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Hilchos Ishus · Perek 5Ishus · Ch. 5
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Ownership, benefit, and the value of

Which property and benefits can establish , and how ownership, consent, value, and timing affect the result.

פרק ה29 halachosTuesday, September 1, 2026י״ט באלול תשפ״ו◷ Estimated study time: 70–90 min

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הלכה א

with Objects Forbidden for Benefit

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If a man consecrates a woman with an object from which benefit is forbidden, such as on or meat with milk, or anything similar that is forbidden for benefit— she is not .

is the legally binding first stage of marriage. When performed with money or an object, it requires the woman to receive usable value of at least a , the minimum monetary amount for . A prohibition against benefit is broader than a prohibition against eating: the object cannot provide the permitted benefit needed for this transfer.

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Even if the prohibition against benefit is only Rabbinic, such as during the sixth hour of the fourteenth of — she is not .

According to the , even a Rabbinic prohibition can make the object unusable as the value needed for .

Synopsis

An object that may not be used for benefit cannot serve as the value of . According to the , this is true even when the prohibition against benefit is Rabbinic.

🔎Dig Deeper with Objects Forbidden for Benefit

with Objects Forbidden for Benefit

The and the understand the broadly: whenever the Sages forbid deriving benefit from an object, that object cannot create .

, in the Kessef Mishneh, initially limits the ruling to Rabbinic prohibitions rooted in a prohibition. In the , however, he follows , who distinguishes between the two types: if the Rabbinic prohibition has no basis, the can take effect; if it does have a basis, the are doubtful.

The defends the broader reading of the Rambam. Since the woman may not actually derive benefit from the object, it lacks usable value for her even if law would otherwise recognize its monetary worth.

Sources: Maggid Mishneh, 5:1; Tur, 28; Kessef Mishneh, 5:1; , 28:21; Beit Shmuel 28:52.

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הלכה ב

Proceeds and Byproducts of Forbidden Objects

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If a man transgressed and sold an object from which benefit is forbidden, and used the money he received to a woman— she is ;

Although the original object could not be used for , the money received in exchange for it does not ordinarily retain the same prohibition.

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with the exception of idolatry— for if he her with the money received for it, she is not , because the proceeds of idolatry are themselves forbidden for benefit just like the idolatrous object.

Idolatry is exceptional because its prohibition extends to the money received in exchange for it.

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If a man consecrates a woman with the dung of a calf of idolatry— she is not ; because everything associated with the idolatrous object is forbidden for benefit, as the states, “Nothing from that which is condemned shall cling to your hand” ( 13:18).

The prohibition is broad enough to include even the dung produced by the idolatrous animal.

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But if a man consecrates a woman with the dung of an ox condemned to be stoned— she is ; even though the condemned ox itself is forbidden for benefit, its dung is not forbidden for benefit, because it is not considered significant in relation to the ox itself.

The prohibition attached to the condemned ox does not extend to something as insignificant as its dung.

Synopsis

Money received from selling most benefit-forbidden objects can still be used for . Idolatry is different: its proceeds and associated products remain forbidden, while the dung of an ox condemned to stoning is permitted and can be used for .

הלכה ג

with Produce, Red Heifer Materials, and

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If a man consecrates a woman with produce of the year or with ashes of the Red Heifer or with water that was drawn to be used as purification water— she is .

Although each of these items has a special status, it can still provide the woman with legally recognized value.

produce becomes the property of the person who takes possession of it after it has been made ownerless, and therefore it can be used for .

Regarding the Red Heifer materials, one may not charge for the sacred acts of consecrating or sprinkling the purification water, but payment may be taken for permitted activities such as drawing and transporting the water. The ashes and water therefore are not treated as objects from which all monetary benefit is forbidden.

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If a man consecrates a woman with property dedicated to the upkeep of the , and does so unintentionally— she is , and he must repay the plus an additional fifth to , and bring his guilt offering, as required of anyone who unintentionally misuses sacred property;

Unintentional misuse means, for example, that he did not know the property was sacred. This misuse removes the property’s sanctity, allowing the woman to acquire it through . He must still repay the and the additional fifth and bring a guilt offering.

but if he used it for knowingly, she is not .

By contrast, deliberate misuse does not remove the property from , so the woman acquires nothing through it and the do not take effect.

Synopsis

produce and certain materials associated with the Red Heifer can be used for because they can provide legally recognized value. Unintentional misuse of can produce valid , while deliberate misuse leaves the sacred property unavailable for transfer.

