Eligibility for the Waters and the Consequences of Separation

Kinui is a formal warning, given before two valid witnesses, against secluding herself with a particular man. Setirah means that she subsequently secluded herself with that man long enough for relations to have occurred, with the seclusion established by two valid witnesses. The witnesses need not have seen relations; the resulting uncertainty is precisely what the waters are intended to resolve. These events make her forbidden to her husband while the matter remains unresolved.

The right to decline described here must be distinguished from the rules governing a later stage of the procedure. After the scroll has been dissolved in the waters, refusal is treated differently, as explained in Chapter 4, Halachah 4.

She acknowledges that she committed adultery, so the waters are not used to resolve the matter. Her husband must divorce her through a valid get, and she forfeits the payment due under her kesubah, the financial obligation recorded in her marriage contract. Becoming forbidden does not itself dissolve the marriage.

Even while maintaining her innocence, she may be afraid to drink. Her claim alone, however, cannot remove the prohibition created by the warning and subsequent seclusion. Since she declines the procedure that could resolve the doubt, she must leave without her kesubah. The distinction between refusal prompted by fear and other refusal, including whether she may change her mind, is discussed in Chapter 4, Halachah 3.

Once qualifying seclusion follows the warning, relations between husband and wife are forbidden. If he nevertheless has relations with her, his own transgression prevents the waters from testing her, as explained in Halachah 8.

Here, the husband prevents the procedure from going forward, whether by refusing it or by his forbidden conduct. He therefore remains responsible for her kesubah payment. Neither action removes the prohibition or permits them to remain together.

Eligibility depends on the Torah’s requirements for this procedure. The willingness of both spouses cannot replace a missing requirement.

Inability to drink does not itself create a prohibition. Where valid warning and qualifying seclusion make her forbidden, her ineligibility prevents the waters from resolving the doubt.

The categories below do not all have the same underlying marital status. These consequences apply where the relevant marital bond and warning have legal force; the list does not validate a relationship in which kiddushin cannot take effect.

An arusah has entered kiddushin, the binding stage of consecration, but has not yet entered nisu’in, the full stage of marriage. This differs from a woman who has entered nisu’in but has not yet had marital relations, a case addressed in Halachah 5.

A shomeres yavam is a widow awaiting resolution of her bond to her deceased husband’s brother through yibbum or chalitzah. Although relations with another man do not ordinarily forbid her to the yavam, the case here includes his formal warning followed by qualifying seclusion.

An androgynos is a person with both male and female sexual organs. An androgynos’s act of kiddushin creates a doubtful marital status (Hilchos Ishus 4:11).

By contrast, a minor boy’s attempted kiddushin do not take effect at all (Hilchos Ishus 4:7). Calling the woman his “wife” in this list does not establish a valid marital bond.

These conditions affect eligibility for this particular Torah procedure. They do not establish that adultery occurred. The next halachah derives these exclusions from the Torah’s description of the spouses and the acts performed during the procedure.

The following derivations identify the marital status, maturity, and physical capacities required for this procedure.

Kiddushin establishes a binding bond, but the woman has not yet entered the full marriage required here. Similarly, the bond of a woman awaiting yibbum does not itself constitute marriage to the yavam.

This exclusion concerns drinking the waters, even when her father established her kiddushin under Torah law. A warning given while she is a minor does not qualify her for drinking after she reaches majority; a new warning must be administered after she reaches halachic majority.

This differs from the warning given during erusin discussed in Halachah 5, which can remain effective after the marriage is completed.

The procedure requires a husband who meets the Torah’s designation of ish, an adult man. As noted above, the underlying kiddushin also differ: a minor boy’s kiddushin do not take effect, whereas an androgynos’s kiddushin are doubtful.

The verse describes an act hidden from a husband who could otherwise see it. A blind husband could not see the act even if it were not concealed.

The offering must be placed upon her hands. A hand that cannot receive and hold it does not meet this requirement.

The plural wording requires both hands to be fit for this part of the procedure.

These phrases require her participation through speech and hearing.

