Eligibility, Forbidden Relationships, and Overlapping Yibbum Bonds

A yavam is a surviving brother to whom his deceased brother’s widow is bound when the conditions for yibbum apply. Yibbum establishes marriage through marital relations; chalitzah releases the bond without marriage.

Zikah is the yibbum bond between the widow and an eligible surviving brother. Here, no such bond exists with the brother in question. If another eligible brother exists, however, his bond must still be resolved before she can marry outside the family.

In these last two categories, a bond exists, but only one procedure is available in the brother’s present status. The following three halachos identify the brothers in each category.

A saris chamah is a man in the defined halachic category of congenital reproductive incapacity, who never had a period of reproductive fitness. An androgynos is a person with both male and female sexual organs. These are specific halachic categories, not general terms for every person who cannot have children. Inability to father children is also distinct from inability to have marital relations.

Yibbum is directed toward perpetuating the deceased brother’s name. In these categories, the surviving brother was never capable of the procreation contemplated by the mitzvah, so no yibbum bond arises with him. Halachah 4 distinguishes a man whose incapacity developed only after an earlier period of fitness.

Cheresh here refers to the Rambam’s defined category of a person who neither hears nor speaks. Shoteh denotes someone who lacks halachic mental competence. These are legal categories; they should not be equated with every hearing impairment or mental-health condition.

Chalitzah requires the requisite halachic competence and intent. Yibbum, however, can take effect through the act of marital relations even without intent to fulfill the mitzvah, as discussed in Chapter 2, halachah 3. Thus, “can perform yibbum” here describes its legal effect; it does not mean that these individuals should be encouraged to do so. The minor’s case is qualified below.

This ruling assumes that her marriage to the deceased brother was binding under Torah law. That marriage gives rise to a Torah-level yibbum bond. The surviving brother’s act of yibbum then establishes a full Torah-level marriage with her, but his limited capacity to effect divorce cannot dissolve that marriage.

The Kessef Mishneh distinguishes a case in which the deceased husband was also a cheresh: the original marriage was Rabbinic, and the surviving cheresh can end it through the recognized procedure of gestures.

At this age, his relations create a partial bond with the effect of an adult’s maamar—the Rabbinic act of kiddushin preceding completed yibbum. They do not complete yibbum under Torah law. A get is a halachic divorce document.

Kiddushin is the first legally binding stage of Jewish marriage, called “consecration” here. Nisuin completes the marriage. Kiddushin already creates a marital bond that ordinarily requires a get to dissolve.

Reaching adulthood enables him to give a get, but does not itself complete the earlier act. If he has no further relations with her after reaching adulthood, she needs both a get and chalitzah to be released. If he completes yibbum through relations after reaching adulthood, a subsequent divorce requires a get alone. See Chapter 5, halachos 18 and 21.

An ervah is someone forbidden by a severe Torah prohibition of the kind that excludes yibbum. When it is uncertain whether the widow falls into that category, yibbum cannot be performed, since it might involve a forbidden relationship. She cannot simply be released without chalitzah either, since she might be eligible and therefore bound to the surviving brother.

The concern here is a possible forbidden relationship. Not every uncertainty about a marriage prevents yibbum; halachah 7 distinguishes a doubt that presents no such risk.

Petzua dakka refers to specified damage to the testicles; kerus shofchah refers to severing of the male organ. The precise conditions governing these categories and related reproductive injuries are detailed in Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah, Chapter 16. Unlike the categories in halachah 2, the men discussed here had an earlier period of reproductive fitness.

The qualification concerns an elderly man who is no longer capable of marital relations; age alone is not the stated reason for excluding yibbum.

A saris adam is a man whose reproductive organs were damaged through human action. His earlier reproductive fitness means that the yibbum bond exists, and the act of yibbum can establish marriage even though he was forbidden to perform it. The ruling concerns this defined category, not every form of acquired infertility.

The marriage taking effect does not make its continuation permitted. “The congregation,” or kahal, here refers to a defined category for marriage eligibility. This is a restriction on whom he may marry, not exclusion from the Jewish people. The ruling assumes that the widow belongs to the category he is forbidden to marry, so he must end this marriage through a get.

A tumtum is a person whose genital area is covered by flesh, so that it cannot be determined whether the person is male or female. The uncertainty prevents treating the person as a definite male who may perform yibbum; chalitzah is performed because of the possible obligation.

Once the uncertainty has been resolved and he is established as male, he is treated like another eligible male for these procedures.

