therefore collect, but only after swearing to her denial.
,.
For if she were to admit that she transgressed after the warning, she would receive nothing.
Her oath is required because her own admission would be sufficient to defeat her monetary claim.
Synopsis
In the ordinary case of violating , a woman does not forfeit her unless there was a prior warning and the necessary proof. If the warning and later violation were not witnessed and she denies the husband’s claim, she may collect her after taking an oath.
✦Live ItMake expectations clear
Make expectations clear
For the violations discussed here, forfeiture requires a prior warning and the necessary proof. The distinguishes between the conduct itself and the conditions needed to impose its financial consequence.
In everyday life, we sometimes assume that another person already knows what we expect. A shared task is left unfinished, and frustration arrives before a clear conversation ever does. Before treating this as disregard, we can ask whether we actually agreed on who would do it and when. Saying what is needed calmly and specifically gives the other person something clear to respond to and gives us a better starting point for resolving the problem.
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Clarify one shared responsibility without assuming that your expectation has already been understood.
Conduct That Creates Serious Suspicion of Adultery
?
What constitutes a case in which a woman is divorced because of serious suspicion?
For example, were present
,
and observed her engage in extremely compromising conduct,
,
such that the circumstances strongly indicate that serious sexual misconduct occurred,
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even though there is no conclusive testimony that adultery itself took place.
This category therefore requires much more than rumor or gossip. must have observed conduct that creates a powerful inference of serious wrongdoing, although they did not witness adultery itself.
?
What kinds of circumstances are included?
,
For example, she was alone in a courtyard,
,
and saw a peddler leaving,
,
and they entered immediately as he left,
,
and found her standing up from the bed,
while putting on her undergarments,
,
or fastening her belt,
;
or they found fresh spittle above the bed canopy;
The unusual location of the fresh spittle was treated as circumstantial evidence suggesting that someone had just been lying on the bed.
,
or they saw the two of them emerging together from a dark, secluded place,
,
or helping one another out of a pit,
;
or engaging in comparable suspicious conduct;
;
or they saw him kissing the opening of her garment;
,
or saw them kissing one another,
;
or embracing one another;
.
or they entered a room one after the other and shut the door behind them.
This explanation follows the expanded formulation recorded by the ,11:1.
.
And the same applies to comparable circumstances of this kind.
The common denominator is not mere suspicion but witnessed conduct sufficiently compromising to create a serious inference of sexual wrongdoing.
-,..
If her husband wishes to divorce her, he may divorce her, and she receives no . This case does not require a prior warning.
Unlike the violations of discussed in the preceding , this degree of compromising conduct does not require an earlier warning before the is forfeited.
Synopsis
A woman may lose her because of witnessed, highly compromising conduct that strongly indicates serious sexual misconduct even without conclusive testimony of adultery. Unlike a violation of , this category does not require a prior warning.
🔎Dig DeeperConduct That Creates Serious Suspicion of Adultery
Conduct That Creates Serious Suspicion of Adultery
, commenting on 24b, explains the example of spittle found above the bed canopy: its position suggests that it was spat upward by someone lying face-up on the bed during relations. This is part of the suspicious evidence under discussion, not eyewitness testimony to adultery.
The , 11:1, also lists entering one after the other and closing the doors among these examples. The adds the qualification that the doors were locked.
If a woman violates or , or if she engaged in highly compromising conduct, we do not compel the husband to divorce her;
These cases do not have the legal status of proven adultery. Although the conduct can justify divorce and the loss of rights, the court does not compel divorce on this basis alone.
,.
but if he wishes to divorce her, he may do so.
The husband may choose to end the marriage on this basis.
,;
Even if he does not divorce her, these women are not entitled to a ;
This ruling assumes that the relevant conditions have been established. For or , the warning and proof requirements of Halachah 14 still apply. Once the has been forfeited, the loss does not depend on the husband actually carrying out a divorce.
,
because the is an enactment of the Sages,
,
instituted so that divorcing one’s wife should not be an easy matter in his eyes,
;
and the Sages established this protection for Jewish women who conduct themselves modestly;
,
but women who engage in such wanton conduct are not included in this enactment,
.
rather, the financial barrier to divorcing them does not apply.
