Testimony, Presumptions, and the Yibbum Bond

A surviving child exempts the deceased man’s widow from these obligations. His acknowledgment therefore establishes a fact that allows her to remarry without first undergoing chalitzah.

The exemption is not limited to sons: a daughter or a surviving descendant through a son or daughter can also exempt the widow. The offspring may be from this wife or another woman. “Qualifying offspring” means offspring who count under the rules explained in chapter 1, halachos 3–5.

His credibility rests on migo: he already has another means of freeing her from the future obligation. He could give her a get, a Jewish bill of divorce, rather than falsely claim to have a son. That available alternative supports accepting his statement here (Bava Batra 134b).

This ruling concerns a man who was previously presumed to have no brother. His statement alone does not establish a new obligation that would prevent his widow from remarrying until she undergoes yibbum or chalitzah.

A yavam is an eligible surviving brother who shares the deceased husband’s father. A brother related only through their mother does not create this obligation.

The concern is that he is inventing a brother to prevent her from freely remarrying. Unlike the statement in the previous halachah, this claim would impose a restriction rather than release her from one.

Under this ruling, his denial does not overturn the established presumption, called a chazakah, that he has brothers. Even a statement made near death does not remove the concern that he is trying to spare his wife the obligation of yibbum or chalitzah.

His ability to release her by giving her a get does not suffice here. The Rambam does not accept that argument as grounds for contradicting the established brotherhood.

The report has not yet established that a brother exists. Nevertheless, it identifies potential witnesses whose testimony could establish a yibbum obligation. She therefore cannot disregard it and remarry on the strength of her husband’s denial.

His acknowledgment has legal effect regarding inheritance, as discussed in Hilchos Nachalot 4:1. It does not, however, establish paternity sufficiently to exempt his widow from yibbum and chalitzah.

Here, the pregnancy resulted from relations outside marriage. His knowledge that he had relations with her does not establish that he fathered the child. There is no marital presumption linking the child to this man, who was not the woman’s husband. If she was married to someone else, the ordinary marital presumption instead points to her husband. This is why his acknowledgment does not have the same effect as the statement in halachah 1.

The widow whose status is being considered is this man’s own wife. The ruling concerns a situation in which he has an eligible surviving brother and no other offspring who would independently exempt her.

The concern is possible paternity by another man, rather than a finding that another relationship definitely occurred. The parties’ acknowledgment alone does not eliminate that possibility.

Both possibilities must be considered. If the child belongs to another man, the deceased may have left no offspring, so his widow still needs chalitzah. If the child is his qualifying offspring, she is exempt from yibbum, and relations with his brother would be forbidden. Chalitzah addresses the first possibility without permitting the prohibited relationship created by the second.

A yevamah is a widow subject to yibbum or chalitzah. Here, the witness establishes her husband’s death; where the other requirements for yibbum are present, she may proceed on that basis.

These statements remove the yibbum obligation in different ways. The yavam’s death releases her when no other eligible brother remains. Testimony about a son establishes offspring whose existence exempts her from yibbum and chalitzah. Merely reporting a birth does not suffice if the child does not establish that exemption.

“Another man” here means a man outside the brothers to whom she would otherwise be bound. Unlike halachah 4, this testimony establishes an exempting son; it is not merely an acknowledgment of uncertain paternity.

The non-Jew must be relating the death naturally, without intending to provide testimony.

This final clause expressly discusses evidence of the yavam’s death. It does not, by itself, determine which forms of evidence are accepted concerning the birth of a son.

The special rules for establishing a husband’s death, discussed in Hilchos Gerushin, chapters 12–13, also apply here to establishing the yavam’s death.

These are her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her husband’s other wife, her husband’s brother’s wife, and her husband’s daughter from another woman, as explained in Hilchos Gerushin 12:16.

The Sages identified these relationships as ones in which hostility may undermine the reliability of testimony intended to permit the woman to remarry. Although a woman’s testimony about a death is generally accepted under the special rules discussed previously, these five women are excluded. The same concern applies whether the reported death is that of the husband or the yavam.

The special evidentiary rules apply as a complete framework. Accepting one witness does not mean that any report is sufficient regardless of conflicting testimony or other limitations. Those questions are governed by the same rules explained in Hilchos Gerushin.

The women were married to two brothers who shared the same father. Neither husband left offspring that would exempt his widow, and there is no additional surviving brother. Each woman’s husband is therefore the other woman’s potential yavam.

Each woman is believed concerning her own husband’s death. That establishes her widowhood, but does not establish that her yavam has also died. For that second fact, she would have to rely on the other woman’s statement.

The other woman belongs to one of the five excluded relationships listed in halachah 6. Consequently, each woman’s testimony establishes her own husband’s death without releasing the other woman from her yibbum obligation.

This continues the case in which both women say that their husbands died. An additional, accepted witness now confirms the death of one brother.

Her own statement already established her husband’s death. The witness confirms that same fact, but supplies no evidence that her husband’s brother died. Her unresolved yibbum obligation therefore remains.