הלכה ד

with

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If a man consecrates a woman with , whether unintentionally or knowingly— she is not ;

is the second tithe, designated in certain years to be eaten in or redeemed onto money used there for food. Unlike the unintentional misuse of in the previous , using for does not give the woman ordinary ownership over it.

because he may not use it for his other personal purposes until it has been redeemed, as the says regarding the tithe, “It belongs to ” ( 27:30).

Until is properly redeemed, the owner’s rights in it are restricted. He therefore cannot use it as ordinary personal property to create .

Synopsis

cannot be used for , whether knowingly or unknowingly, because until it is redeemed it is not available to the owner for ordinary personal use.

הלכה ה

Which Priestly and Agricultural Gifts Can Be Used for

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If a consecrates a woman with his portion of offerings of the highest sanctity or with his portion of offerings of lesser sanctity— she is not , because these portions were permitted to him only for eating.

His right to consume the sacrificial portion does not give him unrestricted ownership that he can transfer to another person as .

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But if a consecrates a woman with , with , or with , and similarly, if a consecrates a woman with , or an Israelite consecrates a woman with — she is .

is the portion of produce given to a ; is the portion the gives to a from his tithe. are the first fruits brought to the . is the first tithe, given to a , and is the tithe for the poor. Once the recipient entitled to these gifts acquires them, he has sufficient ownership to transfer them as , even where restrictions on eating remain.

Synopsis

A cannot use his portion of sacrificial offerings for because his right in them is limited to eating. , , , and are different: once received by the person entitled to them, they are sufficiently his property to be used for .

הלכה ו

Inherited Through a and the Value of

Required gifts that have not yet been separated are regarded as though they had already been separated.

For the law discussed here, the portions destined to become and can already be treated as distinct interests even before they are physically separated.

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Therefore, if an Israelite inherited untithed produce from the household of his maternal grandfather, who was a , and he separated from it the and — those portions are treated like and that he inherited directly from his maternal grandfather;

The grandson is not a , but he inherits his grandfather’s ownership rights. The priestly portions later separated are treated as though those portions themselves had come to him through the inheritance. Ownership does not give him permission to eat them.

and if he a woman with them, she is , because although they are not fit for him to eat, he has the right to sell them to someone for whom they are fit.

His inability to eat them does not remove their monetary value. Since he can sell them to a entitled to consume them, they can serve as the value of .

But if an Israelite a woman with that he separated from his own threshing floor, she is not ; because he has no right to sell it, and all he possesses in it is the benefit of choosing its recipient, since he may give it to whichever he chooses, and that benefit of choosing the recipient is not considered money.

here is the limited privilege of deciding which will receive the . The rules that this privilege is not itself a monetary asset sufficient for .

Synopsis

An Israelite may use inherited priestly portions for when he has a transferable monetary right in them. By contrast, from his own produce cannot be used, because his only right is to choose which receives it, and is not considered money.

הלכה ז

with Stolen or Robbed Property

If a man consecrates a woman with robbed property, or stolen property, or property taken through coercion: if the owners have despaired of recovering it and it is known that he acquired that object through their despair, she is ;

means the owner’s despair of recovering the object. The explains that despair alone ordinarily does not make the thief or robber its owner. Here, the owner’s prior despair combines with the transfer to the woman, a third party, to complete the change of ownership needed for .

but if not, she is not .

If the conditions necessary for the stolen object to leave the original owner’s property have not been established, the man is trying to create with property that is not legally his.

Synopsis

Stolen or robbed property can create when the owner has despaired of recovering it and the transfer to the woman is sufficient to complete the change of ownership. Otherwise, the do not take effect.

🔎Dig Deeper with Stolen or Robbed Property

with Stolen or Robbed Property

The acquisition described above requires both the owner’s despair and the transfer to a new holder; the next question is what the must know about that acquisition.

The adds an important evidentiary point: if the know the object was stolen, they must also know that the original owner had already despaired of recovering it. Otherwise, they do not actually witness a valid act of , and the case is treated as though the occurred without proper .

Sources: , 5:7; Noda B’Yhudah, second edition, 77.

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הלכה ח

Taking Someone Else’s Property Without Permission

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If a man enters another person’s home and takes a utensil, food, or something similar belonging to him and uses it to a woman, and the owner then arrives, even if the owner says to him, “Why did you not give her this item, which is better than what you gave her?”— she is not ;

The owner’s generous-sounding response after the fact does not retroactively authorize the taking.

because he made that statement only so that the person would not be embarrassed before him, and since he performed with another person’s property without that person’s consent, it is treated as robbery, and she is not .