The purpose of the here points in the opposite direction: these women are not given the protection designed to make divorce more difficult.
Synopsis
When the applicable warning and proof requirements have been met, or can cause forfeiture even if the husband remains married to her. The same financial consequence applies to the witnessed, highly compromising conduct defined in Halachah 15, although these cases do not by themselves compel divorce.
🔎Dig DeeperWhen Serious Misconduct Does Not Require Divorce
When Serious Misconduct Does Not Require Divorce
The , 115:4, states that although the court does not compel divorce in these cases, it is nevertheless a to divorce such a woman. The adds that the usual restrictions associated with the enactment of do not prevent the husband from divorcing her against her will in these circumstances.
The adds an important qualification when the couple remains together: if the woman later repents and resumes proper conduct, the husband must provide her with a new .
Sources: and Rama, 115:4; Chelkat Mechokek, 115:18.
When the Husband Personally Believes His Wife Committed Adultery
If a man personally saw his wife commit adultery,
or one of his relatives or one of her relatives told him
and he trusts that person and relies on the report,
,
that his wife committed adultery,
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whether the person who told him was a man or a woman—
The decisive point here is not whether the report has the legal status of two-witness testimony. Rather, the husband himself has accepted the information as true.
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since he has firmly accepted the matter as true, he is obligated to divorce her and may no longer have marital relations with her,
His personal certainty is enough to prohibit the marriage to him, but it is not the same as legally sufficient testimony in . Therefore, he must separate from her while still paying the unless there is legally sufficient evidence, or her own admission, that causes her to forfeit the .
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and he must pay her .
His own certainty governs his personal conduct, but it does not by itself create court-level proof sufficient to deprive her of her financial claim.
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But if she admits to him that she committed adultery, she leaves without a .
Her own admission is sufficient to establish the monetary consequences against herself.
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Therefore, he may require her to take a formal oath while holding a sacred object that she did not commit adultery while married to him, when his claim is based on what he himself witnessed, and only afterward may she collect her .
Because his claim is definite and based on his own observation, her monetary claim can be conditioned on an oath denying his accusation.
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But when his claim is based only on the statement of one other person, he cannot require her to take this oath except through .
is a procedure in which, once a person is already obligated to take an oath on another matter, an additional disputed claim can be included in that oath.
Synopsis
If a husband personally sees adultery, or firmly accepts a trusted report of it as true, he is obligated to divorce his wife and may no longer have marital relations with her. Unless there is legally sufficient evidence or her own admission, however, she retains her .
🔎Dig DeeperWhen the Husband Personally Believes His Wife Committed Adultery
When the Husband Personally Believes His Wife Committed Adultery
The explains the oath required here by comparing it to a creditor collecting on a written debt when the debtor claims that the obligation was already paid. The creditor may still collect, but if the debtor demands an oath, the creditor must first swear that the debt was not repaid.
When the husband’s accusation rests only on another person’s report, his claim is not considered definite enough to impose an independent oath. It can be added only through if she is already taking another oath connected to her claim.
The husband’s firm belief can obligate him to act, but it does not by itself remove his wife’s financial rights. The distinguishes personal certainty from the proof needed to impose a financial loss on someone else.
We can feel very sure about why a colleague left us out of a conversation. Yet the facts we know may be fewer than the conclusions we have drawn. Before repeating the story, it helps to separate what we observed from what we inferred. We may still need to ask a question or address a concern, while leaving room for an explanation we have not yet heard.
Try today
Before repeating a troubling account, identify which part you know firsthand and which part is your interpretation.
If a wife tells her husband that she willingly committed adultery while married to him, we do not automatically act upon her statement, because we are concerned that she may have become interested in another man.
The concern is that she may be trying to create grounds for release from her present marriage so that she can pursue someone else. Her statement therefore does not, by itself, require the husband to divorce her or prohibit continued marital relations.
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Nevertheless, she loses both the basic and the additional amount, and she loses any claim for property that was lost or worn away, because she admitted that she committed adultery.
Her statement is not automatically accepted to alter her marital status, but it is accepted against her own financial interests. In monetary law, a person’s admission can be binding against that person.