Yevamos are widows whose husbands’ deaths bring them within the laws of yibbum. Having classified the surviving brothers, the chapter now classifies the widows.

Here, being excluded from both procedures means that no yibbum bond applies. These widows do not need chalitzah before marrying someone else.

These last two categories still involve a yibbum bond; the distinction is which procedure is available in the widow’s present status. The following halachos explain the circumstances that place a widow in each category.

A chereshet is a woman in the defined halachic category of one who neither hears nor speaks. A shotah is a woman who lacks halachic mental competence. These are specific legal categories. The minor here is a girl who has not yet reached halachic adulthood.

These women lack the halachic competence required for chalitzah in their present status. The issue is not merely unfamiliarity with the Hebrew words of the ceremony. Yibbum, however, can take effect without the same requirement of understanding and intent. A minor girl’s invalid chalitzah is discussed in Chapter 4, halachah 16.

This assumes that the yavam himself has the legal competence to give a valid get. The distinction from the cheresh in halachah 3 concerns who must give the get: a cheresh cannot give the Torah-level get needed to end the marriage described there, whereas a competent husband can. Under Torah law, the wife’s understanding and consent are not prerequisites for the divorce to take effect.

These categories differ from an ervah, a woman forbidden by one of the Torah’s severe prohibitions against certain relationships. The negative-commandment prohibitions mentioned here are Torah marriage restrictions that do not have that severity. Shniyos are additional relatives forbidden by Rabbinic law. A positive-commandment prohibition is a marriage restriction derived from a positive Torah requirement.

In these categories, kiddushin can still take effect despite the prohibition. The zikah—the bond requiring yibbum or chalitzah—therefore remains and must be resolved through chalitzah. Halachah 10 explains this distinction.

The doubt concerns whether the deceased brother successfully divorced her before his death. If the divorce took effect, she was no longer his wife when he died, and yibbum cannot permit the surviving brother to marry her. If the divorce did not take effect, she remained married and is subject to the yibbum obligation. Chalitzah releases the possible bond without risking the forbidden relationship.

If the kiddushin took effect, she is his deceased brother’s widow, and yibbum applies. If they did not take effect, she never became his brother’s wife and may marry the surviving brother through ordinary kiddushin. Neither possibility creates the forbidden relationship present in the doubtful-divorce case. This assumes that she is otherwise permitted to him.

Here, the cheresh is the deceased husband; the surviving brother is otherwise eligible to perform the chosen procedure. Although a cheresh’s ordinary marriage has Rabbinic rather than Torah standing, his widow is still subject to the corresponding Rabbinic yibbum and chalitzah obligations.

Present inability to bear children does not itself remove the obligation. These women had an earlier period of reproductive fitness, unlike the aylonis described in the next halachah.

The terms saris chamah, androgynos, shoteh, and minor describe the deceased husband, rather than the surviving brother. A saris chamah belongs to the halachic category of congenital male reproductive incapacity; an androgynos has both male and female sexual characteristics. An aylonis belongs to the defined halachic category of congenital female reproductive incapacity. An ervah here is a widow forbidden to the surviving brother by an ervah prohibition.

The reasons for these exemptions differ, as the following passages explain.

The expression “whose names are already effaced” refers here to their congenital inability to produce descendants through whom their names could continue. It describes the basis of this legal exclusion, not their personal worth. Because they never had reproductive fitness, their widows are excluded from the obligation. Halachah 2 addressed these men as surviving brothers; this passage addresses them as deceased husbands.

This distinguishes an aylonis from the elderly woman or woman who later became barren in halachah 7. Those women had an earlier period of reproductive fitness; an aylonis did not.

Here, the purported marriage was not established through valid ordinary kiddushin: kiddushin performed by a shoteh or a minor do not create the marital bond required for these laws. This differs from a cheresh’s marriage, which has Rabbinic standing.

Kiddushin cannot take effect between the surviving brother and this woman. The positive commandment of yibbum does not override an ervah prohibition carrying karet, the Torah’s punishment of spiritual excision. No yibbum bond therefore arises with that brother.

These relationships are measured against the surviving brother’s wife. The widow could have been permitted to the deceased husband and validly married to him, yet be forbidden to the surviving brother because of his own family relationships. In the case of his wife’s sister, the prohibition applies while his wife is alive.

This is a definite ervah, so there is no bond with this brother to release. It differs from the possible ervah in halachah 4, where chalitzah is required because a bond may exist.