The determining fact is that at the moment of he used someone else’s property without permission.

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But if he her with something that the owner would not normally object to someone taking, such as a date or a nut— she is doubtfully .

The uncertainty is whether the owner’s lack of objection is enough to treat the item as available for the man’s use. Because that cannot be established with certainty, the remain doubtful.

Synopsis

Using another person’s property without permission does not create , even if the owner later responds graciously. If the item is something the owner would normally not object to being taken, the are doubtful.

🔎Dig DeeperTaking Someone Else’s Property Without Permission

Taking Someone Else’s Property Without Permission

The considers whether this doubtful case refers specifically to an owner who is present and does not object, but ultimately hesitates to establish that interpretation because earlier authorities did not say so.

The connects this case to the law of : an owner who does not care about the taking may be viewed as having relinquished his ownership interest. The , however, explains the doubt more simply—perhaps the owner really does object despite appearances.

Sources: Noda B’Yhudah, first edition, 59; Chatam Sofer, I:85; Beit Shmuel 28:45.

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הלכה ט

Dividing Partnership Property Without the Other Partner

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If merchandise was jointly owned by a man and his partner, and he divided it without his partner’s knowledge, and used what he took as his share to a woman— since the division requires an appraisal by , she is not ;

His unilateral decision about which portion belongs to him does not establish that portion as exclusively his.

because one partner may not simply take for himself whatever he chooses and leave whatever he chooses for the other partner.

Until the jointly owned merchandise is divided through the required process, he cannot treat a particular item as unquestionably his property and use it for .

Synopsis

A partner cannot unilaterally designate part of jointly owned merchandise as his own and use it for when the division requires appraisal. Until a valid division occurs, the particular item is not established as exclusively his.

הלכה י

Returning Her Own Stolen Property as

If a man robbed a woman, or stole from her or took her property through coercion, and afterward attempted to her with the very property that he had robbed, stolen, or taken from her, and said to her, “Behold, you are to me with this”: if there had previously been between them,

here means a prior agreement or understanding that they would marry, not merely a conversation about the possibility.

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and she took the item and remained silent— she is ;

Because they had already reached an understanding about marriage, her acceptance in silence can indicate consent to the necessary transfer: she is treated as granting him the property and then accepting it back from him as .

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But if he had never previously entered into with her, even if she remained silent when he gave these items back to her as — she is not ;

Without prior , her silence cannot establish that understanding. She has an obvious reason to take the item: she is simply recovering her own property.

But if she said, “Yes,” she is .

Her explicit “yes” supplies the consent that silence could not establish and allows the transaction to function as .

Synopsis

When a man returns property that he stole from the woman and declares it as , prior allow her silence to be understood as granting him the object and then accepting it back as . Without prior , silence proves nothing because she may simply be taking back her own property; explicit agreement is then required.

הלכה יא

When Silence Does and Does Not Accept from a Deposit

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Similarly, if a man gave a woman an item for safekeeping and said to her, “Take this deposit,” and then said to her, “Behold, you are to me with it”: if he said this to her before she took possession of it, and she then took it and remained silent— she is ;

At the moment she takes the item, she already knows that he is giving it to her as . Her silent acceptance can therefore indicate consent to the .

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But if, after she had already taken it as a deposit for safekeeping, he said to her, “Behold, you are with it,” and she remained silent— this has no effect, because silence after the item has already been given into her possession does not establish consent to ;

The deposit still belongs to the man; she is only holding it for safekeeping. Once she already holds it for that purpose, remaining silent when he later declares it to be does not show that she agrees to acquire it as .

But if she said, “Yes,” after she had already taken the item, she is .

Her explicit agreement removes the problem created by mere silence after the item was already in her possession.

Synopsis

If the woman knows before taking a deposited item that it is being given as , her silent acceptance can create . If the declaration comes only after she already received it as a deposit, silence is ineffective, though an explicit “yes” can still make the valid.

הלכה יב

Returning a Debt as

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If a man repaid a debt that he owed a woman, and said to her, “Behold, you are to me with it” before she took the money, and she took it and remained silent: if there had previously been between them— she is ;

Because they had already reached an understanding about marriage, her silent acceptance after hearing the declaration can be understood as consenting to receive the payment as .

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but if there had been no prior — she is not , unless she explicitly says, “Yes.”

Without that prior understanding, taking the money does not by itself show acceptance of : she may simply be collecting the debt owed to her.

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But if he said to her after she had already received payment of her debt, “Behold, you are to me with it,” even if she said, “Yes”— she is not ;

because nothing now reaches her from him, rather, she merely received what was already hers, and his debt was already discharged from the moment she took the payment, and she can no longer demand that debt from him again.

