רRambam, Clearly
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Hilchos Yibbum VaChalitzah · Perek 2Yibbum & Chalitzah · Ch. 2
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, brotherly priority, and the widow’s rights

prepares for , but marital relations complete the marriage. This chapter explains which brother has priority, how refusal affects rights, and what happens when a widow becomes involved with another man before the bond is resolved.

פרק ב21 halachosTuesday, October 6, 2026כ״ה בתשרי תשפ״ז◷ Estimated study time: 115–145 min

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Chapter overview

BackgroundWhat this chapter is going to clarify

This chapter follows the relationship from beginning to end. First, it explains the Rabbinic procedure of and what kind of marital act actually completes . It then asks which brother has priority, what happens when a brother or refuses or delays, and how those choices affect the . Finally, it examines what happens if the becomes involved with another man before or has fully resolved her .

הלכה א

Before

By Rabbinic law, a should not have marital relations with his

until he first consecrates her in the presence of two ,

using a or an object worth a .

A is the minimum monetary value that can be used for this type of act of .

Although law allows to take effect directly through marital relations, the Sages required the first to perform a formal act resembling .

This act is called .

is the Rabbinically instituted preliminary act by which the formally designates the before .

does not acquire the as his wife completely,

as will be explained.

This is a crucial distinction: has significance, but it does not itself complete the marriage of . The later will explain the consequences of this incomplete status.

-

If a man performs with his without her consent,

he has accomplished nothing,

because a woman is only with her consent.

Because is performed through an act patterned after , it requires the woman’s consent just as does.

If a minor girl became widowed after ,

may be performed with her only with her father’s consent.

Because her first marriage had reached only and had not yet been consummated, she remains under her father’s authority in this respect.

BackgroundWhy the Sages instituted

The notes that can also be performed through a shtar, a legal document, rather than only through money or an object of monetary value.

52a indicates that the institution of reflects a concern for modesty. Although law allows to take effect directly through marital relations, the Sages required the first to formally designate the woman, just as they discouraged beginning an ordinary marriage through marital relations rather than through a prior act of .

Synopsis

The Sages required a to perform before . resembles and requires consent, but it does not by itself create the complete marriage of .

הלכה ב

The Marriage Procedure Around

Just as the performs with his ,

so too, he recites the blessings of in the presence of ten men,

and writes a for her,

as is required whenever a man marries a woman.

Although the underlying bond arises through the special law governing a brother’s widow, the Sages required the marriage to be accompanied by the ordinary framework of marriage blessings and a .

-

If he has marital relations with his without first performing ,

he nevertheless acquires her completely as his wife,

The Rabbinic requirement of does not change the mechanism of . Marital relations themselves still create the complete acquisition.

and he does not need to perform afterward.

Once has taken effect through marital relations, there is no missing that must now be supplied.

However, he is given lashes for rebellious conduct,

is a Rabbinic disciplinary punishment imposed for disregarding a Rabbinic requirement. His remains valid even though he violated the procedure established by the Sages.

and he must write her a .

BackgroundAdditional marriage practices around

The adds that should also be performed as part of the marriage. The adds that Birkat should be recited as well.

These additions reflect the broader Rabbinic framework surrounding : although the marriage itself is effected through , the Sages surrounded it with elements familiar from an ordinary marriage ceremony.

Synopsis

is accompanied by marriage blessings and a . If the skips and proceeds directly to marital relations, the is fully effective, but he is punished for disregarding the Rabbinic procedure.

הלכה ג

Which Marital Relations Complete

-

When a has marital relations with his ,

whether unintentionally or intentionally,

The effectiveness of does not depend on his specifically intending to fulfill the . Halachah 4 will qualify this by requiring that there at least be an intention to engage in a marital act.

whether under compulsion or willingly,

whether he acted intentionally while she acted unintentionally or under compulsion,

or she acted intentionally while he acted unintentionally or under compulsion,

The various combinations show that the acquisition of does not require both participants to share the same intent or circumstances.

whether she was asleep or awake,

These cases address whether the act legally effects ; they should not be understood as saying that every circumstance described is permissible or proper.

whether the relations were in the usual manner or in an unusual manner,

-

whether there was only the beginning of penetration or the act was completed —

Ha’arah refers to the initial degree of penetration that already recognizes as an act of marital relations.

he acquires her as his wife.

Once an act that qualifies as marital relations has occurred under the conditions described here, the takes effect.

Synopsis

can take effect through a wide range of circumstances and does not require both participants to share an intention to fulfill the . These rules address legal effectiveness, not whether every circumstance described is proper or permitted.

הלכה ד

The Must Intend a Marital Act

When do the rules above apply?

When the intended to engage in a marital act.

Halachah 3 does not require an intention specifically for the of , but there must at least be an intention to perform an act of sexual relations.

But if he fell and accidentally penetrated her,

or had relations with her while so intoxicated that he was aware of nothing,

-

or while he was asleep —

he does not acquire her through .

In all of these cases, there was no conscious intention to engage in a marital act at all. The physical occurrence alone is therefore insufficient.

If he intended a non-marital act of self-stimulation against a wall,

-

and instead did so through his ,

he does not acquire her.

His intended act was not an act of sexual relations, so the accidental contact with his does not effect .

But if he intended to engage in relations with an animal,

-

and instead had relations with his ,

he does acquire her,

because, despite the forbidden object of his intent, he did intend an act of sexual relations.

The distinction is therefore not whether he intended the , or even whether he intended relations specifically with the . The dividing line is whether he intended an act classified as sexual relations at all.

Synopsis

does not require specific intent to fulfill the , but the must at least intend an act of sexual relations. A purely accidental physical occurrence does not create .

