Sisters, Competing Bonds, and the Timing of Eligibility

Both brothers died without children, leaving their wives subject to the laws of yibbum. There is also a surviving brother. Both widows would ordinarily be bound to him for yibbum or chalitzah. Yibbum is the marriage of such a widow to an eligible surviving brother of her deceased husband. Chalitzah is the prescribed procedure that releases her from this bond and allows her to marry someone else.

Zikah is the legal bond connecting the widow to her deceased husband’s surviving brother for yibbum or chalitzah. Here, both sisters are bound to the same surviving brother. Although neither is his wife, the Sages prohibited him from marrying the sister of a woman bound to him by zikah. Each sister therefore prevents yibbum with the other, and both require chalitzah.

The yavam is the surviving brother to whom the widow is bound. A sh’niyah is a relative whom the Sages prohibited as an extension of the Torah’s forbidden relationships. The other categories mentioned here involve marriage restrictions arising from a Torah positive or negative commandment.

Although these marriages are prohibited, kiddushin—the act establishing the marital bond—can still take effect with these women. Their prohibitions therefore do not exempt them from zikah or chalitzah, as explained in Chapter 6, Halachah 10. Consequently, the prohibited sister remains bound to him, and her zikah also prevents yibbum with her sister.

An ervah here is a woman forbidden to him by a Torah-level prohibited relationship that exempts her from both yibbum and chalitzah. This differs from the restrictions in the preceding segment, which leave zikah in place.

Only the other sister is bound to him. She is therefore not the sister of another woman bound to him by zikah, and this obstacle to yibbum does not arise.

Here, two brothers survive the deaths of the sisters’ husbands. Each surviving brother is forbidden to one sister as an ervah, but is otherwise permitted to the other.

Zikah is determined separately for each surviving brother. Since the sister who is an ervah has no zikah to him, she does not prevent him from performing yibbum with her sister. Neither brother is therefore bound to both sisters.

In this case, the order of the deaths is known. The “first” woman is the widow whose husband died first; the “second” woman is the widow whose husband died afterward. These descriptions concern the order in which their obligations arose, not their ages.

The first widow was initially eligible for yibbum. Once her sister also became bound to the surviving brother, however, each became the sister of a woman bound to him by zikah. While both bonds remain unresolved, neither may undergo yibbum. Knowing which obligation arose first does not change that result, although it matters when one of the bonds later ends, as explained in the next halachah.

This continues the case in Halachah 3, where the order of the husbands’ deaths is known. When the first woman became subject to yibbum, she was permitted to the surviving brother. Her sister’s later zikah temporarily prevented him from marrying her. Once that sister dies, the obstacle disappears, and the first woman’s original eligibility returns.

When the second woman’s husband died, her sister was already bound to the surviving brother. The second woman was therefore forbidden to him from the outset. Her sister’s later death does not give her an eligibility she lacked when her obligation first arose. She still requires chalitzah to release her zikah.

This case requires more than one surviving brother. The first woman becomes permitted to the other brothers, but remains forbidden to the brother who performed chalitzah. For him, she is the sister of the woman with whom he performed chalitzah—a separate Rabbinic prohibition, explained in Chapter 6, Halachah 12.

This is an after-the-fact ruling. The Kessef Mishneh and Beit Shmuel explain that the brothers should not initially be instructed to arrange this sequence, lest they mistakenly perform chalitzah with the first woman instead.

The second woman’s zikah was the obstacle preventing yibbum with the first. Once chalitzah removes that bond, the first woman’s original eligibility returns for the remaining brothers.

This continues the sequence in Halachah 3, but here there are at least two surviving brothers. The “first” widow is the woman whose husband died first; the “second” is her sister, whose husband died afterward.

For the brother to whom the first widow is an ervah, she never had zikah. The second widow was therefore permitted to him when her husband died: she was not the sister of another woman bound to him by zikah.