The verse connects the eligibility of husband and wife. A physical requirement stated directly concerning one also applies to the other. Thus, the exclusion concerning blindness applies to the woman as well, while the requirements concerning the woman’s standing, hands, speech, and hearing also apply to her husband.

This concerns the specific capacities identified here; it does not require both spouses to be free of every physical condition.

Her father can establish kiddushin for her that are binding under Torah law. According to the Rambam, the willing conduct described here can therefore make her forbidden to her husband even though she is still below halachic majority.

Her age excludes her from drinking, but the warning can still have legal consequences. If valid kinui is followed by qualifying setirah established by witnesses, she becomes forbidden to her husband and forfeits her kesubah. The warning alone does not cause that forfeiture.

Mi’un is the refusal through which a minor girl can end a marriage established for her under Rabbinic law, without a get. This refers, for example, to a fatherless girl married off by her mother or brothers. It does not include a Torah marriage established by her father.

Because this marriage is not binding under Torah law, the conduct described does not create the prohibition of adultery within a Torah marriage. “Her willingness” refers to its legal effect; it does not mean that she has expressed a wish to remain permitted to her husband.

Although a Kohen is subject to additional marriage restrictions, the conduct described here does not make this minor girl forbidden to him.

A warning given during erusin or while she awaits yibbum can remain effective after the marriage is completed. Here, the qualifying seclusion occurs afterward, once the couple have entered married life, including marital relations.

Her earlier ineligibility to drink does not invalidate this warning. If the required seclusion occurs after she becomes eligible, the earlier warning can support the procedure, provided its other requirements are met.

This woman has already entered nisu’in through chuppah, but the marriage has not yet been consummated. Nisu’in alone does not satisfy every requirement for drinking: marital relations with her husband must precede the qualifying seclusion.

The warning and seclusion nevertheless create the prohibition. Since she cannot undergo the bitter-water procedure in this case, her husband must divorce her through a get, without paying her kesubah.

The verse describes the suspected act as occurring after marital relations with her husband. This requirement concerns the order of events; it does not establish that adultery occurred. The waters address the doubt left by the qualifying seclusion.

A mamzer or mamzeres has a specific lineage status arising from certain forbidden unions, with corresponding restrictions on marriage. It does not mean simply a person born outside marriage.

A saris chammah is a man whose condition is congenital; a saris adam is a man whose condition resulted from human intervention. These categories can carry different marriage restrictions.

A man can be capable of marital relations even though he cannot father children. Inability to father children does not itself prevent his wife from undergoing the sotah procedure.

“Permitted to their husbands” qualifies the list. These personal statuses do not themselves exclude a woman from the procedure, but the particular marriage must be permitted.

For example, a mamzer or mamzeres may marry only someone permitted under the laws governing that status. Similarly, certain forms of physical injury restrict whom a man may marry. The ruling does not permit every possible pairing within the list.

Where the marriage is permitted and the other requirements are satisfied, valid kinui followed by qualifying setirah leads to the ordinary sotah procedure.

Pregnancy and nursing do not themselves exclude her from drinking. According to the Rambam, when the requirements are satisfied, the procedure is not postponed until she gives birth or finishes nursing.

This concerns a woman whose marriage is permitted. The distinct case of a man who married a woman pregnant with, or nursing, another man’s child is addressed in Halachah 9.

The procedure cannot continue after her husband’s death. Although his death would ordinarily make a kesubah payable, valid warning and qualifying seclusion have already placed her entitlement in question. Since she did not drink and resolve the matter, she does not collect the payment.

Her inability to collect does not establish that adultery occurred. The warning and seclusion created an unresolved doubt, and her husband’s death prevents the procedure that could resolve it.

The effectiveness of the waters depends on the husband’s conduct as well as the circumstances concerning his wife. The disqualifying conduct described here is forbidden sexual relations. “Free of sin” in the verse below refers to this requirement, rather than an assertion that he has never committed any kind of sin.

“Curse-bearing waters” refers to the Torah’s description of the waters through which the prescribed curse takes effect when the conditions for the test are met.

Although kiddushin already bind her to him, marital relations before nisu’in are forbidden by Rabbinic law. According to the Rambam, even this prohibition is sufficient to prevent the waters from testing her.