Unlike the deposit in Halachah 11, the repaid money is now hers. His debt has been discharged, so a later declaration—even with her agreement—does not transfer anything new from him to her.

Synopsis

If a man identifies repayment of his debt as before the woman takes the money, prior can make her silent acceptance effective; otherwise she must explicitly agree. Once she has already received the repayment, however, the debt is finished and that money can no longer be turned into afterward.

הלכה יג

Why an Existing Loan Cannot Serve as

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If a man consecrates a woman with a loan that she owes him— even if the debt is recorded in a promissory note, she is not .

The existence of a formal document does not change the essential problem: the loan itself is not something newly being transferred to her at the time of .

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How so? For example, if she owed him a , and he said to her, “Behold, you are to me with the that you owe me”— she is not , because a loan is given to be spent,

From the moment the borrower receives the loan, the money becomes hers to use. The lender is left with a claim for repayment, not ownership of the original money.

and there is no existing object here from which she can now receive benefit, because she has already spent that and the benefit from it has already passed.

This applies even if she has not spent the original coins: they already became hers when she received the loan. The explains that the lender retains a repayment claim, not ownership of those coins.

Synopsis

An existing loan cannot be used as because the original money already became the borrower’s to spend, and the benefit from receiving it occurred in the past. What remains is only a debt obligation, not a new object or benefit being transferred to her now.

🔎Dig DeeperWhy an Existing Loan Cannot Serve as

Why an Existing Loan Cannot Serve as

The notes that a different question can arise when the debt is represented by a promissory note that itself has monetary value. Some authorities maintain that if the note is worth at least a and the man transfers the note itself to the woman, the can take effect.

This question concerns the value of the note itself, not a new transfer of the money originally lent. See Rama, 28:7; , 28, on with a loan.

Sources: Rama, 28:7; Beit Yosef, 28.

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הלכה יד

Returning Collateral Creates a Present Benefit

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If the woman owed him a loan for which he held collateral, and he her with that loan, and returned the collateral to her— she is ;

Here he gives up the secured debt and returns her collateral as . Returning the security while still requiring repayment of the loan is not the case being discussed.

because she now receives benefit from the collateral, and a present benefit has reached her.

Releasing the debt and returning the collateral restores her use of the pledged property now. That present benefit distinguishes this case from using an ordinary existing loan as .

Synopsis

When the lender gives up the secured debt and returns the woman’s collateral as , she receives a present benefit and the take effect.

🔎Dig DeeperReturning Collateral Creates a Present Benefit

Returning Collateral Creates a Present Benefit

takes a broader view and maintains that the can be effective even if the collateral is not actually returned at that time. The appears to favor the ’s requirement that the collateral be returned, while also recording the differing opinion.

Sources: Tosafot, 19a; , 28:11.

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הלכה טו

Through the Benefit of a Newly Issued Loan

If a man consecrates a woman through the benefit provided by a loan, she is .

The distinction from the previous laws is that he is not trying to use an old debt itself as . He is giving her a new benefit connected with a loan that is being made now.

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How so? For example, he now lends her two hundred , and says to her, “Behold, you are to me through the benefit of allowing you to keep and use this loan for the following period, so that it may remain in your possession for such-and-such a number of days, and I will not demand repayment from you until a specified date”— she is ,

because she receives a benefit beginning now from being able to use this loan until the end of the period he established.

The are based on the present benefit of receiving a newly issued loan that she may use until the agreed repayment date. This is different from attempting to use an existing debt itself as .

Nevertheless, it is forbidden to arrange in this way, because it resembles interest.

The woman receives the use of the loan, while the lender receives an additional benefit—the —connected to extending that loan. The calls this arrangement “like interest” and forbids it, even though the take effect.

My teachers interpreted the phrase “the benefit of a loan” in a way that is not worthy of being accepted.

The explicitly rejects his teachers’ interpretation of the Talmudic phrase and understands the case as a new loan whose initial use period provides the present benefit used for .

Synopsis

A prior debt cannot itself serve as , but a newly granted benefit connected with a loan can. If the man presently lends her money and uses the value of the period during which she may keep and use it as the , the take effect, although arranging them this way is forbidden because it resembles interest.

🔎Dig Deeper Through the Benefit of a Newly Issued Loan

Through the Benefit of a Newly Issued Loan

interprets the benefit of a loan differently: an existing loan has reached its due date, and the lender extends the deadline in exchange for .