For the other brothers, the first woman was initially eligible for yibbum and became forbidden only when her sister’s zikah arose. The second woman’s lawful yibbum ends her zikah to those brothers. The obstacle is therefore removed, and the first woman becomes eligible for them again.

The second woman has no zikah to this brother. Her husband’s death therefore does not make the first woman forbidden to him, and he may perform yibbum with the first.

For the other brothers, the second woman was forbidden when her obligation first arose, because the first woman was already bound to them. Even after the first undergoes yibbum with the brother permitted to her, the second does not become eligible for the others.

The reference to “both women” also includes a later possibility: if the brother who performs yibbum with the first woman subsequently dies without children, she remains forbidden to the remaining brothers. His yibbum does not erase her earlier prohibition to them.

This returns to the ordinary case in which both sisters are bound to the surviving brothers and neither sister is exempt as an ervah. It does not refer to the permitted yibbum described above.

Both marriages must end. The brother who married first acted while the sisters’ zikah prohibited yibbum. Even where his act removed the obstacle that would otherwise prevent the second brother’s marriage, the second marriage must also end, because it became possible through the first brother’s prohibited act.

The husband died without children. Ma’amar is a Rabbinically instituted act of kiddushin with a yevamah before yibbum. It creates a legal connection, but does not complete the marriage or replace yibbum.

The second husband also died without children, before the third brother had performed yibbum with the first sister. Since ma’amar does not establish a complete marriage, it does not exempt the second sister as the sister of his wife. Both sisters therefore have zikah to him, preventing yibbum with either.

A get is a Jewish bill of divorce. Here, the get dissolves the connection created by ma’amar, while chalitzah releases the zikah arising from her husband’s death. Neither procedure alone removes both connections.

The second sister requires only chalitzah, since he did not perform ma’amar with her.

This considers a different sequence from Halachah 6. After performing ma’amar, the third brother died without children while the other sister’s husband was still alive. He left his own wife, as well as the woman with whom he had performed ma’amar. The surviving brother is married to that woman’s sister.

She is an ervah to the surviving brother. The ma’amar performed by the brother who subsequently died does not change that prohibited relationship.

The deceased brother’s own wife is not herself the surviving brother’s wife’s sister. Nevertheless, his connection to that sister creates a Rabbinic co-wife restriction that prevents yibbum with his own wife. As explained in Chapter 6, Halachah 25, this restriction can arise through zikah even without ma’amar.

A tzarah, or co-wife, is another wife of the same husband. When a deceased man leaves a wife who is an ervah to his surviving brother, her co-wife is ordinarily exempt from both yibbum and chalitzah.

Here, the wife’s sister received only ma’amar, not a completed marriage through yibbum. The connection creates a Rabbinic restriction against yibbum with the deceased brother’s own wife, but does not establish the full marriage needed to exempt her from chalitzah under Torah law. She therefore requires chalitzah but may not undergo yibbum.

The kiddushin took place after his brother died and the widow became bound to the surviving brothers. Although he is forbidden to marry the sister of a woman bound to him by zikah, his kiddushin with the sister take effect.

He may not complete the marriage while her sister’s zikah remains. Nevertheless, he need not immediately dissolve the kiddushin, because another brother may resolve the widow’s zikah and thereby remove the prohibition.

An arusah is a woman whose kiddushin have taken effect but whose marriage has not yet been completed. Each event listed here ends the widow’s zikah to this man. Her sister is therefore no longer forbidden to him as the sister of a woman bound to him by zikah.

With no other brother available to resolve the zikah, he cannot continue waiting for that possibility. The same ruling applies if he had no other surviving brothers from the outset.

The get dissolves his kiddushin with the sister, but does not permit yibbum with the widow: she is now the sister of the woman he divorced. He must therefore release the widow through chalitzah.

The widow was eligible for yibbum when her husband died. The later kiddushin with her sister created an obstacle, but the sister’s death removes it. The widow therefore regains her original eligibility, unlike a woman who was forbidden when her obligation first arose.