The requirement is therefore not limited to relations forbidden by Torah law or to relations with someone other than his wife.

The verse makes the woman’s punishment through the waters dependent on the husband meeting this requirement. If he does not, the absence of the waters’ effect cannot establish that she was faithful.

A shniyah is a relative whom the Sages prohibited him to marry, beyond the relationships forbidden by the Torah.

This follows the preceding halachah. The husband’s forbidden relations within such a marriage prevent the waters from testing her. Even when the marriage prohibition is Rabbinic, as in the case of a shniyah, the procedure does not go forward.

There are now two grounds for prohibition: the restriction that already applied to their marriage, and the prohibition arising from valid kinui followed by qualifying setirah. Because the waters cannot resolve the latter, it remains in force.

Marrying her during the restricted period is prohibited. “There is no transgression here” does not permit the marriage or deny that he acted wrongly.

Rather, this restriction safeguards the other man’s child. It does not inherently prohibit a marital relationship between this man and woman. For the particular requirement governing whether the waters can test her, this case is therefore treated differently from the prohibited relationships listed above.

Eligibility to drink does not settle whether the couple may remain married during the restricted period. That question is governed by the separate laws in Hilchos Gerushin.

An aylonit is a woman with a specific congenital condition involving the absence of normal female physical development and the inability to bear children. It is a distinct halachic category, rather than a general term for every woman unable to conceive.

The ruling assumes that valid kinui and qualifying setirah have occurred. Her inability to bear children does not itself cause the loss of her kesubah.

The husband’s circumstances matter. Since he has no children and no wife through whom he can have children, this marriage does not provide a means for fulfilling his obligation to have children. As explained in Hilchos Ishus 15:7, he is required to end such a marriage. The bitter-water procedure is therefore not used to permit its continuation.

Her inability to bear children is not an independent disqualification from drinking. When the husband has children or another wife capable of bearing children, the exclusion described in the first case does not apply. She may undergo the procedure when its other requirements are satisfied.

The promise of conception does not mean that only a woman capable of conceiving may drink. It describes the blessing granted to an innocent woman to whom that promise is applicable.

This describes the particular blessing stated here; it does not imply that daughters have lesser worth.

This continues the preceding halachah’s discussion of a wife who cannot bear children. Her husband’s having children, another wife capable of bearing children, or both made her eligible to drink despite her own inability to conceive.

The qualifying circumstances existed when he issued the warning. Their subsequent loss before the seclusion does not remove the eligibility already established. Provided the other requirements are met, she can still drink.

At the time of the warning, this wife was ineligible under the preceding halachah. The subsequent birth does not make her eligible through that earlier warning.

His divorced wife had become pregnant before their divorce and gave birth afterward. The case does not imply that he had relations with her after divorcing her.

For the family circumstances discussed here, eligibility is determined at the warning. A change between the warning and the seclusion does not reverse that initial status. This timing rule concerns the particular family circumstances discussed in Halachos 10–11. It does not mean that every kind of ineligibility is fixed at the warning: Halachah 5 expressly allows a warning during consecration to support drinking after marriage and consummation.

The warning and seclusion must meet the legal requirements explained earlier. The discussion concerns a woman who consequently became forbidden to her husband and did not become permitted through drinking.

These cases do not all establish the same facts. Refusing to drink is not itself an admission of adultery. An admission or testimony accepted under the special laws of sotah has a different legal significance. Nevertheless, all these cases share the consequence relevant here: she remains forbidden to her husband.

A warning issued by the court can lead to her becoming forbidden, but it cannot authorize the drinking procedure. As explained in Chapter 1, that procedure requires a warning issued by the husband himself.

Divorce from her husband does not permit her to marry the man involved. This applies whether the prohibition remains because the doubt was never resolved or because of an admission or legally accepted testimony.

Thus, even when adultery was not conclusively established, the prohibition resulting from valid warning and seclusion applies to both men.

Having children together does not allow this marriage to continue. This differs from the less conclusive circumstances discussed in the next halachah.