Even if the other woman actually remarries, her remarriage does not provide accepted proof of her husband’s death for purposes of releasing this widow. Her conduct does not replace the testimony needed to establish the yavam’s death.

The same man is a husband to the first woman and a yavam to the second. For the second woman, the witness establishes precisely the fact that was missing. Her own statement establishes her husband’s death, and the witness establishes her yavam’s death. Since no other yavam remains, she may remarry.

Here, neither woman has an additional witness establishing her husband’s death. Each relies on her own statement, as in halachah 7. The children are offspring of the husband whose death she reports and qualify to exempt his widow.

The childless widow still needs accepted evidence that her yavam died. The other woman’s statement cannot supply that evidence.

The widow whose husband left children has no yibbum obligation. Her own statement establishes her husband’s death, and his children exempt her regardless of whether his brother is alive.

This clause returns to the original case in which both widows are childless. It does not permit yibbum with the woman whose husband left children.

These women were originally married to different brothers, so they represent two separate households. This differs from two wives of the same deceased man, only one of whom may undergo yibbum with his brother (chapter 1, halachos 9–11).

If a third eligible brother is present, each woman’s statement establishes her own husband’s death sufficiently to permit yibbum with him. They do not need to establish the other absent brother’s death, because the third brother can perform yibbum whether that brother is alive or dead. He may alternatively perform chalitzah with each widow.

This continues the case of the third brother who performed yibbum with both childless widows. He now dies without leaving offspring that would exempt them, and there is no other known surviving brother apart from the two whose deaths were reported.

For each woman, the death of her original husband was accepted on her own testimony, but the death of the other brother was never established by testimony accepted for her. If that brother is still alive, the third brother’s childless death leaves her subject to yibbum. She therefore cannot freely remarry merely because the third brother has died.

Actual yibbum followed by a get releases each woman from the yibbum bond, including her possible obligation to the absent brother. The third brother’s death could leave her bound to another surviving brother; his divorce ends the marriage without creating a new yibbum obligation.

Marrying another man while still married involves a far more severe prohibition than marrying while bound to a yavam. The latter remains a Torah prohibition, but she may regard it less seriously. The Sages therefore feared that her desire to remarry could lead her to report her yavam’s death falsely. Her credibility concerning her husband’s death does not automatically extend to her yavam’s death.

His statement would permit him to marry the very woman whom he may wish to marry. That personal interest prevents relying on his testimony for this purpose.

Entering her sister’s household means marrying her sister’s husband. A man may not marry his wife’s sister while his wife is alive. The woman’s possible desire to marry him creates a concern about accepting her statement that her sister died.

Neither the husband’s statement nor the surviving sister’s statement is sufficient to permit this marriage. The death must be established by two witnesses.

An agunah is a woman unable to remarry because her existing marriage has not been released or her husband’s death has not been established. The special allowance addresses that predicament. Here, the obstacle concerns the particular marriage these two people want, rather than a woman’s inability to marry anyone. The allowance is therefore not extended to permit their marriage.

The husband was known to have an eligible brother, and there were no offspring exempting her. Her established status was therefore that she would require yibbum or chalitzah if her husband died.

She is not believed to establish her yavam’s death and thereby permit herself to marry another man. Changing the reported order of the deaths does not overcome the limitation explained in the previous halachah.

Here, her husband was presumed to have no eligible brother when they departed. She now reports that a new paternal brother was born to her husband while they were abroad, but that this brother also died.

For this newly born brother to create a yibbum obligation, he must have been born before her husband’s death. A brother born only afterward would not become her yavam.

The possible yibbum obligation arises entirely from her own statement that a brother was born. Without that statement, she would be presumed free of a yibbum obligation upon her husband’s death. We therefore accept her accompanying statement that this newly reported brother died, and she may marry another man.

The son was her husband’s qualifying offspring. According to her report, he was alive when his father died, so his existence exempted her from yibbum and chalitzah. His later death does not create an obligation that did not arise at her husband’s death.

This presumption concerns what her status would be upon her husband’s death. Since he was known to have a son, she was presumed to be exempt from yibbum. Her report preserves that status.

Assuming there is an eligible surviving brother and no other exempting offspring, this account would mean that her husband died childless. It would change her established status and permit yibbum. Her statement is not accepted sufficiently to authorize that relationship, because she may wish to marry her brother-in-law.

“She is not believed” means that her statement is insufficient to establish the permission she seeks. It does not mean that her account has been proved false. Consequently, her statement can prevent yibbum even when it cannot establish an exemption from chalitzah.

Her statement cannot be ignored entirely. If her son really died first, she needs release from the yibbum obligation. Chalitzah addresses that possibility, while withholding permission for yibbum because her husband may actually have been survived by his son.

In this case, her husband was presumed to have no offspring, and an eligible brother existed. Her established status was therefore that she would be permitted to undergo yibbum upon her husband’s childless death.

Her account leaves that presumed status intact. Although she reports the birth of a son, she also reports that he died before his father, so no exempting offspring remained when her husband died.

Her report would mean that her husband was survived by a son, permanently exempting her. Unlike the previous halachah, however, this son was not independently known to exist. Her statement does not suffice to remove her established yibbum obligation.