This concerns a widow whose zikah is still unresolved. If she has already undergone chalitzah, her sister’s subsequent death does not undo that chalitzah or permit yibbum.

Each of the two married brothers had two wives: one of the sisters and another woman. There are therefore four women, belonging to two separate marital households.

Both husbands died without children. The surviving brother may not perform yibbum with either sister, because each is the sister of another woman bound to him by zikah.

He performs chalitzah with one co-wife from each deceased brother’s household. Each chalitzah releases both women of that household, so neither sister needs a separate chalitzah.

Chalitzah with each sister releases that sister herself. It does not release her co-wife, who still needs her own chalitzah.

The chalitzah is valid and releases the woman who performs it. Its limitation is that it does not also release her co-wife. Since each sister is prohibited from yibbum because of her sister’s zikah, her chalitzah has this limited effect.

The same distinction was established in Chapter 5, Halachah 12: a chalitzah may release the woman herself without releasing another wife of the same deceased husband.

These are two wives of the same man who died without children. Ordinarily, chalitzah with one wife releases both. Here, whether it releases both depends on which wife performs it.

These restrictions prevent yibbum but leave zikah intact. The prohibited wife therefore requires chalitzah; she is not exempt like an ervah.

Her chalitzah is valid and releases her own zikah, but does not release the other wife. Like the sisters’ chalitzah in the preceding halachah, its effect is limited because she is prohibited from yibbum. Her co-wife therefore still requires chalitzah.

The co-wife is otherwise eligible for yibbum. Her chalitzah therefore releases the entire household, including the wife who is prohibited.

“Unrelated” means that this woman does not share the family relationship relevant to this case. It does not mean that she is non-Jewish.

The deceased brother died without children. The third brother performed yibbum with his widow, so he now had two wives: the unrelated woman and one of the sisters.

The third brother also died without children. The only surviving brother’s wife—the other sister—had already died. Although the surviving sister is no longer the sister of his living wife, her status when the first brother died still determines the outcome.

When her original husband died, she was an ervah to this brother because he was married to her sister. No zikah arose between them. She therefore remained forbidden to him as his brother’s wife, and that prohibition became permanent. Neither his wife’s later death nor the third brother’s intervening yibbum makes her eligible for him.

If a man was born only after his brother died, he cannot perform yibbum with that brother’s widow. The comparison concerns the permanent prohibition: in both cases, the widow was excluded from yibbum with this brother when her husband died.

The third brother’s yibbum established a complete marriage with the sister. His unrelated wife therefore became the co-wife of a woman permanently forbidden to the surviving brother as an ervah. She too is exempt from both yibbum and chalitzah.

The first brother died without children while the surviving brother was still married to the widow’s sister.

At her husband’s death, she was the surviving brother’s own wife’s sister and was therefore exempt from yibbum and chalitzah. Her sister’s later death does not reverse that original exclusion.

Here, the husband remarried her before dying without children. Unlike the preceding widow, she was eligible for yibbum when her husband died.

A brother’s divorced wife is forbidden to the other brother, and her former husband’s later death would not create an obligation of yibbum. Here, however, the husband remarried her, restoring her status as his wife and her potential eligibility for yibbum.

This does not mean that she became permitted to his brother while her husband was alive. It means that the divorce no longer prevented yibbum if her husband subsequently died without children.

The decisive point is her eligibility at her husband’s death. A prohibition that arose and ended during his lifetime does not permanently exclude her from yibbum.

The husband died without children. This differs from the ordinary remarriage in Halachah 12: her original marriage and divorce were binding under Torah law, but her remarriage while she remained a minor was binding only under Rabbinic law.

Halachic adulthood for a girl requires reaching the prescribed age of twelve years and the requisite physical signs of maturity. Reaching the birthday alone does not establish the change of status discussed here.

The Torah grants a father authority to accept kiddushin for his minor daughter, making that marriage binding under Torah law. The divorce here was likewise a Torah-valid divorce.