🔎Dig DeeperThe Must Intend a Marital Act

The Must Intend a Marital Act

The discusses why a profoundly intoxicated person in this does not acquire the , even though elsewhere a person with severely impaired mental capacity may still effect .

He explains that the distinction lies in intent. A person whose mental capacity is impaired may nevertheless intend to engage in relations. The intoxicated person described here has lost awareness to such an extent that no such intent exists at all.

Sources: Or Sameach on 2:4.

הלכה ה

When the and Disagree Whether Was Consummated

If a was taken into the ’s home for ,

-

and within thirty days she says, “We did not have marital relations,”

-

even though the says, “I did have relations with her” —

Within the first thirty days, her claim remains plausible. We do not simply assume that marital relations must already have taken place.

we compel him to perform with her,

provided that he had already taken the initiative and divorced her with a .

Because he has already divorced her, can no longer be carried out. Her claim that no relations occurred leaves a possibility that the original was never resolved through , so is required to release her.

But if he has not yet divorced her,

we compel him to complete the through marital relations,

or to perform and separate from her with a .

If they are separating, both possibilities must be addressed: a is required because their having lived together creates concern that did occur, while is required because her claim that it did not occur remains plausible within thirty days.

This does not contradict the general rule that a man is not forced to enter a marriage. Here, the himself claims that marital relations already occurred and that the marriage already took effect. The court is requiring the uncertain status to be resolved consistently with that claim.

If he divorces her after thirty days have passed,

-

and she says, “We did not have marital relations,”

we ask him to perform with her.

Once they have lived together for thirty days, presumes that marital relations occurred, because we do not ordinarily assume that a couple living as husband and wife refrained for that entire period. Her contrary claim is therefore no longer strong enough for to compel . Nevertheless, he is asked to perform it so that she can remarry without concern.

If he admits that he did not have relations with her,

we compel him to perform .

Since he himself admits that never occurred, the thirty-day presumption no longer helps him. And because he has already divorced her, is no longer an option, so he must release her through .

If she says, “We did have marital relations,”

-

and he says, “I did not have relations with her” —

she does not require ,

because he is not believed when his claim would cause her to remain forbidden to everyone else,

after he had already brought her into his home as his wife.

Once he treated her publicly as his wife, he cannot later use his own claim that never occurred to leave her bound by and unable to marry another man.

Synopsis

When the and disagree over whether marital relations occurred, the first thirty days are treated differently from the period afterward. Within thirty days, her claim that no relations occurred remains plausible; after thirty days, the presumption is that they did. The required or addresses the possible status created by each side of the doubt.

Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration

brings his deceased brother’s widow into his home for . Two weeks later, says that no marital relations ever took place, while says that they did. If has already given her a , also requires him to perform , because ’s claim is still plausible within the first thirty days. If the same disagreement arises only after they have lived together for more than thirty days, generally relies on the presumption that relations took place and asks, rather than compels, to perform .

Rachel says no marital relations occurred; Shimon disagrees and has already given her a get. Within thirty days, beis din compels chalitzah. After thirty days, it requests chalitzah. If Shimon admits no relations occurred, chalitzah is compelled even afterward.
Both timing examples assume a was already given. ’s admission overrides the thirty-day presumption.
Live ItDon’t live indefinitely in uncertainty

Don’t live indefinitely in uncertainty

This deals with a situation where two people give conflicting accounts, and the has to address both possibilities until the uncertainty can be resolved. Sometimes life also leaves us without perfect clarity. does not always tell us to pretend the uncertainty is gone; it teaches us to act responsibly while it is still there.

In , uncertainty can easily become an excuse for paralysis: “I’m not sure what the right next step is, so I’ll do nothing.” A better response is to ask what can be done safely and honestly now, without pretending to know more than we do.

Try today

Identify one unresolved question in your life and take one responsible step that does not depend on having every answer.

Suggested reflection on 2:5.

הלכה ו

The Eldest Brother Has the Primary

-

If a man dies and leaves several brothers,

the falls first upon the eldest brother to perform either or ,

The responsibility is not divided equally at the outset. The gives priority to the eldest surviving brother.

as it is stated: “And the firstborn whom she bears…” ( 25:6).

The Oral Tradition teaches

that this refers to the eldest of the brothers,

meaning that the eldest brother is the one who should perpetuate the name of his deceased brother.

The verse is being interpreted as assigning the primary to the eldest surviving brother.

-

And the words “whom she bears”

refer to the mother who bore the brothers,

and do not refer to a child that the herself will bear.

For this interpretation, the verse is read as referring to the eldest of the brothers born to their mother, rather than to the first child who might be born from the .

BackgroundHow the verse identifies the eldest brother

The straightforward reading of the verse sounds as though “whom she bears” refers to the and to a future child born from the . The tradition also reads the verse as referring to the mother of the brothers, making the “firstborn” the eldest surviving brother for this law.

The same wording can be interpreted differently in another context, so this explanation is background to the derivation rather than a change in the ’s ruling.

Synopsis

When several brothers survive the deceased, the eldest brother has the primary responsibility to perform or . The ’s reference to the “firstborn” is interpreted here as referring to the eldest surviving brother.

הלכה ז

If the Eldest Brother Refuses

-

If the eldest brother does not wish to perform ,

we go through the other brothers to see whether one of them will perform .

Because the eldest has declined , the court looks to the other brothers for someone willing to perform it.

-

If they also do not wish to perform ,

we return to the eldest brother

and tell him, “The rests upon you;

either perform or perform .”

The eldest brother cannot leave the indefinitely bound simply because he prefers that another brother act.