The explains why the rejects that approach: if completely forgiving an existing debt cannot create , it would be difficult to understand why merely granting extra time on that same debt should be more effective.

and the follow Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s interpretation. The records both approaches, while the treats the as doubtful in a case affected by the disagreement.

Sources: Rif, 2b; Maggid Mishneh, 5:15; Rashi, 6b; Raavad, 5:15; , 28:9; Rama, 28:10.

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הלכה טז

Combining a with an Existing Debt

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If he said to her, “Behold, you are to me with this , and with the debt that you owe me”— she is .

The existing debt alone cannot serve as , but she also receives a now. She is understood to rely on that present for the ; mentioning the old debt alongside it does not invalidate the transfer.

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Similarly, if he said to her, “With the loan that you owe me, and with this ”— she is .

The order in which he mentions the debt and the does not change the result. Since a valid present transfer is included together with the loan, the take effect.

Synopsis

An existing debt cannot create by itself, but if the man combines that debt with a present , the are valid. The order in which he mentions the two does not matter.

הלכה יז

Transferring a Debt Owed by a Third Party

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If another person owed him a debt, and he said to a woman, “Behold, you are to me with the debt that this person owes me,” in the presence of all three parties— she is .

is a Rabbinically established method for transferring a debt when the creditor, debtor, and recipient are all present. Once the transfer takes effect, the woman receives the debt itself as a present monetary right, and it can serve as .

Synopsis

A debt owed by a third party can be used for when it is transferred to the woman through , with all three parties present.

הלכה יח

with a Deposit or Borrowed Item Already in Her Possession

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If he her with an item of his that she was holding as a deposit, or with an item that he had lent her for use— if the deposited or borrowed item, or at least a ’s worth of it, still exists in her possession, she is .

Although the item was already physically with her, she did not own it. By using it for , the man now transfers ownership of that existing object—or at least a ’s worth of it—to her.

A deposit or borrowed object remains the man’s property, unlike borrowed money, which becomes hers to spend. The consent requirement in Halachah 11 still applies: when she already holds the object, her silence alone does not accept a later declaration of .

Synopsis

An item that the woman is holding as a deposit or borrowed object can serve as if at least a ’s worth of it still exists in her possession, because the man still owns the item and can transfer it to her now.

הלכה יט

Why Payment for a Completed Service Becomes a Loan

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If a man said to a woman, “Behold, you are to me with the payment due to me for speaking to the authorities on your behalf,” and he did speak on her behalf, and the authority left her alone and did not pursue a claim against her— she is not , unless he also gives her a of his own.

Speaking to the authorities on her behalf is treated like performing a service for her. Once that service has been performed, the value of the service is treated as a debt she owes him, and an existing debt cannot serve as .

because the benefit she received from his words is treated like a loan, and one who consecrates a woman with a loan does not create .

The problem is not that she received no benefit. She did. The problem is that by the time the are supposed to take effect, that benefit has already become a debt rather than something new being transferred to her.

Synopsis

Payment owed for a service already performed is treated as a debt. Therefore, even when the service benefited her, it cannot by itself serve as ; the man must give her new value, such as a of his own.

הלכה כ

Wages Accruing During Work Become a Debt

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If a man says to a woman, “Behold, you are to me with this work that I will perform for you,” and he performed the work— she is not , unless he also gives her a of his own;

At first glance, this might seem different from an old loan because the work is being performed specifically for the sake of the . The explains why it nevertheless becomes a debt.

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because a worker acquires his wages continuously from the beginning of the work until its completion— as he performs each portion of the work, he earns the corresponding portion of his wages, so that by the end, the entire wage is a debt that she owes him, and one who consecrates a woman with a loan does not create .

As each portion of the work is completed, a corresponding portion of the wage becomes owed to him. By the end, the entire wage is already a debt, so it cannot serve as a new transfer of .

Synopsis

Work performed for a woman cannot serve as once the wages have accrued, because the worker earns his pay gradually as he works. By the end, the entire wage is already a debt she owes him, and a debt cannot be used as .

הלכה כא

Through a Gift Given at Her Request

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If a woman said, “Give a as a gift to so-and-so, and I will become to you,” and he gave it, and said to her, “Behold, you are to me through the benefit of this gift that I gave at your request”— she is .

There are three people here: the woman, the man who gives the , and the person who receives it. In this first case, she becomes to the giver. Although she does not receive the money herself, having her request carried out provides the benefit used for .

Even though nothing came into her possession, she benefited from having her wishes carried out and from the other person receiving benefit because of her.