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But if her husband believes her and relies upon her statement as true, he is obligated to divorce her.
Once he personally accepts her confession as true, he must act according to that belief and may no longer remain married to her.
The court, however, does not compel a man to divorce his wife
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on the basis of any of these forms of personal information,
unless two come forward
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and testify that this woman willingly committed adultery in their presence,
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and only then do we compel him to divorce her.
This distinguishes the husband’s personal religious obligation from the court’s power to compel divorce. His own certain belief can obligate him personally, but coercive judicial action requires the formal testimony of two .
Synopsis
A wife’s confession of adultery does not automatically force a divorce because of concern that she may be seeking another man, but her admission causes her to lose her financial claims. If the husband believes her, he must divorce her; the court compels divorce only when two establish willing adultery.
🔎Dig DeeperWhen a Woman Admits That She Committed Adultery
When a Woman Admits That She Committed Adultery
The applies the monetary principle that a person’s own admission is binding against that person’s financial interests. Thus, although the wife’s confession is not automatically accepted to prohibit her to her husband, it is sufficient to make her lose her and related claims.
In his ,11:12, the Rambam addresses the apparent inconsistency: if the husband does not believe her confession and continues the marriage, why does he not also owe her ? He invokes , accepting a statement for one legal purpose without accepting it for another. Her admission can therefore defeat her financial claim without automatically establishing a marital prohibition.
When Relations Occurred Unintentionally or Under Duress
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If a married woman had relations with another man unintentionally or under coercion— she remains permitted to her husband, as the verse states, “and she was not forced” ( 5:13), implying that if she was forced, she remains permitted.
The prohibition discussed earlier concerns willing adultery. An example of an unintentional act is a woman having relations with a man she mistakenly thought was her husband. Here and in the following , an Israelite husband means a husband who is not a ; a is included. Halachah 21 explains the different rule for a .
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This applies whether the person who raped her was a Jew or a non-Jew.
The identity of the attacker does not change the ruling.
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Whenever the beginning of the act occurred under coercion,
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even if she later appeared to consent,
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and even if she said, “Let him continue,
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for had he not forced me, I would even have hired him,”
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she nevertheless remains permitted to her husband,
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because desire overcame her,
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while at the outset she had been subjected to coercion.
The classification follows the fact that the encounter began under coercion. Later apparent willingness does not retroactively transform the original coercive act into one that began voluntarily.
Synopsis
A woman who had relations unintentionally or under coercion remains permitted to an Israelite husband. If the encounter began through coercion, later apparent willingness does not retroactively transform it into an act that began voluntarily.
Women who were abducted by bandits are treated like captives, because they are presumed to have been coerced, and they remain permitted to their husbands.
The law does not presume willing participation merely because the women were in the robbers’ control. Their captivity itself establishes a presumption of coercion.
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But if the robbers released them, and the women then went to the bandits on their own initiative— they are regarded as acting willingly, and they become forbidden to their husbands.
Once the coercive situation has ended, a voluntary decision to go to them changes the legal character of the later conduct.
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The law of a woman who acted unintentionally and the law of a woman who was coerced are the same, because an unintentional act contains an element of coercion.
Here, an unintentional act means an act such as relations with a man she mistakenly believed was her husband. The mistake prevents it from being treated as a knowing, voluntary act of adultery.
Synopsis
Women abducted by bandits are presumed to have acted under coercion and remain permitted to their husbands. If they are released and later go to the bandits voluntarily, the later conduct is treated as willing. Unintentional relations and coerced relations share the same basic legal status in this context.
Why a ’s Wife Is Different After Coerced Relations
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When do the preceding rules apply? When her husband is an Israelite.
The preceding permission applies when her husband is not a . The term Israelite here includes a ; it distinguishes both from a , whose additional marital restrictions are addressed next.
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But if the wife of a had relations unintentionally or was raped, she becomes forbidden to her husband—
This is not because she is treated as having acted willingly. A is subject to additional marital restrictions, and those restrictions apply even where the woman herself was blameless.
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because in either case she acquires the status of a ,
Here, is a specific status relevant to the laws of whom a may marry. It is not being used as a moral description of the woman.