We do not compel the to perform ,

Even though the rules that takes precedence, a man is not forced to marry a woman he does not wish to marry.

but we do compel him to perform .

is different because until it is performed, the remains bound by and cannot marry someone else.

Synopsis

If the eldest brother refuses , the other brothers are approached to see whether one of them will perform it. If none agrees, the obligation returns to the eldest: he cannot be forced to marry her, but he can be compelled to perform so that she is not left bound indefinitely.

Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration

dies childless, leaving his widow and several brothers. The eldest brother declines , so asks the other brothers whether one will perform it. If one agrees, he performs . If all decline, returns to the eldest: he must resolve the bond through or . He is not compelled to perform , but he can be compelled to perform .

After the eldest declines yibbum, the other brothers are asked. If one agrees, he performs yibbum. If all decline, the eldest must resolve the bond. He is not compelled to perform yibbum but can be compelled to perform chalitzah.
The return to the eldest occurs if no other brother will perform .
Live ItResponsibility eventually comes back to you

Responsibility eventually comes back to you

The eldest brother first has the primary responsibility. If he declines , the court turns to the other brothers — but if no one else acts, they return to him and say: “The is upon you.” He cannot keep passing the responsibility along while the remains stuck.

There are responsibilities we naturally hope someone else will handle: a family need, something in the community, a difficult conversation, or an area of our own . Sometimes others really can help. But when something is genuinely ours, passing it around does not make it disappear. places great emphasis on that is personal — doing the work placed in front of you, rather than waiting for somebody else to become the right person.

Try today

Ask yourself: “What have I been hoping someone else will take care of that may actually be mine to do?”

Suggested reflection on 2:7.

הלכה ח

The Eldest Brother Cannot Delay the

If the eldest brother says, “Wait until the younger brother reaches adulthood,”

or, “until the brother who is away returns,”

or, “until a brother who is presently a recovers,

Here, refers to the status of a person unable to hear and communicate in the manner required for these legal acts. The is discussing a case in which that condition may later improve. The eldest cannot keep the waiting in the hope that this brother will later become able to perform the .

and then we will ask whether he wishes to act,

-

and if he does not wish to, I will perform or ” —

we do not accept his request.

The is not made to remain bound while everyone waits to see whether another brother may later become available or willing.

Instead, we tell him:

“The rests upon you;

either perform or perform .”

The purpose is to resolve the ’s status without unnecessary delay when a brother capable of acting is already present.

Synopsis

The eldest brother may not postpone the merely to wait for another brother to become available. Since the obligation rests on him now, he must resolve the ’s status through or .

הלכה ט

A Present Brother Cannot Wait for the Eldest to Return

-

Similarly, if the eldest brother is in another country,

the younger brother may not say,

Here, “younger brother” means younger than the eldest brother; it does not mean that he is necessarily a minor.

“The belongs to my older brother;

wait until he returns.”

Even though the eldest normally has priority, that priority does not justify leaving the waiting when another brother is present and able to resolve the obligation.

Rather, we tell the brother who is present:

“Perform either or .”

The practical concern is the same as in the previous : the should not remain unnecessarily bound while waiting for an absent brother.

BackgroundWhat “another ” can mean

The discusses what the means by the eldest brother being in another . He explains that it can refer to a place where a different language is spoken, even if it is not extremely distant.

Mahari Mintz rules in a related case that if the eldest brother is in another city and the does not have the means to travel there, the younger brother can be compelled to perform the .

Synopsis

If the eldest brother is away, a younger brother who is present must act. “Younger” here does not mean a legal minor; it means a brother younger than the eldest. The eldest brother’s priority does not require the to wait unnecessarily.

הלכה י

When a Refuses

If a is eligible for

-

but does not wish to undergo ,

There is no other reason preventing the ; the issue is her refusal to proceed.

her law is like that of a wife who is considered a toward her husband,

A is a wife who refuses marital life with her husband. The laws of are a broader subject; here the applies that framework to an otherwise eligible who refuses .

and we compel her to perform with her,

She is not compelled to enter the marriage itself. Rather, the bond is ended through .

and she leaves without receiving her payment.

According to the , her refusal has the financial consequence associated with a : she is released from the bond but forfeits the payment she would otherwise receive.

-

If his deceased brother left several wives,

whichever woman the asks to perform

and she refuses,

she is the one considered a ,

The status attaches only to the particular widow whom the actually chose for and who refused him.

This remains true even if another co-wife would willingly perform . According to the , the choice of which widow to take for belongs to the .

he performs with her,

and she leaves without receiving her payment.

But her other co-wives, whom he did not ask to perform ,

receive their payments like other widows.

They did not refuse a demand for , so they are not treated as moredot and do not lose their financial rights.

Synopsis

According to the , an eligible who refuses the offered to her is treated under the law of : she receives but forfeits her . When there are several widows, only the woman actually chosen for and who refuses suffers that consequence.

Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration

dies childless, leaving two wives, and . His brother asks to perform , and she refuses. performs with , and she forfeits her payment under the law of . , whom did not ask to perform , retains her rights like another widow. ’s refusal does not make a .

Reuven dies childless leaving Rachel and Leah. Shimon asks Rachel for yibbum and she refuses. After chalitzah with Rachel she forfeits her ketubah payment. Leah was not asked and retains her ketubah rights.
applies to the widow who was asked and refused, not automatically to her co-wife.
🔎Dig DeeperWhen a Refuses

When a Refuses

Later authorities differ from the on several parts of this ruling.

The differs from the Rambam in the underlying laws of and in whether a husband — and by extension a — may be compelled to end the relationship.