The relevant value is therefore not physical receipt of the money but the personal benefit she receives from having the gift made on her instructions.

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Similarly, if she said to him, “Give a as a gift to so-and-so, and I will become to him,” and he gave it to that person, and that person then her and said to her, “Behold, you are to me through the benefit of this gift that I received with your consent”— she is .

In this second case, she becomes to the recipient of the gift, not its giver. The recipient makes the declaration. The benefit she receives from having the gift given and accepted at her request supplies the value of .

Synopsis

A woman can become through the benefit she receives when a gift is given to another person at her request. Physical receipt of the money by the woman herself is not always necessary if she receives a legally recognized benefit through the transaction.

🔎Dig Deeper Through a Gift Given at Her Request

Through a Gift Given at Her Request

The compares this ruling with the earlier case in Chapter 4 in which the woman tells the man to give something to another recipient. He explains that here the woman herself proposes the arrangement as the basis of , and the man explicitly responds to that proposal.

The likewise emphasizes that her statement here comes first, showing that she intends the gift to create rather than merely deflecting the man’s proposal.

Sources: Maggid Mishneh, 4:4; Maggid Mishneh, 5:21; Rama, 29:2.

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הלכה כב

When Someone Else Provides the Money

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If a man said to a woman, “Take this as a gift and become to so-and-so,” and that other man her and said to her, “Behold, you are to me through this benefit that came to you because of me”— she is , even though the man consecrating her did not personally give her anything.

Here the woman receives the money, a third person supplies it, and the intended husband makes the declaration. She becomes to that intended husband, not to the person who handed her the money.

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If the woman said to a man, “Take this as a gift, and I will become to you,” and he took it and said to her, “Behold, you are to me through the benefit of my accepting this gift from you”— if he is an important person, she is ;

because she receives benefit from the fact that he accepts benefit from her, and through that benefit she gives herself to him in .

Ordinarily, involves the woman receiving value from the man. Here, however, an important person’s willingness to accept her gift is itself considered a benefit to her. That benefit can serve as the value through which the take effect.

Synopsis

can take effect even when the husband does not personally provide the money, if the woman receives a benefit on his behalf. When an important person accepts a gift from her, the benefit she receives from that acceptance can itself serve as the value of .

🔎Dig Deeper When Someone Else Provides the Money

When Someone Else Provides the Money

The notes that the definition of an “important person” is not always clear. Because of that uncertainty, the rules that where there is doubt whether the man qualifies, a should be required before the woman marries someone else.

Sources: , 27:9; Chelkat Mechokek 27:21.

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הלכה כג

When Collateral Is and Is Not Enough for

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If a man says to a woman, “Become to me with a , and meanwhile, here is this collateral for you to hold until I give you the ”— she is not ; because the has not reached her, and the collateral was not given to become hers.

The promised has not yet been transferred, while the collateral remains merely security rather than property given to her. She therefore receives no present value that can create .

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But if he already held collateral for a debt owed to him by another person, and used that collateral to a woman, even though the collateral is not his— she is ; because a creditor has a partial ownership interest in the collateral itself.

This case differs from the first because the creditor already possesses a recognized legal interest in the collateral. That interest provides something he can transfer as .

Synopsis

Merely handing the woman collateral for a that has not yet been paid does not create , because neither the nor the collateral becomes hers. Existing collateral held for someone else’s debt is different: the creditor has a legal interest in it that can be transferred as .

🔎Dig DeeperWhen Collateral Is and Is Not Enough for

When Collateral Is and Is Not Enough for

The records a narrower opinion, citing the in the name of : the collateral must have been taken after the loan was made, rather than when it was first issued. This qualification belongs to that opinion; the does not state it here. See Rama, 28:12.

Sources: Rama, 28:12; Tur, 28.

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הלכה כד

on Condition That the Money Be Returned

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If a man says to a woman, “Behold, you are to me with this , on condition that you return it to me”— she is not , whether she returned it or did not return it;

The condition creates a problem either way.

because if she did not return it, the condition was not fulfilled;

Without fulfilling the stated condition, the cannot take effect as proposed.

and if she did return it, she did not receive any benefit and nothing ultimately came into her possession.

According to the , if she returns the , the required benefit of has not reached her.

Synopsis

A given for on condition that it be returned does not create according to the . If she keeps it, the condition fails; if she returns it, she has not received the benefit required for .

🔎Dig Deeper on Condition That the Money Be Returned

on Condition That the Money Be Returned

disagrees with the ’s underlying analysis. He maintains that a gift given on condition that it later be returned is still a valid transfer under law. On that view, the would fundamentally work, but the Sages invalidated them because such an arrangement resembles , a barter-style acquisition that cannot be used for .