She cannot freely remarry, because her claimed exemption has not been established. Yet yibbum is also prohibited: if her account is true, her husband left a surviving son, and relations with his brother would be forbidden.

The permission to perform chalitzah in this second case is subject to the qualification in the following halachah.

This qualifies the previous halachah’s second case, in which she reports that her newly born son survived her husband.

A chalalah is a woman disqualified from marrying a Kohen because of the priestly marriage laws—for example, a daughter born from a Kohen’s prohibited union with a divorced woman. If she was already prohibited from marrying a Kohen, performing chalitzah does not impose a new restriction in that respect.

The case is one in which she was alone with them when they died, so witnesses are not expected to arrive later and establish the order of their deaths. The significance lies in the absence of potential witnesses, rather than the cave itself.

If her son was alive when her husband died, she never became obligated in yibbum or chalitzah. The unnecessary procedure would therefore not give her the status of a woman whose valid chalitzah prohibits marriage to a Kohen.

The observer would know about the visible procedure, but not the later evidence showing that it was legally unnecessary. To prevent that mistaken conclusion, the Sages withhold chalitzah in this case.

Yibbum remains prohibited because her account may be true, in which case her husband left a surviving son. Chalitzah is withheld because of the concern about a later marriage to a Kohen. She must therefore wait for testimony that clarifies her status.

A co-wife is another woman married to the same husband. Two witnesses have established the husband’s death. The unresolved question is whether his other wife bore offspring who exempt both widows.

The case assumes that an eligible yavam exists and that no offspring were already known to exempt them. A qualifying child born to either wife exempts both wives.

The possibility of a child prevents yibbum: if her husband left qualifying offspring, relations with his brother would be forbidden. This concern applies even if the co-wife was not pregnant when she departed, since she may have become pregnant while living with their husband overseas.

The reason for withholding chalitzah is explained next.

The nine-month wait addresses the possibility that the absent wife is still carrying a child conceived during the husband’s lifetime. Waiting does not establish whether she bore an exempting child; that uncertainty remains.

Chalitzah would appear to resolve either possibility. If a qualifying child was born, no release is necessary; if no such child was born, chalitzah supplies the required release.

If a qualifying child exempted her, she never required chalitzah. The unnecessary procedure would therefore not give her the status of a chalutzah—a woman whose valid chalitzah prohibits her from marrying a Kohen.

The observer would know about the visible chalitzah procedure but not the later evidence showing that it was unnecessary. He could mistakenly treat this marriage as proof that a woman who truly required chalitzah may marry a Kohen.

Since she cannot marry a Kohen regardless of whether chalitzah was necessary, the concern about an observer drawing the wrong conclusion does not arise.

The wife who accompanied him follows the ordinary waiting period, discussed in chapter 1, halachah 19. This ruling concerns her when she has no child or pregnancy of her own preventing those procedures.

The husband lived overseas with the accompanying wife, so the woman at home must consider the possibility that her co-wife conceived there. The accompanying wife need not assume that the woman left behind had an unnoticed pregnancy from before the journey.

Here, no eligible brother was known to exist, and the mother-in-law was not known to be pregnant.

The possible concern would be that her mother-in-law bore an eligible paternal brother who was alive when her husband died. Such a birth could create a yibbum obligation. Without evidence of that development, however, she need not investigate whether it occurred.

Her presumed freedom from a yibbum obligation remains in place. The mere possibility that a new brother was born does not prevent her from remarrying.

The son is presumed to have remained alive when his father died, thereby exempting the widow. She need not obtain fresh confirmation of his survival merely because he lives elsewhere.

Unlike the previous halachah, there is now a known pregnancy that may have resulted in the birth of an eligible paternal brother. The concern is supported by an established fact, rather than the possibility of an entirely unknown pregnancy.

The timing matters. An eligible brother born before her husband died could create a yibbum obligation. A brother born only after his death would not. She must establish whether an eligible paternal brother was born before her husband’s death and was still alive when her husband died.

According to that testimony, her husband was survived by his son. She was therefore exempt from yibbum and chalitzah and married a man other than her yavam.

Her son actually died first. Assuming no other exempting offspring remained and an eligible brother survived, she was bound to a yavam when she married the other man. She must therefore separate from that husband, as discussed in chapter 2, halachah 18.

The child’s valid lineage does not make the marriage permissible. Relations with another man while she is bound to a yavam violate a negative commandment, but do not give their child the status of a mamzer.

This account indicated that her husband died without surviving offspring, so she married his brother through yibbum.

Her husband actually died first, while his son was still alive. She was therefore exempt from yibbum. Relations with his brother remained prohibited as relations with a brother’s wife, without the permission created by the mitzvah of yibbum.

Here, “the news” means the discovery that the original report was mistaken. The child has the status of a mamzer whether born before or after that discovery.

A mamzer has a specific Torah status carrying restrictions on whom he or she may marry. This relationship violates a prohibition punishable, when committed deliberately, by karet—a severe Torah penalty commonly translated as “excision.” The child’s status results from the prohibited relationship even when the parents acted unknowingly because they relied on mistaken testimony.