How Chalitzah Is Performed and What Makes It Valid

A yevamah is a widow whose husband died without surviving descendants and who awaits yibbum or chalitzah with his eligible paternal brother, the yavam. Yibbum establishes their marriage; a valid chalitzah releases the bond that prevents her from marrying someone else.

She approaches the court in the yavam’s locality, rather than requiring him to travel to hers.

The judges consider the circumstances of both people. Their advice should guide the couple toward the course appropriate for their particular situation.

According to Rambam, the mitzvah of yibbum takes precedence over chalitzah. Nevertheless, the judges must consider whether this particular marriage would be suitable. The general priority of yibbum does not mean that they should recommend it in every case.

A substantial difference in age can make the proposed marriage unsuitable. In such a case, the judges recommend chalitzah. “Young” here describes the age difference between the parties; it does not mean that a minor may perform chalitzah.

The location must be designated for the chalitzah before the procedure begins.

The gate was a place where the elders sat as a court. The verse’s reference to going to that place teaches that chalitzah should take place at a location designated for the proceeding.

Darchei Moshe explains that advance designation also helps publicize the chalitzah.

Advance arrangement is part of the proper procedure, but its omission does not invalidate an otherwise valid chalitzah. This ruling concerns the lack of preparation; it does not dispense with the required court.

Both the yevamah and the yavam have prescribed passages to say during chalitzah. They practice beforehand so that they can recite the words properly.

Lo avah means “did not desire,” and yabmi means “my yavam.” Together, the phrase means, “My yavam did not desire.”

She learns to keep lo and avah together. Rambam’s wording does not require her to pause before saying yabmi.

Her declaration first states that her yavam refused to establish his brother’s name. If she attaches lo—“not”—to that preceding statement and then pauses, she could sound as though she is denying his refusal and continuing, “My yavam desired.”

Keeping lo avah together makes the intended meaning clear: he did not desire to perform yibbum.

“This point” refers to saying lo avah together in one breath.

Once she has learned to say these words properly and is capable of saying them together, the court does not insist on that detail if she happens to pause during the actual recitation. The distinction is between her ability to recite correctly and whether she actually does so on that occasion.

If she cannot yet say lo avah together properly, the judges continue teaching her until she can. Mere familiarity with the words is insufficient if she has not yet acquired that ability.

This halachah concerns learning the recitation. The separate laws concerning someone who cannot speak are discussed later in the chapter.

Chalitzah is treated as a judicial proceeding and must take place during the day. If it is performed at night, the chalitzah is invalid and does not permit the yevamah to marry someone else; she still requires a valid chalitzah.

An invalid chalitzah nevertheless has certain halachic consequences. Those consequences are explained later in the chapter.

These three constitute the court. They must know how to read the prescribed passages for the yavam and yevamah to repeat.

They need not possess classical semichah, the formal ordination transmitted through earlier generations. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Rambam favors learned judges, allowing less learned men who know the recitation in pressing circumstances.

The requirement that the judges know how to prompt the recitation concerns the proper procedure at the outset. As halachah 15 explains, an otherwise valid chalitzah is not invalidated because the judges lacked that knowledge.

This is a particular qualification for serving on the chalitzah court. A convert is fully Jewish, and a child born to a Jewish mother is Jewish; nevertheless, Jewish status alone does not satisfy this additional qualification.

The requirement is derived from the Torah’s wording that the declaration is made “in Israel.”

Three men form the required court, and two additional men attend to help publicize the chalitzah. Their addition is part of the proper procedure; an otherwise valid chalitzah before the required three judges is valid.

Rashi gives two explanations for this publicity: people should know that she has undergone chalitzah and may not marry a Kohen, or prospective husbands should know that she is now available for marriage.

The two additional men attend for publicity. They therefore need not possess the knowledge of the prescribed recitation required of the three judges at the outset.

The shoe must include the proper leather covering for the heel of his foot. “Heel” here does not refer to a raised heel of the kind found on some modern shoes. The shoe is made of leather, and its stitching must not be linen. The Rama specifies that its straps should also be leather.