The explains the conceptual difference: the Rambam focuses on whether the woman actually receives benefit, while Rabbenu Asher focuses on whether a legally valid transfer occurred.

Sources: Rabbenu Asher, 1:6; Or Sameach, 5:24.

The Rebbe’s guidance: Learn in depth
הלכה כה

Hidden Money Revealed Only After She Already Took the Item

If a man gave a woman a bundle of myrtle or something similar and said to her, “Behold, you are to me with this,” and she accepted it, and they said to him, “But it is not worth a ,” and he replied, “Let her become with the four hidden inside the bundle”:

The original act of referred to the bundle itself. Only after she had already accepted it did he reveal that money was hidden inside.

if she said, “Yes,” she is ;

Her explicit agreement after learning about the hidden money supplies the consent needed to use that money as the basis of .

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but if she remained silent— she is not through this money, because silence after money has already been placed in her possession does not establish consent to ;

At the time she originally took the bundle, she did not know that the hidden money was being offered as the basis of . Once the money is already in her possession, silence alone cannot supply the missing consent.

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Nevertheless, she is doubtfully , because of the bundle itself— perhaps it is worth a in another place.

Although the hidden money cannot establish through her silence, the original bundle may itself have been sufficient. As established earlier, an object worth less than a locally can create doubtful because it may be worth a elsewhere.

Synopsis

If money hidden inside an item is revealed only after the woman has already received the item, her silence does not establish consent to based on that money. An explicit “yes” does. Even without that agreement, the original item can still create doubtful if it may be worth a elsewhere.

הלכה כו

Repeating with Separate Dates

If a man says to a woman, “Become to me with this date, become to me with this one, become to me with this one”:

Each date is presented as a separate act of . The dates are therefore not automatically combined to reach the minimum value.

if one of them is worth a , she is ;

A single date worth a is enough because that individual act of has the required value.

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but if none of them is, she is only doubtfully , because perhaps one of the dates is worth a in another region.

As explained earlier, an object worth less than a locally can create doubtful because it may have the required value elsewhere.

Synopsis

When the man separately repeats “Become with this one” for each date, each date stands on its own. If one is worth a , the are certain; otherwise they remain doubtful because one date may be worth a elsewhere.

🔎Dig DeeperRepeating with Separate Dates

Repeating with Separate Dates

The notes a difficulty in the ’s ruling because the associates this formulation with the reasoning of , while in other contexts the Rambam does not always follow that view.

In his commentary to 4:11, the same author, Rav Yosef Caro, offers a possible resolution. The anonymous in follows Rabbi Shimon, whereas the anonymous in concerning an oath about a deposit follows . The anonymous in also follows Rabbi Shimon; nevertheless, because vows and oaths are closely related, the Rambam follows the opposing ruling in for that area of law. The contrast is therefore between and , not between and an opposing anonymous in .

Sources: Kessef Mishneh, 5:26; Kessef Mishneh, 4:11.

The Rebbe’s guidance: Learn in depth
הלכה כז

Combining Several Dates into One

If he said to her, “Become to me with this one, and this one, and this one”:

Unlike the previous , his wording joins all the dates into one act of .

if all of them together are worth a , she is ;

Because he combined them into a single act, their values can be added together.

but if they are not worth a together, she is only doubtfully .

The remaining doubt is the same one discussed earlier: one or more of the dates may have greater value elsewhere.

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If she was eating each date as he gave it to her: if the final date is worth a — she is ; but if it is not— she is only doubtfully ;

With “this one, and this one, and this one,” he finishes the declaration only as he gives the final date. If she eats the earlier dates before then, they are already gone when the can take effect. They are treated as a loan, leaving only the final date as present value.

because the dates that she ate are treated like a loan, and one who consecrates a woman with a loan does not create , so it follows that the depend only on the final date.

The final date is still present at the point when the combined can take effect, so its value is what determines whether there is definite .

Synopsis

When the man joins several dates together in one declaration, their values combine. But if she eats them one by one before the act is completed, the earlier dates are treated like a loan, and the ultimately depend on the final date.

הלכה כח

When He Includes All the Dates from the Outset

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If he said to her, “Behold, you are to me with these”— if all of them together are worth a , she is ;

By saying “with these,” he completes the declaration at the outset and includes all the dates. Unlike Halachah 27, he is not still adding to the declaration as he hands over each date.

even if she eats each one as it is given to her, because she is eating what is hers, and she is .

