Sons’ inheritance and daughters’ support

This concerns a wife who dies while still married to her husband. He inherits her property and does not become obligated to pay her marriage settlement upon her death. The Sages nevertheless established that, when he later dies, her sons first receive the amount of her settlement from his estate, subject to the conditions explained below. This includes the basic ketubah amount and any additional amount he undertook to pay her.

Nichsei tzon barzel is dowry property whose assessed value the husband guarantees as part of the marriage settlement. Here, that assessed value is included in the amount her sons inherit from their father. The entitlement is to the value recorded for the dowry, not necessarily to the original objects she brought into the marriage.

Their mother’s settlement is an initial entitlement, not their entire inheritance. After the amounts belonging to the respective mothers have been allocated, their sons also participate in the division of their father’s remaining estate.

Both wives died before him, so neither collected her marriage settlement as a widow. The sons now receive their respective mothers’ amounts through the special inheritance condition described above.

The two settlements account for 1,200, leaving 800 of their father’s estate. Each son receives half of that remainder: 400.

A dinar is a monetary unit. For this arrangement to apply, the father must leave enough landed property to cover both mothers’ settlements and the required additional dinar. That surplus is then divided among the sons as their father’s ordinary inheritance.

In that case, neither group first receives its mother’s settlement. The special arrangement does not apply, even if the estate is large enough to cover both settlements exactly.

The Sages required their enactment to leave room for the Torah’s ordinary inheritance law to operate. The additional dinar ensures that part of the estate passes to the sons through that ordinary division, rather than the entire estate being allocated solely according to their mothers’ settlements.

Where one wife left several sons, those sons share their mother’s settlement. Each son does not receive a separate payment of its full value.

The remainder is divided among the individual sons, not into one equal portion for each mother’s family. Also, the required surplus is one dinar beyond all the settlements together—not a separate dinar for every wife.

The estate’s actual value falls short of the required threshold. The sons who would benefit from their mother’s larger settlement offer to take the property at a higher valuation, so that the calculation would leave the required additional dinar. The court does not use their proposed valuation to establish eligibility.

Their willingness to assign a higher figure to the property does not establish that their father actually left the necessary surplus. Eligibility depends on the estate’s assessed value, not the figure the interested heirs are willing to accept.

A later increase does not create eligibility that was absent when he died, and a later decrease does not undo eligibility that already existed. The decisive question is whether the required surplus was present at his death.

The estate must contain the additional dinar required above. The following ruling addresses a case in which that surplus exists, but the father also left an outstanding debt.

The debt must still be paid. However, the surplus first falls to the sons as their father’s inheritance, and they use it to discharge his debt. That payment itself expresses their position as his heirs. The Torah’s ordinary inheritance therefore still operates, even though the surplus will go to the creditor rather than remain available for the sons to keep.

The two groups of sons claim their mothers’ settlements on different grounds. The wife who died first never became entitled to collect as a widow; her sons rely on the special rabbinic inheritance arrangement. The wife who survived her husband became entitled to claim her settlement from his estate, subject to the required oath. Her sons can inherit that claim from her.

The oath establishes that she has not already received or taken payment of her settlement. Here, she took that oath but died before collecting.

They inherit their mother’s enforceable claim against their father’s estate. Its payment therefore takes precedence over the special inheritance allotted to the other wife’s sons.

The second wife’s settlement is a debt owed by the father’s estate. All his sons inherit the responsibility to discharge that debt from his property, even though payment goes specifically to her sons as her heirs. Paying it therefore fulfills an obligation arising from their inheritance of their father. For this reason, no separate surplus of a dinar beyond both settlements is required.

Without their mother’s oath, the second wife’s sons cannot collect her settlement: the possibility that it was already paid or taken has not been resolved. They also cannot claim it under the special rabbinic arrangement, which applies when the mother died before her husband.

Since the second wife’s settlement cannot be collected, the property that would have been used to pay it remains available for ordinary inheritance. The first wife’s sons receive their mother’s settlement provided the estate contains the required surplus beyond that settlement. The second wife’s sons still share in the remainder as their father’s heirs.