At the outset, the shoe should belong to the yavam. Halachah 19 explains that using a shoe belonging to someone else does not invalidate the chalitzah after the fact.

The shoe is placed on his bare foot, without a sock underneath. Removing a shoe worn over another covering is not the same as removing it directly from his foot.

His foot and the inside of the shoe should also be cleaned of adhering mud. This cleanliness precaution belongs to the careful preparation of the procedure; it should not be confused with the separate requirement concerning a sock or other covering underneath the shoe.

Both stand for the declarations that precede removal of the shoe. Rambam will shortly describe the yevamah sitting to remove it; she then stands again for the spitting and concluding declaration.

The judges read the prescribed words for her to repeat in Hebrew. Her declaration states that the yavam has refused to establish his deceased brother’s name through yibbum. The complete passage appears in halachah 9.

“Take her” means take her as his wife through yibbum. He repeats this declaration himself.

He holds his foot firmly against the ground while she unties and removes the shoe. She must perform the act of removal herself.

According to Rambam’s description, she sits for this part of the procedure. She herself unties the straps and then removes the shoe. Halachah 16 explains the consequences when he performs one part of that act and she performs the other.

The decisive point is when most of his heel has emerged from the shoe. In an otherwise valid chalitzah, the bond requiring yibbum or chalitzah is released at that point. Nevertheless, she must still complete the remaining steps of the mitzvah: spitting and reciting the concluding declaration.

“Another man” means someone outside her deceased husband’s brothers. She remains forbidden to marry a Kohen because she has undergone chalitzah.

She stands after removing the shoe. The saliva is directed toward the ground in front of him; she does not spit onto his face.

Both the yavam and the yevamah stand at these stages. This is the prescribed manner of performing the mitzvah; halachah 15 explains that failure to stand does not invalidate an otherwise valid chalitzah.

The judges should observe the saliva as it leaves her mouth, rather than merely seeing it afterward on the ground. This gives expression to the Torah’s requirement that the act take place before the elders’ eyes.

As explained later in halachah 23, failure to see the saliva emerge does not invalidate the act after the fact.

She repeats the concluding declaration. “Building his brother’s household” refers to performing yibbum. “The one whose shoe was removed” refers to the yavam with whom she has just performed chalitzah.

The prescribed declarations must be recited in Hebrew. The word kachah—“thus”—teaches that the Torah’s wording is to be used, rather than replacing it with a translation.

After her concluding declaration, those attending repeat chalutz hana’al three times. The phrase identifies the yavam as the man whose shoe was removed in chalitzah. The threefold repetition helps publicize what has taken place.

Both parties must intend the act as chalitzah. Her intention alone, or his intention alone, is insufficient for a valid procedure.

Both must intend this as chalitzah that releases her from the obligation of yibbum. Merely carrying out the physical motions while intending something different does not accomplish a valid chalitzah.

They need not have a particular future marriage in mind, or actually plan for her to remarry. The necessary intention concerns the legal purpose of the act: releasing her from the bond that prevents her from marrying someone else.

This refers to a man who is blind in both eyes. According to Rambam, the yavam should be able to see the saliva, so such a man should not perform chalitzah at the outset.

However, this requirement does not invalidate the procedure after the fact: halachah 15 rules that if he did perform chalitzah, it is valid.

Rambam now brings together the steps described in the preceding halachos.

Her words declare that the yavam has declined to perform yibbum, through which his deceased brother’s name would be perpetuated.

He confirms that he does not wish to take her as his wife through yibbum.

This concluding declaration follows removal of the shoe and the spitting. The next halachah distinguishes this prescribed order from what is indispensable for the chalitzah to be valid.

The sequence in halachah 9 must be followed at the outset. However, changing that sequence does not invalidate an otherwise valid chalitzah.

Failure to recite their opening declarations does not invalidate the procedure. This applies when both are able to speak and therefore capable of reciting, as halachah 13 will explain.

The proper order is to remove the shoe first and spit afterward. Reversing those two acts does not invalidate the chalitzah.