The , reflecting the preference for , rules that when the wants and the refuses, he is not forcibly compelled to perform merely because of her refusal. Instead, efforts should be made to persuade him to do so.

If the is himself someone whom regards as unsuitable for the marriage, however, the authorities agree that he may be compelled to perform .

Sources: , 77:2; Rema, 165:1; , 165:1.

הלכה יא

When the Eldest Brother Chooses to Perform

If there are several surviving brothers,

and the eldest brother asks the to perform with him,

As explained above, the of is given priority in the eldest brother.

but she does not wish to marry him,

-

and instead wishes to marry one of his brothers —

we do not accept her preference,

because the is primarily for the eldest brother.

According to the , when the eldest brother is willing to perform , the ’s priority in him takes precedence over her preference for another brother.

If she nevertheless refuses his , she is treated according to the law of explained in the previous .

Synopsis

When the eldest brother is willing to perform , the gives him priority over the other brothers. The cannot choose a different brother merely because she prefers him; if she refuses the eldest, the law of applies.

Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration

dies childless, leaving and surviving brothers. The eldest brother wishes to perform , but prefers the younger brother . Under the ’s ruling, the eldest brother’s priority takes precedence over that preference. If refuses his , the law of described in Halachah 10 applies. Compare Halachah 12, where the eldest has withdrawn.

Reuven dies childless leaving Rachel and paternal brothers. If the eldest wants yibbum, his priority takes precedence over her preference. If he withdraws, the other brothers have equal standing and she may prefer another willing brother or choose to wait for an absent brother.
Compare the eldest’s willingness, not merely which brother prefers.
הלכה יב

Once the Eldest Brother Withdraws, the Other Brothers Are Equal

If the eldest brother says, “I do not wish to perform either or ;

my brothers are available before you,”

the eldest brother has withdrawn from exercising the priority that ordinarily belongs to him.

This is not changing the earlier rule that the eldest brother cannot simply leave the bound indefinitely. It is addressing a different question: once he has withdrawn and another brother seeks , is the considered a if she prefers a different brother?

and one of the other brothers asks her to perform with him,

but she does not wish to marry him,

and instead wishes to marry another brother,

-

and that brother wishes to marry her —

she is not considered a .

Unlike the previous , she is not refusing a brother who has special priority.

Once the eldest brother, upon whom the primarily rested, has withdrawn,

all the remaining brothers have equal standing for this ,

and since she wishes to marry one of them,

-

and he wishes to marry her,

she has not rebelled.

Her refusal is not a rejection of itself. She remains willing to fulfill with another brother who, according to the , has equal standing.

Moreover, even if one of the brothers is in another country,

and she says, “I am willing to wait until he returns and performs with me,

-

but I do not want this brother” —

she is not considered a .

Ordinarily, avoids unnecessary delay for the ’s benefit, so that she will not remain unable to marry. Here, however, she herself prefers to wait, so that concern does not justify overriding her choice.

We tell the brother who is not the eldest and who is asking to perform with her:

“If you wish to perform with her and give her the payment due to her, you may do so;

but if not,

-

she has chosen to remain waiting until your brother returns —

since you have no right of priority over him.”

Because neither of the remaining brothers has priority over the other according to the , the brother who is present cannot force his own preference merely because he is available now.

Synopsis

Once the eldest brother withdraws, the treats the remaining brothers as equal. The may choose one willing brother over another and may even choose to wait for an absent brother without being treated as a .

Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration

After dies childless, the eldest brother withdraws. asks to perform , but she prefers , who also wishes to marry her. Because and now have equal standing, her preference does not make her a . If is away and chooses to wait for him, ’s being present does not give him priority. He may instead perform and pay the due to her. Compare Halachah 13 if returns and refuses.

Reuven dies childless leaving Rachel and paternal brothers. If the eldest wants yibbum, his priority takes precedence over her preference. If he withdraws, the other brothers have equal standing and she may prefer another willing brother or choose to wait for an absent brother.
Compare the eldest’s willingness, not merely which brother prefers.
🔎Dig DeeperOnce the Eldest Brother Withdraws, the Other Brothers Are Equal

Once the Eldest Brother Withdraws, the Other Brothers Are Equal

The and other authorities disagree with the on this point. In their view, when the eldest brother declines, priority passes to the next-oldest brother rather than disappearing entirely. The follows this approach.

The explains the Rambam’s willingness to let the wait for an absent brother. The usual effort to avoid delay is made for her benefit; when she herself prefers the delay, that concern does not justify forcing her to accept another brother who has no greater claim.

Sources: Raavad on 2:12; , 161:4; Or Sameach on 2:12.

Live ItDon’t turn preference into entitlement

Don’t turn preference into entitlement

Once the eldest brother withdraws, the treats the remaining brothers as having equal standing. If the prefers one willing brother over another, the brother she does not choose cannot insist that his availability gives him a greater claim.

There is a subtle lesson here about relationships. We may have a preference, a plan, or even a very reasonable expectation — but that does not automatically create a right over another person. asks us to recognize where our responsibility ends and another person’s legitimate choice begins. That kind of humility protects relationships from becoming controlling.

Try today

In one interaction, notice the difference between “I would like this” and “I am entitled to this.”

Suggested reflection on 2:12.

הלכה יג

If the Brother She Chose Refuses Her

If the brother upon whom she was relying returns,

-

and he does not wish to perform with her —

the basis for allowing her to reject the other willing brother has now disappeared.

we return to the brother who had previously asked her to perform with him,

but whom she does not wish to marry,

and we tell her:

“There is no one here who wishes to perform except this brother,

-

and the of takes precedence;

either perform with him,

or leave without receiving your payment,

as is the law of any .”