The second wife’s sons lose the separate claim to her settlement, but retain their ordinary share in their father’s remaining estate.

Both women survived their husband and took the oath needed to collect their settlements. Their sons therefore inherit claims that belonged to their mothers. Neither group relies on the special arrangement for sons whose mother died during their father’s lifetime.

The sons inherit their mothers’ respective claims with their existing priority. The earlier wife’s settlement is collected first; the amounts are not simply combined and divided equally if the estate cannot cover both.

Neither group can collect its mother’s unresolved claim. Nor does the special rabbinic inheritance apply, since both mothers died after their husband. The estate is therefore divided among the sons as their father’s ordinary inheritance.

This continues the preceding case: both wives survived their husband and subsequently died, but only one completed the oath required to collect her settlement.

Only one mother left a claim her sons can collect. After that claim is paid, the sons of both mothers share the rest as their father’s ordinary inheritance.

The Rambam now returns to the special inheritance arrangement for a mother who died before her husband. Her sons receive an inheritance from their father, rather than collecting their mother’s debt against him. They can therefore claim only property available in his estate; this entitlement does not allow them to reclaim property he had sold.

The chapter now turns from the sons’ inheritance of their mothers’ settlements to the daughters’ right to support. This support is provided from the property their father left, even though his sons inherit the estate.

A daughter’s right to this support can apply even if her parents divorced and she lived with her mother. It is not limited to daughters whose mother remained married to their father until his death.

Bagrut is a later stage of halachic maturity, normally reached at twelve and a half; it is distinct from becoming bas mitzvah at twelve. Support ends when she reaches bagrut or becomes consecrated, whichever happens first. “Become consecrated” refers to kiddushin, the first stage of marriage, even before the couple enters full married life.

This ends her claim against her father’s estate. It does not mean that she must necessarily go without support: Halachah 15 addresses the obligation of the man who consecrates a girl whose support from the estate has now ended.

Although her father had rights to her earnings and finds during her youth, those rights do not pass to her brothers. Their obligation to provide support from the estate does not entitle them to take her income. A father would prefer his daughter to retain her earnings rather than have them pass to his sons.

Her entitlement to support includes more than meals. The estate must also provide clothing and a place to live, subject to the conditions governing her eligibility.

Certain court-supervised property sales ordinarily require a period of public announcement so that potential buyers can submit offers. Here, the daughters’ ongoing needs cannot wait until that process is completed.

The widow’s support takes account of the standard of living to which her marriage entitled her. If her husband’s standing entitled her to a higher standard, that affects her allotment.

The daughters’ entitlement does not carry the same guarantee of a standard corresponding to their father’s wealth or status. The amount is determined by what adequately provides for them.

They receive this support without the oath required of a widow receiving support from the estate. The rules governing the widow’s claim are not automatically applied to her daughters.

The sons’ entitlement here is the special inheritance of their mother’s marriage settlement described earlier in the chapter. Both that entitlement and the daughters’ right to support arise from the conditions attached to their mother’s ketubah.

This does not cancel the sons’ ordinary inheritance from their father. It concerns the particular entitlements being claimed through the ketubah conditions.

Where a written document is customary, its absence raises a concern that the mother relinquished her marriage-settlement rights. According to the Rambam’s ruling, that concern prevents the children from collecting these associated benefits merely on the assumption that the obligations remain in force.

The Sages’ standard ketubah conditions can apply even without a written document. Where documents are not normally written, the absence of one does not suggest that the mother waived anything.

These obligations arise from the binding conditions of the marriage. They are not optional gifts that he can withdraw by expressing a different wish before his death.

The following ruling concerns a matnas shechiv mera: a gift made under the special rules for a gravely ill person, which takes effect upon death. It is not describing an ordinary gift fully transferred during his lifetime.

The recipients cannot claim that the property became theirs before the family’s entitlements took effect. Although the marriage conditions were established earlier, the obligations discussed here become payable from the estate at death—the same point at which this gift takes effect.

The gift does not remove these claims. Each entitlement remains subject to its own conditions, including the rules already explained for the sons’ special inheritance.