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and a is forbidden to a , as will be explained in .
The difference between an Israelite husband and a therefore comes from the ’s additional restrictions, not from any difference in how the woman’s conduct is judged.
Synopsis
A woman who had relations unintentionally or under coercion remains permitted to an Israelite husband, but not to a . The difference arises from the ’s additional marital restrictions, not from any fault on her part.
Whether she is the wife of an Israelite or the wife of a who was raped— her remains fully in force, both the basic amount and the additional amount, and she loses nothing.
The assault was not the result of her willing conduct. She therefore does not lose the financial rights of the marriage, even in the case of a ’s wife who can no longer remain married to him.
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And we compel the to pay her and divorce her.
Although neither spouse caused the prohibition through misconduct, the cannot continue the marriage because of the special restrictions that apply to him. He must therefore end the marriage while fully honoring her rights.
Synopsis
A woman who was raped does not lose any rights. If her husband is a , he must nevertheless divorce her because of the ’s additional marital restrictions, while paying both the basic and additional amounts.
🔎Dig Deeper Rights of a Woman Who Was Raped
Rights of a Woman Who Was Raped
88b derives from “You shall sanctify him” that the court may compel a to observe the restrictions of even against his will.
This requirement to divorce is therefore not a judgment against the woman. It reflects the additional sanctity and marital restrictions placed specifically upon a .
or, “I unintentionally had relations with another man”— he does not automatically act upon her statement, because we are concerned that she may have become interested in another man.
As in the earlier case of a woman who claims she committed adultery, her statement alone is not automatically accepted to create a marital prohibition. Otherwise, a wife could potentially force the end of the marriage through her own unsupported claim.
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But if he believes her, or another person told him and he relies on that person’s word— he must divorce her and pay her .
Once he accepts the report as true, he must personally act on that belief. Because the relations were not willing adultery, however, she does not forfeit her .
Synopsis
A ’s wife does not become forbidden to him merely through her unsupported claim that she was raped or acted unintentionally. If he believes her, or believes a trusted report, he must divorce her but still pay her .
If a man says to his wife in the presence of two ,
״״,
“Do not enter into seclusion with so-and-so,”
This formal warning is known as , the first stage of the process.
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and then saw her enter into seclusion with that man, and she remained there long enough for relations to have occurred—
This second stage is called . The elsewhere defines the required time interval more precisely.
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she becomes forbidden to her husband until he has her drink the bitter waters, as will be explained in .
The warning and witnessed seclusion create the formal status of a . Although adultery has not been proved, the requires the procedure before married life may resume. This is a Temple procedure administered by a ; the husband does not personally prepare or administer the waters.
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If the husband dies before she drinks the waters, she is not entitled to her , even though no independently compromising act was discovered, because there is no more compromising conduct than this.
Once the formal warning and witnessed seclusion occurred, the burden was upon her to remove the resulting doubt through the procedure. If her husband dies before that can happen, she cannot establish the right to collect her .
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And today, when the waters are no longer available, she becomes permanently forbidden to him.
Because the procedure that could establish her innocence is no longer available, the prohibition created by the warning and witnessed seclusion cannot be removed.
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and she must leave the marriage without a , neither the basic amount nor the additional amount, because her own wrongful conduct caused her to become forbidden.
Unlike a woman who was raped, the prohibition here resulted from her deliberate violation of the formal warning against seclusion.
Synopsis
After a formal warning witnessed by two people, witnessed seclusion with the specified man creates status and forbids the woman to her husband until the procedure resolves the doubt. In the present age, when that procedure is unavailable, the prohibition remains and she leaves without a .
This warning was not given before two . It therefore lacks the witnessed warning required for the ordinary procedure, but the concern explained below still gives it serious consequences.
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and he himself saw her enter into seclusion with that man, and she remained there long enough for relations to have occurred— she becomes forbidden to him in the present age, when the waters are unavailable.
The concern is that the law may follow the opinion that a husband’s private warning is effective. If he then sees the required seclusion, he cannot disregard that possibility. Since the waters are unavailable, there is no way to resolve the resulting prohibition through that procedure.