Here, “she recited” refers to her concluding declaration, which should follow the spitting. If she said that declaration before spitting, the chalitzah remains valid.

These examples concern omissions or changes in the recitation and sequence. They do not dispense with actual removal of the shoe or the other conditions necessary for a valid chalitzah.

The previous halachah established that if she spat before removing the shoe, the chalitzah is nevertheless valid. Why not have her spit again after removing it, so that the steps also follow their prescribed order?

If the court required her to spit again, observers might conclude that the earlier spitting did not count at all because she had not yet removed the shoe.

They could then mistakenly permit yibbum in another case where a woman spat during the chalitzah proceedings but never removed the shoe. In fact, that spitting already prevents yibbum with any of the brothers, although it does not release her to marry someone else.

The court therefore does not have her repeat the spitting merely to restore the proper sequence. Yevamos 105a

The prescribed procedure includes recitation, removal of the shoe, and spitting. All these parts should be performed.

Nevertheless, if the recitation and spitting were omitted, proper removal of the shoe can still establish valid chalitzah and release her from the yibbum bond.

This assumes that the other requirements for valid chalitzah were met. In particular, as the next halachah explains, both participants must have been capable of speaking, even if they did not actually recite.

Since proper removal of the shoe can suffice even without either of the other parts, the chalitzah certainly remains valid when recitation also took place and only the spitting was omitted.

Likewise, omitting the recitation does not invalidate chalitzah when the shoe was properly removed and the participants were capable of reciting.

These rulings explain what remains valid after an omission. They do not permit deliberately leaving out parts of the required procedure.

The previous halachah established that omitted recitation does not necessarily invalidate chalitzah. Here the Rambam qualifies that ruling: both the yavam and the yevamah must have been capable of saying their prescribed words.

Someone who can speak but needs to learn the words or repeat them after prompting is different from someone who cannot speak.

Although actually reciting is not indispensable to validity, the ability to recite is required. The Gemara connects this distinction to the principle of kol hara’ui lebilah: a step may sometimes be omitted without invalidating the act, but only when that step could have been performed. Yevamos 104b

For example, a meal offering contains flour and oil that should be mixed. If the mixture could have been made properly, failing to mix it does not necessarily invalidate the offering. If the quantity makes proper mixing impossible, however, the offering is invalid. Similarly, omitted recitation does not invalidate chalitzah when both participants could recite; inability to recite is different.

Here, illemes and illem refer to a woman or man who can hear but cannot speak. They possess the necessary legal understanding, but their inability to recite prevents valid chalitzah.

Nevertheless, their act is classified as chalitzah pesulah—invalid chalitzah with legal consequences. It prevents yibbum with any of the brothers, but does not release the woman to marry someone else. She still needs valid chalitzah.

As halachah 26 explains, invalid chalitzah also disqualifies her from marrying a Kohen and creates the specified marriage restrictions between the yavam and her female relatives.

In this classical halachic usage, cheresh and chereshes refer to a man or woman who neither hears nor speaks. Hearing loss alone is not the category being discussed. Yevamos 104b

According to the Rambam, their attempted chalitzah has no legal effect. The original yibbum bond remains, and this act does not itself prevent yibbum.

It also creates no additional prohibition against marrying a Kohen and no chalitzah-related restrictions involving her relatives. These are consequences of the act being legally ineffective; she is still not released to marry someone else.

Chalitzah requires legally effective understanding and intention. The Rambam’s ruling rests on the halachic status assigned to this classical category.

A person who hears but cannot speak retains the necessary legal capacity; the obstacle in that case is the inability to recite. The two cases therefore receive different classifications.

This refers to spitting as part of the chalitzah proceedings, before the yavam and the court.

Without removal of the shoe, she has not completed valid chalitzah and may not marry someone else. Nevertheless, the spitting prevents yibbum with any of the brothers.

Her act has the consequences of invalid chalitzah, as explained in halachah 26. She still needs valid chalitzah to be released from the bond.

Saying the prescribed words alone does not change their legal status. The original yibbum bond remains: she still needs yibbum or valid chalitzah before she may marry someone else.