Previously, she was not considered a because she wished to perform with another brother who was equally eligible. Once that brother refuses her and only one willing remains, continued refusal is treated as refusal of the available itself.

Synopsis

If the brother the preferred ultimately refuses , she must either accept with the remaining willing brother or be treated as a and forfeit her .

Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration

After the eldest brother withdraws, refuses with because she prefers , who is away. She is allowed to wait for because has no priority over him. When returns, however, he says that he does not want to perform . If is still willing, can no longer rely on her preference for . She must either perform with or accept the financial consequences of being treated as a .

Reuven dies childless leaving Rachel and surviving paternal brothers. The eldest withdraws; Shimon is willing, and Levi is away. Rachel may wait for Levi. When Levi returns and refuses yibbum, Rachel must choose yibbum with Shimon or the ketubah consequences of being treated as a moredet.
Track ’s change from absent to unwilling. With the eldest withdrawn, ’s preference initially allows her to wait; ’s refusal ends that reason.
הלכה יד

When Is Required Instead of

-

Whenever we have ruled that a must perform and may not undergo ,

she receives her payment,

if she is entitled to a ,

like other widows.

When the law itself prevents , the woman is not treated as though she refused the marriage. She therefore retains the financial rights she would ordinarily have as a widow.

Similarly, if her is afflicted with severe skin disease,

-

or has another condition for which a husband can be compelled to divorce,

the is not expected to enter a marriage that itself recognizes as grounds for compelling a husband to end an existing marriage.

he performs with her,

and she receives her payment.

If physical blemishes developed in the

-

while she was waiting for ,

the loss is regarded as having fallen upon the .

The expression literally pictures “his field being swept away”: the setback is treated as something that happened to his situation after the bond had already arisen, rather than as a defect she brought into the relationship.

If he does not wish to perform because of this,

he must perform

and pay her .

The arose immediately upon her husband’s death. Since the blemish developed only afterward, the cannot use it to deprive her of the rights she already had.

Synopsis

When the law itself prevents , or the has a condition that justifies the woman’s refusal, she receives without losing her . A blemish that develops only after the has arisen likewise does not cause her to forfeit her financial rights.

הלכה טו

A Vow That Prevents

If a , during her husband’s lifetime, took a vow forbidding herself from benefiting from her ,

-

or took a vow forbidding herself from benefiting from all Jewish men —

Here, the vow made during her husband’s lifetime is understood as having been made for a reason other than avoiding a future obligation.

In the second case, although the vow did not prevent her from benefiting from her own husband while he was alive, after his death it applies to the .

we compel the to perform with her,

and she receives her payment.

Since she did not deliberately create the obstacle in order to escape , she is not treated as a . The must release her through , and she retains her .

But if she took the vow after her husband’s death,

we ask the to perform with her,

Once the obligation already exists, there is concern that she took the vow specifically in order to prevent . The is therefore asked to release her, but is not immediately compelled to do so.

and if he does not agree,

she is treated as a .

If he refuses to perform and her vow prevents the available , she bears the financial consequence of .

If he voluntarily agrees to perform , however, he remains obligated to pay her .

Similarly, if her intention in making the vow was

even during her husband’s lifetime,

-

to prevent the from performing with her —

we do not compel him to perform ,

unless she accepts the status of a ,

and leaves without receiving her payment.

The decisive issue is therefore not simply when the vow was made, but whether she created the vow in order to prevent .

If her intention in making the vow is uncertain, the presumption described here treats it as though she intended to avoid .

Synopsis

If a vow that prevents was made for an unrelated reason before the husband’s death, the is compelled to perform and she retains her . If she made the vow in order to avoid — or that is presumed to have been her intent — he is not compelled to release her unless she accepts the financial consequences of .

הלכה טז

A Cannot Choose to Remain Bound Indefinitely

If a asks his to perform ,

and she says, “I will not perform , and I will not take my payment;

-

instead, I will remain in my deceased husband’s home like other widows” —

A widow would ordinarily be entitled to remain in her husband’s home and receive support from his estate. The argues that she is willing to give up even her and simply remain in that status.

we do not accept her request,

because Heaven has placed her in a bond with this ;

The does not affect only the woman. It also creates a continuing relationship with the that he is entitled to have resolved.

if he wishes, he may perform ,

and if he wishes, he may perform and pay her .

Within the ’s framework here, the may choose to resolve the through or .

Moreover, even if she says,

“I will support myself from my own resources,

-

and I will remain without marrying for the rest of my life” —

we do not accept her request.

Even if she waives any financial burden on the estate, the can insist that the itself be ended.

For the can say to her:

“As long as you remain bound to me,

I will have difficulty finding another woman willing to marry me.”

As long as the possibility remains that he may ultimately marry his through , another woman may hesitate to marry him because she could later have to share the marriage.

Even if he is already married,

he may wish to marry another wife,

or the unresolved bond may create conflict within his household,

because of the .

The unresolved can therefore affect the ’s own family life even if the is willing to remain alone indefinitely.

Synopsis

A cannot insist on remaining indefinitely bound to the , even if she waives her and supports herself. The affects the as well, so if he seeks to resolve it through , she must do so.

🔎Dig DeeperA Cannot Choose to Remain Bound Indefinitely

A Cannot Choose to Remain Bound Indefinitely

The explains that, according to the , just as a man may divorce his wife even against her will, a may likewise perform even if the does not want it.

The cites authorities who disagree. Since has priority according to the Rambam’s general approach, they maintain that a woman who wants cannot necessarily be forced to accept instead.

Sources: Kiryat Sefer on 2:16; Maggid Mishneh on 2:16.