For the minor to receive such a divorce herself, she must be capable of distinguishing a get from another object, as explained in Hilchos Gerushin 2:19. The father’s role establishes the original marriage’s Torah status; the divorce must also satisfy its own requirements.

After her divorce, her father no longer has authority to establish another Torah-level marriage for her. While she remains a minor, her remarriage therefore cannot recreate the Torah-level marital bond that existed before the divorce.

This refers to kiddushin entered into by the minor herself, rather than the original kiddushin accepted by her father. Her own kiddushin do not establish a Torah-level marriage while she remains a minor.

The fully binding divorce made her forbidden to her husband’s brother as his brother’s divorced wife. A remarriage binding only under Rabbinic law cannot remove that Torah-level prohibition. According to the predominant understanding of the Rambam, she is exempt from chalitzah as well.

The husband died without children. The term chereshet here refers to the classical halachic category of a woman who is deaf and unable to speak. Her marriage in that status is binding under Rabbinic law.

The divorce took place while she had full legal capacity and was binding under Torah law. The remarriage took place after she became a chereshet and was binding only under Rabbinic law.

The Rabbinic remarriage does not remove the Torah-level prohibition created by the divorce. She remains forbidden as his brother’s divorced wife and is exempt from both procedures.

This concerns another wife whose marriage to the deceased was binding under Torah law. In this divorce-and-remarriage case, the minor’s or chereshet’s Rabbinic remarriage does not exempt that other wife or prevent yibbum with her. The other wife therefore retains her obligation and may undergo either yibbum or chalitzah.

This permission concerns the particular divorce-and-remarriage case described here. It should not be extended to every Rabbinic marriage involving an ervah. In Halachah 21, the co-wife of a deaf-mute daughter requires chalitzah and may not undergo yibbum.

For the remarriage to become binding under Torah law, the husband must have marital relations with her after she reaches halachic adulthood or regains full legal capacity. The change in her status alone is not sufficient.

Once the remarriage becomes binding under Torah law, her status is like that of an ordinary woman who was divorced and validly remarried before her husband died without children. The earlier divorce no longer prevents yibbum.

The brother died without children. In both alternatives, the sisters’ marriages were binding only under Rabbinic law.

Mi’un is a minor girl’s refusal of a marriage established for her under Rabbinic law. It annuls that marriage without a get. The description “eligible to perform mi’un” excludes a minor whose marriage was established under Torah law through her father.

Both marriages have the same Rabbinic status. The surviving brother’s existing marriage continues, and the widow is exempt as his wife’s sister. There is no stronger obligation of yibbum that requires displacing his existing marriage.

The adult sister’s marriage to the surviving brother is binding under Torah law. The minor widow’s Rabbinic marriage does not create an obligation that overrides it. She is therefore exempt from both yibbum and chalitzah.

Here, the adult widow’s marriage was binding under Torah law, so her obligation of yibbum takes precedence over the surviving brother’s Rabbinic marriage to her minor sister.

The minor is instructed to dissolve her marriage through mi’un. An ordinary divorce would leave the adult widow forbidden as the sister of his divorcee. Mi’un instead annuls the minor’s marriage as though it had not existed.

Once mi’un removes the minor’s marriage, the adult widow is no longer prohibited as his wife’s sister, and he may perform yibbum with her.

A marriage involving a deaf-mute in the classical halachic category defined above is established by Rabbinic law rather than Torah law.

In the first group of cases, both husbands are deaf-mutes. In the second, both wives are deaf-mutes. Thus, every arrangement described involves two marriages that have the same Rabbinic standing.

“Not fully binding” does not mean that the marriages have no legal effect. Both are recognized by Rabbinic law. Since the deceased brother’s marriage has no greater standing than the surviving brother’s existing marriage, the widow’s claim to yibbum does not displace that marriage. The surviving brother remains married to his wife, and her sister is exempt.