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He is obligated to divorce her, and he must pay her .
The obligation to separate does not itself establish her financial forfeiture in court. Unless she admits that she entered the specified seclusion after his warning, he must pay her , subject to the oath described below.
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But if she admits that she entered into seclusion after he warned her, she leaves without a .
Her own admission establishes the fact that would otherwise be missing from the husband’s monetary claim.
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Therefore, he may require her to take an oath concerning this, and only afterward must he pay her .
Because her denial preserves her claim, he may require her to swear that she did not enter into the prohibited seclusion after his warning before she collects.
Synopsis
In the present age, a private warning followed by the husband’s observation of the required seclusion obligates him to divorce, because of the concern that such a warning is legally effective. He must nevertheless pay the unless she admits the violation; if she denies it, he may require an oath before payment.
🔎Dig DeeperA Private Warning Against Seclusion
A Private Warning Against Seclusion
The questions why the emphasizes that this rule applies “in the present age.” Even when the Temple stood, a private warning without would not qualify for the formal procedure, so the bitter waters seemingly could not resolve the case then either.
The Kessef Mishneh suggests that the Rambam follows the wording of 2b. That passage cautions against giving a private warning today because the law might follow , who recognizes such a warning, while the waters are unavailable to resolve the case. The concern is therefore about the legal effectiveness of private warning, not simply the husband’s certainty that seclusion occurred.
Translation and elucidation: Independently prepared for Rambam, Clearly in contemporary English. Translation follows the Rambam’s words; elucidation supplies only the context needed to understand them.
Word cards and glossary: Hebrew word cards distinguish a word’s basic meaning from its meaning in the particular phrase. Shared glossary entries explain recurring terms; biography entries identify the cited authorities.
Explain and Background: Explain provides context needed for the ruling. Optional Background panels provide additional context that can be skipped without losing the essential explanation.
Synopsis: A short summary follows each halachah. It is a guide to the central ruling, not a replacement for the full text and its qualifications.
Dig Deeper: Based on the classic commentaries named inside each panel. Editorial explanations are not presented as quotations.
Live It: Where present, these panels connect a particular halachah to a suggested personal reflection and an action to try. Original applications are labeled as suggested reflections. They are distinct from the ruling and are not attributed to the Rebbe merely because his guidance supports seeking a practical lesson.
Measurements: Modern equivalents draw on Chabad.org’s measurement glossary and cited halachic calculations. They show a range when major accepted calculations differ. Monetary equivalents fluctuate with the price of silver.
The Rebbe’s teachings and guidance: Source links accompany the completion teachings and the guidance inside Dig Deeper and Live It. Quotations, translations, and adaptations are identified; the general guidance is separate from the sources for a panel’s particular discussion.
Editorial responsibility: Created and prepared for this project by Levi Gelb. Corrections and suggestions can be submitted below. This presentation supports learning; practical halachic questions should be brought to a qualified rav.
Chapter 24 at a glance
Marriage, evidence, and financial rights
The chapter distinguishes marital restrictions from financial consequences and explains the role of warnings, testimony, and personal belief.
When a man knowingly marries an , she retains the ordinary rights of a wife and he retains the ordinary marital property rights. If he has no children and no other wife through whom he can fulfill the of having children, he is nevertheless compelled to divorce her.
property that still exists remains the wife’s even if she has forfeited her . In cases where the ordinary rules apply, the husband is responsible for , while losses to are generally borne by the wife.
When the required conditions are established, adultery, violations of or , and witnessed highly compromising conduct can cause the loss of both amounts and the other provisions. The warning and proof requirements differ, as 14–15 explain. Whatever remains of her own is returned, but she cannot recover the losses described here.
Some modesty practices are important without being grounds for forfeiting the . Failing to observe ’s additional home practice, or moving between courtyards with the hair covered by a headscarf, does not by itself constitute a violation of .
A wife’s confession of adultery does not automatically force a divorce because of concern that she may be seeking another man, but her admission causes her to lose her financial claims. If the husband believes her, he must divorce her; the court compels divorce only when two establish willing adultery.
פרק כד
End of chapter.
You have reached the end of all twenty-five halachos.