She therefore receives each date under the completed declaration of . Eating them one by one does not turn the earlier dates into a prior loan: she is eating what is being given to her through that act of .

Synopsis

When the man says “You are with these,” all the dates form one combined consideration. If together they are worth a , she is even if she eats them one by one, because those dates are part of the property being given to her for the .

הלכה כט

What Is Included When He Says “With This Cup”

If a man says to a woman, “Behold, you are to me with this cup”:

This explanation reflects the relative values and ordinary uses of the cup and its contents in the setting discussed. It is not a claim that water, wine, oil, and cups always have the same relative prices today.

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if it was filled with water— she is with the cup itself together with what is inside it;

Water has little independent significance in relation to the cup, so the cup and its contents are treated together as what he gave for .

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if it was filled with wine— she is with the cup itself, but not with what is inside it;

The wine has value of its own, but the cup is more valuable in the setting described. The wine therefore remains distinct, and “with this cup” refers to the cup itself.

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and if it was filled with oil— she is with what is inside the cup, but not with the cup itself.

The oil is more valuable than the cup in the setting described. It can also remain in the vessel for continued use. The cup is therefore secondary to its contents, and “with this cup” refers to the oil.

Therefore, if the oil was not worth a , she is doubtfully ,

The oil is the item on which the are based, so if it lacks the required local value, only the possibility that it is worth a elsewhere creates a doubt.

but if the oil was worth a , she is certainly ; and the value of the cup is disregarded.

Since the oil itself provides the required value, the cup’s value has no bearing on whether the take effect.

Synopsis

When a man says “with this cup,” what counts as the depends on the relative significance of the cup and its contents: water is included with the cup, wine remains distinct so the cup alone counts, and with oil the contents are primary and the cup is disregarded.

Sources & editorial method

Hebrew text: Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Ishus, Chapter 5. The Hebrew is preserved as the primary text and divided into short learning units.

Translation and elucidation: Independently prepared for Rambam, Clearly in contemporary English. Translation follows the Rambam’s words; elucidation supplies only the context needed to understand them.

Word cards and glossary: Hebrew word cards distinguish a word’s basic meaning from its meaning in the particular phrase. Shared glossary entries explain recurring terms; biography entries identify the cited authorities.

Explain and Background: Explain provides context needed for the ruling. Optional Background panels provide additional context that can be skipped without losing the essential explanation.

Synopsis: A short summary follows each halachah. It is a guide to the central ruling, not a replacement for the full text and its qualifications.

Dig Deeper: Based on the classic commentaries named inside each panel. Editorial explanations are not presented as quotations.

Live It: Where present, these panels connect a particular halachah to a suggested personal reflection and an action to try. Original applications are labeled as suggested reflections. They are distinct from the ruling and are not attributed to the Rebbe merely because his guidance supports seeking a practical lesson.

Measurements: Modern equivalents draw on Chabad.org’s measurement glossary and cited halachic calculations. They show a range when major accepted calculations differ. Monetary equivalents fluctuate with the price of silver.

The Rebbe’s teachings and guidance: Source links accompany the completion teachings and the guidance inside Dig Deeper and Live It. Quotations, translations, and adaptations are identified; the general guidance is separate from the sources for a panel’s particular discussion.

Editorial responsibility: Created and prepared for this project by Levi Gelb. Corrections and suggestions can be submitted below. This presentation supports learning; practical halachic questions should be brought to a qualified rav.

Chapter 5 at a glance

Present value and transferable ownership

The chapter distinguishes transferable property and present benefits from prohibited objects, property belonging to others, and existing debts. Consent and the timing of a declaration also affect whether take effect.

  • An object that may not be used for benefit cannot serve as the value of . According to the , this is true even when the prohibition against benefit is Rabbinic.
  • Stolen or robbed property can create when the owner has despaired of recovering it and the transfer to the woman is sufficient to complete the change of ownership. Otherwise, the do not take effect.
  • An existing loan cannot be used as because the original money already became the borrower’s to spend, and the benefit from receiving it occurred in the past. What remains is only a debt obligation, not a new object or benefit being transferred to her now.
  • A woman can become through the benefit she receives when a gift is given to another person at her request. Physical receipt of the money by the woman herself is not always necessary if she receives a legally recognized benefit through the transaction.
  • When the man says “You are with these,” all the dates form one combined consideration. If together they are worth a , she is even if she eats them one by one, because those dates are part of the property being given to her for the .
פרק ה

End of chapter.

You have reached the end of all twenty-nine halachos.