Live ItUnresolved obligations affect other people too

Unresolved obligations affect other people too

The says she is willing to remain as she is forever, even supporting herself. Yet the says the matter cannot simply be left unresolved, because the continuing affects the as well. What feels like “my choice” can still create consequences in someone else’s life.

This is an important principle. We often judge an unfinished responsibility only by whether we can tolerate leaving it open. But an unanswered message, an unpaid obligation, an unresolved disagreement, or a commitment we never clearly closed may be weighing on another person. Sensitivity means noticing the effect our unfinished business has outside ourselves.

Try today

Close one open loop that another person may be waiting on — answer, decide, pay, return, or clearly communicate where things stand.

Suggested reflection on 2:16.

הלכה יז

When the First Marriage Had No Rights

If a had no rights against her deceased husband

because she had been forbidden to him,

but she is permitted to the ,

-

as will be explained later —

the fact that she lacked rights in the first marriage does not itself prevent if she is permitted to the .

-

if the wishes to perform ,

he may do so,

but she has no basic claim against him,

just as she had no such claim against her first husband.

Her status in the follows the status she had in the first marriage. Since that marriage did not entitle her to the basic payment because it was prohibited, does not automatically give her that payment against the .

Her status regarding the additional amount of the with the

is the same as it had been with her husband.

The added amount that the first husband undertook follows the same rules after as it did before.

But if her husband simply did not write her a ,

or she sold him her rights,

-

or waived them —

the must write her a ,

like other widows who enter .

These cases differ from the first one because the original marriage itself was one that entitled her to a . The fact that no was written, or that she later sold or waived her rights, does not place her in the same category as a woman who never had the basic entitlement because the marriage was prohibited.

In short: if she never had the basic entitlement, does not create it. If she did have the entitlement but later lost or waived the claim, the must establish a new .

Synopsis

If the first marriage itself did not entitle the woman to a basic payment, does not automatically create that entitlement. If she was fundamentally entitled to a but it was unwritten, sold, or waived, the must write a new one.

🔎Dig DeeperWhen the First Marriage Had No Rights

When the First Marriage Had No Rights

The cites the and as offering one way to understand this difficult ruling. They explain that if the intends to divorce the immediately, he need not create a new obligation. If he intends to remain married to her, however, they require him to write one because a husband may not remain married to his wife without a .

The Maggid Mishneh notes that this interpretation does not fit the ’s wording smoothly. The therefore offers another explanation: because the remains responsible for the additional amount of the first husband’s , there is already a financial deterrent against lightly divorcing her, which is the purpose normally served by the obligation.

Sources: Maggid Mishneh on 2:17; Or Sameach on 2:17.

הלכה יח

A May Not Marry Another Man Before Her Is Resolved

Before the has performed with the ,

-

or before he has performed with her —

she is forbidden to marry an unrelated man,

as it is stated: “The wife of the deceased shall not marry outside the family to an unrelated man” ( 25:5).

This is a prohibition: until the is resolved through or , she may not marry a man outside the brothers.

If she nevertheless marries another man,

-

and they have marital relations,

both the man and the woman receive lashes,

The prohibition is violated through the marital relations. If only took place without relations, this punishment does not apply.

and he must divorce her with a ,

even if she has already borne him several children.

The children themselves are not , even though the relationship was forbidden.

The length of the marriage and the existence of children do not allow the prohibited relationship to continue.

She becomes forbidden to the man she married

and to her .

Her relations outside the bond now prevent her from subsequently remaining with either man.

Her performs with her,

and afterward she becomes permitted to marry other men.

Although she can no longer perform with the , the original must still be released through before she can marry elsewhere.

Synopsis

Until or occurs, a is forbidden by law to marry another man. If she marries another man and they have relations, that marriage must end, she becomes forbidden to both him and the , and is still required before she may marry elsewhere.

הלכה יט

With Another Man Before

If the was to another man,

she does not thereby become forbidden to her ,

Unlike the previous , only took place; there were no marital relations with the other man. She therefore does not become forbidden to the on that account.

rather, the unrelated man who her gives her a ,

The with the unrelated man must be ended with a .

and her may then perform either or .

The remains in force and can still be resolved in either of its ordinary ways.

If her is a ,

-

who may not marry a divorced woman —

the she receives from the other man now makes impossible with this .

she must nevertheless leave the unrelated man through a ,

so that the person who acted wrongly should not benefit from his wrongdoing;

One might have argued that since the prevents the - from performing , the woman should now simply remain with the man who her. The Sages do not allow his improper act to produce that benefit.

and her performs with her.

Since the can no longer perform after she becomes a divorcee, is the only remaining way to release the .

Synopsis

If a receives from another man before , she does not become forbidden to the merely from the . The other man must give her a , after which the may ordinarily perform or ; if the is a , only remains possible.

Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration

remains bound by to her deceased husband’s brother . Before , she becomes to , an unrelated man, without marital relations. must give her a ; may then ordinarily perform or . If , the original , is a , that makes a divorcee whom he cannot marry, so he performs . Here the is the ; in Halachah 21, the is the second man.

Rachel is bound by zikah to Shimon but receives kiddushin from unrelated Yehudah without marital relations. Yehudah gives a get. Shimon may ordinarily perform yibbum or chalitzah. If Shimon is a Kohen, the get makes her forbidden to him as a divorcee, so only chalitzah remains.
The here is , the original . Halachah 21 addresses a different case involving a as the second man.
🔎Dig Deeper With Another Man Before

With Another Man Before

The states that this ruling applies even if the man who her did not know that she was bound to a .