The term boel ordinarily refers to the man who engaged in the forbidden relations. In the present application, this rule also encompasses the man named in the warning with whom she secluded herself, even when their having relations was not established.

Without a prior warning, seclusion does not create the prohibition discussed in the preceding halachah. Here, however, the witnesses also observed circumstances suggesting improper intimacy, although they did not witness adultery itself.

The expression davar mechuar, literally “an unseemly matter,” refers here to concrete, compromising circumstances. It does not mean an unsupported suspicion or general disapproval of her behavior.

Finding her fastening her clothing after the man’s presence could suggest that something improper had occurred.

Rashi explains the canopy example as spittle directed upward by someone lying on his back beneath it. In the circumstances described, this was considered an indication of possible intimacy. These remain suspicious indications, rather than eyewitness testimony to adultery.

The nit’an is the particular man suspected of having been involved with her.

According to the Kessef Mishneh’s explanation of the Rambam, the original husband is not compelled to divorce her in this case. The ruling addresses what follows if he chooses to do so: she may not then marry the man implicated in the compromising circumstances.

Because adultery was not conclusively established, the presence of children affects whether the court ends this subsequent marriage. Requiring a divorce could cast suspicion on their children’s lineage. This consideration does not permit the marriage initially, but it matters after the marriage has taken place.

The requirement to divorce when they have no children is subject to the additional conditions in the next halachah.

This qualifies the preceding requirement that the suspected man divorce her if they married and have no children together. In addition to the witnessed compromising conduct already described, there must be a persistent public accusation meeting the conditions stated here.

The report must concern adultery between these particular people. Vague suspicions do not constitute the specific accusation described here.

A report being circulated by enemies cannot be treated as the independent public accusation required for this ruling. Its persistence may result from their efforts to damage the couple’s reputation.

Silence caused by intimidation does not show that the report genuinely subsided. The leniency applies when it ceased without people being frightened into stopping their discussion.

The compromising conduct described in Halachah 13 still prevents her from marrying him initially. The distinction concerns what happens after she has already married him: without the qualifying persistent report, the court does not require their divorce, even when they have no children together.

There was no prior warning and seclusion establishing the special sotah framework. Consequently, the exceptional acceptance of one witness to adultery discussed in Chapter 1 does not apply. In the case described here, one witness does not establish adultery sufficiently to require ending this marriage.

Two witnesses to adultery present a different case, addressed in Halachah 16.

The intervening husband is someone other than the man implicated in the original suspicion. The sequence is therefore: divorce from her first husband, marriage to another man, and divorce from that second husband.

The intervening marriage does not erase the original restriction. She may not now arrange a marriage with the man implicated in the compromising conduct.

The intervening marriage changes the consequence after the fact. Since adultery was not established by witnesses, and another marriage separated her first divorce from her marriage to the suspected man, the court does not require this later marriage to end.

This leniency concerns the suspicious-conduct case. It does not apply when adultery itself has been established by two witnesses, as the next halachah explains.

“This man” is the man to whom she is now married. The witnesses establish that their forbidden relationship occurred while her earlier marriage was still in effect.

The preceding halachos discussed compromising circumstances and public accusations without eyewitness testimony to adultery. Here, two witnesses establish the adultery itself. As explained below, this refers to willing adultery.

Willing adultery makes her forbidden both to the husband to whom she was married at the time and to the man with whom she committed it. Consequently, her subsequent marriage to that man cannot continue, and the court requires a divorce with a get.

The presence of children does not change this ruling. In the earlier suspicious-conduct cases, concern for the children’s reputation could prevent the court from dissolving a marriage because adultery had not been conclusively established. Here, that consideration cannot permit a marriage established to be forbidden. An intervening marriage to someone else likewise does not remove this prohibition.

In the cases addressed by this concluding rule, she leaves without the payment ordinarily due under her marriage contract because her conduct created the circumstances requiring separation. This financial consequence does not itself establish that adultery occurred: some of the preceding rulings concern compromising conduct or unresolved suspicion.

Cases in which the Rambam expressly requires payment retain their stated ruling. For example, when the husband himself declines to have her drink, she receives her kesubah payment, as explained in Halachah 1.