Unlike spitting alone, recitation alone does not prohibit yibbum. It also creates no additional disqualification from marrying a Kohen and no chalitzah-related restrictions involving her relatives.

The Rambam emphasizes the Torah’s reference to something being done. The physical acts of the ceremony have legal significance.

These actions do not have identical effects. Proper removal of the shoe can establish valid chalitzah and release her. Spitting without removal of the shoe produces the consequences of invalid chalitzah, but does not release her.

The words remain part of the required procedure. However, when the participants were capable of reciting, omitting the words does not invalidate otherwise valid chalitzah.

Conversely, saying the words without removing the shoe or spitting does not change their status.

Both participants should stand during recitation and spitting, and the yavam should stand during removal of the shoe. If these positions were not followed, the completed chalitzah nevertheless remains valid.

The woman’s sitting while removing the shoe is different: that follows the Rambam’s prescribed procedure in halachah 6. Here he addresses departures from the positions that should otherwise be maintained.

The prescribed procedure places the straps around his foot. Nevertheless, tying the strap around the lower leg below the knee does not invalidate chalitzah.

The location matters: tying the shoe above the knee is treated differently in the next halachah.

Initially, the judges should know how to guide the participants through the prescribed words. If three otherwise qualified judges lacked that knowledge, the completed chalitzah remains valid.

This ruling concerns their inability to prompt the recitation. It does not waive the other qualifications required of the judges.

Halachah 8 ruled that a blind yavam should not initially perform chalitzah. Here the Rambam clarifies that if he nevertheless did, the chalitzah is valid after the fact.

The blindness discussed here is blindness in both eyes. The Shulchan Aruch likewise records the distinction between the initial procedure and validity after the fact. Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 169:48

Chalitzah must take place during the day. Performing it at night makes it invalid, even if the other parts of the ceremony were performed correctly.

Chalitzah requires a court of three qualified judges. Two are insufficient. Likewise, three people do not constitute the required court when one is disqualified—for example, because of a prohibited family relationship with another judge or one of the participants.

The Torah requires removal of the shoe “from his foot.” Tying it above the knee does not meet this requirement.

This differs from the previous halachah, where a strap tied around the lower leg below the knee did not invalidate chalitzah.

The woman must perform the entire act of removing the shoe, including releasing its fastening. According to the Rambam’s ruling here, dividing these actions between them makes the chalitzah invalid.

Both must intend to perform chalitzah that releases her from the yibbum bond and permits her to marry someone else.

One participant’s intention cannot replace the other’s. Merely performing the physical movements is insufficient when either participant lacks the required intention.

A yevamah who has not reached halachic adulthood cannot complete valid chalitzah. Nevertheless, her act has limited legal consequences. The commentary explains that, since a minor girl can have a legally recognized marriage, her attempted chalitzah is not treated as entirely without effect.

For chalitzah, adulthood requires the prescribed age and physical signs of maturity: thirteen years and one day for the yavam, and twelve years and one day for the yevamah, together with the required signs. Age alone does not establish every requirement. See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 169:10.

The concluding ruling applies to all the cases listed above: the woman is not released to marry someone else, but she may no longer perform yibbum with any of the brothers. Valid chalitzah is still required.

Even an act lacking the required court and daytime setting can have the consequences of chalitzah pesulah.

They therefore cannot assume that, because the procedure was invalid, they may disregard it and proceed with yibbum.

A cheresh is the classical halachic category of someone who neither hears nor speaks. A shoteh is someone whose condition places him in the halachic category of lacking the necessary legal understanding; the term does not mean an ordinarily foolish person. A katan is a boy below halachic adulthood.

According to the Rambam, these individuals cannot perform a legally effective act of chalitzah.

This differs from the minor girl mentioned earlier. Her act is invalid but has consequences; the minor boy’s attempted chalitzah has no legal effect.

When the woman is exempt from both obligations, performing the outward ceremony does not create the legal status of chalitzah.

In these final cases, the act creates none of the chalitzah-related restrictions explained in halachah 26. Where a yibbum bond exists, an ineffective act does not release it.