The cites the and as taking a different view in that situation. According to them, when the second man acted without knowledge of the and the chooses rather than , the woman may be able to remain with the second man.

Sources: , 159:1; Beis Shmuel, 159:1.

הלכה כ

If the Second Man Marries Her After

If the unrelated man who had divorced her after returns

-

and marries her after her has performed with her —

we do not require him to divorce her.

Because the earlier requirement that he separate from her after improper was a disciplinary consequence, once has resolved the , if they later marry the Sages do not require that new marriage to be dissolved.

But if he had previously divorced her after a full marriage,

-

and then marries her again after she has undergone —

we require him to divorce her.

The earlier case involved only . Here, the prohibited second relationship had already progressed to .

because her case resembles that of a married woman who remarried,

and then her original husband returned,

in which case she becomes forbidden to both men,

as explained previously.

Because the prohibited relationship had reached the stage of marriage and marital life, the Sages imposed the stronger consequence that she may not later return to that second man even after the is resolved.

If, however, a engaged in illicit relations

-

while she was still bound by —

she does not thereby become forbidden to her ;

This differs from the woman who actually entered a prohibited marriage with another man.

if the wishes, he may perform ,

and if he wishes, he may perform .

The illicit relations alone do not remove either of the ordinary options for resolving the .

Synopsis

If a man who had only a before later marries her after , the marriage is allowed to remain. If their earlier prohibited relationship had already reached full marriage, they must separate even after . Mere illicit relations, however, do not by themselves forbid the to her .

Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration

Compare two paths involving and while her to is unresolved. In the first, consecrates her without marital relations, gives her a , and later marries her after performs . does not require that later marriage to end. In the second, ’s prohibited relationship with had already reached full marriage. Even if they divorce and performs , a later remarriage to must be dissolved. This differs from illicit relations without entering a marriage, which do not themselves make her forbidden to her .

Compare later remarriage after a get and chalitzah: if the earlier relationship involved only kiddushin without marital relations, the later marriage is not dissolved. If the earlier relationship had reached full marriage, the later marriage must end. Mere illicit relations without marriage do not themselves forbid her to the yavam.
These outcomes describe a later marriage that has already occurred; they are not instructions to marry beforehand.
🔎Dig DeeperIf the Second Man Marries Her After

If the Second Man Marries Her After

The explains that when the earlier relationship consisted only of , the requirement that the second man separate from her was disciplinary. Once has properly ended the , if they later marry, the Sages did not require that marriage to be dissolved.

The limits this leniency when the second man knowingly the despite knowing that she was bound to a . In that situation, even if he later marries her after , he may not remain married to her.

The Rema adds another important distinction regarding the final case. Although illicit relations do not forbid the to her , they do forbid her to the man with whom those relations occurred. Even if the later performs , she may not marry that man.

Sources: Maggid Mishneh on 2:20; Rema, 159:1; Rema, 159:3.

הלכה כא

A Rabbinic Doubt About After to Another Man

Whenever a is in a case of Rabbinic doubt

whether she remains bound by to a

or whether no such remains,

this addresses a case in which the uncertainty itself gives rise to a Rabbinic requirement of , rather than a definite -level obligation.

for example, a who gave birth

to a child whose full term had not been completed

and the child died within thirty days,

as explained previously, there is uncertainty whether such a child was viable.

so that her law is to perform because of a Rabbinic doubt,

-

as we explained previously —

the need for here exists only because the Sages required it in response to the unresolved doubt; she is not being treated as definitely bound by -level .

if she went and became to another man

before performing ,

her performs with her,

and she may remain with the man who her.

After resolves the remaining concern, she may remain with the man who her.

But if she became to a ,

who is forbidden to a woman who has performed ,

the does not perform with her,

because performing would itself create a new prohibition: a may not remain with a .

because we do not cause this man’s wife to become forbidden to him

because of a Rabbinic doubt.

Since the very need for exists only because of a Rabbinic uncertainty, the Sages did not require in this situation when that Rabbinically required act would itself make her forbidden to the .

If the later divorces her,

-

or dies —

she then performs ,

and afterward she may marry other men in the ordinary manner.

The obligation was postponed, not erased. Once there is no longer a relationship with a to protect, she must resolve the remaining doubt through before marrying again.

Synopsis

When is required only because of a Rabbinic doubt, and the becomes to another man first, the performs and she may remain with him. If the man is a , however, is not performed while she remains with him, because that Rabbinically required act would itself make her forbidden to him.

Picture the CaseA concrete example + illustration

gives birth after an uncertain-length pregnancy, and the baby dies within thirty days. Because it is unclear whether the child was viable, requires only because of a Rabbinic doubt. Before that takes place, she becomes to . If is an Israelite, her performs and she may remain with . If is a , however, the does not perform while she remains with him, because itself would make her forbidden to .

Rachel needs chalitzah only because of a Rabbinic doubt about her child’s viability. She becomes consecrated to another man first. If he is an Israelite, her yavam performs chalitzah and she may remain with him. If he is a Kohen, chalitzah is postponed while she remains with him; if he later divorces her or dies, chalitzah is required before another marriage.
The here is the second man, not the . This exception concerns a Rabbinic doubt; the requirement is postponed, not erased.
🔎Dig DeeperA Rabbinic Doubt About After to Another Man

A Rabbinic Doubt About After to Another Man

limits the special leniency for a . He explains that it applies when the entered the without knowing that the woman had a possible obligation. If he knowingly her despite that issue, the same leniency does not necessarily apply.

The extends the underlying principle to another situation: when the woman was to an Israelite but the is abroad and cannot presently perform , the existing relationship may receive special consideration rather than being immediately disrupted because of the unresolved Rabbinic doubt.