Mi’un is a minor girl’s rejection of a marriage arranged for her by her mother or brothers, under the rabbinic framework that applies when she no longer has a father with authority to marry her off. Where mi’un is available, it ends the marriage without a get.

Although the mother’s mi’un causes her to lose her own ketubah, the daughter retains her right to support from her father’s estate.

Yibbum is the marriage of a childless man’s widow to his brother under the Torah’s laws of levirate marriage. The daughter here is the child of that subsequent marriage. Her mother’s basic ketubah claim ordinarily rests against the deceased first husband’s estate, which raises a question about the daughter’s support from her own father’s estate.

A sheniyah is a relative whom the Sages prohibited a man from marrying as an extension of the Torah’s forbidden relationships. The term does not mean “a second wife.” In this prohibited marriage, the mother does not receive the ordinary ketubah entitlement.

This refers to a child conceived through relations with the man to whom her mother was consecrated, without their having completed the second stage of marriage. The full marital framework underlying these ketubah conditions had not been established.

The case discussed here is one in which the man subsequently married the woman under the Torah’s laws governing that offense. That marriage has special rules: the statutory payment takes the place of the ordinary basic ketubah payment, creating a question about the accompanying condition for daughters’ support.

In these four cases, the Gemara leaves unresolved whether the daughter is included in the support condition. The Rambam therefore rules that payment cannot be compelled from the heirs: the daughter’s entitlement has not been established sufficiently to collect estate property. The explanations above identify what creates the uncertainty; they do not establish a general rule that every irregularity in the mother’s ketubah cancels her daughter’s support.

The ruling concerns a claim against the father’s estate through the standard ketubah condition. It does not mean that these girls are not his daughters or that all other family rights are canceled.

A father’s responsibility to support his living children is distinct from the ketubah condition that provides for daughters after his death. These children fall under the ordinary rules for support during his lifetime, including the age-dependent distinctions explained in Chapter 12.

Her brothers are providing this support from their father’s estate under the condition explained earlier. “Enters kiddushin” means the first binding stage of marriage, not an informal engagement.

Although kiddushin alone does not ordinarily create an immediate obligation to support the woman, this case is different: his kiddushin brings her existing entitlement to estate support to an end.

As explained in Halachah 10, her estate support ends when either event occurs first.

A na’arah is in the halachic stage between minority and bagrut, normally the six months beginning at age twelve when the required signs of maturity are present. Here, she has lost estate support through kiddushin while still below bagrut.

Bagrut is the legal endpoint of this estate-support entitlement; it is not a finding that every girl can actually earn enough to support herself. Here, she has not yet reached that endpoint. Her support stopped specifically because of kiddushin, so the man who consecrated her must provide for her.

By entering kiddushin in these circumstances, he is understood to accept responsibility for her support. He cannot leave her without provision after his own act has ended the support she previously received.

Mi’un is the refusal through which a minor girl can end a marriage established under the applicable rabbinic framework, without a get. The Rambam now discusses the daughter’s own marriage ending, rather than her mother’s marriage, which was discussed in Halachah 14.

A shomeres yavam is a childless widow awaiting either yibbum with her deceased husband’s brother or chalitzah, which releases that bond. That pending bond does not itself prevent the support described here.

According to the Rambam’s ruling, her earlier marriage does not necessarily end her eligibility permanently. Once she returns in the circumstances described, she receives support while she remains below bagrut and has not entered a new kiddushin. Either event ends that renewed entitlement.

The sons inherit ownership of the property, but that property remains subject to their sisters’ support rights. The daughters receive maintenance from the estate rather than equal ownership shares alongside the sons.

Under this arrangement, support is provided as needed. The brothers do not initially have to place the entire projected cost of their sisters’ future support into a separate fund.

If the court sees the sons recklessly consuming the estate and endangering their sisters’ support, it must intervene and set aside provision for the daughters.

“Ample” is a legal classification based on the family’s projected support needs. The question is not whether the estate would generally be considered wealthy, but whether it can support both groups for the required period.

The calculation looks ahead to bagrut. A daughter’s actual entitlement can end earlier if she enters kiddushin.