Chalitzah requires the right foot. Its absence does not allow the left foot to take its place.

Nor does the earlier ruling about tying a strap below the knee establish permission, according to the Rambam, to perform chalitzah using the remaining portion of an amputated leg. The Maggid Mishneh explains that the earlier case involved an existing foot on which the shoe could have been tied.

The Rambam describes conditions that prevent the yavam from placing and pressing his heel against the ground as required.

The issue is the physical inability to perform this step, rather than an unusual appearance or manner of walking by itself.

According to the Rambam’s ruling as explained by the commentary, omitting the pressing of the heel does not invalidate chalitzah after the fact when the yavam was capable of doing it.

Here, however, he cannot perform that step. His inability makes the chalitzah invalid.

This resembles halachah 13: actual recitation may be omitted without invalidating chalitzah, but the participants must still be capable of reciting.

It does not release her to marry someone else, although it has the consequences of invalid chalitzah, including the prohibition against yibbum.

The woman herself must remove the shoe, but she need not necessarily use her hands. If she cannot use them, she may perform the removal with her teeth.

This is permitted lechatchilah—as the planned procedure in her circumstances—not merely accepted after the fact.

The Torah requires her to perform the removal without specifying that it must be done by hand. Her inability to use her hands therefore does not prevent valid chalitzah.

According to the Rambam’s classification, a cloth shoe lacks the protective footwear status required for this ceremony.

His wording means that the act has no legal effect. It does not release the woman, but it also does not create the restrictions that result from invalid chalitzah.

A proper chalitzah shoe must have the required heel structure and must not be sewn with linen thread.

These defects invalidate the chalitzah, but the act still has the consequences of chalitzah pesulah.

These materials provide some protection and therefore give the article a degree of footwear status. Nevertheless, in the forms described here, they do not meet the requirement for a leather chalitzah shoe.

That explains the difference from the cloth shoe: these cases produce invalid chalitzah with consequences, rather than an act with no effect.

The next halachah distinguishes certain constructions that include leather.

The shoe must function as footwear for this yavam. An excessively large shoe that he cannot walk in fails that requirement.

A small shoe must at least cover most of his foot. Covering a smaller portion is insufficient.

Damage does not automatically disqualify a shoe. Its extent matters: here, the shoe no longer provides the required coverage or holds most of the foot.

In all the cases following the cloth shoe, the woman is not released to marry someone else, but the act has the consequences of invalid chalitzah.

These constructions include leather in a way that allows the chalitzah to remain valid after the fact.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the rule concerning a wooden sandal covered with leather also applies to footwear made from the other materials mentioned earlier when covered with leather.

A shoe designed for the left foot is different from performing chalitzah on the left foot.

Here, the sandal was worn on the required right foot. Although designed for the other foot, it does not invalidate the chalitzah after the fact.

His ownership of the shoe is not indispensable to validity.

Nevertheless, when the court provides its chalitzah shoe, the customary procedure is to give it to the yavam as a gift before the ceremony, so that it belongs to him.

The previous halachah disqualified a shoe so large that walking in it was impossible. Here, despite the imperfect fit, it still functions as footwear for him.

A small shoe can still meet the minimum requirement when it covers most of his foot.

The damage has not reduced the shoe below the required threshold.

These rulings establish validity after the fact. Initially, the ceremony should use the proper shoe rather than deliberately rely on an imperfect one.

The Torah’s laws of tzara’as apply to certain garments and leather articles, as well as to people and houses.

A musgar sandal has been placed under observation by a Kohen because of a suspected qualifying mark. A muchlat sandal has been definitively declared affected and must be burned.

These are halachic statuses determined through the prescribed examination process.

This sandal serves as an accessory to an idol. Rashi explains that such a covering could protect the idol’s feet when it was moved.

Footwear associated with tzara’as or serving idolatry should not be chosen for the mitzvah.

The prohibition against using these sandals initially does not invalidate the completed chalitzah.

Regarding the sandal associated with idolatry, the Gemara invokes mitzvos lav leihanos nitnu: performing a mitzvah is not classified as the personal benefit prohibited here. This does not permit ordinary use of the sandal.