In the mixed case, the sister with full legal capacity is married to the brother with full legal capacity, and the deaf-mute sister is married to the deaf-mute brother. In either arrangement, the first brother’s marriage is binding under Torah law, while his deaf-mute brother’s marriage is binding only under Rabbinic law.

The surviving brother’s Torah-level marriage exempts his wife’s sister from both yibbum and chalitzah.

Zikah is the bond that requires a widow whose husband died without surviving descendants to receive yibbum or chalitzah from his eligible surviving brother. Here, the deceased brother’s Torah-level marriage creates a Torah-level zikah, even though the surviving brother is a deaf-mute. His own Rabbinic marriage cannot exempt the widow from that bond.

He may not remain married to the sister of a woman who is bound to him by zikah. His existing marriage must therefore end through a get.

Divorcing his wife does not permit yibbum with her sister: a man remains forbidden to his divorced wife’s sister during his former wife’s lifetime. Nor can this brother perform an effective chalitzah. The widow therefore remains bound by an unresolved zikah and cannot marry another man while that bond remains in force. “Forever” describes the absence of a means of release through this brother in the circumstances presented.

This question concerns the preceding case in which both the surviving brother and his wife are deaf-mutes. Although the widow’s zikah requires their marriage to end, why must the court intervene when both spouses fall within a category exempt from personal obligation in mitzvos?

Neveilos are animal carcasses forbidden as food because the animals died without valid shechitah. The comparison concerns the court’s duty to stop someone who is not personally obligated in the prohibition. It does not remove the separate responsibility to educate a child in mitzvah observance.

Observers might assume that the surviving brother’s marriage exempts the widow, just as a Torah-level marriage would. That conclusion would be mistaken: his Rabbinic marriage cannot remove the widow’s Torah-level zikah. Leaving the couple together could therefore lead people to permit the widow to marry without a valid release.

Ending the marriage removes the misleading appearance that the widow is exempt as the sister of his present wife. The divorce does not itself release the widow. As explained above, this brother cannot perform yibbum with his divorced wife’s sister or provide an effective chalitzah, so her zikah remains unresolved.

The marriage to the sister with full legal capacity is binding under Torah law. The marriage to the deaf-mute sister is binding only under Rabbinic law, even though her husband has full legal capacity.

The surviving brother’s Torah-level marriage exempts the widow from both yibbum and chalitzah.

The widow’s Torah-level zikah takes precedence over his Rabbinic marriage, so he must divorce his wife. He cannot then perform yibbum with the widow, because she is his divorced wife’s sister. Chalitzah is therefore required to release her.

Unlike the surviving brother in Halachah 17, this brother can perform an effective chalitzah. The widow also has full legal capacity, so the procedure can release her to marry another man.

Both marriages are established by Rabbinic law because their husband is a deaf-mute. Neither marriage has greater legal standing than the other.

Ordinarily, an ervah’s co-wife is also exempt. Here, one might question whether the ervah’s Rabbinic marriage is sufficient to exempt the other wife. The following reasoning establishes that both are exempt.

If these Rabbinic marriages are treated as marriages for the laws of yibbum, the women must also be treated as co-wives. The ervah therefore exempts the other wife.

Both marriages rest on the same Rabbinic basis. If that basis is disregarded, neither marriage creates a zikah requiring yibbum or chalitzah. One cannot disregard the ervah’s marriage while treating the other wife’s marriage as creating an independent obligation.

The alternatives do not express uncertainty about the final ruling. They show that either approach leads to the same definite result: both women are exempt.

The daughter is an ervah to the surviving brother. The same applies to another woman who is permitted to marry the deceased brother but is an ervah to the surviving brother. Although her husband has full legal capacity, their marriage is established only by Rabbinic law because she is a deaf-mute.

The case concerns the brother’s death without children, leaving this woman and another wife whose marriage is binding under Torah law. The ervah herself is exempt, but her Rabbinic marriage cannot entirely exempt the other wife from the Torah-level obligation arising from that wife’s own marriage. The other wife therefore requires chalitzah.