The decisive distinction here is whether kiddushin can create a marital bond between them. With an ervah, they cannot. The next halachah addresses prohibited marriages in which kiddushin nevertheless can take effect.

A prohibition does not always prevent marriage from taking effect. Unlike an ervah, these women can enter a legally binding marriage with the surviving brother, even though the marriage is prohibited. Their zikah therefore remains and requires chalitzah.

The Torah-level permission being discussed concerns the relevant negative-commandment prohibitions. It does not extend to a competing positive-commandment prohibition, which yibbum does not override. Shniyos are prohibited by Rabbinic law; their underlying Torah-level eligibility for yibbum remains.

This principle applies under its governing halachic conditions. It does not override an ervah prohibition carrying karet, nor does it permit violating a competing positive commandment.

The initial act establishes the yibbum marriage and fulfills the commandment. Later relations do not carry that same overriding mitzvah. To prevent the couple from continuing a prohibited relationship, the Sages required chalitzah instead of allowing the initial act of yibbum.

The act was prohibited, but the prohibition did not prevent a full marital bond from taking effect. A get is therefore needed to end the marriage. Even in the case of a shniyah, whose prohibition is Rabbinic, he may not continue the relationship.

Her co-wives are the other women who were married to the same deceased brother. The full yibbum acquisition resolves the household’s original zikah and releases those other widows. The woman with whom he performed yibbum also needs the get to end her new marriage before she may marry someone else. No chalitzah is required to resolve this household’s original obligation.

Nisuin is the stage that completes marriage after kiddushin. The Kohen Gadol—the High Priest—is the surviving brother here. His relations with the widow do not release another wife of the deceased from her yibbum obligation.

The widow’s previous marriage had reached nisuin, the completed stage of marriage. In the case addressed here, she is treated as a non-virgin for the Kohen Gadol’s marriage restrictions. He therefore faces both the prohibition against marrying a widow and the positive requirement to marry a virgin. The positive commandment of yibbum cannot override both together. This differs from the negative-commandment prohibition alone discussed in halachah 10.

A complete yibbum acquisition would resolve the deceased brother’s household obligation and release the co-wife. That complete acquisition did not occur here, so the co-wife’s obligation remains. The word “she” at the end refers to the co-wife: she must undergo chalitzah before marrying someone else.

The prohibition here concerns the woman’s relationship to the deceased husband. This differs from halachah 9, where the deceased’s marriage was valid but the widow was an ervah to the surviving brother.

Whether the man knowingly transgressed or acted in error, his attempted kiddushin created no marriage. His death therefore cannot create a yibbum obligation for this woman: she was never legally his wife.

Here, “co-wife” is a descriptive designation for another woman whom the deceased had validly married. Legally, the forbidden woman never became his wife, so the validly married widow was never her co-wife within his marital household. The forbidden woman therefore does not exempt that widow from yibbum or chalitzah.

A woman can be a forbidden relative of one brother without being a forbidden relative of another. For example, the deceased’s maternal sister may have no family relationship to his paternal brother, whose mother is different.

He marries the first woman through ordinary marriage, since she was never his brother’s legal wife. He performs yibbum with the other woman, whose marriage to the deceased was valid. This does not constitute yibbum with two widows from one household: only the second woman belongs to the deceased’s marital household for these laws.

Unlike an ervah prohibition, these prohibitions did not prevent the deceased’s kiddushin from taking effect. She therefore became his wife and, upon his death without descendants, is subject to yibbum. A restriction that applied to the deceased does not automatically apply to the surviving brother.

For example, a Kohen Gadol consecrated a widow but died before nisuin and without having relations with her. His kiddushin took effect despite the prohibition. If his surviving brother is an ordinary Kohen and she is otherwise permitted to him, the prohibition against a Kohen Gadol marrying a widow does not prevent that brother from performing yibbum.

After the intervening marriage ended, her first husband was forbidden to remarry her. If he nevertheless did so, the marriage took effect, but his subsequent death does not permit his brother to perform yibbum with her. Chalitzah is required to release the bond.

When she may be an ervah to the surviving brother, yibbum risks a forbidden relationship. Chalitzah is needed because, if she is not an ervah, a yibbum bond exists.

The alternative concerning a possible ervah relationship to the deceased presents a textual difficulty. Halachah 12 permits the surviving brother to marry a woman who was an ervah to the deceased, provided that she is permitted to him. The wording reproduced here reads “or”; the Kessef Mishneh questions that reading and proposes a textual correction, discussed below.