The definitively affected tzara’as sandal is a special case. Although it must be burned, Rashi explains that the Torah still calls the affected article a “garment” when commanding its burning. It therefore retains its legal identity for this purpose. This differs from the permanently prohibited idolatrous offering discussed below. Yevamos 103b, Rashi

An example is a sandal made from the hide of an animal offered to an idol.

This differs from an accessory placed on an idol. The prohibition attached to an idolatrous offering cannot be nullified, and the object remains permanently prohibited.

An ir hanidachas is a city that meets the Torah’s specific legal conditions for a city led into idolatry. Property subject to that judgment must be destroyed by burning.

The sandal consequently lacks the legal standing required of footwear used for chalitzah.

A burial shoe was made for burial rather than walking. Its outward shape does not give it the required purpose of footwear used for walking.

These final cases produce invalid chalitzah with legal consequences. They do not release the woman to marry someone else.

A chalitzah shoe must qualify as footwear intended for walking. These final categories fail that requirement because of their legal designation for destruction or their purpose as burial footwear.

The woman must perform the required act of removing the shoe. Here, she exposed the foot by tearing away or burning the shoe instead of removing it in the ordinary manner.

The Gemara leaves unresolved whether exposing the foot in these ways fulfills the Torah’s requirement. Because their validity remains in doubt, these acts cannot release her to marry someone else. The Rambam classifies them as invalid chalitzah, which nevertheless prevents yibbum.

One shoe was worn over another on the same foot. Removing the outer shoe leaves the inner shoe covering his foot.

Ordinary removal of the outer shoe, followed by tearing away the inner shoe, does not establish valid chalitzah.

In all these cases, the act has the consequences of chalitzah pesulah: she may no longer perform yibbum, but valid chalitzah is still required before she may marry someone else.

Gargir is a pungent herb. The relevant feature of these foods is that they stimulate the flow of saliva.

The food-induced flow does not fulfill the required spitting of the chalitzah ceremony.

The words “does not count” refer to the spitting, rather than declaring the entire chalitzah ineffective.

She must perform the spitting with naturally occurring saliva, rather than rely on the flow produced by these foods.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that she must repeat the spitting properly to complete the prescribed procedure. Nevertheless, if the shoe was properly removed and the other requirements were satisfied, defective or omitted spitting does not invalidate the chalitzah after the fact, as established in halachah 12.

According to the Rambam, blood alone does not fulfill the required spitting. Blood flowing from the mouth likewise does not replace saliva.

She must perform the spitting properly. This defect concerns the spitting itself; it does not invalidate an otherwise valid chalitzah.

If she sucked the bleeding area in her mouth and then spat, the discharge counts for the required spitting.

The presence of blood does not disqualify saliva mixed with it. In this case, traces of saliva are necessarily present, and that is sufficient.

The saliva must pass in front of the yavam. It does not need to touch him.

When she is taller, the saliva may leave her mouth above the level of his face. It must descend opposite his face before the wind carries it away.

When she is shorter, the saliva is already in front of him below facial height. It does not need to rise to the level of his face. Yevamos 106b

If the wind carried it away too early in the case described by the Rambam, she must spit again properly.

Initially, she should spit toward the ground in front of him. However, once the saliva has passed opposite his face, its being carried away before landing does not invalidate the spitting.

The judges should watch the saliva emerge, as explained in halachah 7. Their failure to see that moment, however, does not invalidate the spitting after the fact.

The decisive question is whether the yavam intended an act that releases the woman from the yibbum bond.

The following cases distinguish a mistake about what chalitzah accomplishes from a condition attached to an act whose meaning he understands.

He believes that removing the shoe will establish their marriage. He therefore does not intend the release that chalitzah must accomplish.

The physical procedure cannot compensate for this missing intention.

Here, he wrongly believes that chalitzah leaves yibbum available afterward. According to the Rambam, this misunderstanding prevents the required intention to release her.

These cases produce invalid chalitzah with consequences: she cannot perform yibbum, but she is not yet permitted to marry someone else.