Here, the daughters’ projected support is reserved first. The designated property or funds are held under the court’s supervision or by a guardian, so that the daughters’ provision is protected.

If the sons have no other means, they must seek outside assistance rather than consume the provision reserved for their sisters. This describes the priority within the estate; it does not remove the community’s responsibility to assist needy sons.

The following halachah limits this special priority according to the type of property left.

This qualification concerns the daughters’ priority in an insufficient estate. The original support condition was collectible from the father’s landed property.

Metaltelin means property other than land, such as money, merchandise, and household possessions.

The Geonim, the leading Torah authorities of the post-Talmudic academies, extended collection of the daughters’ support to movable property. The extent of that later enactment determines their rights here.

No separate reserve is first set aside exclusively for the daughters. Both groups draw their support from the available property, even if it will not last until the daughters reach bagrut.

The enactment enables the daughters to receive support from these assets. It does not, by itself, give them the stronger priority that applies to an insufficient estate of landed property.

The estate remains under the arrangement for ample assets. The sons continue to support their sisters from the remaining property, but the later shortage does not require transferring the property into a separate reserve exclusively for the daughters. Both groups continue receiving support while the resources last.

Once the estate becomes ample, it follows the arrangement for ample assets: the sons hold the property and support their sisters from it. The daughters retain their support rights, but a separate reserve for their future support is no longer required under this arrangement.

This differs from Halachah 5, which fixes eligibility for the sons’ special inheritance of their mothers’ settlements according to the estate’s value at death. Here, the subject is the daughters’ support and the administration of the estate.

The daughters’ priority for support does not mean that the sons have no ownership interest. Consequently, their sale can take effect, and the daughters cannot recover the sold land from its purchasers through this support entitlement.

The validity of a completed sale does not itself grant permission to sell property at the expense of the daughters’ rights.

The second case concerns his wife’s daughter from another man. Her claim arises from his specific undertaking to support her, rather than from the standard condition providing support for his own daughters.

Even if subtracting those obligations would leave too little to support all his sons and daughters until the daughters reach bagrut, the estate is not reclassified as insufficient for this purpose.

The debt is not canceled or ignored. This ruling concerns who holds the estate and whether a special reserve must first be established for the daughters.

Her entitlement follows the duration of his agreement. It is not automatically governed by the bagrut cutoff applicable to his own daughters’ support under the standard ketubah condition.

The sisters’ ordinary support rights continue. However, the sons also retain their right to receive support from the estate; these outstanding obligations do not create the daughters’ exclusive priority associated with an insufficient estate.

“Leave their care” describes the change brought about by kiddushin. It does not add a requirement that the daughter physically move out before her estate support ends.

Both have claims to support under the ketubah conditions, but the widow’s claim takes precedence when the available property cannot support both. This priority applies even when the daughter is the widow’s own child.

If the daughter has no other means, she must seek assistance outside the estate. The ruling determines which claim the estate pays first; it does not remove the responsibility to help her through charity.

The son’s claim here is kesubas benin dichrin: the special rabbinic inheritance of his mother’s marriage settlement, explained at the beginning of this chapter. The daughter’s support must be provided for before property is allocated to satisfy that claim.

Their shared origin does not give them equal priority. The Rambam now explains why the daughter’s support comes first.

A kal vachomer applies a ruling from a case where there is less reason for it to a case where there is greater reason.

As explained in Halachah 17, when the estate is insufficient, provision for the daughters is reserved before the sons can benefit from their ordinary inheritance.

The sons’ ordinary inheritance has the stronger foundation of Torah law, yet the daughters’ support receives priority over it in an insufficient estate. Their special inheritance of their mothers’ settlements, established by the Sages, certainly cannot have greater priority.

The case contrasts daughters who have passed the age of entitlement to estate support with younger daughters who would ordinarily still qualify.

That arrangement would give the younger daughters support from the common estate before they also receive equal inheritance shares, reducing the amount available to their older sisters.

Here, the daughters themselves inherit the estate. The special support condition does not give the younger daughters an additional allocation ahead of their fellow heirs.

The younger daughters’ shares can be administered for them while they are minors. Equal division does not mean that young children must personally manage their property.