If his kiddushin took effect, the widow is his wife’s sister and is forbidden to him as an ervah. If they did not take effect, she is not his wife’s sister and is subject to yibbum. He must therefore perform chalitzah to release the possible bond, while avoiding yibbum because of the possible prohibition.

The woman he originally consecrated may legally be his wife, so a get is required to end that possible marriage. The get addresses her possible marital bond; it does not resolve the widow’s possible yibbum bond, which requires chalitzah. He cannot remain with the woman he consecrated after the chalitzah, for the reason now explained.

A chalutzah is a woman with whom a man performed chalitzah. Her specified relatives, including her sister, are forbidden to him by Rabbinic law.

If the original kiddushin were valid, the widow was an ervah and the chalitzah had no legal effect. But if those kiddushin were invalid, the chalitzah released a genuine yibbum bond, making the originally consecrated woman the sister of his chalutzah. Because the facts remain uncertain, he may keep neither woman. The prohibition concerning a chalutzah’s relatives is discussed in Chapter 1, halachah 13.

Both women were validly married to the deceased, and one was an ervah to the surviving brother at the time of the deceased’s death—for example, she is the surviving brother’s daughter. The other widow has no such personal relationship to him.

The exemption extends beyond the woman who is personally an ervah. It also includes her co-wife—the other widow of the same deceased husband. Neither woman needs chalitzah from this brother.

This differs from halachah 12. There, the woman was an ervah to the deceased, so she never became his legal wife and could not exempt his validly married widow. Here, both marriages were valid, and one widow’s ervah relationship to the surviving brother exempts the entire household from him.

The verse speaks of the deceased’s “house,” treating his widows as one household for this law. When one widow is an ervah with whom the surviving brother cannot establish marriage, the other widow is also excluded from yibbum with him. This concerns an ervah prohibition; it does not mean that every lesser marriage restriction exempts a co-wife.

Ordinarily, the yibbum obligation permits the surviving brother to marry his deceased brother’s widow. Here, that obligation never arises. The co-wife therefore remains forbidden to him under the original prohibition against his brother’s wife, even though she has no other forbidden relationship to him.

Reuven, Shimon, and Levi are brothers. Reuven died without descendants. One of his widows is personally forbidden to Shimon as an ervah, but neither widow has an ervah relationship to Levi.

The same household can be exempt from one brother while remaining obligated to another. For Shimon, the ervah exempts both herself and her co-wife. For Levi, who is eligible to marry either widow, the yibbum obligation remains.

The woman Levi married through yibbum was not personally Shimon’s forbidden relative. Nevertheless, she had already been exempted from Shimon because she was the co-wife of his ervah.

Levi also died without descendants. His marriage through yibbum does not make the previously exempted woman newly eligible for Shimon. Her continuing prohibition also exempts Levi’s other wife from Shimon.

The first woman retains the prohibition that arose when Reuven died. The second woman is now her co-wife in Levi’s household and is exempted along with her. These exemptions concern Shimon specifically; another eligible surviving brother could still have a yibbum obligation.

If another eligible brother performs yibbum with the later co-wife, has an additional wife, and then dies without descendants, the same principle applies again. The continuing prohibition to Shimon exempts the additional co-wife in that household as well.

In this sequence, a woman who was excluded from Shimon’s yibbum obligation does not become permitted to him through a later yibbum marriage to another brother. Her original prohibition remains, and it can exempt her later co-wives as well.

This refers to a brother born after the married brother’s death. Although they share the same father, their lives never overlapped. The widow therefore does not become obligated to the younger brother through yibbum or chalitzah.

“Together” here requires an overlap in their lifetimes. It does not mean that the brothers must have shared a home.

Since no yibbum obligation arises between this brother and the widow, yibbum cannot permit the relationship. The prohibition against his brother’s wife therefore remains. As with other arayos discussed earlier, her exemption also extends to her co-wife.

Reuven, Shimon, and Levi are paternal brothers. Reuven died without descendants. Shimon was already alive when Reuven died, so Reuven’s widow became obligated to him. Levi was born afterward and never lived at the same time as Reuven.

The decisive point is that Levi was born after Reuven’s death. Shimon’s later yibbum marriage does not erase the woman’s original prohibition to Levi, even if Levi was already alive when Shimon performed yibbum.