Sources: Rabbi Akiva Eiger on , 164:7; Rema, 164:7.

Sources & editorial method

Hebrew text: Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Yibbum VaChalitzah, Chapter 2. The Hebrew is preserved as the primary text and divided into short learning units.

Translation and elucidation: Independently prepared for Rambam, Clearly in contemporary English. Translation follows the Rambam’s words; elucidation supplies only the context needed to understand them.

Word cards and glossary: Hebrew word cards distinguish a word’s basic meaning from its meaning in the particular phrase. Shared glossary entries explain recurring terms; biography entries identify the cited authorities.

Explain and Background: Explain provides context needed for the ruling. Optional Background panels provide additional context that can be skipped without losing the essential explanation.

Synopsis: A short summary follows each halachah. It is a guide to the central ruling, not a replacement for the full text and its qualifications.

Dig Deeper: Based on the classic commentaries named inside each panel. Editorial explanations are not presented as quotations.

Live It: Where present, these panels connect a particular halachah to a suggested personal reflection and an action to try. Original applications are labeled as suggested reflections. They are distinct from the ruling and are not attributed to the Rebbe merely because his guidance supports seeking a practical lesson.

Measurements: Modern equivalents draw on Chabad.org’s measurement glossary and cited halachic calculations. They show a range when major accepted calculations differ. Monetary equivalents fluctuate with the price of silver.

The Rebbe’s teachings and guidance: Source links accompany the completion teachings and the guidance inside Dig Deeper and Live It. Quotations, translations, and adaptations are identified; the general guidance is separate from the sources for a panel’s particular discussion.

Editorial responsibility: Created and prepared for this project by Levi Gelb. Corrections and suggestions can be submitted below. This presentation supports learning; practical halachic questions should be brought to a qualified rav.

Chapter 2 at a glance

, brotherly priority, and resolving

The chapter explains how takes effect, which brother acts, when refusal changes rights, and how unresolved affects relationships with another man.

  • The Sages required a to perform before . resembles and requires consent, but it does not by itself create the complete marriage of .
  • is accompanied by marriage blessings and a . If the skips and proceeds directly to marital relations, the is fully effective, but he is punished for disregarding the Rabbinic procedure.
  • can take effect through a wide range of circumstances and does not require both participants to share an intention to fulfill the . These rules address legal effectiveness, not whether every circumstance described is proper or permitted.
  • does not require specific intent to fulfill the , but the must at least intend an act of sexual relations. A purely accidental physical occurrence does not create .
  • When the and disagree over whether marital relations occurred, the first thirty days are treated differently from the period afterward. Within thirty days, her claim that no relations occurred remains plausible; after thirty days, the presumption is that they did. The required or addresses the possible status created by each side of the doubt.
  • When several brothers survive the deceased, the eldest brother has the primary responsibility to perform or . The ’s reference to the “firstborn” is interpreted here as referring to the eldest surviving brother.
  • If the eldest brother refuses , the other brothers are approached to see whether one of them will perform it. If none agrees, the obligation returns to the eldest: he cannot be forced to marry her, but he can be compelled to perform so that she is not left bound indefinitely.
  • The eldest brother may not postpone the merely to wait for another brother to become available. Since the obligation rests on him now, he must resolve the ’s status through or .
  • If the eldest brother is away, a younger brother who is present must act. “Younger” here does not mean a legal minor; it means a brother younger than the eldest. The eldest brother’s priority does not require the to wait unnecessarily.
  • According to the , an eligible who refuses the offered to her is treated under the law of : she receives but forfeits her . When there are several widows, only the woman actually chosen for and who refuses suffers that consequence.
  • When the eldest brother is willing to perform , the gives him priority over the other brothers. The cannot choose a different brother merely because she prefers him; if she refuses the eldest, the law of applies.
  • Once the eldest brother withdraws, the treats the remaining brothers as equal. The may choose one willing brother over another and may even choose to wait for an absent brother without being treated as a .
  • If the brother the preferred ultimately refuses , she must either accept with the remaining willing brother or be treated as a and forfeit her .
  • When the law itself prevents , or the has a condition that justifies the woman’s refusal, she receives without losing her . A blemish that develops only after the has arisen likewise does not cause her to forfeit her financial rights.
  • If a vow that prevents was made for an unrelated reason before the husband’s death, the is compelled to perform and she retains her . If she made the vow in order to avoid — or that is presumed to have been her intent — he is not compelled to release her unless she accepts the financial consequences of .
  • A cannot insist on remaining indefinitely bound to the , even if she waives her and supports herself. The affects the as well, so if he seeks to resolve it through , she must do so.
  • If the first marriage itself did not entitle the woman to a basic payment, does not automatically create that entitlement. If she was fundamentally entitled to a but it was unwritten, sold, or waived, the must write a new one.
  • Until or occurs, a is forbidden by law to marry another man. If she marries another man and they have relations, that marriage must end, she becomes forbidden to both him and the , and is still required before she may marry elsewhere.
  • If a receives from another man before , she does not become forbidden to the merely from the . The other man must give her a , after which the may ordinarily perform or ; if the is a , only remains possible.
  • If a man who had only a before later marries her after , the marriage is allowed to remain. If their earlier prohibited relationship had already reached full marriage, they must separate even after . Mere illicit relations, however, do not by themselves forbid the to her .
  • When is required only because of a Rabbinic doubt, and the becomes to another man first, the performs and she may remain with him. If the man is a , however, is not performed while she remains with him, because that Rabbinically required act would itself make her forbidden to him.
פרק ב

End of chapter.

You have reached the end of all twenty-one halachos.